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MEMOIRS

TO ILLUSTRATE

THE HISTORY OF MY TIME.

By F. GUIZOT,

AUTHOR OF 'MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT PEEL,' 'HISTORY OF OLIVER CROMWELL,' ETC. ETC.

TRANSLATED BY J. W. COLE.

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CONTENTS

OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

EXTERNAL POLICY.

(*From Oct. 11th*, 1832, *to Feb. 20th*, 1836.)

Page

One of the Causes of the Policy of Conquests and Adventures.—Radical Vice of this Policy.—Formation of Public European Right. — Its essential Maxims. — Consequences of the Violation of these Maxims. — The Government of 1830 respected them. — European Questions during 1832. — Errors of the three Northern Powers in their Relations with the Government of 1830. — Prussia: King Frederic William III., the Prince of Wittgenstein, and M. Ancillon. — M. Bresson at Berlin. — Austria: the Emperor Francis II. and the Prince of Metternich. — M. de Sainte-Aulaire at Vienna. — Russia: the Emperor Nicholas. — Marshal Maison at St. Petersbourg; his Instructions. — Idea of a Russian Marriage for the Duke of Orléans.—Revolutionary Ferment in Germany. — Meeting of Münchengrætz. — Its Consequences. — Affairs of the East. — Egyptian Question. — Character, Situation, and Policy of Mehemet Ali. — Situation and Policy of the great European Powers between the Porte and Egypt. — Mission of M. de Bois-le-Comte to the East. — His Conversations with Mehemet Ali. — Peace of Kutaieh. — Russia at Constantinople. — Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. — Affairs of Spain. — Death of Ferdinand VII. — Question of the Spanish Succession. — Policy of the French Government and its Motives. — Its Promises and

Page

Advice to the Government of Queen Isabella. — Explosion of Civil War in Spain. — Don Carlos in Portugal with Don Miguel. — M. Zéa Bermudez, his Character and Policy. — Origin of the Question of the Intervention of France in Spain. — Fall of M. Zéa Bermudez. — M. Martinez de la Rosa, his Character and Policy. — Promulgation of the *Royal Statute*. — Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. — Don Carlos, expelled from Portugal, takes Refuge in England, and re-enters Spain. — Assembly of the Spanish Cortes. — The *Royal Statute* and the *Constitution* of 1812. — The Cabinet of Madrid demands the Intervention of France and England. — Their Refusal and its Motives. — Difference of Opinion in the French Cabinet. — Fall of M. Martinez de la Rosa. — The Count of Toreno succeeds him. — His speedy Fall. — At the moment when the Cabinet of the 11th of Oct. 1832, breaks up in Paris, M. Mendizabal and the Extreme Party enter on the Possession of Power at Madrid 1

CHAPTER II.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.

(From February 22nd, to September 6th, 1836.)

My Situation and Disposition after the breaking up of the Cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832. — My Participation in the Debates of the Chambers from the 22nd of February to the 6th of September, 1836. — My Election to the French Academy. — M. de Tracy, my Predecessor. — My Inaugural Discourse. — The Academy of Sciences and Belles-lettres of Stockholm, and the King of Sweden, Charles John. — Deaths of the Abbé Sièyes and of M. Carnot. — Death of M. Ampère; his Character. — Death of M. Armand Carrel; his Character. — Acquisition and Description of Val-Richer. — The Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas à Becket, at Val-Richer in the 12th Century. — Situation of M. Thiers in 1836. — Attempt to assassinate King Louis-Philippe by Alibaud. — Affairs of Spain; M.

Page

Mendizabal, and his Dispositions towards France. — The English Cabinet proposes Intervention in Spain. — The French Cabinet rejects the Overture. — Despatches of M. de Rayneval on this Subject. — Revolutionary Movements in Spain for the Constitution of 1812. — M. Isturitz succeeds M. Mendizabal. — General Quesada, Governor of Madrid; his Energy. — Measures adopted by the French Government towards Spain. — Mission of M. de Bois-le-Comte to Madrid. — Military Insurrection of Saint Ildefonso. — Courage and useless Resistance of Queen Christina. — Effects of this Insurrection at Madrid. — General Quesada is massacred. — Proclamation of the Constitution of 1812. — Disagreements in the French Cabinet on the Question of Intervention in Spain. — King Louis-Philippe and M. Thiers. — Retirement of the Cabinet of the 22nd of February, 1836 119

CHAPTER III.

MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE WITH M. MOLÉ.

(1836—1837.)

My Relations with Count Molé. — Formation of the Cabinet of the 6th of September, 1836. — Different Sentiments of my Political Friends. — From what Motives and on what Conditions I joined the Cabinet. — Its first Acts. — State of Affairs in Algeria. — Expedition to Constantine. — Marshal Clauzel. — The Commandant Changarnier. — General Trézel. — Ill Success of the Expedition. — Retreat of the Army. — Conspiracy of Strasbourg. — Prince Louis Bonaparte. — His Failure and Embarkation at L'Orient. — Motives of the Cabinet for not bringing him before the Tribunals. — Opening of the Session of the Chambers. — Attempt to assassinate King Louis-Philippe. — Debate on the Address. — Prosecution of the Conspirators of Strasbourg before the Court of Assizes at Colmar. — Acquittal of the Accused. — Bills presented to the Chambers. — On the Disjunction of certain Criminal Processes; on the Place

Page

of Transportation; and on the Non-revelation of Plots against the King's Life. — On the Dotation of the Duke de Nemours. — Presentiments of King Louis-Philippe on the Future of his Family. — The Bill on Disjunction rejected by the Chamber of Deputies. — The Cabinet breaks up. — Different Attempts to form a new Ministry. — The King sends for me. — My Propositions and Endeavours. — They miscarry. — I retire, with MM. Duchâtel, Gasparin, and Persil. — M. Molé forms the Cabinet of the 15th of April, 1837 166

CHAPTER IV.

THE COALITION.

(1837—1839.)

My Disposition on leaving Office.—Family Afflictions.—The Duchess of Orleans; her Arrival at Fontainebleau; her Marriage; her Entry into Paris.—Character of the Palace of Fontainebleau. — Accidents at the Champ de Mars. — Opening of the Museum of Versailles.—My Conversations with the Duchess of Orleans. — The Princess Marie; her Marriage; her Pursuits; her Death. — What is due to the Memory of the Dead. — Lady Holland and Holland House. — Great Number of eminent Men who died between 1836 and 1839. — Their Characters. — M. Raynouard and M. Flaugergues. — M. de Marbois and the Abbé de Pradt. — Baron Louis. — Marshal Lobau and General Haxo. — M. Silvestre de Sacy. — M. Laromiguière. — Dr. Broussais. — Prince Talleyrand. — His last Visit to the Institute. — His latest Acts. — Count de Montlosier. — Difficulties of M. Molé's Position. — How he surmounted or postponed them. — His internal Measures. — Favourable external Incidents. — War with Mexico. — With Buenos Ayres. — Treaty with Hayti. — Second Expedition to Constantine; its Success. — Return of Prince Louis Bonaparte to Switzerland. — Final Adoption of the Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles on

Page

the Limits of Belgium. — Evacuation of Ancona. — My Attitude in the Chamber of Deputies. — My Speeches in May, 1837, in the Debate on secret Supplies. — Displeasure of M. Molé. — Dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. — Character of that Measure and of the Elections. — Session of 1837–1838. — Successes and Failures of the Cabinet. — Its Position after the Session. — Session of 1838–1839. — The Coalition. — Its general Causes. — My personal Motives. — Was it a Mistake? — Debate and Vote on the Address. — Good Attitude of M. Molé. — Dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. — Result of the Elections. — Retirement of the Molé Cabinet. — Vain Attempts to form a Coalition Ministry. — Provisional Cabinet. — Riot of the 12th of May, 1839. — Formation of the Cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839 . . . 227

CHAPTER V.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

(*From* 12*th May*, 1839, *to* 25*th Feb.* 1840.)

Situation of the Cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, on its Accession. — My own Position. — How I employed my political Leisure. — I am requested to superintend the Translation and Publication in France of the Letters and Writings of Washington. — I undertake the Charge. — Great Interest with which this Work inspires me. — My "Historical Study" on the Life and Character of Washington. — Its Success. — Testimonials of Gratitude received from the Americans. — Letter from King Louis-Philippe. — Revival of the Eastern Question. — Why that Name was given to the Quarrel between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt. — General State of the Ottoman Empire. — Dispositions and Policy of the great European Powers. — War breaks out between Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali. — Good understanding between France and England. — Death of the Sultan Mahmoud. — Battle of Nezib. — Disagreement commences between France and England on

Page

the Territorial Question between the Sultan and the Pacha. — Vicissitudes of the Negotiations at London. — Attitude of Russia. — She places herself at the Disposal of England. — France persists in her Opposition, and the English Cabinet in its Resolutions. — General Sebastiani. — M. de Brunnow in London. — Lord Palmerston. — The French Cabinet offers me the Embassy to London. — I accept it. — My Reasons. — King Louis-Philippe evinces Opposition. — His Motives. — The Cabinet insists. — The King yields. — My Appointment. — The Chamber of Deputies refuses the Dotation proposed for the Duke of Nemours. — Uncertain Position of the Cabinet. — I leave Paris for London 311

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS 373

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CHAPTER I.

EXTERNAL POLICY.

ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE POLICY OF CONQUESTS AND ADVENTURES. — RADICAL VICE OF THIS POLICY. — FORMATION OF PUBLIC EUROPEAN RIGHT. — ITS ESSENTIAL MAXIMS. — CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIOLATION OF THESE MAXIMS. — THE GOVERNMENT OF 1830 RESPECTED THEM. — EUROPEAN QUESTIONS DURING 1832. — ERRORS OF THE THREE NORTHERN POWERS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF 1830. — PRUSSIA: KING FREDERIC WILLIAM III., THE PRINCE OF WITTGENSTEIN, AND M. ANCILLON. — M. BRESSON AT BERLIN. — AUSTRIA: THE EMPEROR FRANCIS II. AND THE PRINCE OF METTERNICH. — M. DE SAINTE-AULAIRE AT VIENNA. — RUSSIA: THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS. — MARSHAL MAISON AT ST. PETERSBURG; HIS INSTRUCTIONS. — IDEA OF A RUSSIAN MARRIAGE FOR THE DUKE OF ORLÉANS. — REVOLUTIONARY FERMENT IN GERMANY. — MEETING OF MÜNCHENGRÆTZ. — ITS CONSEQUENCES. — AFFAIRS OF THE EAST. — EGYPTIAN QUESTION. — CHARACTER, SITUATION, AND POLICY OF MEHEMET ALI. — SITUATION AND POLICY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN POWERS BETWEEN THE PORTE AND EGYPT. — MISSION OF M. DE BOISLE-COMTE TO THE EAST. — HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MEHEMET ALI. — PEACE OF KUTAIEH. — RUSSIA AT CONSTANTINOPLE. — TREATY OF UNKIAR-SKELESSI. — AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. — DEATH OF FERDINAND VII. — QUESTION OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. — POLICY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND ITS MOTIVES. — ITS PROMISES AND ADVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF QUEEN ISABELLA. — EXPLOSION OF CIVIL WAR IN

SPAIN. — DON CARLOS IN PORTUGAL WITH DON MIGUEL. — M. ZÉA BERMUDEZ, HIS CHARACTER AND POLICY. — ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION OF THE INTERVENTION OF FRANCE IN SPAIN. — FALL OF M. ZÉA BERMUDEZ. — M. MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA, HIS CHARACTER AND POLICY. — PROMULGATION OF THE *ROYAL STATUTE*. — TREATY OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE. — DON CARLOS, EXPELLED FROM PORTUGAL, TAKES REFUGE IN ENGLAND, AND RE-ENTERS SPAIN. — ASSEMBLY OF THE SPANISH CORTES. — THE *ROYAL STATUTE* AND THE *CONSTITUTION* OF 1812. — THE CABINET OF MADRID DEMANDS THE INTERVENTION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND. — THEIR REFUSAL AND ITS MOTIVES. — DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN THE FRENCH CABINET. — FALL OF M. MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA. — THE COUNT OF TORENO SUCCEEDS HIM. — HIS SPEEDY FALL. — AT THE MOMENT WHEN THE CABINET OF THE 11TH OF OCT. 1832, BREAKS UP IN PARIS, M. MENDIZABAL AND THE EXTREME PARTY ENTER ON THE POSSESSION OF POWER AT MADRID.

(*From Oct. 11th, 1832, to Feb. 20th, 1836.*)

I HAVE retraced the internal policy and acts of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, from its formation to its dissolution: I shall now speak of what it did externally, of the line of conduct it held, of the part it played, and caused France to play, in the European world.

For nations as well as for kings, for statesmen and warriors, foreign policy is the field in which imagination, ambition, and pride display themselves in their unfettered range. In domestic legislation, present and ostensible interests, recognized rights, and legal powers, imperiously restrain pretensions and hopes within fixed limits. In external dealings with foreign states, and in front of prospective views of power and glory, both national and personal, a great temptation presents itself to yield to passion, to appeal to force, and to

rely on success. But what if we have lived in an epoch of prodigious wars and enterprises, — if we have seen states, great or small, adjoining or remote, incessantly overrun, conquered, dismembered, partitioned, alternately changing extent, form, name, and master? Such exhibitions, even when at the close of the drama astounding reverses have decried them, leave a vast number of minds in prey to the fever of war or ambition, solacing themselves with military or political complications, with schemes of alliance and plans of campaigns. Gigantic exploits excite chimerical projects; reminiscences engender dreams.

From its birth, and through the entire course of its life, the government of 1830 had to contend against this posthumous passion for adventure and conquest. The decline was great. In place of the National Convention and the Emperor Napoleon, were substituted a sophistical advocate and a declamatory soldier, who proclaimed themselves the patrons of ambitious and warlike policy. But, notwithstanding their emphatic mediocrity, M. Mauguin and General Lamarque interpreted sentiments very generally expanded through the country, and on that account they exercised actual power. They spoke in the name of revolutionary and military traditions; they united and confounded, in an incoherent but brilliant amalgam, the promises of liberty and the illusions of force, the Revolution and the Empire. France had no desire to renew either of those terrible systems; she felt in the inmost recesses of her soul, that, to enjoy their benefits and escape their disasters, it was

necessary to repudiate openly their errors and their crimes. But still dazzled and disturbed, she took pleasure in hearing them confusedly celebrated and under imposing names. In this, it was said, the liberal and national spirit were combined; greatness for France, and progress for Europe.

I recognize no idea more radically false and pernicious, more belied by experience, more opposed to the true tendencies of our age, as well as to the aggrandizement of France and the general advance of Europe.

Europe is a society of peoples and states, at once similar and opposite, separated but not estranged; not alone neighbours, but relatives; reciprocally united by moral and material ties, which cannot be broken up; by the intermingling of races, by community of religion, by analogy of ideas and manners; by numerous and continued relations, whether industrial, commercial, political, or literary; by advances of civilization, varied and unequal it is true, but all tending to the same ends. The multiplied European communities know, comprehend, visit, and imitate each other, with mutual and incessant modification. Through all the differences and contests of the modern world a deep and dominant unity reigns in its moral life as in its destinies. Let us call it Christianity. In this is comprised our original character and our glory.

This great fact has, as a natural consequence, produced the formation of a public, European, and Christian law, or, as we may say, the establishment

of certain principles understood and accepted as the rule in all intercourse between states. This law, for a long time, and even at the present day, extremely imperfect, often disowned and violated, is not the less real, and becomes more and more clear and imperative in proportion as general civilization develops itself, and the mutual relations of peoples are more frequent and intimate.

The essential and undisputed maxims of public European law are few in number. Amongst the principal we may include the following.

1. Peace is the normal condition of nations and governments. War is an exceptional fact, which ought to have a legitimate cause.

2. The different states are entirely independent of each other with regard to their internal affairs; each constitutes and regulates itself according to the most suitable principles and forms.

3. As long as states are at peace, their respective governments are bound to do nothing that may tend to disturb mutually their internal order.

4. No state has a right to interfere in the internal position and government of another state, unless its own individual security renders such intervention indispensable.

These salutary maxims have been exposed, in our days, to the roughest trials. Sometimes they have been outrageously trampled upon, to give free course to the passions they are expressly framed to control; again, at other times, they have been scandalously abused to promote designs they distinctly condemn.

We have taken part in immense wars, entered into without legitimate motive, from egotistical and inordinate ambition, or to realize arbitrary and frivolous combinations under an assumption of greatness. We have seen an encroaching propagandism carry to extremes its violence and tyranny under the name of liberty. Great governments have oppressed the independence of small states, to maintain amongst them, as with themselves, the principles and forms of absolute power. Others have laughed at the privileges and existence of established authorities, under the pretext of restoring the rights of nations. Revolutionary conspirators have demanded the principle of non-intervention to cover their plots against the security of states in general. Indignant at so many opposite excesses, some honest and superficial minds have wished to suppress external policy altogether, and to place the independence of nations and the safety of states under the guarantee of perpetual peace and diplomatic inaction. We do not struggle against violence and hypocrisy with chimeras; neither shall we attempt to annul the external activity of governments at the very moment when the foreign relations of different countries are extending and multiplying themselves. What we require is, that this activity should be exercised in conformity with justice and sound sense. Herein is comprised the object of public European law such as it has existed for ages. This law has not perished under its checks. Despite the heavy and numerous blows it has received, these very attacks, and their injurious conse-

quences have rendered its maxims, and continue daily to render them, more defined and urgent. From their empire alone we may hope, as far as the imperfection of all human affairs permits, for the habitual maintenance of peace, and for the mutual independence and security of states.

This is not a mere philosophical conviction. For more than three centuries, the facts, the greatest facts of history speak loudly to the point. Every state which long and shamelessly violated the essential maxims of public European law, ended by finding itself, government and people, in a deteriorated condition. In the sixteenth century, Charles V. paraded his ambition and power throughout all Europe, without respect for peace, for the independence of states, or for the traditional rights of princes and nations. He attempted, if not actual monarchy, at least supremacy over Europe. He became wearied and disgusted with the labour, and bequeathed to Spain the reign of Philip II., who, following up in his turn, without genius as without heart, the same pretensions, left, when dying, his kingdom stripped externally of its noblest provinces, and within enervated and stricken with barrenness. In the seventeenth century, Louis XIV., abandoning the organized restraint of Henri IV., resumed with increased ostentation the European dream of Charles V., and arrogantly violated, as well towards nations as sovereigns, the principles of public justice and Christianity. After the most brilliant successes he found himself unable to sustain the burden they imposed on him; with great difficulty he

obtained from Europe a peace as humiliating as it was indispensable, and died, leaving France exhausted and almost compelled for more than half a century to confine herself to a foreign policy of the most limited pretensions and most inert character. We have ourselves seen, on even a more extended scale, the same extravagances of human ambition end in similar ruin.

To what an extent in Europe did the power of the French Revolution manifest itself!—at one time anarchically let loose by its popular assemblies, at another despotically mastered by the Emperor Napoleon. Under both forms it achieved the most astounding victories; but while triumphing, it trampled on the principles, the traditions and establishments of public European law, and after twenty-five years of blindly imperious domination, it was compelled to purchase, at an extravagant price, peace from that very Europe the theatre and material of its conquests. In the course of three centuries, the most illustrious in the annals of history, the three greatest empires the world has ever seen fell into a rapid decline, because they insolently contemned and violated the common law of Europe and of Christianity. Three times that law, after enduring the most violent shocks, raised itself again above the power and ascendency of genius and glory.

It was the fundamental characteristic of the government of 1830 to have adopted the public law of Europe as the rule of its external policy, not alone in words and in official diplomacy, but in fact and in

actual conduct. We did not hypocritically maintain and practise any special maxim of that law, which might appear convenient to the new power we were called upon to establish; we loyally accepted and respected its maxims in the aggregate, the most difficult to reconcile, as well as the simplest; those which consecrated the order established between different states, as also those which protected the independence and free internal development of each state in particular. After 1830 we found ourselves at issue with all the questions which had long excited, and still continue to excite, so much clamour in Europe; with questions of nationality, of intervention, of insurrection, of territorial acquisition, and of natural frontiers. In Germany, in Poland, in Italy, in Switzerland, in Spain, in Belgium, these questions were at that time in play, either separately or in conjunction. We solved them all according to the principles of public European law: occasionally we treated these rights with diffidence, at other times we acted on them without hesitation; here we interfered, there we abstained, and in some cases we declared that we should interpose if others did. Everywhere we placed at the service of human and liberal policy the moral influence we were able to exercise. In no instance did we disavow or exceed the limits of international rights.

I have already named the motives, political and moral, public and personal, by which King Louis-Philippe and his advisers, from their first advent to power, were induced to desire and promote the main-

tenance of peace in Europe. It was not alone for the direct benefit of peace itself, however powerful that consideration may be, and ought to be held. External inaction is not always the compelled condition of states. Great national interests may recommend and authorize war. It is an honest error, but still an error to believe, that to be just, every war must of necessity be exclusively defensive. There have been, and there will be again, natural conflicts and legitimate changes of territory between different countries. Instincts of aggrandizement and glory are not, in all cases, interdicted to nations and their rulers. When Charles X., in 1830, declared hostilities against the Dey of Algiers, that could not be called on our part a defensive war; yet was it, nevertheless, legitimate. In addition to the insult we had to revenge, we also satisfied a great and lawful interest, not only French, but European, by delivering the Mediterranean from the pirates who had infested it for ages. The conquest of the Regency was also equally lawful with the war, for it was the only method of really and permanently accomplishing that deliverance. But the rights of ambition, if such a phrase may be permitted, vary according to the times. The spirit of war and conquest did not formerly lead to the consequences which accompany it at present. Throughout all Europe it met with obstacles, counterpoises, and limitations; its breeze excited no universal hurricane. The most ambitious enterprises of Charles V. and of Louis XIV. neither imperilled every state in Europe, nor shook the foundations of human society. They

were able to pause, and did pause in fact, or rather were compelled to pause in their successes and objects. Europe at present is one vast body more essentially single and susceptible. All vital questions spring up and ferment throughout. Every evil is contagious, every disturbance becomes general. When a great enterprise commences, no one can calculate its range, or promise that it will stop on the brink towards which it verges. The problem is invariably found to be more vast and complicated than was foreseen; a blow struck in a corner shakes the entire edifice; movement is ever on the point of becoming chaos.

But at least chaos preceded creation, and ruins were transformed into new edifices! This avails nothing. What remains of all the territorial overthrows, of all the diplomatic combinations, of all the states called into being by the external policy of the national Convention and the Empire? Everything has fallen and disappeared, republics and kingdoms, foundations and conquests. So much imagination, boldness, and power, displayed in utter contempt of public justice, produced only the ruin of the great performers in these ephemeral achievements, and brought on the reaction of the Congress of Vienna, and of the Holy Alliance.

Much is said at present of the new state of social institutions, of the new spirit by which they are influenced, of the necessity of comprehending and satisfying their requirements, aspirations, and tendencies; while in all that applies to the relations of states with

each other, these precepts of quick-sighted innovation are absolutely disavowed. We still crawl on in the same beaten track so long trodden by the foreign policy of Europe. Unbridled ambition and force have found their favourable epochs not only for transitory successes, but for solid triumphs. In the midst of coarse and violent manners, when the great majority of states were still unsettled and in the throes of formation,—amongst peoples who neither united closely their daily interests, nor held regular and permanent intercourse, in the absence of that universal and rapid communication which in our day has transformed all nations into one enormous public, ever present and attentive at the spectacle of passing events,—war, even divested of lawful or specious motives, however unrestrained in its pretensions and enterprises, quickly disposed of sovereignties and territories, and terminated in durable results. Assuredly neither Alexander nor Charlemagne was endowed with greater genius nor wielded greater power than Napoleon; and their empires also fell with them, but not as his subsided. The dominions of Alexander were broken up into kingdoms for his generals; those of Charlemagne were divided amongst his descendants. At both periods the gigantic edifice gave way, but other buildings immediately arose from its ruins and flourished in permanence. Of the states subdued and the thrones erected by Napoleon, none survived him for the advantage of any; and, by a strange phenomenon, the only one of his generals who retained royalty held it not at his hands. The fact

was, that Napoleon in his foreign policy disregarded the true tendencies of humanity. The time has passed away for great territorial overthrows, accomplished solely by strokes of war, and regulated by the exclusive will of the conquerors. Scarcely are their strong hands withdrawn when their works are questioned, and attacked by the two powers which constitute the good and evil genius of our age, — the spirit of civilization, and the spirit of revolution. The first invokes the empire of justice in the bosom of peace; the second appeals incessantly to force, and endeavours to establish at all hazards, by anarchy alternated with tyranny, what it designates the reign of pure democracy. It is between these two powerful excitements that the present contest which embroils Europe, and will decide her future, is exclusively engaged. In this state of European society, respect for international law becomes with every well-regulated government not only an imperative duty, but a necessary precaution. In our days, the ambition which disturbs the world in contempt of this law, and for the gratification of its own desires, is equally senseless and criminal.

When the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, assumed office, the greater number of the international questions which had agitated Europe were, if not silenced, at least lulled. Poland had submitted; Italy seemed to slumber again; Spain remained motionless under her sick King; Switzerland deliberated patiently on the form of her federal constitution. The Belgic question alone remained in

doubt, and excited some uneasiness as to the peace of Europe. I have previously mentioned, and all the world remembers, the diplomatic arrangement between France and England, which led to the siege and capture of Antwerp. It is unnecessary to repeat the details. I do not write the general history of that time; I merely undertake to characterize its policy and the part I took in it. It was most especially in the Belgic question that our sincere and steady adherence to the principles of public European law completely manifested itself. We had in that matter to defend ourselves from all the temptations which could assail a government on the day after a revolution,— temptations at once revolutionary, dynastic, and bearing on territorial aggrandizement. We resisted them all. And at the same time we vindicated and caused Europe to admit the interests of security and dignity which appertain to France on that frontier. We seconded the impulse of the Belgian population in favour of the national independence and political liberty they have enjoyed for thirty years,—a considerable segment even in the life of a nation.

In this affair, as in all their relations with the government of King Louis-Philippe, the three leading powers of the North, and the secondary states who attend them as satellites, proved themselves deficient, not in wisdom, but in that consistent firmness which gives to wisdom all its fruits. Austria, Prussia, and Russia offered no opposition to the separation of Belgium and Holland. They sat in conference with

France and England to enrol the accomplished fact in the European system, and to settle the relations of the two new states; they accepted, or allowed to pass without effective resistance, and finally sanctioned, all the details so laboriously debated which the question successively involved. But while acknowledging the necessity, they yielded to it with that hesitation and discontent which divest moderation of its merit, and destroy the confidence it ought to inspire. It was perfectly natural that, in the negotiations on the Belgian question, they should support the interests of the King of Holland; that they should advocate and watch over a general respect for treaties, while at the same time they consented to modify them in concert; and that the intimate understanding of France and England should excite their warm displeasure. But in the midst of these natural consequences of their position, their policy towards the newly-established government of France might and ought to have been uniform, and exempt from contradictions and mental reservations. It was nothing of the kind. Absolute governments, when they have not a great man at their head, are more controlled by their prejudices and more uncertain in their acts than free legislations. Despite their ostentatious irresponsibility, the burden of power oppresses them, and to lighten it they voluntarily take refuge in inconsistency and inertness.

While accepting what had passed in France and around her since 1830, the policy of the continental powers was narrow and short-sighted, without bold-

ness or grandeur. The origin of the new French monarchy, the confusion and struggle of its principles, the disorders which had beset its cradle and still pursued it, the evil traditions and objectionable language of a portion of its adherents,—all these circumstances darkened and perplexed the eyes of the old governments of the continent. They did not foresee, and even after years of experience they were incapable of appreciating at its true value, what formed the practical merit, and will constitute the historical honour, of the government of King Louis-Philippe. The issue of a revolution, that government at once and distinctly renounced the revolutionary spirit, both in its internal and foreign relations; it refused to take into its service the policy of disorder in conjunction with that of order, alternately exercising both, according to the desires of its ambition or the embarrassments of its position; it perseveringly regulated its acts in a conservative spirit, in accordance with the public law of Europe. The continental powers did not meet this difficult constancy with a just return. On their part, their attitude towards the monarchy differed from their conduct, and their unrestrained expressions from their official language. Ill-will alternately penetrated and displayed itself behind friendly overtures and pacific declarations. On the 22nd of March, 1834, M. de Barante wrote to me from Turin as follows: "They resign themselves to us with a reserved hope, more or less indulged, that we shall fall into misfortune;" and again on the 28th of November following: "They submitted to us at first

with astonishment and fear; afterwards they looked on our struggle against disorder with a malevolent hope; and more recently with an idea that, if we were successful, our victory would turn to the advantage of absolute power. At present they are disposed to acknowledge us as liberals rather than jacobins, calm but strong. Even now they are not quite decided on the question."

Although the understanding between Austria, Prussia, and Russia was general and permanent, the characters and personal sentiments of the heads of these states, sovereigns and ministers, differed materially, and carried into their relations with the government of King Louis-Philippe important distinctions.

Of the three persons who at that time directed the affairs of Prussia,—the king, Frederic William III., the Prince of Wittgenstein, his most confidential adviser, and M. Ancillon, his minister for Foreign Affairs,—not one was endowed with eminent ability, or calculated, by natural superiority of mind, to impress on Europe his ideas and desires; but all had dispositions and qualities which worked well together, and fitted them to exercise a salutary influence on European politics. The King, while inclining to the principles of absolute monarchy and the traditions of the Holy Alliance, evinced no systematic or inveterate antipathy to other maxims and forms of government. If he had not realised the political hopes, which in the national movement from 1813 to 1815 he had allowed his subjects to entertain, it arose less

from a jealous passion for power than from an anxious sentiment of the inherent difficulties attached to free constitutions, of the confusion they might introduce into the state, or of the embarrassment they might occasion to himself. He had at least, in concert with his chancellor, the Prince of Hardenberg, carried out extensive and liberal reforms in the civil administration of Prussia. He was a sensible, well-meaning monarch, the trials of whose life had enlightened and strengthened, while at the same time they had fatigued him. Equally desirous of repose, within and without, simple, economical, and reserved, he imposed respect on his people and confidence on his allies without requiring much from them in return. He had learned to understand the exigencies of difficult positions, to appreciate the full responsibility of government, and he felt thankful to the sovereigns, his neighbours, who assisted him to bear the burden in his own states by sustaining it in their own, regularly, peaceably, and for the advantage of European order. The revolution of July had caused him to feel more angry with Charles X. than irritated against his necessary substitute. The moderation of King Louis-Philippe pleased him. His ability inspired him with confidence, and he sincerely desired the consolidation of his throne, notwithstanding the objectionable example of the revolution which had placed him there. The Prince of Wittgenstein, a courtier and a man of the world, formed in the school of the eighteenth century, and of Frederic II., of an acute, enlightened, and unfettered spirit, neither a liberal in

avowed opinions nor a professed politician, the devoted friend without being the ambitious rival of the King, his master, a true-hearted German as well as a patriotic Prussian, and a constant correspondent of Prince Metternich, but strongly inclined to French manners; — this nobleman confirmed and seconded the King in his impartial policy, tranquil and well-disposed towards France, and at the same time faithful to the alliance of the three courts. No influence can be more effectual at any given moment than that of a man who habitually affects none, and offers nothing beyond the advice and services required of him. Such was the influence of Prince Wittgenstein at the court of Berlin, exercised not only as regarded the King but over the whole royal family, in all of whom he contributed skilfully to maintain respect and obedience for their head.

Of much less importance, although more directly in the conduct of affairs, was M. Ancillon, the publicist, historian, moralist, and philosopher; a man of little originality or power in these different careers, but ever judicious, clear-sighted, and conciliatory, arranging and defending the King's policy with dignity and perseverance. With a government thus organized, the French minister at Berlin, M. Bresson, ardently devoted to the policy of his own country and sovereign, thirsting for success, vigilant with ardour, and dexterous with authority, sometimes even with enthusiasm, had acquired a commanding position and effectual credit. The King, Frederic William III., listened to him with confidence and treated him with

favour. He established a close intimacy with Prince Wittgenstein, visited him almost every day without any political urgency, for the sole enjoyment of social intercourse; and thus found himself ever in a condition to turn personal regard to the advantage of public affairs whenever the latter presented themselves.

At Vienna, the position of the government of 1830 and its representative was more difficult. The principles and passions of absolutism predominated at that court, and seemed to encounter no opposition from the Austrian public. The Revolution of 1830 was looked upon with an evil eye, and the society of Vienna felt towards the agents of the government which that movement had established, the worldly coldness which, despite its frivolity, embarrasses and seriously envenoms the relations of states. The Emperor Francis II., moderate by character and experience, and thoroughly sincere in his desire for peace, had at the same time a profound antipathy against all free governments issuing from revolutionary action; and he conceived that he did quite enough in their favour by abstaining in his policy from all hostile practices. Under this monarch, more influential himself in his affairs than has generally been believed, and in the midst of an independent and haughty aristocracy, although without constitutional or traditional liberty, Prince Metternich had directed for more than twenty years the foreign policy of Austria. He possessed a lofty mind, and appeared to place his credit and enjoyment on all occasions in a somewhat ostenta-

tious display of liberalism and impartiality; but while perfectly comprehending and admitting, when compelled by necessity to do so, the new aspect of states, he desired only to maintain intact the European edifice, such as it had been constructed by the Congress of Vienna, the apogee of his influence and glory. No man ever encouraged within himself so much intellectual movement; while devoted to the defence of political immobility; when he spoke, and even more when he wrote, in the midst of a lengthened prolix style, loaded with periphrases and ambitiously philosophical, it was easy to detect a rich, varied, and profound intelligence, eager to seize upon and discuss general ideas, and abstract theories; and at the same time singularly practical and sagacious, skilful in unravelling what the state of facts or the dispositions of men commanded and allowed, yet ever confining itself strictly within the narrow limits of the possible, while assuming the air of disporting in the boundless regions of thought. When at leisure, and in the freedom of conversation, M. de Metternich evinced an inquiring interest in all questions of literature, philosophy, science, and art. He possessed and took pleasure in displaying on these topics taste, imagination, and systematic theories; but no sooner did he enter on politics, than he subsided at once into the least experimental of all practitioners, the most devoted to established facts, and the most opposed to all morally ambitious innovations. From his quickness of general comprehension, combined with prudence when action was called for and the con-

tinued success resulting from this double endowment, Prince Metternich had derived a confidence singularly, and I may even say, ingenuously presumptuous in his own views and judgment. In 1848, during our mutual retirement in London, "a conviction of error," said he to me one day, with a half smile which seemed to justify his words beforehand, "has never approached my mind." "I have been more fortunate than you, Prince," I replied; "on several occasions I have satisfied myself that I was mistaken." His manner told me that he approved my modesty without wavering, at the bottom of his heart, in his own presumption. The quality most wanting in his political talent was courage. I mean the courage of impulse and enterprise. He had no genius for contest, the dangers of which he feared more than he coveted the successes to which it might lead. Herein lay his chief embarrassment in his relations with the government of King Louis-Philippe. He rendered it full justice, acknowledged its importance in preserving European order, and although extending little favour to some of its principles, and doubtful of its future, he abstained from all that might injure it, and would willingly have contributed to its support; but to do so effectually, he must have displeased certain members of the Imperial family, the society of Vienna, and the Emperor Nicholas, whose hostility towards King Louis-Philippe, though far from bold, was declared and haughty. M. de Metternich was indisposed to enter into any of these conflicts, or to encounter these hazards. Hence

arose, in his policy towards the French government, those hesitations, obscurities, and reserves, which frequently rendered his impartiality fruitless, and his wisdom of less avail than it ought to have proved if he had ventured more to establish its influence.

M. de Sainte Aulaire, whom the Duke de Broglie despatched as ambassador to Vienna a few months after the formation of the cabinet, was eminently adapted to that mission. Nobly liberal, dignified and conciliating, polished and brave, zealous in his duty but not officiously meddling, and a man of the world without unbecoming worldly complaisance, he commanded an elevated reception in the circles of Vienna, and established himself with Prince Metternich on the footing of easy frankness, as a man who had nothing to conceal and required only his due. It would have been useless to have instructed M. de Sainte Aulaire to persuade Prince Metternich to any important resolution or difficult effort to which he was not spontaneously inclined; no one exercised such influence over the Chancellor of Austria; but M. de Sainte Aulaire maintained friendly and confiding relations with him which sufficed for the regular course of affairs, and prevented any complication or misunderstanding betwen the two governments.

But it was above all the Emperor Nicholas who weighed like a night-mare on Prince Metternich, and often prevented him from regulating his conduct by his own judgment. Determined to maintain, under any circumstances, the union of the three Northern

Powers, M. de Metternich, with this idea, consented in the West as in the East to more sacrifices than were necessary, and the Emperor Nicholas took advantage, for the promotion of his own personal views and passions, of the anxious prudence of the Austrian Chancellor. Perhaps no sovereign has ever exercised in his own states and in Europe such extensive influence while doing so little to acquire it and turning it to such an unimportant account. The Emperor Nicholas was neither a great soldier, an enlightened politician, an expanded spirit, nor even a lofty ambitionist. He neither increased his territories nor advanced his people materially in prosperity, in civilisation, in knowledge, in power, and in European credit. Nevertheless, he reigned internally with vigour, and externally with renown. He had within himself the instincts and before the world all the actual prestiges of power; an imposing person, distance, the immensity of his empire, the number of his subjects, their devoted discipline, and their silent submission. On two or three serious occasions when his physical qualities had been called into play, he showed presence of mind, courage, and the exercise of an effective ascendency. Subsequently, he avoided rather than courted trials, and feared to compromise more than he desired to exhibit himself. He was a hard and haughty, but a prudent despot, and a great royal actor, with more taste for theatrical effects than for the events and emotions of the drama. Fortune had miraculously assisted him. On ascending the throne he found Russia great and Europe restored to order, but

still fatigued. He profited by the brilliant successes of the Emperor Alexander his brother for the glory and security of his empire, and neither his people nor his allies required much from him. Within, his labours of reform were confined to sincere efforts for the introduction of more probity in general administration; without, a haughty non-interference sufficed to maintain his influence. In the West, events gave him no opportunity for action; in the East, his first blows against Turkey had succeeded without engaging him too deeply. In the midst of this prosperous and easy position, the revolution of July shocked his pride as a monarch, interfered with his schemes for the future, and disturbed him as to his own repose. He vowed against it an intense hatred, but without daring to proclaim it openly, or to acknowledge himself the adversary of the event that he detested. And to gratify his passion without compromising his policy, he affected to separate King Louis-Philippe from France, cajoling the French nation after as before 1830, while nourishing enmity against its new head. The attitude was unworthy of such a powerful prince, and strangely inconsistent in a despot; for it is the usual care as well as the necessity of absolute power to confound closely the sovereign and the people, and to look upon the monarch as the representative, and in some measure as the incarnation of the millions who live under his rule. Of a superficial mind, notwithstanding his pompous severity, the Emperor Nicholas forgot this vital maxim of his own system of government, and

was unconscious how puerile it was to persist in looking upon Louis-Philippe as unlike other kings, while at the same time bowing before the revolution which had placed him on the throne.

His obstinacy, besides, was not always as intractable as it wished to appear, and when likely to produce any serious inconvenience, he knew how to relax it. After 1830, it was his habit, when he received the French ambassador, to treat him with personal deference, and to discourse with him on the affairs of the two countries without naming the King. In January 1833, the Duke de Broglie, when appointing Marshal Maison to the embassy at St. Petersburg, instructed him not to acknowledge such an attitude; and after adding to his official orders [1], already clearly defined, certain verbal instructions even more precise, he requested an interview with M. Pozzo di Borgo, and stated that he considered it his duty to apprise him that if, while overwhelming the new envoy with undivided attention, the Emperor abstained from mentioning the King, the Marshal was commissioned to quit St. Petersburg within eight days, at the same time assigning a pretext, and that the most transparent would be considered the best. The Marshal was also desired to confirm this confidential communication made to Count Pozzo, who failed not to write on the subject to his Court. The Emperor Nicholas had no desire to embroil himself with France for the pleasure of persisting in a gross breach of politeness. At the

[1] See Historic Documents, No. I.

first diplomatic reception, he hastened to meet the ambassador; took him by the hand, inquired cordially after the King's health, and on this point, at least, conventional proprieties were restored between the two courts.

About three years later, and in a private matter, the personal feeling of the Emperor Nicholas towards King Louis-Philippe and his family, manifested themselves with a mixture of calculated reserve, conceited susceptibility, indirect insinuations and violence, which passed from the character of the man into the policy of the sovereign. Towards the end of the summer of 1835, M. de Barante left the Sardinian embassy to succeed to that of Russia. At that epoch, there was no particular negotiation pending between the two governments, no special question to arrange. The attitude and language of the new ambassador, comprised the principal and almost the sole object of his instructions. The future marriage of the Duke of Orleans was then beginning to be discussed. Before leaving Paris for his post, M. de Barante requested the Duke de Broglie to inform him as to what he was to do or say, in case, by any accident, the possibility of a union between the Duke of Orleans and one of the Grand Duchesses, daughters of the Emperor Nicholas, should be named to him. "I know," he said, "that the Emperor is at this moment extremely ill-disposed towards the King; but Russian policy is subject to sudden revulsions, and the Emperor's character partakes of the peculiarity. How am I to act under this possible con-

tingency?" "The King," replied the Duke de Broglie, "looks upon the marriage of his children as entirely a family interest, unconnected with politics. Ask him his intentions." The King told M. de Barante explicitly, that he by no means desired a Russian alliance for his son. In alluding to the little taste he had for such a connection, some encouraging expressions had lately reached him, holding out the prospect of a marriage between the Duke of Orleans and an Archduchess of Austria. M. de Barante received the King's answer as definitive, and thenceforward regulated his conduct on that point accordingly.

A few days after this conversation, and on the eve of his departure for St. Petersburg, he received instructions from the Duke de Broglie, to pause at Berlin, and to ascertain, in conjunction with M. Bresson, whether, in the event of the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours paying a visit to that capital, they would meet from the King of Prussia and his family a cordial reception. This was not a matter on which to found an official question. It was a subject for guarded conversation, and not for a written overture. M. Bresson was desired to ask a temporary leave of absence, and to communicate the result in Paris. An assurance speedily arrived, that the Princes would be eagerly welcomed in Berlin, and that the King was prepared to receive them with paternal regard. And as the confidential understanding between Prussia and Austria was such, that in similar matters the two courts invariably

acted in concert, the French government looked upon it as certain that the Princes would, with the exception of royal cordiality, be hailed with the same unanimity in Vienna as in Berlin. When, some months later, the projected journeys were carried out with complete success, much conversation arose on the subject in St. Petersburg. It was asked if the Princes would also visit Russia, and some astonishment was expressed that they had not done so. "They would have been heartily welcomed," said the Emperor Nicholas; and this observation was carried to M. de Barante, towards whom the Emperor had never exhibited the slightest shade of ill humour. He even spoke with him in most favourable terms of the position of France and of the King's government, very contrary to his usual practice, although on this subject he invariably abstained from any expression of critical censure. A sentiment very opposite to dissatisfaction soon exhibited itself indirectly. A person of high consideration at the court of St. Petersburg, one of the ladies of honour and an intimate friend of the Empress, the Baroness Frederyks, spoke one day with Madame de Barante, with whom she was on confidential and familiar terms, of the possibility of a marriage between the Duke of Orleans and the Grand Duchess Maria. M. de Barante attached little importance to the words of Madame Frederyks; he rather avoided than sought any conversation with her on the subject. He knew the views of King Louis-Philippe, and feeling convinced at the same time that the Emperor Nicholas

had no sincere desire for such an alliance, he cared little to ascertain if these words were merely a woman's fancy, or whether Madame Frederyks had been charged to feel the ground at all hazards.

Nevertheless, it occurred to him that the Grand Duchess Maria often spoke of the Duke of Orleans; that she inquired as to his character, his disposition, and personal endowments; and had expressed a wish to see his portrait: At a ball where M. de Barante found himself seated at supper at a small table near the Empress, the Grand Duchess being also present, the conversation turned upon the Duke of Orleans, and many questions were put to him with flattering curiosity. Shortly after, M. de Barante himself gave a ball, at which the Emperor and Empress did him the honour of attending. He also asked permission to invite the Grand Duchess Maria, and the invitation had been accepted; but she did not come, and the Emperor took the trouble of apologising for her absence, by assuring the ambassador, even with some detail, that it arose from indisposition. A few days later, at another court assembly, the Grand Duchess mentioned to M. de Barante the disappointment she had felt at not being at the Embassy; "I wept for it," she said, "and I walked in the morning before your windows."

These doubtful and inconsistent demonstrations induced M. de Barante to think that the Emperor Nicholas had no idea of bestowing his daughter on the Duke of Orleans, and he therefore maintained the reserve which King Louis-Philippe had prescribed to

him. After a certain time, the marriage of the Duke with the Princess Helena of Mecklenburgh began to be spoken of, and M. de Barante ascertained that the Emperor Nicholas expressed himself very warmly against this project. He wished, it was said, to employ all his influence to prevent its accomplishment, and with that view, availed himself of his habitual correspondence with Prince Charles of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz, a general officer in the Prussian service, and in some credit at the court of Berlin. When it became known at St. Petersburg that the King of Prussia strenuously advocated a plan which proceeded from himself, the Emperor Nicholas indulged in a strange fit of passion. He acted publicly a scene with Baron de Boden, the envoy of the Duke of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin in Russia, and spoke in coarse terms of the part the King of Prussia had taken in forwarding the marriage. At a ball given about this time, at which the Emperor was present, he addressed not a single word to the Ambassador of France; a marked exception to his usual custom, and the more significant, as the ministers of Austria and England held on that evening their ordinary conversation with him. This fit of ill-humour soon subsided; it produced no change in the official relations of M. de Barante with the Count de Nesselrode, who carefully avoided mixing himself up with the sallies of his master; and in a short time nothing more was said at St. Petersburg of the marriage of the Duke of Orleans.

In 1838, M. de Barante came on leave to Paris,

and the Duke of Orleans, then happily married, requested him to relate all that had passed at St. Petersburg on the subject of his espousals. Being informed of the incidents I have now related, the Prince agreed with the ambassador in thinking that the Emperor Nicholas never had any idea of bestowing his daughter on him. While an attempt was making to impress the contrary on M. de Barante, there was also a desire to flatter the Duke himself by encouraging such a prospect. A confidential female intimate repeated to him in Paris what Madame Frederyks had said to Madame de Barante in St. Petersburg, and endeavoured to dissuade him from any other alliance. The Prince remained equally incredulous with the ambassador.

They were both right. The Emperor Nicholas had never sincerely contemplated even in thought a marriage so contrary to his prejudices. If the Grand Duchess Maria had met with an opportunity of seeing the Duke of Orleans; if he had pleased her, and she herself had ardently desired the union, very possibly the Emperor might have yielded to the wishes of his daughter. Harsh in his government, he had a tenderly paternal heart towards his family; and moreover, in questions of marriage was strongly inclined to hold it as a point of duty to allow much weight to the personal tastes and inclinations of his children. But no such motives pressed on him in 1836, and when the visit of the French princes to Germany suggested the idea in his immediate circle, the Emperor Nicholas had recently adopted towards King Louis-Philippe

manifestations and proceedings calculated to estrange him still more from such a connection.

After the taking of Antwerp, and in presence of that brilliant French solution of the Belgic question, the discontent of the three northern cabinets, although restrained, was profound. It was they who had to submit successively to the most important and bitterest concessions, at the same time political and domestic, — concessions equally of principle and relationship. The King of Prussia and the Emperor had been compelled to abandon, in the King of Holland, — the one his brother-in-law, the other the brother-in-law of his sister. The Emperor Nicholas had even gone so far as to send on an extraordinary mission to the Hague, his chief confidant Count Orloff, to announce to King William his secession, and to overcome his obstinate resistance to the wishes of Europe. Such sacrifices, even where sincerely carried out, leave stinging wounds in the hearts of the coldest politicians. Austria, Prussia, and Russia, beheld moreover the perfect accordance and united action of France and England, strengthen and extend from day to day. This was not merely an accidental agreement of the two governments upon special questions; it was, in fact, a general sympathy of ideas and tendencies openly proclaimed between the countries despite their ancient hostility; a sympathy which, throughout all Europe inspired the advocates of political reform, and the fabricators of revolutions with the allurements and hopes of success. From self-love and apprehension, the three northern powers felt the

desire and necessity of ostensibly opposing combined action to action and force to force, of mutually supporting each other in the face of a doubtful future, and of taking revenge, in case the opportunity should present itself, for the checks to which they had recently submitted.

Another more immediate and pressing cause urged them to this course. The revolutionary attempts excited in Italy, Poland, and Germany by the crisis of 1830 had failed, but conspiracies still existed, ardently fomented by the Italian, Polish, and German refugees, who had found free shelter in France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland. I have already stated my opinion on the right of asylum, its legitimacy and political utility, and also of the duties thereto appertaining, as well on the part of the protecting governments as on that of the exiles themselves.[1] The question is as simple and clear in principle as delicate and difficult in application; but practical obstacles have too often caused the empire of the principle and the necessity of respecting it to be forgotten. Political refugees, however natural and patriotic their enterprise may have been, have evidently no right to prosecute, from the bosom of the asylum they have obtained, and to the danger of the state that has admitted them, their war against the government of their own country; and the power that shelters them, whatever its sympathy may be, is obviously called on to restrain their attacks against the authorities with which it lives in peace itself. This

[1] See vol. ii. chap. ii. pp. 85, 90.

course is imperatively commanded by the public law which constitutes the inherent morality and loyalty of nations. This law forbids not the kind reception of exiles, nor the relief afforded to them in misfortune; neither does it interdict respect for natural affection, nor the maintenance of the private ties of which these exiles may be the object. When Count Pozzo di Borgo complained that the Duchess de Broglie had received in friendly intercourse at her house Prince Adam Czartoriski, that noble chief of the Polish emigrants, he was in the wrong, and the Duchess was justified in saying with animated pride, "Prince Czartoriski has long been my mother's and my own personal friend: I shall not exclude him from my drawing-room because my husband has the honour to represent France and her king." Generous sentiments, under such circumstances, do not justify any defalcation from political duties, neither are they condemned to obliterate themselves in the presence of harsh or overweening exigencies; and the governments which exclaim against the underhand practices of refugees, are also bound to consider the dignity as well as the legal position of the power it calls upon to repress them. On both sides there are many considerations to be respected, many restraints to be observed, many embarrassing points to be allowed for. But all these being admitted, the right of remonstrance remains entire with the one party, and the duty of repression with the other; a duty of political honesty as well as of prudence, the strict observance of which is equally essential to the honour of

governments and the safety of states, and which cannot be disregarded but through deplorable weakness or inexcusable arrogance. In spite of our sincere efforts to acquit ourselves of our duty on this point to the different governments of Europe, from hence arose, between 1832 and 1836, in all our dealings with them, a source of complications incessantly renewing, and one of the principal causes which induced the three Northern Powers to adopt combined demonstrations and measures tending to compromise the pacific relations they desired to maintain, and to defeat the redress of the injuries of which they complained.

At the beginning of April 1833, a revolutionary movement exploded at Frankfort; one of those oscillations so frequent in our days, serious from the ideas and sentiments which excite them, but frivolous from the thoughtlessness and incapacity of their authors. At the same moment a similar conspiracy was discovered at Turin. Both were promptly repressed. But the Germanic Diet set on foot an extensive inquest to ascertain their sources, ramifications, and objects; and, as might have been easily foreseen, the inquiry from its first steps encountered and brought to light the plots and aggressions of the refugees. While pursuing its course, we learned that on the 14th of August, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, accompanied by their ministers, Prince Metternich and M. Ancillon, had held an interview at the castle of Theresienstadt, near Töplitz. Three months later, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia

again met at Schwedt on the Oder, and a few days subsequently the Emperor Nicholas and the Emperor of Austria, also accompanied by their ministers for Foreign Affairs, conferred personally at Münchengrætz, a small town in Bohemia, whither the Prince Royal of Prussia had previously repaired. The result of these repeated meetings soon manifested itself. During the first days of November, 1833, Baron de Hügel, chargé d'affaires of Austria, in the absence of Count Appony, Baron de Werther, in the name of Prussia, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, on the part of Russia, called successively upon the Duke de Broglie, and communicated to him three despatches from their courts, all winding up by declaring in the same terms, that "If France, who had known so well how to defend herself from the attempts of disturbers, did not henceforward equally defeat the machinations which in her territory they were contriving against foreign states, in some of these latter, internal commotions might arise which would compel them to appeal to the assistance of their allies; that this aid would not be refused to them, and that every attempt to oppose it would be considered by the three cabinets of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, as an act of hostility directed against each."

In itself, this remonstrance contained nothing beyond what was natural and conformable to the law of nations and the exigencies of the moment, but the concert which had led to it, the uniformity and peremptory tone of the despatches, impressed too palpably on the act of the three courts the character of an

attempt at intimidation, not to confine us exclusively to a consideration of its principle and motives. The cabinets which had adopted the resolution, and the diplomatic agents instructed to communicate it to the French ministry, so thoroughly understood its bearing, that while acquitting themselves of their mission, the most moderate endeavoured to extenuate it. The Austrian despatch lavished encomiums on the ability and energy of the King's government. The Prussian document, filled with expressions of personal esteem and affection, rendered ample justice to the efforts the King had already made to restrain the refugees; and Count Pozzo di Borgo, perhaps little satisfied with the details of the Russian missive, refrained from stating it at full length to the Duke de Broglie, and confined himself to reading the conclusion. While varying, according to these different attitudes, his reception and language in reply, the Duke de Broglie becomingly repulsed the attempt at intimidation, and resolutely maintained, for all cases of European complication or intervention which the future might present, full liberty of action and the free exercise of the declared policy of France. When this answer was conveyed to Prince Metternich, he endeavoured only to understand it in part, and to persuade himself that Piedmont was not one of the states in which France would suffer no foreign intervention without interposing herself; but M. de Sainte Aulaire, by a prompt and frank retort, prevented him from assuming the air of deceiving himself on that point. M. de Metternich submitted. At Berlin, and even at St. Petersburg, the firm reply

of the Duke de Broglie entailed no remark; and the whole affair had no other result than that of exhibiting with some display the concerted action of the three courts, and the laborious efforts of the Emperor Nicholas to coerce his allies. It revealed at the same time their internal disagreements, and little inclination to push their demonstrations to extremity. There are few worse politicians than those who possess minds more haughty than expanded, more impassioned than reflecting; who seek the momentary gratification of their prejudices far more than the actual and permanent accomplishment of their designs.

Independently of Western revolutions, the Emperor Nicholas, a few months after the conferences of Theresienstadt, Schwedt, and Münchengrætz, discovered in the East a new subject of irritation against the government of King Louis-Philippe. The struggle between the Ottoman Porte and the Pacha of Egypt had commenced. Mehemet Ali subdued Syria; his son Ibrahim, victorious at Konieh, overran Asia Minor as a conqueror, occupied Smyrna, and menaced Constantinople. The great problem which weighs, and in all probability will long continue to weigh upon Europe, the Eastern question, was approaching a most violent crisis. I shall presently describe the conflagration which was then so near being lighted up; at present I confine myself to its first glimmerings.

There can be no doubt that Mehemet Ali aspired to throw off the yoke of the Sultan, and to establish an independent sovereignty for himself. It was in

vain that he multiplied his protestations of fidelity, and declared to M. de Bois-le-Comte, who in the spring of 1833 was charged by the Duke de Broglie with a commission to the East, — "I am ready at all times to proclaim, in face of the world, that I shall never seek a quarrel with the Sultan provided he seeks none with me, and that I will live in peace and obedience. But let the great European Powers guarantee, both for the Porte and for myself, that we shall never mutually disturb by any aggression the peace they may re-establish between us." M. de Bois-le-Comte observed to the Pacha that the Sultan was his sovereign; and that it would be difficult for the Powers to enter into any guarantee which should place them on an equality. "Do you know why I am not independent?" quickly retorted Mehemet Ali. "It is from respect for the Powers. Do you believe that but for the deference I pay to their intentions, I would continue in the position of a subject? Well; the regard I have had for your counsels neither the Greeks nor Belgians have entertained, and you have rewarded them by securing their independence; but you punish me by refusing to guarantee my safety." Leaving then the view of his own interest, "Within a year," he said, with an expression full of mystery and gravity, "within a year war will burst forth in Europe; I have certain information of this. United to England, you will have to combat Russia, Austria, and the States of the Continent. Russia predominates at Constantinople; do you not then see the advantage of employing Mehemet Ali, and of using

him to oppose and destroy a hostile influence? Think well of this; it may suit you to let me seize the district of Adana: this would give strength to you and to me." M. de Bois-le-Comte then affirmed that there would be no war; Europe had resolved to remain at peace. Mehemet Ali seemed to understand this, and hesitated; but some days after, speaking familiarly with the French envoy, he said to him, "Mr. Campbell, the English political agent, is going to present to me to-morrow, Mr. Turnbull, Her Britannic Majesty's consul. When will you also give to your consul, M. Mimaut, a political character? Shall I tell you what the result will be? You not only allow yourselves to be forestalled by England, but you will also be so by Austria and Russia. Yes, by Russia herself. Do not believe that I stand badly with her; on the contrary, we are on excellent terms. The Austrian agent, M. Prokesch, who seems so closely united with the English and with you, has taken upon himself to maintain friendly relations between Russia and me." Sometimes, under an appearance of forgetting politics altogether, the Pacha related to M. de Bois-le-Comte with complete unreserve the vicissitudes of his life, and the difficulties he had to overcome before reaching his present eminence. "One of the greatest," he said, "was the vice of my education. I was fifty, and had governed Egypt for ten years before I learned to read." "What motive induced your Highness to submit to such a painful labour? Mahomet established a religion, and laid the foundations of one of the greatest empires in the

world, without knowing how to read." "True; but the necessity of being able to read impressed itself on me more and more. Until I could do so, I arranged in my head, as in a magazine, all that I saw and heard; sometimes the impression of objects became weak, but in moments of danger, or when inflamed by passion, all came back upon my mind clear and lucid; I found out, nevertheless, that my memory declined. I then determined to strengthen it by reading. Every one I saw, I desired to take a book and read with me. By dint of this process, I learned to read myself, and very quickly. Since then, I have perused many books; latterly, a large volume of geography sent to me from Constantinople. Above all, I have studied works on military and political science. I also read your journals. In addition, I have looked over books of history, and I feel convinced that no one with such weak means has achieved the great deeds that I have accomplished. I have still much to do. I have already advanced my country beyond Turkey, Greece, and particularly beyond Persia. But I began too late. I doubt whether I shall have time to finish. At all events I wish to leave matters to my son in as good a state as I possibly can." He concluded by returning to his fixed idea, the necessity for the Porte ceding to him the district of Adana, or that the Powers should guarantee to him the security of his possessions. "I consider myself," he added, "as a man placed in presence of an enemy who holds the sword over his head; I have a shield before me, you call upon me

to abandon this shield; you are my friends and I give it up to you, because I have full confidence that you mean to provide me with another defence. Without that, it would be to destroy me."

When he wished to ingratiate himself with the powers whom he knew to be sincere friends of the Porte, — and probably with sincerity on his own part, for he sometimes doubted his fortune if separated from the general lot of the Ottoman empire,—he spoke of a desire to end his days after the peace, at Constantinople, and to devote himself heart and soul to the raising and reanimation of that crumbling monarchy. In this hypothesis, even European policy paid homage to the superiority of his views and character. "Assuredly," said M. Prokesch to M. de Bois-le-Comte, "if, as by a sudden theatrical effect, Mehemet Ali could be placed on the throne of Constantinople, Austria, and all the other Powers who suffer from the weakness of that government, would gladly see him there. Mehemet Ali is a reformer; he replaces old dying institutions by improved new ones. The Sultan Mahmoud is a revolutionist; he destroys without substitution."

"Whatever turn his ambition might take, whether as an enemy or a protector, such a man was insupportable to the Sultan and his advisers. One of the most influential members of the divan, Khosrew Pacha, hated him with an old and intense antipathy. Whether it was peace or war with Mehemet Ali, either in concession or denial, the Porte incessantly meditated his ruin; and this bitter hostility, this un-

remitting effort to destroy him, as constantly furnished the viceroy of Egypt with real motives and plausible pretexts for engaging in the struggle towards which his ambition impelled him. "What would you have had me do?" he said, in May 1833, to M. de Bois-le-Comte, who complained of his attack upon the Pacha of St. Jean d'Acre, and the war thereby excited; "I held in my hands undeniable proofs that the Porte, resolved on my destruction, was preparing to fall on me within a year. I have taken the initiative. I was placed between two abysses, and I preferred descending into the one to being thrown into the other."

In presence of the Eastern question thus abruptly laid down, and surrounded by great powers all eager to take a share in it with very opposite feelings, the position of France was one of peculiar difficulty. England and Austria had a simple and fixed idea; they were anxious only to support the Ottoman empire, and to defend it against its enemies. Russia also held but one view, less simple, though equally exclusive and determined. She wished to maintain without strengthening the Turkish dominion, and to control while protecting it. Prussia, little interested in the matter, inclined habitually towards Austria and England while humouring Russia. The policy of France was complicated and alternative. She wished at the same time to assist the Sultan and the Pacha, to support the Ottoman empire, and to strengthen Egypt. The Porte found itself engaged

with two real allies, a hypocritical protector, and a friend with a divided heart.

Arguments in some points substantial, in others specious, were not wanting to justify this double policy of France. The importance of Egypt in the Mediterranean has been set forward, with the assistance France might derive from that quarter in case of a contest either with England or Russia; and, above all, the necessity, in the precarious state of the East, that Egypt should neither remain in impotent hands, nor pass into those of enemies. I shall balance the value of these reasons when I treat of the great debates in which they were introduced. They were opinions formed after the blow was struck, rather than determining causes before the event. To speak truly, the policy of France on this question derived its source from our brilliant expedition to Egypt in 1798; from the renown of our generals, soldiers, and scholars; from the reminiscences and impressions of their achievements and labours; from impulses of imagination, and not from calculations of safety or political balance. A lively interest attaches itself to the theatre of that national and singular glory. Egypt conquered by a French army and described by a French institute, had become a popular fantasy in France; we associated ourselves with its destinies; and its new master, equally glorious and remarkable, who governed with so much reputation while courting our favour, became in our estimation a natural ally, whom we supported from inclination and enthusiasm rather than from reflection and motives of interest.

The difficulties of this position manifested themselves from the beginning. Three French agents interposed, in 1833, in the struggle between the Porte and Egypt. At the close of 1832 General Guilleminot, recalled in 1831, had not yet been replaced as ambassador at Constantinople. M. de Varennes, first secretary to the embassy, represented France in that quarter when the Syrian war broke out. After the battle of Konieh, he exerted himself strenuously to induce the Porte to consent to the concessions that Mehemet Ali demanded. Admiral Roussin, appointed ambassador at the commencement of January 1833, arrived at Constantinople on the 17th of February, and three days afterwards a Russian fleet applied for by the Sultan on the 21st of January, entered the Bosphorus to protect him against his ambitious vassal. Admiral Roussin demanded from the Divan its immediate withdrawal, pledging himself to obtain the consent of Mehemet Ali to the conditions which the Porte had proposed to him in answer to his demands; and on the promise of the Sultan that on these terms the Russians should effectually retire, the admiral wrote as follows to the Pacha on the 22nd of February: "To persist in the pretensions you have set forward would be to call down disastrous consequences on your head, which will, I have no doubt, awaken your fears. France will keep the engagement she has contracted; she possesses the means, and I answer for her inclination. It only remains for me to hope that you will not force us to the cruel necessity of attacking a Power partly created by ourselves, and of

tarnishing a glory of which I am the sincere admirer." The Pacha haughtily refused to yield; intrigues and negotiations continued; and when, six months later, M. de Bois-le-Comte was despatched to the East without any official authority, merely to watch the progress of events and to give advice, he found Mehemet Ali still so irritated at the menacing summons of Admiral Roussin, that he was unable to persuade him to answer himself a second letter that the admiral had addressed to him. "What do you wish me to write to the ambassador?" said the Pacha; "I cannot say *my dear friend*, for I should speak falsely; neither can I evince my resentment, for in that case I should offend your government. France has an accredited agent here; your consul is the organ of her relations with me, and on my part he is the medium of my communications with her. She herself established this rule, to which I have faithfully conformed. When the ambassador at Constantinople is changed, I am not told of it, and I have nothing to do with him. As to my relations with the Sultan, all conventionalities require that I should carry them out alone and without intermediary." Thus France, according to the urgency of the moment, inclined alternately to either scale of the balance, endeavouring to act as a counterpoise between her two friends, and to keep her rivals at a distance.

Meanwhile Russia, on the one hand, and Mehemet Ali on the other, pursued their work, which was little complicated and less sincere. On learning the refusal of Mehemet Ali to satisfy himself with the

offer of the Porte, the Emperor Nicholas once more placed his fleet and army at the disposal of the Sultan, and Mehemet Ali lavished at Constantinople his ordinary means of persuasion, to induce the Porte to cede to him, not only Syria, but, in addition, the district of Adana, — in fact, the gate of Asia Minor, the last object of dispute. After many secret conferences and confused fluctuations, both parties succeeded in their efforts. On the 5th of April, a Russian fleet, casting anchor in the Bosphorus, disembarked five thousand soldiers on the Asiatic coast, while a Russian division marched towards the Danube, and on the 16th of May, a hundred discharges of artillery announced at Alexandria that a firman of the 5th ceded to the Pacha the district of Adana, as well as Syria, and that the Egyptian army had recommenced its march for the evacuation of Asia Minor. The arrangement, considered at that time as definitive between the Porte and the Pacha, was in effect signed on the 5th of May at Kutaich. Ibrahim Pacha executed his retreat, and peace might be said to be re-established in the East.

But it was purchased at a price that sowed discord in Europe. On the 6th of May, the day following that which had witnessed the promulgation of the pacific firman of the Sultan, Count Orloff entered Constantinople in great pomp, invested with the titles of ambassador extraordinary, and commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the Ottoman empire.

He arrived at the precise moment when the Porte seemed to be free from danger, to realise substantially

the protection proffered by Russia, and to promise that this protection should be extended under any circumstances for the future. The apparent inutility and unusual display of this embassy inspired the other courts with well-founded mistrust. They required explanations from the Porte. The Porte complained of this demand as insulting, and affirmed that the arrival of Count Orloff was nothing more than an explicit evidence of the perfect harmony then subsisting between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia. Count Orloff remained more than two months at Constantinople, expecting, as he said, that the Egyptian army would entirely evacuate the Ottoman states. By the end of June this evacuation was completed. Ibrahim Pacha had recrossed the Taurus, and on the 10th of July the Russian fleet and army retired in their turn from Turkey; but two days previously, on the 8th, a treaty called the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was signed at Constantinople, expressing in Article 3, "That in consequence of the sincerest desire to secure the durability, maintenance, and entire independence of the Sublime Porte, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in case any circumstances should arise to induce the Sublime Porte to require once more the moral and military assistance of Russia, although there is no reason whatever to anticipate such a contingency, yet, should God permit it, his Majesty promises to supply, by land and sea, as many forces as the two contracting parties may consider necessary." And in return for this promise, a secret article, annexed

to the treaty, added, "As his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expenses and embarrassments which might result to her from the contribution of material succour to Russia, will not require this succour should circumstances impose on the Sublime Porte the obligation of supplying it,— the Sublime Porte, in place of the aid it is called upon to furnish when required, and in compliance with the principle of reciprocity of the present treaty, is allowed to limit its action in favour of the imperial court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles; that is to say, to the total exclusion of all foreign ships of war, under any pretext whatever."

Thus the cabinet of St. Petersburg, converting into a written, legal right the fact of its preponderance at Constantinople, reduced Turkey to the condition of an official client, and transformed the Black Sea into a Russian lake, the entrance to which this client guarded against the possible enemies of Russia without any restriction imposed on the latter power against issuing from thence and pouring her fleets and armies into the Mediterranean.

During the course of this negotiation, and when the results began to be foreseen, Admiral Roussin, a bold and straightforward spirit, always governed by a single idea, was tempted to place himself directly in opposition to it, and to announce to the Porte, if she thus delivered herself into the hands of Russia, the hostility of France. He was overruled by his colleague, the English ambassador at Constantinople,

Lord Ponsonby, as intensely hostile to Russia as himself, but who mingled more calculation with his passion.

"I have dissuaded Admiral Roussin from opposing the signature of the Russian treaty," said he one day to M. de Bois-le-Comte; "it would only have provoked a contest which we were not then in a condition to sustain." Such was, in fact, the anger of the Sultan and his ministers at the mere name of Mehemet Ali, and so convinced were they that he was already preparing to recommence war, that very probably nothing would have restrained them from securing against him the powerful protector who offered himself. A courageous adviser attempted on one occasion, in the name of the peace of Constantinople and the dignity of the empire, to disturb the Sultan's mind as to the designs of the Russians.

"What signifies the empire to me?" exclaimed Mahmoud; "what signifies Constantinople? I would give both to the man who brought me the head of Mehemet Ali." But when the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, thus concluded in a paroxysm of terror, became public in Europe, the French and English cabinets paid little attention to the alarms of the Porte, but inspired it in their turn with new fears, by testifying their resentment at its cowardly submission.

They did not confine their protests to the Porte alone. M. de Lagrenè, representative of France at St. Petersburg in the absence of Marshal Maison, received orders to transmit a note to Count de Nesselrode, in which the French government, after

premising "that the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi assigned to the mutual relations of the Ottoman and Russian empires a new character against which the powers of Europe had a right to protest," declared that, "if the stipulations of that act should subsequently lead to an armed intervention on the part of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the French government would hold itself entirely free to adopt such a line of conduct as circumstances might suggest, acting from that moment as if the treaty in question had no existence."

The English government held similar language at Constantinople and at St. Petersburg. Neither did the two cabinets confine themselves to words. They materially increased their naval forces in the Mediterranean. A part of the English squadron appeared before Smyrna, and even more decisive demonstrations were spoken of. It was asked if the time had not arrived to force the Dardanelles, to enter the Black Sea, and to burn that Russian fleet ever ready to take possession of Constantinople under pretext of protection. The answer of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to the notifications it received from Paris and London, tended to aggravate still more the anger and suspicion which these menaces inspired; for its tone was as violent as that which it repulsed.

The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, according to M. de Nesselrode, contained nothing which exceeded the rights of the contracting parties, "and his Majesty the Emperor," said he in conclusion, "is determined to fulfil punctiliously, should occasion require, the

obligations which the treaty of the 8th of July imposes on him, acting thus as if the declaration contained in the note of M. de Lagrenè had no existence."

So much irritation and excitement alarmed the prudent guardians of the peace of Europe. The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had greatly displeased the Prince de Metternich, who felt uneasy, with us, at the Russian predominance in Constantinople; but, even more disturbed at the prospect of any serious misunderstanding between Austria and Russia, he took care to conceal his discontent, and his agents were instructed to blame the explosion of ours. "Why did you carry your protest to St. Petersburg?" said the Austrian internuncio, Baron de Stürmer, to M. de Bois-le-Comte. "At Constantinople it might have passed; but at St. Petersburg it assumes the air of a menace, and you have drawn upon yourselves an answer which may be injurious to you and embitter mutual feelings."

When this acrimony led to proceedings which visibly threatened the peace of Europe, the Chancellor of Austria availed himself of the danger to act upon the Emperor Nicholas, who had not in reality any desire for war, and to impress upon him the inconvenience of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi,—a demonstration more brilliant than useful, and which excited more anger against Russia than it conferred on her real strength. M. de Metternich excelled in turning to account the changes introduced by time into the state of facts and minds, to insinuate the truths he was unwilling to declare openly, and to diminish the dan-

gers he dared not combat at the critical moment. The conference of Münchengrætz furnished him with a favourable opportunity for exercising this sedative influence. He extracted words from the Emperor Nicholas which, without abolishing the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, disavowed its consequences, and contained almost an engagement not to claim its application under any possible circumstances.

This was, in fact, nothing more than a pacific demonstration placed in balance with an ambitious one. In reality, situations and intentions remained the same; but none of the powers who thus looked on each other with jealous eyes had, to say the truth, any very urgent fears, or strong inclination to push their menaces to extremity. The Chancellor of Austria obtained much credit both in Paris and in London for the verbal concessions of the Emperor Nicholas and his own perseverance in extorting them.

The alarm subsided; the armaments diminished, the vessels returned to their harbours; and with the opening of the year 1834 nothing remained of this first phase of Eastern affairs except the permanent hostility of the Porte and Mehemet Ali; the difficult situation in which France stood pledged towards them; the clouds which her declared favour for the Pacha had already spread between her and England; and the increased ill-will which this struggle had excited in the soul of the Emperor Nicholas against King Louis-Philippe and his government.

At the moment when this question seemed to terminate, another sprang up, destined to become, if not

for all Europe, at least for us, even more important than that of the East.

King Ferdinand VII. died at Madrid, and Spain plunged once more into the career of revolution.

Since Ferdinand VII. had fully acknowledged King Louis-Philippe, and no longer tolerated in Spain the openly hostile plots of the legitimists, we lived with the Spanish government, if not in intimate, at least in regular and pacific relations.

The King inspired us with no confidence; the violent and senseless predominance of the absolute party disturbed us for Spain herself, agitated by perpetual conspiracies and severities. We acted in concert with England to prevent the usurped tyranny of Don Miguel, in Portugal, from establishing and aggrandizing itself by the support which the court of Madrid was inclined to give him; but we had not beyond the Pyrenees any serious or pressing French interest to defend.

We paid very little attention to what was passing there; our leading affairs turned to other quarters. One point alone, that of the order of succession to the crown of Spain, attracted our notice. During the last 120 years it had undergone very different solutions. The old law of the Spanish monarchy called females to the throne in default of direct heirs male, and even down to the reign of Philip V. the fact and right had conformed.

In 1714, Philip V. substituted in place of the Spanish law, not the Salic law as has been said, but a family Pragmatic which restricted the succession of

females to the single contingency that there should be no heirs male whatever, either direct or collateral; and the Cortes adopted the decree of the King.

In 1789, Charles IV. revoked the Pragmatic of Philip V., restored the ancient Spanish law, and also obtained the sanction of the Cortes for his measure, but without publishing it. Known to many people, but officially concealed, the royal act and the reports of the Cortes remained in the hands of the King. The Cortes of Cadiz, in the constitution of 1812, maintained, while regulating it with detail, the principle of female succession; and on the 3rd of April 1830, Ferdinand VII., during the first pregnancy of Queen Christina, his wife, after having taken the opinion of the Council of Castille upon the validity of the decree enacted in 1789 by his father Charles IV., ordered it to be suddenly and solemnly proclaimed as the law of the kingdom. The representatives of the courts of Naples and France at Madrid made some efforts to oppose this act; but when it was declared, their courts did not reject it in any official or positive manner. Two forms of protest, couched in letters intended to be addressed to Ferdinand VII. by the Kings of France and the Two Sicilies, were drawn up in Paris in the bureaux of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, when the Revolution of July exploded. The two protests led to nothing, and after all these public or secret oscillations, the female succession was established in 1830 as the ancient and actually existing law of the Spanish monarchy.

In the month of July 1832, Ferdinand VII. fell

ill. The absolutist and priestly party, powerful around him and in his council, resolved on a great effort to replace the crown on the head of the Infant Don Carlos, their chief. Queen Christina took alarm, and did not then believe herself in a condition to sustain the struggle for the interest of her young daughter, now Queen Isabella II. There was a momentary question of a marriage between the Infanta and the son of Don Carlos, but this idea was soon abandoned; and in September 1832, Ferdinand VII., still seriously ill, revoked the above-named decree of 1789, which he had lately called into vigour, and re-established the Pragmatic of Philip V. Exactly as the latter had passed in 1789 as the decree of Charles IV., the new royal act remained secret and deposited, it was said, in the Chancery of Mercy and Justice at Madrid, with this inscription: "To be opened in case of the King's death, or when he shall direct."

But scarcely had the Infant Don Carlos and his party achieved this victory, when an unexpected court movement announced their defeat. Ferdinand VII. appeared to recover health. Queen Christina took courage: the moderate party and even the ardent liberals supported her cause; her sister Donna Luisa Carlotta, married to the Infant Don Francis de Paule, a princess of a bold and haughty character, repaired directly to the King, and denounced in strong terms the intrigue which had taken advantage of his illness to extort from him a concession fatal to his wife and daughter. The King yielded again. The ministers

favourable to Don Carlos, M. Calomarde and the Count de la Alcudia, were dismissed; the ambassador of Spain in England, M. Zéa Bermudez, head of the moderate party at the court, without siding with the liberals in the nation, was recalled from London to succeed them. Power changed its course; Queen Christina was declared Regent while the King's illness lasted; measures of political clemency and administrative reform were adopted, and at the end of September 1832, Ferdinand VII. resumed the government, and publicly revoked, as having been surprised from him during his indisposition, his reversal of the decree by which, in 1830, he had declared and placed in vigour the Pragmatic of 1789. On the 4th of April 1833, the Cortes were convoked to swear fidelity to the Infanta Isabella. They assembled, in fact, on the 20th of June following, took the oath,—and the right of female succession in default of heirs male direct became once more, as it had been previous to the reign of Philip V., the law of the Spanish monarchy.

In presence of these legislative and ministerial vicissitudes in Spain, we maintained an attitude of extreme reserve. We were anxious to avoid offending the rights and pride of the Spaniards by interposing in their internal affairs; we desired not to impede the recovering fortune of the moderate party at Madrid, nor to remain indifferent to the interest which rendered the demi-salic law of Philip V. more desirable for us than a system of succession which might give the throne of Spain to a prince, as husband of the Queen, unknown and perhaps hostile to the

reigning house in France. It is the custom of violent governments to surrender themselves exclusively to certain special state questions, without calculating the different interests by which the position is complicated. But nations, sooner or later, pay dearly for the neglects of this imperfect policy, and rational legislation is bound to think of everything. Six weeks after the formation of the cabinet of the 22nd of November 1832, the Duke de Broglie, when giving instructions to the Count de Rayneval, our ambassador at Madrid, dwelt particularly on the various combinations which the existing order of succession in Spain might entail. The court of Naples had renewed the suggestion of a marriage between the eldest son of Don Carlos and the Infanta Isabella. If it appeared that this idea had any chance of adoption, and if the fact should place this young prince on the Spanish throne, as king in title and of his own right, M. de Rayneval was ordered to support him strenuously. If, however, the son of Don Carlos was only to reign as husband of the Infanta Isabella, the French ambassador was instructed neither to oppose this step nor to sanction it by express approbation; and even if in the terms of the transaction the question should still remain undecided, he was to exert himself to incline the balance to the side of the male succession. At the same time, on account of the inquietude occasioned by the illness of Ferdinand VII., we increased the number of our troops on the frontier of the Pyrenees. But when M. Zéa Bermudez, on his way through Paris to assume office in Spain, expressed some soli-

citude as to these military movements and our diplomatic interference at Madrid, the Duke de Broglie hastened to dispel his doubts, and to impress on him full confidence in our respect for the independence of Spain, and in our assurances of amicable support.

Meanwhile Ferdinand VII. again fell dangerously ill, and, from the commencement of September 1833, the despatches of M. de Rayneval announced his death as imminent. He died, in fact, on the 29th of September, and the event found us perfectly decided on the conduct to be pursued under the question that arose. I have already said that, in principle, we should have preferred in Spain the maintenance of the male succession; and while the matter was still in doubt, M. de Rayneval was instructed to act accordingly. In 1830, before the Revolution of July, and at the moment when it became known in Paris that Ferdinand VII. had revoked the Pragmatic of Philip V., the Duke of Orleans loudly expressed his disapproval. He even endeavoured to persuade Charles X. and the King of Naples to protest against an act which compromised the future of the house of Bourbon; and King Louis-Philippe still entertained in 1833 the opinion he had so decidedly formed, as Duke of Orleans, in 1830. The French government, therefore, at the latter epoch, had no anterior or systematic predilection in favour of the young Queen Isabella, but, under every title, her claim appeared to us to be evident. Charles IV. in 1789, and Ferdinand VII. in 1830 and 1833, undoubtedly possessed the same right of restoring the ancient Spanish law

of regal succession which Philip V., in 1714, had exercised for its abolition. Their decree had been equally sanctioned by the Cortes. After all these fluctuations the female title prevailed. Queen Isabella held the government at once *de facto* and *de jure*. All our information led us to suppose that the national feeling of Spain was favourable to her, and that if we were to choose between the contending claimants, she had on her side, in the nation the liberal party, and at court the moderate section, or rather those men who had lately and energetically defended the independence of Spain, and who now aspired to establish it by showing themselves disposed to adopt institutions analogous to our own. We could not, therefore, refuse to acknowledge Queen Isabella without renouncing at once right and fact, without wounding the independent sentiments of the Spanish people, and without compromising the future prospects of Spain, and the present friendly understanding between the two States. There was, therefore, not even a momentary hesitation in the French council, either on the part of the King or of his advisers. Before we received positive intelligence of the death of Ferdinand VII., the Duke de Broglie had already prepared instructions to regulate the attitude of M. de Rayneval at Madrid, as follows: "On the decease of King Ferdinand, you will be at first in the position of an agent whose official character is suspended until he receives new letters of credit from his court; but you will, nevertheless, immediately offer to the Queen all the support she can desire from us. You

will make known to her, as also to her ministers, our most explicit disposition to accord her that support in the manner and degree which they may consider most advantageous for the interests of the new government. Moreover you will not hesitate to declare yourself everywhere in the same strain; and if, as we have reason to believe, the cabinet of London addresses analogous instructions to Mr. Villiers, you will act in concert with that minister so that the perfect identity of your mutual attitude may become generally known, and impress the public mind." As soon as the death of Ferdinand VII. was announced in Paris by telegraph on the 3rd of October, these instructions were forwarded to Madrid; and, to invest them with additional authority, M. Mignet, at that time keeper of the archives in the department of Foreign Affairs, was charged with their delivery, and instructed to comment verbally on them, both with the French ambassador and the Spanish government.

While traversing the Basque Provinces, he found the insurrection in favour of Don Carlos already commenced. From the month of March preceding, when Ferdinand VII. renewed the abolition of the Pragmatic of Philip V., the Infant, after protesting against the royal act, had been compelled to quit Spain and to retire to Portugal, where he promised himself not only an asylum, but an ally. Civil war was flagrant in that country. Don Miguel, with the aid of the absolute party, maintained against his niece, Donna Maria, whom he had dethroned, pretensions much more divested of specious foundations

and legitimate sentiments than those of the Spanish prince. The elder brother of Don Miguel, the Emperor Don Pedro, after abdicating the crown of Brazil in favour of his son, came over to Europe to claim, under the title of regent, the rights of his daughter. The struggle, prolonged for eighteen months under varying phases, inclined at last in favour of the young Queen. Six days before the death of Ferdinand VII., Donna Maria, having left France, where she had been received with friendly hospitality, disembarked at Lisbon; and on the 10th of October, the day of M. Mignet's arrival at Madrid, Don Pedro compelled Don Miguel to raise the siege of the Portuguese capital, and reduced his power in that kingdom to a wandering and expiring effort. But three days earlier, on the 7th of October, Don Carlos was proclaimed King of Spain at Vittoria; a band of his partisans, commanded by the Biscayan Verastegui, arrested M. Mignet at that place, detained him for several hours, and only allowed him to continue his journey towards Madrid through fear of France. A civil war, destined to be prolonged and bitter, thus sprang up in Spain at the moment of the final defeat of the usurping tyrant in Portugal, whose aid the Spanish pretender was on his way to solicit.[1]

In taking an immediate share in this contest, we were not at first determined by a simple comparison of the different royal titles of the parties engaged; considerations of another order strongly influenced our resolution. It affords a noble spectacle to see a

[1] See Historic Documents, No. II.

people struggling to raise themselves from a long decline, and to resume an active and glorious position in the civilized world. Spain presented this object to Europe, not by a sudden emotion of fancy and national ambition, but by undergoing the severest trials, and by displaying under them those heroic qualities which authorize lofty hopes and justify difficult designs. The Spanish people had defended their independence and the throne of their sovereign with indomitable devotion against the conqueror of the kings and nations of the continent. During this long and sanguinary struggle, the desire of political regeneration had sprung up amongst them. It was a necessity of their position as well as an impulse of their souls. In the absence of their captive King and of all regular power, they were compelled to govern themselves. The exercise of political liberty became, with them, the condition of existence. In their attempt to found a free government in the very bosom of war, they formed a strange amalgam of modern ideas and the old traditions of their country; ultra-radical theories mingled themselves confusedly in the conduct of the Cortes of Cadiz, and in the constitution they decreed in 1812, with the maxims of the Catholic faith, and with provincial and municipal habits;—so that monarchical instincts acquired imperceptibly, from this alliance, revolutionary principles. A regular and liberal system could not emanate directly from such a chaos, and when, in 1814, Ferdinand VII. reascended the throne, he had a fine opportunity of following successfully the example of

Louis XVIII., and of reforming without weakening the Spanish monarchy. But instead of supplying a remedy to the new disease of his nation, Ferdinand restored the old complaint. Spain fell back under the thoughtless, incapable, and narrow-minded despotism which for more than a century had ensured her decline; and on the King's death, when his daughter Isabella and his brother Don Carlos disputed the crown, the question included in their rivalry was that of determining whether Spain should continue plunged in her ordinary sterile track, or recommence, with more experience and under better conditions, her political regeneration. Between the continued decay and laborious resuscitation of this noble people, our neighbour and natural ally, neither moral judgment nor political foresight permitted us to hesitate; it was not alone, therefore, on account of the right of the young Queen, but from sympathy with the cause and future of Spain herself, that we hastened to promise our support.

What would the government of Queen Isabella do to organize and strengthen itself, while satisfying the wishes of its partisans? What quality and measure of support should we be called upon to lend it? From the commencement we saw ourselves engaged with these two questions, and both failed not to impress us with anxious solicitude.

Few men have inspired me with more esteem than M. Zéa Bermudez, placed, at that time, at the head of the Spanish government. He was a Spaniard of the old type, full of honour, loyalty, and integrity;

an equally disinterested and faithful servant of the crown and of his country, serious, persevering, courageous, firm in his conscience, modest in his pride, and simple in his virtue. He had ever shown himself moderate in the exercise of power, and had invariably opposed the vindictive and fanatical violence of the party which ranged under the standard of Don Carlos. His devotion to the cause of Queen Isabella and of the Queen Regent confirmed him still more in his moderation; but, an anti-revolutionist with more honesty than discernment, he desired the absolute maintenance of the old Spanish royalty, rejected every great political innovation, and confined his promises of progress to administrative reforms. Soon after the 3rd of December 1832, when Ferdinand VII. recalled him from London, to confide to him the direction of Foreign Affairs at Madrid, M. Zéa Bermudez, in a circular to the Spanish diplomatic agents, made a striking profession of the policy which received thenceforward a name, adopted willingly by himself,— the name of enlightened despotism (*illustrado*). After the death of Ferdinand, on the 4th of October 1833, he renewed his declaration, with increased solemnity, in the Manifesto published under his dictation by the Queen Regent.

In any hypothesis, he was wrong thus to pledge, not only himself, but the future of the Queen Regent and of the crown. Nothing at that time in the state of Spain compelled him to announce a systematic and permanent resolution; but his mind was more obstinate than expansive, and he readily adopted the

limit of his own ideas for that of the wants and destinies of his country. "It appears to me," M. de Rayneval wrote, on the 7th of October 1833, "that M. Zéa will find it very difficult to maintain a long resistance against the universal clamour. He has, if I mistake not, committed one of those faults for which there is no remedy. He could not surely abandon the course he has hitherto followed; but he ought not to remove all hope from the men to whose counsels the Queen listened during the first periods of the King's illness, nor, above all, should he induce the Queen to utter words seeming to reproach those counsels which at the time she appeared to approve. . . . . I believe that, in publishing his manifesto, M. Zéa's principal object has been the effect it would produce externally. He hopes that if in the Courts of Germany and the North any difficulties should arise to the recognition of Queen Isabella, this language, and the opinion held of his firmness, will suffice to remove them."

The impression produced in Paris by the Spanish manifesto accorded with that of M. Rayneval at Madrid. It harmonized little with our own policy, and, as regarded Queen Isabella and her minister, appeared to us an act of useless imprudence. The Duke de Broglie communicated this to M. de Rayneval, and through him to the Spanish government. "If it be true," he wrote on the 12th of October 1833, "that M. Zéa especially proposes to conciliate the Northern powers, this combination convinces me that he has no correct idea of the actual state of Europe. The first

external interest of the new government of Spain is to strengthen itself by France and England. We understand, undoubtedly, that it attaches some value to its recognition by the other courts; but were they even less desirous than they are to maintain the general peace, they would not venture to take any step in opposition to the cabinets of Paris and London as regards the Peninsula. M. Zéa has therefore miscalculated lamentably in exposing himself to offend these two cabinets, whose moderation cannot be suspected, by seeking support from the policy of others, who, however disposed they may be to adopt the principles of this minister, can only serve him by moving in strict accordance with France and Great Britain."

We thus evinced a friendly solicitude for the Spanish government, whose disposition as to the support we offered made us speedily foresee a serious embarrassment to ourselves. I have already quoted the words of the Duke de Broglie when communicating this offer to the Count de Rayneval: "You will immediately make known," said he, "to the Queen and to her ministers, our formal resolution to afford her our support, in the manner and degree which they may consider most advantageous to the interests of the new government." The Duke's object was to humour the susceptibilities and to dissipate the lowering jealousy of the Spaniards as to any foreign intervention, — a jealousy which M. Zéa, while passing through Paris on his return to Madrid, had clearly intimated to him. Also, when, on the 6th of October 1833, we adopted the resolution of increasing our army by 35,000 men, and

of adding to our forces on the frontier of the Pyrenees, the Duke de Broglie hastened to remove from this measure all appearance of premeditated, or even of precautionary interference in the affairs of Spain. "We have no intention," he wrote to M. de Rayneval on the 7th of October, "of organizing an army, properly so called, in the neighbourhood of Spain; our object is simply to reinforce the garrisons of the south. In this sense you must particularly explain yourself with M. Zéa. . . . We desire to think that in the measure under discussion the cabinet of Madrid will see much more readily a motive of security than a subject of alarm. While instructing you to declare that the King was ready to afford his support to the government of the young Queen, in the manner and degree that might be judged useful and appropriate, we have, M. le Comte, entirely laid aside all the suspicions and fears which, under other circumstances, might be engendered by reading the determination published this day in the 'Moniteur.'"

But when our offers of support and M. Mignet reached Madrid, the disposition of the Spanish government was materially changed. The Carlist movements had commenced; the approaching entry of Don Carlos into Spain was announced; inquietude rapidly possessed the partisans and ministers of the Queen; their jealousy of all prospective intervention on our part disappeared; and no sooner had M. Zéa received the communication of M. de Rayneval, than, far from evincing the slightest dissatisfaction or jealousy, he hastened to publish it officially, and in

terms which materially enlarged its bearing. "The King of the French," said the "Madrid Gazette" of the 12th of October, "offers to the Queen Regent, for the maintenance of her authority and the throne of Queen Isabella, all the support which, under any circumstances, she may consider it desirable to require."

On reading this article and the despatches acquainting him with the sense entertained at Madrid, and which, with somewhat more of reserve, M. de Rayneval himself seemed to entertain of his first instructions, the Duke de Broglie became seriously uneasy. The King's ministry had never intended to place itself thus at the absolute disposition of the Spanish government, and to pledge itself to their support "under any circumstances whatever, and at their simple demand." In his correspondence with our ambassador at Madrid, and in his interviews with the Count de Colombi, the Spanish chargé d'affaires at Paris, and brother of M. Zéa, the Duke hastened to correct the error, and to restore to his instructions their just interpretation. "The prior conduct of M. Zéa," he wrote on the 20th of October to M. de Rayneval, "has not prepared us for what seems to be such a prompt and striking deviation from his own principles. . . . . We have no desire whatever to interfere, by armed force, in the affairs of Spain; such a proceeding would be for us, on the contrary, an extremity much to be deplored. Neither do we pretend to support the existing government of Spain under every step it may take, or every incident that may occur, in every line of conduct it may adopt; and

in every position in which events may place it. Our wish was to recognise this government openly, to give it strength and courage by declaring that it might depend on our friendship, and by showing ourselves disposed to listen favourably to its demands if reduced to prefer them; but without dispossessing ourselves of the inherent right of every government to form its own judgment on the opportunity, the nature, and the extent of support accorded." The Duke de Broglie had good reason for expressly reserving this right, for M. Zéa, before being apprized of it, and building on his own version of the first instructions, addressed to the French government, on the 21st of October, the extravagant demand that French troops should immediately post themselves on the frontiers, and that the general commanding them should be placed under the orders of the French ambassador in Spain, their entry to depend entirely on advices from Madrid. The King's government consented to approach troops to the frontier, but formally refused to remit thus the right of declaring war into the hands of their ambassador.

Struck with the necessity of allowing no doubt to remain, either on the minds of our own agents or of the Spaniards themselves, as to the intentions of the King's government, and admitting with noble frankness whatever his first words might have contained of excess or obscurity, the Duke de Broglie wrote thus to M. de Rayneval, on the 13th of November 1833: —"Your despatch No. 103 has particularly arrested my attention. Equally with M. Zéa you have con-

cluded, from the explanations given by me to M. de Colombi, that the idea of the King's government had changed since the day when I authorized you to offer our support to the Regent. Nothing of the kind has taken place. When, informed of the death of Ferdinand VII., it became necessary for us to deliberate on the attitude to be assumed and the course to be followed, it was decided at once that we should manifest our interest for the cause of the young Queen Isabella by something more than a simple recognition.

"Desiring, moreover, that our readiness to declare in favour of this cause should not be interpreted at Madrid as implicating any project of controlling the government of the Regent, or of inducing it to adopt measures repugnant to its own views, we have determined not to act, in any case, without the express demand of that government, and to undertake nothing definitively, except in the manner and degree it may judge desirable. But, at the same time, we have positively established that it is our intention to hold ourselves free to examine, discuss, comply with, or refuse whatever may be required of us on the part of Spain; and it is with this object that your instructions specify nothing distinctly with regard to the nature of the support you are authorized to offer to her Catholic Majesty. Such, Count, have been, from the first moment, the system and intentions of the King's government. I thought I had sufficiently explained them in my despatch of the 4th of October; I was far from anticipating that it would from thence be concluded at Madrid that we placed ourselves,

under all contingencies, purely and simply at the disposal of the Spanish cabinet. There has been a mistake on my part, and I feel called upon to admit that my despatch was very incomplete, as you have yourself adopted a similar interpretation with that of M. Zéa. Be that as it may, as soon as this interpretation became known to me by the letter which M. de Colombi received from his brother, I have felt bound to explain myself with him, and to re-establish our relative positions such as we had understood and arranged them. It would have been dangerous for Spain, and painful to us, not to have acknowledged and rectified this misunderstanding until the day when the cabinet of Madrid might have addressed to us one of those demands the necessary rejection of which would have led to a most serious compromise. I have therefore, in my explanations with M. de Colombi, been careful not to retract the promise of the King's government; I have only repeated it in its true significance, and divested it of a commentary it by no means admitted. Finally, I have corrected the mistake as soon as it came to my knowledge."

The Duke de Broglie did not stop here. In his interviews with M. de Colombi he entered fully on the question of the armed intervention of France, and laid before him the leading reasons which ought to deter Spain from such a resource. "The three Northern powers," he said, "may delay recognizing the new government of Spain, but they will avoid declaring against it, and will remain neutral as long as they see it trust chiefly to itself for establishment.

You may be assured it would be quite otherwise as soon as they ascertained that a French army had entered the Spanish territory. Besides, you cannot conceal from yourselves that this very intervention, which, regarded as a probable eventuality, already excites so much attention in London, would give rise to parliamentary embarrassments in the British cabinet, the reaction of which would inevitably be felt in Spain to the detriment of the Queen's cause. In fine, as long as her government proceeds and acts on its own strength, it remains free to consult only the exigencies of its position as they may present themselves; while we, on our part, preserve the entire liberty of not mixing ourselves up with what are exclusively the internal affairs of Spain. But you are sufficiently acquainted with the laws and necessities of the system under which we live, to comprehend that, if you solicit the aid of our arms, public opinion in France would then impose on us certain obligations which would become, in fact, so many conditions attached to the despatch of that succour."

M. de Colombi and M. Zéa suffered themselves, or at least assumed the air of suffering themselves, to be persuaded; but we here encountered the first symptoms of the position preparing for us in our relations with Spain. In the midst of this people, so haughty and persevering in their passions, the different political parties had no strongly established confidence in themselves, and evinced a singular promptness in calling for foreign assistance. The remembrance of the French expedition in 1823, and of its rapid

success for the delivery of Ferdinand VII., was present to all minds; and, after 1833, the constitutional Spaniards yielded at once to the temptation of being quickly and easily saved by France, as the absolutists had been ten years before. For parties as well as for governments, it is the last trial of wisdom and courage to restrain the influence of the impressions of the moment, and, in their conduct, to know how to assign to considerations of the future the full place they are entitled to hold.

To assist M. Zéa, whose character we held in honour, we did all that could be done without promising direct intervention, and without pledging ourselves to the consequences of his policy. We offered him facilities for restoring the finances of Spain by contracting a foreign loan; we gave orders that on the request of General Llassder, Captain-General of Catalonia, 6000 muskets should be delivered to him, and that the fortress of St. Sebastian, threatened by the insurgent Carlists, should be provisioned. M. de Rayneval used all his efforts to bring the liberals and M. Zéa together, and to win over their support for him. But the honest servant of Ferdinand VII. attempted an impossibility in endeavouring to satisfy a party who in the accession of Queen Isabella saw their victory, without accepting either the principles or leaders. Opposition sprang up on all sides; the captains-general appointed by M. Zéa set the example of disobedience, and almost of menace. We were so strongly impressed by the state of parties in Spain, that the Duke de Broglie felt it necessary to write in

detail on this point to M. de Rayneval, to call upon him to point out the impending dangers to M. Zéa, and to ask him how he proposed to dissipate them.[1] By the time this despatch reached Madrid, the Queen Regent, notwithstanding the esteem and confidence she entertained for M. Zéa, had ceased to support him. On the 16th of January 1834, the leader of the moderates of the court vacated office, and the chief of the moderates of the liberal opposition, M. Martinez de la Rosa, was called to replace him.

When I first became acquainted with M. Martinez de la Rosa, he was far indeed removed from power, and probably never expected to exercise it in his own country. After five years of detention, at first in a dungeon, and subsequently in the *Presidios* (fortress) of Ceuta, from no other cause than having been a member of the Cortes from 1812 to 1814, and also in 1820, he had in 1823 exchanged captivity for exile, and lived as a refugee in Paris, seeking and finding in letters a consolation for the weight of inactivity at a distance from his native land. He called on me one day, to speak of an historical drama, *Aben Humaya, or the Revolt of the Moors under Philip II.*, which he was on the point of bringing out at one of our theatres. He explained to me the plot, and read several scenes which inspired me with much interest; but while listening to the work, I was singularly arrested by the author. His physiognomy, at the same time grave, animated, and somewhat melancholy, the noble

[1] See Historic Documents, No. III.

simplicity of his manners, the learned elegance of his language, the candid elevation of his sentiments, his perseverance, calm and without gall, in his political opinions, the evident fruit of conviction rather than of passion or pride,—his entire person and conversation impressed me with a lofty idea of his moral character and general acquirements. I little foresaw that this generous and eloquent spirit would one day be summoned to govern his country; but I felt convinced that he would never fail to reflect honour on it.

His advent to power was extremely popular. It was the first return of the liberal party, and the first step towards a constitutional system. A rapid accord took place between the new cabinet and the council of regency established by the will of Ferdinand VII. near the Queen-mother. The Marquis de las Amarillas, president of this council, an enlightened and influential person, had contributed much to the formation of the ministry, and prided himself on having done so. Useful and approved measures signalized its accession, and attested its sound direction. The news from the Basque provinces assumed a better aspect. The public, for the moment, felt satisfied, and hope appeared to dawn for the future.

But the hopes of parties are imperative and impatient. The liberals expected from the cabinet the immediate convocation of the Cortes, and the re-establishment of the constitutional system. M. Martinez de la Rosa also proposed this object to him-

self, but to reach it, and before gaining it, there were many difficult questions to solve. What should be the power and form of the Cortes? what the mode of their election, the rules of their relations with the Queen's government and the old municipal institutions of the country? How, at this pinnacle of the state, could a division and accordance be made between national traditions and modern ideas? It could neither be the mere nominal Cortes of the last century nor the sovereign Cortes of 1810 which it was sought to restore: a new and complex political order was to be formed. M. Martinez de la Rosa reflected, deliberated, hesitated, and delayed. He was much more a man of principle and meditation than of action. A crowd of difficulties and exigencies rose up in his mind to which the public gave no heed. It is the disposition of serious and devoted scholars to live in their own thoughts rather than in an instinctive and habitual sympathy with the ideas and impressions of the public. They require to satisfy themselves as much, and perhaps more than the spectators who watch and wait on them. M. Martinez de la Rosa was not alone under the empire of this bias. It reigned also in the Council of Regency, his associated and compelled support. "We must prepare for the assembly of the Cortes," said the Marquis de las Amarillas to M. de Rayneval, "but there is no occasion to hurry the convocation of that body; when done, it must be according to the old forms, and without altering too much the existing constitution: prudence requires that we should be cautious in scaring

the people of Spain by words to which their ears are not accustomed; as far as possible, we must use while rejuvenating our old institutions. England has followed this course, and has become as free, enlightened, and flourishing a country as any in the world, without having to this day a written constitution." M. de Rayneval disputed not the importance of this circumspection; but, as an impartial and free observer, he, and we also in Paris, felt extremely anxious as to the dangers which the Spanish cabinet might incur from indecision and delay on the leading point of its mission. "The sentiments which M. Martinez de la Rosa and M. de las Amarillas have manifested to you," the Duke de Broglie wrote, on the 25th of January 1834, to the ambassador, "cannot fail to augment the esteem with which they have inspired us, and the confidence we were disposed to place in their wisdom. Nevertheless I shall not conceal from you that, in the plan of conduct they appear to have traced out, one point has surprised us. The idea we had formed of the new ministry was, that we could only see it in one of the elements of a system which ought to be completed by the immediate convocation of the Cortes. We are far from pretending that if the question could be laid down in an abstract form, if it could be isolated from the general condition of minds, there might not be a real advantage in gradually preparing and ripening a determination so important in its consequences for the future of Spain. But, at the point which things have now reached, would not this advantage be more than balanced by the incon-

veniences inseparable from a system of temporizing? . . . . . Is there not an actual danger in leaving the different parties time to enter upon delicate discussions on the nature and form of the Cortes to be convoked? Are there no grounds for fearing that, by the effect of these discussions, the government may lose something of the absolute liberty which still belongs to it as to the mode of convocation and organization of the Cortes; or, at least, that the resolution it may take at a later period on this important point,—and which adopted now, whatever it might be, would be hailed with enthusiasm and gratitude,—may fail to obtain such unanimous approbation when specious theories, adroitly put forward, shall have seduced and led away inexperienced minds? Ought it not to be expected that the regency, by the anxiety it will evince to satisfy all reasonable desires of public opinion, will surround itself with a popularity which may hereafter give it the necessary strength to resist the exaggerated pretensions of parties? It is in this view, Count, that you will regulate your intercourse with M. Martinez de la Rosa and the other members of the ministry and of the Council of Regency."

Facts were not slow in justifying the apprehensions of the Duke de Broglie, and in demonstrating the necessity of prompt determinations and settled questions. The hopes conceived on the accession of the new cabinet soon transformed themselves into exigencies, and exigencies into errors. Financial discontent added itself to political misunderstanding.

To restore the dilapidated and disordered revenues of Spain, a loan was indispensable; to accomplish a loan, credit had to be re-established; to obtain credit, Spain was called upon to show that she was willing and able to discharge her debts. The fate of the old loans, contracted since 1814, whether royal or revolutionary, were to be determined with equity and without delay. We urged Spain to clear off these questions of natural order, as well as others of political organization; we suggested plans and offered aid. But on this point, as on the convocation of the Cortes, the Spanish government demurred and protracted, and the hesitation of the government excited a ferment in the country. "You have foreseen the discredit which the new ministry has already brought on itself," M. de Rayneval wrote to the Duke de Broglie, on the 1st of March 1834; "discontent increases every day, and appears even stronger in the provinces than in Madrid. The most vexatious symptom, in my opinion, is that M. Martinez de la Rosa does not seem to be aware of the state of public opinion. He sees everything on the fair side; a dangerous tendency in a statesman. I know positively that within the last few days he received a very alarming report from General Dander on the state of Catalonia. The Superintendent-General of Police has laid before him a highly discouraging picture of the condition of the provinces in general. He persists in saying, and, what is worse, in believing, that all goes on for the best. At the same time he defers from one day to another the work relative to

the convocation of the Cortes which he has undertaken, and to which, he says, he wishes to put the last hand before submitting it to the Council of Regency. Such a state of things cannot evidently continue; the slightest untoward event may not only overthrow the ministry, but plunge all Spain into irremediable anarchy. A prompt remodelling of the cabinet seems to me indispensable. I say *remodelling*, and not *a total change*, because I think it important, although his popularity is no longer intact, to retain M. Martinez de la Rosa, an honest man of recognized integrity, and who may be extremely useful to the government on the assembly of the Cortes, from his ability as an orator, which, in fact, is his brilliant side." M. de Rayneval then named as the auxiliary indicated by general opinion to reinforce and animate the ministry, the Count of Toreno, a man of action, it was said, an able financier, influential amongst the moderate liberals, better suited than M. Martinez de la Rosa to treat with the extreme section of that party without surrendering himself up to them, and who, although he had refused at first, seemed now disposed to join the cabinet, to promote the adoption of those measures of which he felt the urgent necessity.

A few days after the arrival of this information from M. de Rayneval, the King's government, more and more impressed by the affairs of Spain, and the perils of the existing authority in that country, decided on instructing our ambassador to communicate without reserve to the Queen Regent herself the

solicitude we were under, and to induce her to delay no longer the convocation of the Cortes, the natural consequence of the accession, and the necessary support of the power of the Queen her daughter. By two despatches of the 18th and 19th of March, the Duke de Broglie communicated these instructions to M. de Rayneval, in terms equally clear and kind. There was no allusion to any particular name or ministerial combination. M. de Rayneval was even directed to apprize M. Martinez de la Rosa of the step which the King prescribed to his ambassador.[1] It occurred most opportunely, for the despatches arrived at Madrid at the moment when M. Martinez de la Rosa had just finished his work on the constitutional system of Spain, and was preparing to lay it before the Queen Regent. He presented it, in fact, in the form of a report, dated the 4th of April, and signed by all the ministers. As a sequel to this report came the *Royal Statute* which regulated the organization, functions, and privileges of the general Cortes of the kingdom. Adopted and signed by the Queen Regent on the 10th of April, the Royal Statute was proclaimed on the 15th at Madrid; and on the 20th of May following a royal decree regulated provisionally the mode of election of the chamber called *des Procuradores*, by confining the electoral operations to the 20th of June, and naming the 26th of July for the solemn opening of the Cortes themselves.

If peoples who desire to be free would hold them-

[1] See Historic Documents, No. IV.

selves bound to be rational, the Spaniards might have acknowledged that their impatience as to the tardiness of M. Martinez de la Rosa was unreasonable, and the merit of his work might have made them forget that it had held them some little time in expectation. The cabinet had not yet been formed for three months, and he had on his hands to prepare and regulate a new government in the midst of a civil war. The Royal Statute manifested a rare intelligence of the conditions of reviving liberty in the bosom of an old social system. M. Martinez de la Rosa had not surrendered himself to the presumptuous and chimerical mania of creation; he did not pretend to organize anew the entire state; he took the actual position of society and the Spanish monarchy as pre-existing and incontestable facts, which he was called upon to reform and complete according to the necessities and lights of our own days, but, by respecting and strengthening rather than by destroying, to reconstruct them. The Royal Statute was neither an abstract declaration of principles and rights, nor a general and systematized constitution. It was the strong resurrection of the Cortes of the kingdom, calculated not only to control power, but to exercise over the entire course of government an effective influence, and to bring in gradually all the reforms of which public desire, controlled as it was by free discussion and the features of the times, might impress the necessity. The decree contained neither the dogma nor the language of the sovereignty of the people; it was the intervention of the country in its own government, tempered by patriotic and loyal sincerity, equally

divested of timid precautions and arrogant pretences; and the report addressed to the Queen Regent, which preceded the statute, was a serious and graceful, though a somewhat prolix, exposition of the essential conditions of the representative system, such as they appear in the present age to soundly thinking minds, according to the arguments of science and the experience of policy.

At the moment of its publication this act was received in Spain with general approbation. The constitutional royalists were really gratified. Their satisfaction, and the general accordance of the public, imposed silence, and even the appearance of content, on the more ardent liberals. The journals, numerous, and free in their opinions, were almost unanimous in eulogium. M. Martinez de la Rosa enjoyed at that crisis, both as a politician and an author, one of those pure and personal gratifications which replace the anxieties and fatigues of a difficult labour by the conviction of a great work accomplished, and worthy of durability. But constitutional labours in our days experience the lot which, according to Tacitus, attended the loves of the Romans,—their success is short and of evil augury. The Royal Statute of M. Martinez de la Rosa had a rival in Spain, which might keep silence for a time, but waited only the propitious moment for declaring war. This was the constitution decreed at Cadiz in 1812 by the Cortes of the struggle for national independence, and restored at Madrid in 1820 by the Cortes of the revolution,—a work inspired by ideas and passions essentially opposed to

those which had dictated the Royal Statute. The thorough reconstruction of the political edifice; the absolute sovereignty of the people,—which means of numbers; the unity of the representative assembly; universal suffrage without conditions; the complete separation of the legislative and executive power; the interdiction to the members of the sitting Cortes of being excluded from the Cortes immediately following: —all these radical and revolutionary theories were proclaimed and drawn up as laws in the constitution of 1812, with more vigour than they had been in France, in 1791, by the National Convention itself. It was the Republic, "one and indivisible," reducing the old royalty under its yoke, and taking it into its service. And to sustain this cause it had a party already formed, ripe for contest, and accustomed to rule; leaders known to the country, who in evil days had defended its independence and vindicated its rights; full of false ideas and noble sentiments, bad publicists, sincere patriots, and self-sufficient authors. The royal statute shocked their political convictions and wounded their personal vanity. Far from satisfying, M. Martinez de la Rosa by his edict had irritated and rallied them against him. Thenceforward he found himself placed between the Carlists and the revolutionists: he had to sustain two civil wars, — one in full effervescence, the other ready to explode.

External affairs and the success attending them about this period somewhat distracted internal disorder. Although driven from Lisbon as from Oporto, Don Miguel still maintained in Portugal an obstinate

struggle against his niece Donna Maria. He had near his person the infant Don Carlos, who from the Portuguese frontier corresponded with his partisans in Spain, and fomented their insurrections and their hopes. M. Martinez de la Rosa resolved to put an end to this anarchical hostility between the two kingdoms. He concerted with Don Pedro, still Regent for his daughter, and on the 16th of April 1834, at the very time when the Royal Statute was promulgated in Madrid, a Spanish army, under the command of General Rodil, entered Portugal to drive out Don Carlos and Don Miguel. The Spanish minister in London, the Count of Florida-Blanca, received at the same time with the envoy of Portugal, M. Moraez Sarmento, instructions to demand from the English government their co-operation in attaining this object. Both designs met with equal and prompt success. General Rodil advanced rapidly into Portugal, driving before him and dispersing the troops of Don Miguel, and on the 13th of April a treaty, to which the signatures alone were wanting, was concluded at London between England, Spain, and Portugal, stipulating that the two Queens should unite their forces to expel both the Infants from the Peninsula, and that England would send ships of war to the coasts of Portugal to second them in their enterprise.

At this point of the negotiation M. de Talleyrand,—informed, as certain evidences say, by the Count of Florida-Blanca, and, according to others, by Lord Palmerston himself, who, it was said, proposed to him the accession of France to the treaty already arranged

between the three powers,—forwarded an account to his cabinet of what was passing, and demanded instructions. It was not without some surprise that we received this tardy communication, and Admiral de Rigny, our minister of Foreign Affairs after the retirement of the Duke de Broglie, hastened to impart it to M. de Rayneval at Madrid, saying to him: "They intended at first to leave us simply the faculty of acceding to this treaty by a separate act. M. de Talleyrand having represented that we could not accept such a secondary attitude, it is now proposed to us to take a more direct part in appearance, by means of stipulations inserted in the body of the treaty, which would imply in substance that in consideration of our close union with England we had been invited to join this alliance, that we had consented, and that if it took place we should co-operate for the expulsion of the two pretenders, according to mutual agreement. You see that in reality the second project differs little from the first, and bears almost equally on the objection raised by our ambassador, since it represents us as merely interposing in the arrangement in question under the auspices of England. I have written to M. de Talleyrand instructing him to propose a counter-project, according to which the contracting parties would be placed in a less unequal position. In case this measure should not be adopted, the council would then deliberate on the course to be taken. I have no occasion to tell you, Count, that in demanding this modification we are moved by no vain susceptibility, but we bow to

questions of general interest . . . . . In the actual situation of Spain, we believe that everything which might tend to represent that country as not acting in the most perfect accord with France, would teem with dangers for the Queen's government. . . . . The partisans of Don Carlos, if they saw France co-operate with less readiness than England, or remain entirely unconnected with an act directed against them, would not fail to assume that we withdraw our support from the Queen Regent, or that we desire at least to remain neuter. . . . . If then we regret that another direction has not been given to the London negotiation, it is, above all, in a friendly spirit towards Spain. We are the more compelled to feel surprise that a Spanish diplomatist, who might be supposed to be well acquainted with the disposition of his government, should lend himself to an arrangement as little conformable to the true interests of his country as to the ties that unite her to France; and our astonishment redoubles when we refer to the note by which, on the 27th of January last, M. Martinez de la Rosa demanded our co-operation to drive Don Carlos from Portugal,—a note which Count Florida-Blanca must of necessity be acquainted with."

The apology, somewhat embarrassed, of the Spanish government, was speedily offered. "I have hastened to see M. Martinez de la Rosa," replied M. de Rayneval to Admiral de Rigny, on the 2nd of May. "He was little prepared to expect such a prompt dénouement of the negotiation carried on by M. de Florida-Blanca. He has confirmed to me what you

assumed, that that minister has exceeded his instructions, or, to speak more correctly, that he has acted without instructions, and even without powers. He was surprised himself[1] at the unexpected facility of the British cabinet; it was, as we may express it, for the acquittal of his conscience that he addressed to it the note, the translation of which was appended to your despatches.[2] It appears to me certain that it was not as a deliberate proposal, still less as the result of instructions from his government, that he has adopted, as regards France, the step with which you reproach him. He has obeyed, without reflection, the impulse which the Portuguese envoy, or perhaps even the English cabinet, has imparted to him. Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of what I have several times suggested to you,—the little anxiety of England to admit us into any transactions relative to Portugal. But if M. de Florida-Blanca did not at first feel the full value of our participation in the convention of the 22nd of April, it was not so with M. Martinez de la Rosa. At once he recognized this as the most important point for Spain, and that without it the treaty would be an act of inferior value."

At London also, when the French cabinet, while expressing its surprise at the silence maintained as to this negotiation, rejected the secondary position proposed in the treaty, the necessity of a change of attitude was speedily felt. The counter-project presented by M. de Talleyrand was accepted, in spite of the

[1] That is to say, the Count Florida-Blanca.

[2] That note was dated the 10th of April 1834.

dissatisfaction warmly expressed by Lord Palmerston, and, on the 24th of April, Admiral de Rigny was enabled to write thus to M. de Rayneval:—"The treaty I named to you in my despatch of the 18th was signed yesterday, and M. de Talleyrand forwards to you directly a copy. You will see that justice has been done to our objections against the completion of the arrangement at first submitted to us."

Some have traced in this proceeding of the English cabinet a proof of the ill-feeling, and indeed, it has been often said, of the hatred of Lord Palmerston towards France. I believe this to be a mistake. Lord Palmerston has neither hatred nor ill-will towards France. He is an Englishman who serves England, and his sentiments vary with his conduct, according to what, in his eyes, the interest of his country requires. It may be said, and I incline to think, that he gives himself up too exclusively to this patriotic egotism, and that, in his zeal for the success and political honour of England, he estimates too slightly the moral sentiments and necessities of natural justice which modern civilization has developed in men's minds on the subject of international relations. Patriotic egotism is legitimate, provided it does not too much resemble the rude indifference of the barbarous ages. But to this disposition Lord Palmerston adds another, which in the exercise of affairs embraces serious inconveniences. The special question of the moment with which he is occupied engages him to this extreme point, that it sets aside every other consideration and idea. Although of a

singularly active spirit, fertile, sagacious, and vigorous, he has not that permanent grandeur of imagination and thought which never loses sight of things in their entire scope, and which assigns to every interest and to every separate affair the exact place and degree of importance which belongs to it in the general system of the interests and affairs of the country. He incessantly forgets the extended policy in which he is engaged, and which, in his mind, becomes concentrated in each distinct question as it successively presents itself, and is treated by him with energetic ability, but without foresight. To preserve a good understanding with France was, in 1834, the sincere object of the cabinet to which he belonged, as it was also his own wish; but when the active co-operation of the two powers was demanded in the Peninsula, Lord Palmerston thought only of maintaining the exclusive preponderance of England in Portugal, as if the affairs of that kingdom were not then closely linked to those of Spain; and of combating in Spain the influence of France, as if Louis XIV. and the family compact were still in existence. Hence arose his silence at the commencement of the negotiation, his eagerness to prepare the treaty without our concurrence, and his discontent when it became necessary to place us in our proper position. Without the influence of his colleagues, and particularly of Lord Grey, more careful than he was of the general policy of England, that position would have been more obstinately contested.

No sooner was the treaty of the quadruple alliance

concluded than it became effective. In Europe, the consequences surpassed the actual importance. It was generally received as a brilliant union of two great constitutional kingdoms in reply and as a counterpoise to the combination of the absolute monarchies. Neither the French nor the English cabinet intended to give it this bearing, but willingly accepted the interpretation. In Portugal, the treaty decided the defeat and retirement of the two pretenders. It reached Lisbon on the 5th of May, and, by the 26th, Don Miguel, beaten, pursued, and surrounded by the Spanish army and that of Don Pedro, capitulated at Evora, engaging, for a pension of 375,000 francs, never again to enter Portugal, and embarked for Italy. The Infant Don Carlos was completely forgotten in this capitulation; but the secretary to the English legation, Mr. Grant, more moved by the distress of that prince than was his royal ally, represented to the generals of Don Pedro the indignity of such an oversight, and on the same day signed with them certain articles in virtue of which the Infant, without condition or engagement on his part, was conducted in safety to the neighbouring small port of Aldea-Gallega, and from thence immediately embarked for England.

On the first rumour of this part of the arrangement, M. Martinez de la Rosa evinced the most lively uneasiness. "He is extremely dissatisfied," wrote M. de Rayneval to Admiral de Rigny, "that in regulating the departure and embarkation of Don Carlos, it has not been imposed on him as a condition to con-

tract an engagement similar to that required from Don Miguel. On the eve preceding the day when he received intelligence of the approaching departure of Don Carlos, in a conference which Mr. Villiers and I held with him, he expressed his desire that the Infant should not be permitted to quit Portugal until the powers who had signed the treaty of London agreed as to the place of his future residence." And on the same day when M. de Rayneval penned this despatch, M. Martinez de la Rosa addressed a long note to him and to the English minister, in which, after laying open all the causes of his anxiety, he formally demanded "that Don Carlos should be called on for specific guarantees similar to those exacted from the Infant Don Miguel; that he should not be left at liberty to fix the place of his residence, as he might, for instance, make choice of some one of those states which had not yet recognized the legitimate Queen of Spain. Finally, that the contracting powers to the treaty of London should declare it available and still subsisting, although the immediate object had been attained, so that it might not become vain and illusory if one of the two princes, or both combined, were again to disturb the tranquillity of these kingdoms." "M. Martinez de la Rosa, who dreads extremely," wrote M. de Rayneval, "not that the departure of Don Carlos without guarantees for Spain can menace this country with real dangers, but that the result may cause the ministry to be taxed with improvidence and incapacity, desires most ardently that some means may be found of reparing the omission of which he complains."

The anxieties of M. Martinez de la Rosa were less personal and more soundly based than M. de Rayneval believed. Within fifteen days after his disembarkation in England, Don Carlos departed again, crossed the Channel, arrived on the 4th of July at Paris, on the 6th at Bordeaux, on the 8th at Bayonne; and on the 10th he was beyond the Pyrenees, at Elisondo, at the head, or, to speak more correctly, in the midst of an insurrection raised in his name.

Loud were the outcries against the inability or negligence of the police. It was said, to aggravate their fault, that Don Carlos had passed several days in Paris in one of the most frequented streets, and that he had made visits in an open carriage. The Prefect of Police, M. Gisquet, formally denied this assertion: "Don Carlos," he said, "only rested twenty-four hours in Paris; while there he shut himself up in his lodgings, and did not, as I believe, make known his presence to more than two of his devoted partisans."[1] Others, to account for the success of the Infant, have attached much value to the secret aid afforded to him, in the name of legitimacy, by the powers who had not yet recognized Queen Isabella,—a real aid, for we were compelled, shortly after the arrival of the Infant in Navarre, to withdraw the *exequatur* from the Prussian consul at Bayonne, who acted as intermediary in the correspondence of the insurgents; and the Duke de Frias, at that time ambassador from Spain in Paris, speaking with me one day of the pecuniary succours

[1] Memoirs of M. Gisquet, vol. i. pp. 511, 515.

furnished to Don Carlos by the Northern courts, assured me that he had himself intercepted a sum of 125,000 francs forwarded with that object. But neither the connivance of remote cabinets, always cold and parsimonious even in their favours, nor the insufficiency, faulty or inevitable, of the police, determined this first success of Don Carlos, or encouraged the boldness of a prince, otherwise timid and ordinary, to encounter such perils. He had in Spain and in Europe an actual political party, men convinced that the right was his, and for this sole reason ardent in his cause. It shows an incorrect knowledge of human nature to seek in incidents purely material the explanation of such enterprises and the obstinate perseverance attending them: we must look for higher causes,—faith, sound or erroneous, in a moral principle, and the passion for heroic adventures; the desire of re-establishing right, and also that of animating life by noble and stirring emotions. Here are the moving springs which urge men to risk and sacrifice everything, even the peace of their country; and civil war, which has proved so often the scourge of nations, is, in this sense at least, not their dishonour.

By a fatal coincidence, at the moment when the unexpected presence of Don Carlos in the Basque provinces redoubled the energy of the insurgents in that quarter, and revived throughout Spain the hopes of his partisans, the Cortes were on the point of assembling at Madrid, bringing back upon the scene nearly all the survivors of the Cortes of 1812 and 1820, with their theories, passions, and the ever-cherished

remembrance of their work,—of that radical constitution, the place of which was now occupied by the Royal Statute. And that nothing might be wanting to the conflagration, eight days before the meeting of the Cortés, the cholera broke out at Madrid with excessive violence, and excited those terrors and popular disorders of which political factions are so prompt and skilful in availing themselves. "I have sad events to announce to you," M. de Rayneval wrote to Admiral de Rigny on the 18th and 20th of July; "the uneasiness occasioned by the symptoms of the epidemic which had been observed in Madrid began to calm down, and all was prepared for the return of the Queen, when, suddenly, on the morning of the 16th, the cholera manifested itself throughout the entire city with unaccountable virulence. In a few hours it seized nearly three hundred victims. In the evening, a commencement of disorder became visible; those same reports of poisoning the fountains, which in all places have been eagerly received by the people, were circulated with surprising activity, and propagated more by malevolence than credulity. The priests, and especially the Jesuits, have been denounced as the authors of this imaginary crime. Yesterday morning, several monks were killed in the streets. At length the populace, excited by plotters, and accompanied, as is confidently asserted, by many members of the town guard, moved against the convent of the Jesuits, and of those of St. Thomas, and of the Fathers of Mercy. It seems that, at the first, resistance was offered, and that some shots were fired from

the windows on the assailants, who having forced the gates, laid violent hands upon all who were not able to escape. The exact number of those who perished is not known,—some speak of ten or twelve, others of thirty or forty. The two other convents having been evacuated in time by the monks, no lives were lost there, but the buildings were forced and completely pillaged. . . . . If this essay which the agitators have just made of their strength remains unpunished, the whole moral force of the government is destroyed from this moment, and it is not possible to see what rampart can be opposed to the revolutionary inundation which threatens it. . . . . The day of the 17th has clearly demonstrated that a disorganising party is formed in secret, and that it is much stronger than the cabinet, and M. Martinez de la Rosa in particular, had supposed. This movement, so sudden and violent, and the atrocities by which it has been accompanied, have deeply affected the First Minister. He has seen in a moment the destruction of his dearest hope,—that of arriving at a change of political order in Spain, without sullying the period during which he has played the leading part, with crimes or excesses. In unison with this sentiment, he experiences the fear that until now he has availed nothing, in not being able to restrain the extreme party."

In this melancholy state of public affairs and of his own mind, M. Martinez de la Rosa, nevertheless, was not found wanting either to his country or to himself. Since the month of June, he had gratified

a general desire, and strengthened his cabinet by calling the Count of Toreno to the Ministry of Finance. Two days after the disturbances which had stained Madrid with blood, he dismissed the various civil and military authorities who had shown themselves weak against the revolt. A royal decree interdicted under severe penalties every description of secret plot or seditious manifestation. "It remains to be proved," wrote M. de Rayneval, "whether all this will not confine itself, as too often happens here, to mere words, and whether the government will be strong enough to execute what it proposes." M. Martinez de la Rosa had, moreover, a pressing and delicate question to resolve. The Cortés were convoked for the 24th of July. Should he, on account of the cholera, which still continued to rage with violence, adjourn their opening, or if not, should the Queen-Regent return from Aranjuez, to impart, by her presence, that solemnity to the ceremony which the public looked for? Queen Christina and her Ministry, on these points, adopted the most courageous and worthiest course. The Cortés were not adjourned, and on the 24th of July, 1834, the Regent, seated on the left of the empty throne of the young Queen her daughter, inaugurated with a speech of remarkable dignity and frankness the dawn of the constitutional system in the Spanish monarchy.

On the eve of the same day, the attack of the constitution of 1812 against the Royal Statute of 1834 commenced. A plot was discovered, the object of which was to re-establish that constitution in the

midst of the royal session, and before any one, either Queen or nation, had taken oath to the Statute. The chief conspirators were arrested, and the cabinet had the mortification of finding amongst them one of the most heroic defenders of Spain, General Palafox, who a few days before had been created by the Queen-Regent, Duke of Saragossa, in commemoration of the glorious defence of that city;—a sad symptom of the disease of minds, and a deplorable prognostic of the struggle about to commence. Men whom Spain honoured, and on just grounds, for they were of those who had saved and wished to see her free, declared war upon the rising constitutional monarchy; and against other men, also sincere patriots and their former friends, because they refused to adopt political theories which tend to produce revolutions, but never establish liberty.

The entire session of the Cortés in the chamber of the *Procuradores* (Deputies) was taken up with the development of this war; and it burst forth especially on three questions: the address of the chamber in reply to the speech from the throne; a petition, which demanded a declaration of rights, a confused mixture of absolute maxims and promises in favour of the various public liberties which the Royal Statute had not regulated; and the details of finance, above all those of the different loans contracted in the name of Spain from 1814 to 1830. The same feature prevailed in all these debates. It was ever the revolutionary government of Spain, from 1810 to 1814, and from 1820 to 1823, disputing empire with the

constitutional system which, in accordance with the ancient royalty, the moderate politicians endeavoured to establish. Neither sincerity, nor talent, nor courage were wanting on either side. I do not hesitate to think and declare that in enlightenment, in the true spirit of policy and in intelligence, as well as in respect for the great moral laws which finally decide the fate of institutions and nations, the defenders of the Royal Statute had greatly the advantage over their adversaries; but they were engaged with liberal prejudices and popular passions, and their worthy leader, M. Martinez de la Rosa, had neither the practical tact and promptitude of resolution and action, nor the skilful management of men, which in all times, and particularly in stormy days, form the indispensable conditions of success in government. He sustained the debates with eloquence, he yielded concessions, he resigned himself to checks; but whether through his own fault, or the fatality of his position, the violence of the attack exceeded the power of resistance; and in this parliamentary struggle, where reason and power were on his side, the cabinet rapidly exhausted, instead of strengthening itself. It bowed at the same time under the pressure of civil war, becoming more obstinate from day to day. In vain the Cortés ardently denounced the Carlists; in vain the Cabinet despatched against Don Carlos in the Basque Provinces the conqueror of Don Miguel in Portugal, — General Rodil, with his army. The insurrection had found in Zumalacarreguy one of those improvised leaders, who at once display the qualities

29657

of a great soldier, a partisan, and a popular hero. After some successes at the outset, Rodil and his lieutenants met with nothing but repeated defeats. The Cabinet recalled him, and gave the command of the Queen's troops to Mina, flattering itself that the renown and skill of the veteran chief would triumph over his younger rival; but Mina, though always ardent and in favour with the enthusiastic party, was worn out and ill; some well-directed strokes, which marked his arrival, produced no decisive result, and the passions as well as the habits of the two opposing commanders rendered the war cruel even to ferocity. Mina threatened capital punishment to all who should be found on the high-road without sufficient reason, between the setting and the rising of the sun. Zumalacarreguy added to the order of the day issued to his troops, *victory or death.* On both sides no quarter was given on the field of battle, and when the fighting ended, prisoners were shot without mercy. Bands, at first suppressed, re-appeared in Arragon and Catalonia; others threatened to organise themselves in the provinces of the centre, the west, and the south. The more the acts and exhibitions of war became odious, the more its end appeared uncertain and perhaps impossible.

Then commenced with this people, so proud and independent, a strange phenomenon: on all sides they began to talk of the necessity of foreign interference. Not only in the provinces desolated by the war, but in Madrid; not only amongst the politicians, but with the soldiers; in the Cortes, in the Council of Regency,

in the bosom of the cabinet, it was declared that foreign intervention alone could put an end to this struggle. Deputies arrived from Biscay and from Navarre, to declare to the government that such was their advice and desire. The moderate members of the Cortés waited upon M. Martinez de la Rosa to express the same conviction. General Llassder, now Minister of War, held similar language to M. de Rayneval. General Cordova, returning from the army, explained himself in the same sense. The Marquis de las Amarillas said frankly in the Council of Regency: "The forces at the disposal of government for the reduction of the insurgent provinces are insufficient. There are only three methods of obtaining this result: the first is a convention with these provinces—a means indicated at a period already remote by the Council of Regency, and which to-day presents many difficulties and few chances of success; the second, the mediation of the French government, which, with this object, should receive full powers from the Spanish authorities, and would become guarantee for the stipulations agreed upon; the third, the armed intervention of France." Before the question thus laid down, the Count of Toreno maintained an attitude of reserve, for the moment more opposed than favourable to intervention. M. Martinez de la Rosa loudly rejected the idea. "Even though all Spain should call for French interference," he had said, at the time of signing the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, "there was at least one Spaniard who would oppose it, and that Spaniard was himself." Without holding, at the close of the year 1834, a lan-

guage so absolute, he persisted in his opposition against all appeal to foreign arms to settle the quarrels of the Spaniards amongst themselves. Two small printed circulars, which announced the entry of a French army into Spain, had been hawked about the streets of Madrid, authorised, it was said, by the police themselves. M. Martinez de la Rosa formally interdicted to the blind men, the professional public criers of the capital, any distribution of printed or written bills not sanctioned by the approbation of the censorship. It was the First Minister, standing almost alone, who maintained the dignity of the country against public disquietude and impatience.

When transmitting this intelligence to us, M. de Rayneval added his own idea, and showed that he also felt convinced that the armed intervention of France alone could stifle the civil war in Spain, and rescue the throne of Queen Isabella from the dangers with which it was menaced.

We were equally grieved and surprised at the state of events beyond the Pyrenees. Not that we entertained the slightest doubt of our right to judge freely of them, and to act only in accordance with the interests of France. I have already said with what care, immediately after the accession of Queen Isabella, the Duke de Broglie had explained and established our notion on this point. We had neglected nothing since then to maintain the liberty of our resolutions, and to impress them thoroughly upon the Spanish government.

On learning the arrival of Don Carlos in the

Basque Provinces, Admiral de Rigny wrote as follows to M. de Rayneval: "You cannot be too careful, not only in declining any request that may be proposed to you for effectual intervention, but also in preventing, if possible, the occurrence of such an idea to the Spanish ministry; and if it should decide on asking that description of aid from us, you must sedulously avoid any ground for anticipating our decision. . . . . The revolt of three or four small provinces, which collectively do not exceed in population and extent one of our ordinary departments, and in which the towns have remained faithful to the government, seems to me utterly insufficient to justify an appeal to foreign force. La Vendée, on several repetitions, has presented very different obstacles to a government surrounded by external enemies. We have triumphed over them nevertheless, still less by force than by the action of time, by the lassitude of the people themselves, and by substituting a mixture of prudence to the measures of terror which had been employed in the first instance. Nay, it was also said that it would be found impossible to subdue by regular means an insurrection which lasted not a few months, but several years. The event has proved the contrary. It is in this sense that you must express yourself, should you have reason to believe that our interference is likely to be called for." [1]

While holding this language, we were warmly disposed to hasten to the aid of the Spanish government,

[1] Despatches of the 16th and 22nd of July, and of the 12th of December, 1834.

and to give it moral strength, as the indirect means which it required to be enabled to avail itself effectually of its own resources. M. Martinez de la Rosa had expressed a desire that, by an official act, the contracting powers to the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance should declare it applicable to the new circumstances in which the return of Don Carlos had placed Spain. We hastened to satisfy this wish, and on the 18th of August, 1834, additional articles were signed in London, to the following effect: 1. His Majesty the King of the French pledges himself to adopt in that portion of his States which borders on Spain the measures best calculated to prevent the despatch of any kind of succour, whether in men, arms, or ammunition, from the French territory to the Spanish insurgents. 2. His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland engages to supply to Her Catholic Majesty all the succour in arms and ammunition that Her Catholic Majesty may require, and in addition, to assist her with naval forces should such become necessary." In fact, we redoubled our vigilance on the frontier of the Pyrenees, to prevent the Carlist insurrection from receiving any aid in France. We reinforced the service of the customs, and established posts of circulating gendarmerie. It was then that we withdrew the *exequatur* from the Prussian Consul, through whom the correspondence of the insurgents had passed: and on the 22nd of July, 1834, Admiral de Rigny wrote thus to M. de Rayneval:—"It might possibly suit the Spanish government to take into its pay some

portion of the foreign legion we have at present in Africa. Should it be so, we might perhaps furnish four or five thousand armed men, to be disembarked at Carthagena." We offered and rendered to the Spanish monarchy all the good offices it could expect from sincere allies, who only rejected the perspective of having to answer for its destinies by placing their forces at its unrestrained disposal.

" But Spain and the Spanish government were in prey to other dangers than those of the civil war in the Basque Provinces. At one time, by taking advantage of those dangers and the anxious irritation they excited in the country, at another by their own direct and personal impulse, the radical party waged from day to day a more determined and formidable war against the Ministry and the Royal Statute. Within the Chambers, M. Martinez de la Rosa, and M. de Toreno, resisted with courage and ability sometimes effectual;—the Chamber of the *Proceres* (Nobles) supported them firmly; and in the Chamber of the *Procuradores* (Deputies) they alternately lost and regained a majority, always uncertain: but externally, power was absolutely deficient in unity and means of action. The remains of the old local liberties, and the inexperienced attempts of new liberties equally supplied causes of anarchy. Attacks against the moderate cabinet blazed forth on all sides; now to demand the constitution of 1812, and now for the sole gratification of revolutionary passions. The spirit of revolt reached the army itself. On the 18th of January, 1835, at Madrid, eight hundred

men of the 2nd regiment of the light infantry of Arragon broke out, crying, "Liberty for ever, down with the ministers!" The Captain-General of Old Castille, General Comtérac, ran to call them to order, and fell under several musket shots. They seized the Post Office, defended themselves there against the loyal troops, and escaped with no other punishment than that of joining, in the Basque Provinces, the army fighting against the Carlists. In February, March, and April, at Malaga, Saragossa, and in Murcia; in one place against an order of discipline issued by the Minister of War; in another against an interdiction of the Archbishop, who was unwilling that the choristers of the cathedral should sing patriotic airs in the theatre, violent popular seditions disturbed the public peace, ending always with the cry, "Long live the constitution of 1812," and in the massacre of several monks. The mutual barbarities of the civil war in the Basque Provinces had excited a vivid sentiment of reprobation in Europe. The English cabinet had despatched to Biscay a special commissioner, Lord Elliot, to endeavour to put a stop to them, and we had formally concurred in the object of his mission. A convention was, in consequence, concluded on the 28th of April 1835, between General Valdez, who had succeeded Mina, and Zumalacarreguy, to this effect: "That the lives of prisoners should be respected, that they should be exchanged two or three times per month, and that no one should be put to death for his political opinions without being tried and condemned according to the existing

laws of Spain." This act of strict justice and simple humanity excited in the Chamber of the *Procuradores* a violent storm. It was, they said, the fruit of foreign influence. Why had the ministers sanctioned any treaty with Zumalacarreguy, a leader of rebels? It was demanded, and the motion was adopted, that the treaty should be communicated to the Chambers, who would examine its motives; and on the 11th of May, at the conclusion of a sitting in which M. Martinez de la Rosa had courageously defended the treaty, a popular assembly intercepted his passage, and pursued him to his residence with insults, and the cry of "Long live the Constitution!"

So many contests and perils, and so much helplessness in the presence of two opposing enemies, exhausted the confidence and wearied the patience of M. Martinez de la Rosa himself. The Council of Regency combined with the Council of Ministers, and on the 17th of May, 1835, a resolution was there unanimously adopted; "to demand the armed co-operation of the powers who had signed the treaty of the 22nd of April, 1834," especially of France, the only one whose action in favour of Spain could be decisive."

The demand was not unlooked-for. M. de Rayneval had announced it to us, supported by all the arguments his own personal convictions could suggest; and before we received it, the Duke de Broglie, in a despatch of the 23rd of May 1835, had forewarned the King's ambassador of our answer, by explaining to him the motives which opposed the

intervention.[1] Called upon for a positive resolution, we had not only to debate the question ourselves, but to concert on the point with England; for the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, in the same article appealed to by Spain, expressly declared that, "In case the co-operation of France should be judged necessary by the high contracting parties, to obtain completely the object of this treaty, His Majesty the King of the French engages to act in this respect as may be decided in common accord between him and his three august allies."

Thus explicitly laid down, the question was scrupulously debated, both in the assembled council and in our private interviews. M. Thiers explained with his characteristic eloquence, at once natural and ingenious, the reasons which decided him in favour of intervention. I remarked to him, on one occasion, "Your reasons are strong; I comprehend that either line of conduct might be adopted." Subsequently, in one of the great debates in the Chamber of Deputies on this subject, M. Thiers asked me from the tribune if I permitted him to repeat these words? "Undoubtedly," I replied; and he then repeated them. I have nothing to add to-day to the explanation I then gave. "I in no sense withdraw those expressions," I said; "the Chamber will readily understand that, dreading at that epoch, in the interior of the cabinet, a separation I never sought, and shall always regret, I have never used in my private conversations or elsewhere, any language but such as

[1] See Historic Documents, No. V.

seemed to me calculated to prevent it. I shall add that my opinion on this question has not been from the first day complete and absolute, like that of others; it has formed and strengthened itself progressively and in presence of passing events. But the honourable member, M. Thiers, knows, as well as any one, or as I do myself, that whenever it has become necessary to adopt a resolution, to pronounce either for or against intervention, I have declared against it. This is the only fact that I desire to establish at this moment."

It is agreeable to me to recall this to-day. The leading argument set forward in 1835 and 1836, by the partisans of intervention was, that without that aid the crown of Queen Isabella, and of the constitutional system in Spain would be lost. Twenty-five years have since rolled on, twenty-five years of severe trials for Spain; no intervention has taken place, and Spain has not required it; she has saved herself. A great security for her future, as well as a subject for legitimate pride. Amongst her friends, these who hoped the most from her are not those who knew her the least.

From the first day, King Louis-Philippe was, in his Council, one of the most decided against intervention; and to speak the truth, it was his solicitude for France, rather than his hopes for Spain, by which he was influenced. "Let us assist the Spaniards externally," he said to me; "but let us not embark in their vessel. If we ever do so, we must take the helm, and God knows what will then happen to us!

Napoleon failed to conquer Spain, and Louis XVIII. to win the people back from their disorders. I know them; they are not to be subdued or governed by foreigners. They call for us to-day; we shall scarcely arrive amongst them when they will abhor and impede us by every means in their power. Do you remember Rayneval's despatch, in which, while preaching intervention to us, he pointed out the inevitable accompaniments. It would be necessary, he said, that the French army, to consolidate its work, should occupy for more or less time the country it had pacified, without which the flame would indubitably burst forth anew.* And have you not told me that the Duke de Frias informed you himself, within the last few days, that the intervention of France in Spain would avail nothing, if not followed by an occupation of four or five years at least? Trust me, my dear minister, let us not employ our army in this interminable work, or open this gulf for our finances; let us not set this cannon-ball on foot in Europe. If the Spaniards are to be saved, it must be their own work; they alone can do it. If we encumber ourselves with the burden, they will place it exclusively on our shoulders, and then render it impossible to be borne."

The reply of the English cabinet to the Spanish government furnished an additional argument to the opponents of intervention. I find the text in a despatch from M. de Rayneval of the 13th of June, 1835: — "A courier arrived here from London yester-

[1] Despatch of the 22nd of May, 1835.

day evening with despatches from the Spanish Legation. Their import is, that the English cabinet declines the request of co-operation made by the Queen's government to her allies; that it does not, however, oppose the assistance which France, in her own name, might wish to afford to Spain; but that it has no desire to hold itself responsible in any manner for such a measure, which might compromise the general repose of Europe."

I do not believe that the last consideration was sincere, or the true reason for the refusal of the English cabinet. If France and England had concurred in supporting Queen Isabella with their armies against the insurgents, the Northern Powers would assuredly not have despatched theirs to the aid of Don Carlos. But be the motive what it might, the course adopted by England of leaving the weight of the responsibility of intervention exclusively on France, could not fail to influence our decision. The Duke de Broglie transmitted it to M. de Rayneval on the 8th of June, adding to his official despatch a private letter in these terms: "Our answer to the demand of Spain is precisely what I have announced to you. We have laid the question before the English government in the simplest terms, and in perfect good faith, and without making any effort to bias its determination. The refusal is positive. We have allowed time here for the expression of public opinion. Through a concurrence of particular circumstances we are willing to excite rather than abate it: of this, the articles in the 'Journal des Débats,'

bear testimony.[1] The entire press, with this exception, declared openly against intervention, and on this occasion found itself the organ of the public in general. We finally sounded individual opinions in the Chambers. There were not twenty members who wished to hear the measure spoken of. As soon then as the cabinet became decided and unanimous (and this was not easily accomplished), any attempt of this nature without the concurrence of England, and in opposition to the feeling of the country, would have been a senseless enterprise, which the ascendency of opinion would soon have compelled us to abandon.

"You will feel no surprise that, in their official communications, the cabinets of London and Paris have only considered intervention with regard to the progress of the Carlist rebellion, leaving entirely aside the eventual dangers which may result from revolutionary insurrections. We appreciate these dangers at their just value; we are aware that the fears they inspire in the Spanish government are the true cause of the demand addressed to France and England, and that if it had only to deal with Don Carlos, it would endeavour to resist with the forces still at its disposal. But however well grounded such apprehensions may be, we could not debate them as the basis of eventual intervention in documents which, according to all appearance, will some day become known to the public. Constitutional governments, governments built on free discussion, could not, on any contingency, engage in an intervention, the sole or at least

[1] On the 29th and 31st of May, and 4th and 7th of June, 1835.

the principal object of which would be to maintain one ministry in power in preference to another, and to set aside certain shades of opinion. It would be with great difficulty, the treaty of the 2nd of August, 1834, in our hand, that we could justify an intervention between the Queen Regent and Don Carlos; but on no pretext whatever could we justify an intervention between M. Martinez de la Rosa and M. Arguelles, or M. Galiano."

The Duke de Broglie was right in dealing with the question thus. Besides the civil war between the party of Queen Isabella and that of the infant Don Carlos, there was an active struggle in progress between M. Martinez de la Rosa and M. Arguelles; between the Royal statute, and the constitution of 1812; or, as we may say, in the very bosom of the adherents and ministry of Queen Isabella herself. We had the means of obtaining, and did obtain, a firmly established opinion of the political merits of the parties who were then struggling for power under the same sceptre. We recognized in the ideas and practices of the radical sections, the deplorable empire of the revolutionary spirit, of its theories and passions; we desired the success of the moderates, we wished to support them with our influence. While refusing the direct and official intervention they called for, we offered them all the indirect service we could think of; the introduction into Spain of the foreign legion, permission to recruit a free corps in France, with supplies of arms and ammunition. But neither did the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance command, nor the

principles of public European law and the interests of France permit us to go farther, or to place at the service of that particular party in Spain the soldiers and treasures of our country. After the refusal of intervention, the internal struggle of the Spanish ministry eventuated as it was easy to foresee. M. Martinez de la Rosa fell, and for three months his colleague, M. de Toreno, his successor, endeavoured to govern still in the name of the moderate party; but his concessions and attempts at resistance were equally vain; popular outbreaks, revolutionary tumults, massacres of monks, and insurrections to the cry of "Long live the constitution of 1812," redoubled in violence. M. de Toreno fell in his turn, and in the month of February 1836, when in France the cabinet of the 11th of October broke up, on the conversion of the funds,—in Spain, the radicals, then represented by M. Mendizabal and his friends, obtained possession of power.

I comprehend the temptations of the policy of fixed ideas and great enterprises, and the impassioned enjoyment which generous spirits may feel in pursuing, at any cost, the success of a design mingled with doubt and evil, but bold and perhaps promising for the future. It is sweet thus to surrender ourselves to our own idea, to strike the imagination of men, and to believe, that in violently changing the face of the world we are ministers of Providence. But this is not the policy of healthy governments, of free people, or of honest men. This latter has for its law, respect for rights, for all rights, the care of the regular

and permanent interests of nations, and some degree of scruple as well as of patience in the employment of means. When, after 1830, we were called to act in the affairs of Europe, we were not indifferent to the condition or wishes of the European states. We knew that there were many wounds to heal, many lawful wants to satisfy. We ourselves had in the question of European reforms our particular ambitions and sympathies; and many powerful reminiscences, many seductive appearances urged us to give them play. But we could not plunge into these attempts without having at first for ally, and speedily for master, the spirit of revolution, — that poisoner of the fairest of human hopes. Moreover, we felt convinced, that an appeal to force was not the eligible method of accomplishing the really salutary reforms and advances which Europe sighed to obtain. It was our determination to exercise a policy entirely new in the relations of states,—the policy of rational minds and honest people. Masters of great and commanding genius have not been wanting to the world. They have displayed, in governing it, superior faculties, and have changed with brilliancy the form and aspect of nations. But in this undertaking there have been so many superficial and disproportionate conceptions, so many arbitrary combinations, so much ignorance of social facts and of their natural laws, such a multiplication of egotistical and capricious desires, that just doubts have arisen, after these leaders have departed, on the definitive merit of what they have thought and done; and then the question has been reasonably asked,

whether they served or led astray the nations whose destinies they controlled. Charles V., Richelieu, and Peter the Great, have conquered and deserved the admiration of history; yet, nevertheless, when the great light of time and experience is brought to bear on them, the real value of their intentions and deeds appears more and more doubtful, and is more disputed from day to day. How many objections and reproaches are cast up to them in these times! How many errors, omissions, and fatal consequences do we not discover in their works! How much mischief mingled with the success which forms their glory! We were sincerely anxious to avoid such a combination. We desired to infuse more discretion into our enterprises, to judge them ourselves with more severity, and to attempt nothing that would not bear a rigid scrutiny and a lengthened trial. I admit that in the estimation of spectators as well as of actors, this policy is less seductive than that of the ordinary class of distinguished men; and that by interdicting improvident abstractions and popular empiricisms, it aggravates for the moment the difficulties, already so formidable, attached to the government of states. But to achieve in this world a certain and lasting good, we must take into the account, justice, liberty, and time. This confidence, both internally and externally, formed the basis of our conduct. I see nothing to regret in it, even after our reverses.

CHAPTER II.

DISMEMBERMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.

MY SITUATION AND DISPOSITION AFTER THE BREAKING UP OF THE CABINET OF THE 11TH OF OCTOBER, 1832. — MY PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATES OF THE CHAMBERS FROM THE 22ND OF FEBRUARY TO THE 6TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1836. — MY ELECTION TO THE FRENCH ACADEMY. — M. DE TRACY, MY PREDECESSOR. — MY INAUGURAL DISCOURSE. — THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND BELLES-LETTRES OF STOCKHOLM, AND THE KING OF SWEDEN, CHARLES JOHN. — DEATHS OF THE ABBÉ SIÈYES AND OF M. CARNOT. — DEATH OF M. AMPÈRE; HIS CHARACTER. — DEATH OF M. ARMAND CARREL; *HIS* CHARACTER. — ACQUISITION AND DESCRIPTION OF VAL-RICHER. — THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, THOMAS À BECKET, AT VAL-RICHER IN THE 12TH CENTURY. — SITUATION OF M. THIERS IN 1836. — ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE BY ALIBAUD. — AFFAIRS OF SPAIN; M. MENDIZABAL, AND HIS DISPOSITIONS TOWARDS FRANCE. — THE ENGLISH CABINET PROPOSES INTERVENTION IN SPAIN. — THE FRENCH CABINET REJECTS THE OVERTURE. — DESPATCHES OF M. DE RAYNEVAL ON THIS SUBJECT. — REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN SPAIN FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF 1812. — M. ISTURITZ SUCCEEDS M. MENDIZABAL. — GENERAL QUESADA, GOVERNOR OF MADRID; HIS ENERGY. — MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS SPAIN. — MISSION OF M. DE BOIS-LE-COMTE TO MADRID. — MILITARY INSURRECTION OF SAINT ILDEFONSO. — COURAGE AND USELESS RESISTANCE OF QUEEN CHRISTINA. — EFFECTS OF THIS INSURRECTION AT MADRID. — GENERAL QUESADA IS MASSACRED. — PROCLAMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1812. — DISAGREEMENTS IN THE FRENCH CABINET ON THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION IN SPAIN. — KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE AND M. THIERS. — RETIREMENT OF THE CABINET OF THE 22ND OF FEBRUARY, 1836.

(*From February 22nd, to September 6th*, 1836.)

I HAVE been attached to power, yet I never escaped from it without a sentiment of satisfaction, and almost

of joy; like a laborious student who enters on his vacation, or a man who breathes freely when delivering himself from a heavy burthen. A profound melancholy seized me when, on the 22nd of February, 1836, I again entered that small house no longer accompanied by her who had recently filled it with happiness; but it was our own, replete with cherished remembrances, and I there recovered repose and liberty, — powerful charms after years of labour and combat. It is the privilege of the human heart to admit at the same moment the most opposing feelings, without regard to disagreement or inconsistency.

I experienced another satisfaction, more superficial but not indifferent. The public applauded my friends and myself for having resigned office rather than submit to a check and an embarrassed position. The reduction of the funds was extremely unpopular in Paris. It was the opposition and the third party who had carried the motion in the Chamber of Deputies. Behind the debates, an intrigue was suspected. The appearances of intrigue follow rapidly in the wake of success, even when success has not been thereby decided, and it is dangerous to rise by a defeat in which you have participated. General tokens of esteem and sympathy attended us in our retirement. I remained at home on the Thursday evenings. The English ambassadress, Lady Grenville, and her niece the Duchess of Sutherland, found it difficult, on one occasion, to penetrate into the small saloon where my mother received visitors with a simple and earnest gravity, which inspired interest

while commanding respect. Even those amongst our friends who regretted our determination, admitted the good effect of it for ourselves. From as far off as St. Petersburg, M. de Barante wrote to me: "I hesitate to affirm that this step was not necessary, but I grieve for the result. Serious, steady, and consistent men, of great talent and exalted fame, are to be regretted at all times, and it does not appear to me that we have reached the point of losing them without damage or danger. The danger you diminish by a conduct I foresaw; you render possible the ministry which succeeds you, and you do not leave it the temptation of departing from your policy, although exposed by its position to that course. M. Thiers is a man of sound sense, talent, and courage, but I fear he cannot long maintain his equilibrium, and that, whether he will or no, he may find it difficult to make a movement. His reason, I imagine, has had a strong combat with his dream of ambition. He has said this freely, and in truth I believe him. Externally, as yet, I perceive no effect, and I feel no anxiety. The position is excellent, devoid of actual danger; and even without the earnest assurances of M. Thiers, I felt convinced that I should receive no different instructions from him. Every body writes to me of the part you take in the Chamber, of the influence you hold there, of a consideration still increasing. I congratulate myself on this, and my friendship is proud of it. I know not what unforeseen events and the fluctuations of coteries in the Chamber may reserve for you, but I am sure you will neither

be impatient nor ardent. Many opinions and even some passions are exhausted; let us hope that envy may become as much depreciated and weary. It is the venom of the worst days of the revolution; the beast is dead, but not the poison."

I quote these friendly words without hesitation. I should cease to write these Memoirs if I felt any difficulty in saying what appears to me true, and fitted to convey a just idea of the times and situations.

I held the same opinion with M. de Barante before he communicated his to me; feeling persuaded that M. Thiers would exert himself to maintain the policy we had carried on together, and resolving to do nothing that might perplex him. During the course of the session, from the month of February to July 1836, I took part in only three debates, and on occasions when I could not abstain; but it is not in the power of man to suppress the consequences of facts, and in free governments there is no skill or prudence which can prevent truth from coming to light. It soon became evident that the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, was necessary to the maintenance of its policy, and that its dismemberment entrained that of the party in government which had rallied under its flag.

It was on the question of the secret supplies called for by the new cabinet that the first important debate arose. My friends and myself were fully resolved to vote them without objection, as in fact we did; but the new supporters of M. Thiers, the men of the old

opposition, whether from the left or third party, strenuously maintained, some that they would not vote these supplies until the policy they had disputed should be effectually modified, — others, that if they did vote them, they reckoned on that modification, which they considered natural and inevitable; some evinced their fears that the new cabinet would merely perpetuate the old one; others, their hope, that being differently constructed, it would act in another spirit; and all indulged in doubts, commentaries, and comparisons with reference to the past, while demanding explanations as to the future. The debate, in truth, was merely an attack somewhat restrained on the policy of resistance, with cajoling advances towards that of concession. In the midst of these uncertain glimmerings I spoke, not to discuss the secret supplies, not to add my own doubts to all these contradictory objections, but to replace in full light the policy which my friends and I had sustained since 1830, and to extract, not from any personal polemic, but from a true picture of facts, the demonstration of its practical necessity as of its moral legitimacy, in the actual condition of our country. "Progress is talked of," I said; "progress does not consist in marching blindly in the same sense, in the same track; true progress for society is to obtain what it requires when society has fallen into licence. Progress is to return towards order, when certain ideas have been abused. Progress is to retreat from the abuse which has thus been indulged in. I do not slander our past: yes, we have had revolutions, in-

evitable, necessary, and glorious; but after forty years of revolutions, after so many and such notable explosions of revolutionary principles, habits, and practices, our France requires to establish, to secure herself on the ground she has conquered, to enlighten and organize herself, to revive the principles of order and preservation she has so long lost. Such is the true progress to which she aspires. I do not conceive it to be any wrong to our illustrious predecessors, to our fathers of 1789 and 1791, not to pursue to-day the path in which they trod. I go even farther; I doubt not, but that in their unknown abode, those noble souls who desired so much good to humanity, experience a profound joy in seeing us avoid the rocks on which they shattered so many of their brightest hopes."

The chamber was moved by these words. M. Odilon Barrot answered me with moderation and dignity, but not without suffering the embarrassment of recent alliances to mingle with his speech; for he decidedly announced his opposition to the line of policy which the new cabinet he seemed inclined to support, declared itself resolved to maintain. M. de Montalivet and M. Sauzet alone took part in the debate. M. Thiers preserved silence. He had too much political tact not to feel the necessity of simple positions, and he had little inclination to exhibit himself in the complicated part he had so recently accepted. Free governments introduce amongst parties and persons many manœuvres and metamorphoses: but they render them difficult and burdensome, at

the very moment of introduction, even for the actors who may succeed in their accomplishment.

Some time after this debate, I had, beyond the Chambers, a new and natural opportunity of bringing into light, at a moment when it seemed a little veiled, the policy which, since 1830, I had ever practised myself, and maintained while supporting the ministers. My friends of the departmental division which I represented were anxious to give me, while I no longer held office, a public testimony of their unflinching approbation. On the 10th of April, 1836, they met together at Lisieux, at a banquet to which the Duke de Broglie was also invited. In thanking them for their faithful support, I enjoyed the satisfaction of laying before them what for six years had been and ought to continue for the future, that policy of moderation and resistance, in the bosom of liberty, which in the time of Henry IV., as in our own days, had received and merited the name of the policy of the just medium (*juste milieu*). It is in this speech, and in that which I have just referred to on the demand for secret supplies, that, if I do not deceive myself, I gave the most complete and animated summary of the conduct, which in my idea, was most suitable to our government, of its rational and incidental motives, of its moral and practical merit. I was at that time unconnected with the cabinet; I had no particular act to defend; no pressing polemic to sustain; I spoke with unfettered freedom, with no other care than that of my own thought, and the desire of making it thoroughly understood, almost with the

same sentiment which I bring to-day into my reminiscences.

I was in favour with the Chamber; my attitude and language pleased the majority. I faithfully advocated what it had thought and done without suggesting any new effort, any new struggle. Occasions were readily embraced to evince its sympathy with me. The committee of the budget had proposed in the monetary department of the ministry of public instruction, several amendments; it wished to multiply the number of chapters, to impose on the minister ties of more rigorous speciality. It demanded that the copies of the works to which this minister subscribed, for their encouragement, should only be distributed to libraries, or other public establishments, never to simple individuals. The gifts which I had made of these were charged with favour and abuse. I opposed both amendments. I urged the inconvenience of shackling the administration within rules too tightly drawn, which at a later period unforeseen facts might often place it under the necessity of infringing; unless to the detriment of the public interest, these facts were ignored and held of no account. I entered into precise details on the individual distribution I had made of works acquired by subscription, and I vehemently protested, in the name of science and literature, against the interdiction sought to be pronounced. Despite the efforts of the reporters of the budget and their friends, the Chamber sided with me, and rejected the two amendments; my arguments weighed with the house, and it had confidence in me in such matters. More-

over, it felt satisfaction in an expression of good will towards one of the most faithful representatives of its policy, and in an act of independence as regarded the new cabinet, which it supported more from conviction than inclination. If I had continued a minister, I should perhaps not have obtained the same success.

The debate on the affairs of Algeria was the third and last occasion on which I spoke during this session, and I availed myself of it to support the demand for men and money originating with the cabinet. From the beginning I had taken a lively interest in this question. When doubts had been raised as to the retention of our conquest, I had repulsed them with my utmost power; and in 1836, on the approach of a new discussion, the colonists already settled in Algeria wrote to me in token of confidence, and requested me once more to take their cause in hand.[1] I needed not this incentive to demand, in the interest of our establishment, all the troops and resources necessary for its security and prosperity. But what had happened at several repetitions, in Algeria, since 1830, with the opinion I had formed of the arrangements of the governor-general in 1836, Marshal Clauzel, a distinguished soldier rather than a forecasting politician and administrator, inspired me with some anxiety, and I felt called upon to explain myself before the Chamber. "There is," said I, "a line of conduct which I must permit myself to call restless, warlike, anxious to advance too quickly or too far, and

[1] See Historic Documents, No. VI.

to extend abruptly, by force or stratagem, the French rule, the official French rule, over all the districts and tribes of the old Regency. There is another line, less restless and warlike, slower and more pacific, the object of which should be to establish the authority of France firmly over certain portions of the territory, over those which were the most closely appropriated in the first days of our occupation; and for that reason, being desirous of entertaining friendly relations with the natives, would not immediately disturb them on the question of their independence, and would make no war on them except through compulsion, in case of absolute necessity. I believe that the state of Africa, the state of France, and the state of Europe, every imaginable reason, reject the first mode of proceeding, the restless and aggressive line; and recommend deliberate, pacific, and moderate measures." I know not whether M. Thiers saw anything in my words which touched him personally, or if he felt himself compelled to shield Marshal Clauzel, to whom alone my doubts applied. Be that as it may, he replied to me at once, not without some impatience, calling upon me to explain, with more precision, the substance of my counsels, which he called lessons. I defended myself thus: "I have never pretended," I said, "and never shall pretend to give lessons here to any one; the words which fall from this tribune are not lessons. We deliver our opinions with perfect freedom, our opinions, and nothing more." I remembered that while I was in the cabinet, and at the very moment when the governor-general of Algeria received its instructions,

I had spoken in the same strain. Marshal Clauzel delivered a few guarded words on the course he intended to adopt, and the debate proceeded no farther.

The session closed; no other opportunity of discord between the various elements of the opposition presented itself; but it was evident that there was no longer union amongst them; mistrusts, discontents, and mutual skirmishes developed themselves from day to day, and the mischief, though checked, was felt by the public as in the Chambers, externally as well as in the heart of the country. "Your position is noble and great," M. de Barante wrote to me from St. Petersburg; "your speeches have never been more weighty, or more seriously attended to; not only in the Chamber, but from one end of Europe to the other; and even here, where little attention is bestowed on our internal policy: and yet, how will all this end? How will a combination re-adjust itself which was still necessary? A combination not alone confined to particular persons and names." M. de Barante had reason for his anxiety. The great government party, which had been formed in the cabinets of the 13th of March 1831, and of the 11th of October 1832, and which constituted their strength, floated in doubt and dislocation.

A happy literary incident at this epoch diverted my mind and thoughts from political pre-occupation. A seat became vacant in the French Academy: M. de Tracy died on the 9th of March 1836, and I was elected to replace him on the 18th of April. No

competitor offered himself to contest this honour. Out of twenty-nine academicians present at the sitting, twenty-seven gave me their voices: there were two blank votes.

The duty which this success imposed on me was almost as agreeable as the success itself. Without any intimate acquaintance with M. de Tracy, I had often met him in the world, at the house of Madame de Rumford amongst others, and I had said to myself more than once, that it would gratify me to succeed him in the Academy, and on that ground to be called on to speak of him and his time. This noble old man, the sincere and consistent friend of universal justice, of political liberty, of all the rights and hopes of his fellow-creatures, invariably faithful to his ideas and his friends, had become, at the close of his life, melancholy, morose, retired within himself, cold, and apparently indifferent to that future of the humanity which had so constantly engaged his thoughts. "I am no longer of this world," he said, with some bitterness; "what passes there concerns me no more." I saw in him a worthy representative and a striking image of the age in which he had lived, and had seen terminate in the midst of such cruel trials and lamentable errors. Lately, when I had the honour of presiding at the French Academy for the reception of my learned friend, M. Biot, I endeavoured to characterise the eighteenth century by calling it "an age of sympathy, and of young and presumptuous confidence, but sincere and human, whose sentiments were more valuable than its principles and manners; which failed greatly,

because it had too much faith in itself, and mistrusted everything else; but for which it may be permitted to hope, that when its faults shall seem to be sufficiently expiated, much may be pardoned, because it has so intensely loved." In 1836, I bore towards that distinguished epoch, the last survivors of which had received me in social life with such generous good will, the same sentiments which I subsequently expressed in 1857; and the memory of M. de Tracy appeared to me the most favourable opportunity that could occur of judging it with independence, or of depicting it with grateful respect.

This was the object and character of the discourse I delivered on the 22nd of December, 1836, before the Academy, when I had the honour of being admitted a member. On reading it to-day, I find it true and just in the estimate of the eighteenth century, of its philosophical doctrines and social influence, of what it was in itself, and of what it has done for its successors. But this discourse did not receive, either in the Academy or on publication, the full sympathy I had expected. The philosophic school of the eighteenth century was still numerous and powerful, and had for representatives, as usually happens when schools become old, no longer its great leaders, but some of their most intractable disciples. These parties were opposed to the rising spiritualistic and religious philosophy; and to philosophical controversies were united political and literary dissensions which greatly aggravated their bitterness. Minds thus disposed found my discourse dry, and even harsh, as

regarded the eighteenth century, its principles and masters. It was, they said, a discourse purely doctrinarian. It was, in fact, too much so for the moment and the place where it was delivered; perhaps, also, in the physiognomy of the ideas and the forms of the language. Emancipated from the arena of politics, I felt a secret pleasure in no longer living within it, in caring for no adversaries, and in giving myself up entirely to my own train of thought, as if I spoke for myself alone. On that day I forgot too entirely the struggles I had to maintain elsewhere, and the caution necessary to be observed when speaking, in respect to the prejudices and tastes of those who listen.

On the same day I met, in requital, with a piece of good fortune, far superior to the somewhat commonplace gratification of the academic compliments. The Academy was presided over by one of the most excellent spirits and generous hearts it had ever enumerated in its ranks, Count Philip de Ségur, devoted like myself to historical studies, and in political life one of my staunchest friends. He spoke of me in terms which I cannot re-peruse to-day without feeling intensely the value and charm of the friendship which inspired them.

Two years after my introduction into the French Academy, the Academy of Historical Sciences, Antiquities, and Belles-Lettres of Stockholm did me the honour of electing me a member; and I received, on that occasion, a letter from a man who, in our days of strange destinies, has accomplished one of the most singular as well as of the most illustrious;—from

Charles John, King of Sweden, with whom I had never held the slightest communication. I insert the letter here as a curious specimen of the original and emphatically conciliating turn of mind of this regal soldier of fortune, who, while occasionally yielding to the most chimerical ambition, still contrived to maintain himself and establish his dynasty on the throne to which popular election had called him. He wrote to me thus, on the 8th of June 1838:—

"Monsieur Guizot,

"When I sanctioned your nomination as a member of the Academy of Historical Sciences, Antiquities, and Belles-Letters of Stockholm, I yielded to the natural desire of my soul in expressing the satisfaction I felt at the choice. Those who read your works will applaud the words I uttered; and I, Monsieur Guizot, congratulate myself that chance and my own conviction have furnished me with the opportunity of making known to those who were near me at that moment, the tribute of esteem with which you have inspired me, and to which you have so many titles.

"Yours very affectionate,

"Charles John."

The year 1836 saw expire with M. de Tracy, several men whose names, on different grounds, have acquired and will retain a celebrity equal to his own: two of his contemporaries, the Abbé Sieyès and M. Carnot; and belonging to our own generation, the great philosophic physician M. Ampère, and M. Ar-

mand Carrel. I had no personal knowledge of the first two, and I shall abstain from expressing, as regards them, my full opinion. It might perhaps be considered too severe, both on their genius and on the acts of their lives. Times of revolution are times of idolatry as well as of hatred; many men enjoy, we know, much more reputation than they deserve, and commit deeds worse than they are themselves; and when they are only judged by public report and appearances, there is great risk of running into puerile admiration or of condemning with excessive rigour. But I was well acquainted with M. Ampère and M. Armand Carrel, and in referring to them I am sure to speak without borrowed prejudice and according to my own judgment. I have no intention of painting and estimating them here at full length; but I am anxious to name of each what particularly struck me in them, and what, in my idea, were the essential features of their superiority. M. Ampère possessed one, which has ever been rare, and seems to become more so; he bore to science an unaffected and unlimited love, purified from all personal prepossession, from vanity, as from the desire of wealth. He was an impassioned scholar and scrutinizer of nature, of her laws and secrets; and nature, to him, was not entirely confined to what he could see with his eyes and touch with his hands, nor even to the abstract labours of his mind. This perfect geometrician, this inventive physician, believed in the moral as well as in the material world, and studied the human soul with as much ardour and faith as he did the combinations

of molecules or figures. I once found myself in company with him and an illustrious rival, Sir Humphrey Davy, who was making a short stay in Paris. M. Cuvier and M. Royer-Collard were of the party. After talking on various subjects, the conversation turned to philosophical questions, especially to the foundations of psychology and morality. Sir Humphrey Davy and M. Ampère joined in it with warm interest; but Sir Humphrey was evidently animated with the desire of showing himself, in presence of his learned friends, as profound a metaphysician as he was an able chemist; vanity seemed to have a very considerable share in the taste he exhibited for philosophic inquiry. M. Ampère, on the contrary, gave himself up to it in conversation, as in his cabinet, with the most disinterested passion, solely desirous of discovering truth; and when he believed he had discovered it, of making it understood and acknowledged, without the slightest idea of aiming at personal admiration. A truly simple mind and a fertile genius, which sought light everywhere,—in the celestial as in the terrestrial regions,—for the sole pleasure of contemplating and expanding it.

The original and remarkable character of M. Armand Carrel had this peculiar feature, that he was capable of being quite different from what he really was, and of doing the opposite of what he really did. Not that I hold slightly the powers he loved and served,— the republic, the democracy, and the press. Apart from the strength they possess in our days, there is, in the ideas and sentiments which those

names awaken, a large measure of truth and grandeur. But M. Armand Carrel embodied in himself more than a republican, a democrat, and a journalist. I was in relation with him at two periods, and on very different occasions. I had given little attention to his early writings, and his *History of the Counter-revolution in England under Charles II. and James II.* was not calculated to give me an exalted idea of his historical lights. In 1828, when I commenced publishing the *Revue Française* (French Review), he called to see me, and brought me two articles on the state of Spain and the French expedition to that country in 1823, which were inserted in the miscellany. I and the public were equally struck by the forcible justice and impartial freedom of mind, as also by the clear and resolute ability therein displayed by the author, — recently a conspiring emigrant and actor in that brief episode. His frank and dignified demeanour pleased me, moreover, as much as his ability. In 1830, during the very days of July, I saw M. Carrel several times, and after the revolution was accomplished, as Minister of the Interior, I sent him to the departments of the west, with a commission to observe their condition, and to carry to them words of equity and peace. His reports during his journey were replete with sagacity and moderation. When he returned to Paris, I offered him a prefecture, to which I had already appointed him. He refused, from two motives; one, of personal position, which he avowed to me; the other, of wounded pride, which he withheld. He was dis-

gusted at not being placed in the career of politics, in the same rank with his two eminent companions, M. Thiers and M. Mignet, in the contests which *Le National* had sustained. I was wrong in not perceiving on the instant the secret wound, which no one amongst the men then in power, and in spite of our momentary embarrassment, would I think have refused to heal. I should regret it still to this day, if I thought that a different situation would have given to the inward dispositions and life of M. Carrel an opposite course: but I cannot believe this. There were in him deficiencies and passions which would ever have prevailed over the influences of his external position, and have thrown him back into the path in which he preferred to tread. This keen observer, who carried into his appreciation of particular facts and the practical views they suggested to him, so much justice and freedom of thought, had no unity of principle, and extracted not from his constitutional good sense the general ideas which might have been its legitimate produce. This unshackled and sagacious censor of the errors and faults of the party he had embraced from his first steps in life, submitted not the less, and under diverse circumstances, to bear the entire yoke of that party. This character, filled with elevated and generous instincts, but also with impetuous and personal excitements, found neither the rule nor measure of which he stood in need, in wholesome moral convictions. This submissive admirer of military discipline had in his political life a rude taste for independence, and repulsed, with

haughty impatience, superiority, rivalry, obstacles and delays. He was an ambitious spirit, who would have wished to be carried at once to the top of the ladder, and perhaps might have well sustained his place there, but who could not endure to mount the steps by progressive labour. His resolute spirit failed to preserve him from ebullitions of passion and sallies of temper. Neither could his antipathy to disorder and plebeian rule restrain him from submitting to disorderly and popular influences. Such were the incidents of position and natural tendencies which determined the lot of M. Carrel; stifled in him some of his most precious gifts, and made him the noblest and most judicious, but also the most powerless and least satisfied of republicans, democrats, and writers in the opposition. A melancholy example of the mischief that may befal an uncommon man, from his time, his party, and his own defects accepted by himself without struggle. M. Armand Carrel wasted in an incoherent, imperfect, sterile, and gloomy life, qualities of character and mind formed to reach and suffice to a destiny more illustrious for himself and more profitable to his country. According to his friends, he experienced in his latter days, and a short time before the lamentable encounter in which he fell, attacks of low spirits, overflowing with ennui and sinister presentiments;—a state of lassitude natural to a man engaged in the course he had followed with sincere passion, but wherein he found, and from day to day hoped less to find, the gratification of his more wholesome thoughts and nobler inclinations.

At this period I took advantage of my political leisure to accomplish a desire I had long formed of acquiring in Normandy, in the midst of a population who for seven years had treated me with so much confidence and sympathy, a residence which might become my vacational refuge while I continued in the arena of public life, and my haven of retirement when I finally seceded from it. One of my friends at Lisieux took me to see, at a distance of three leagues from the town, the abbey and farm of Val-Richer, then for sale. There remained of the ancient monastery only the abbot's house, not old in itself, for it had been rebuilt towards the middle of the last century. The church adjoining the abbey, and the claustral buildings dependent on it, had been destroyed during the Revolution. The mansion, solid and spacious, was very imperfectly finished within, and already much dilapidated. Walls, the remnants of earlier constructions, old apple-trees, planted here and there, kitchen gardens, and small washhouses for domestic purposes surrounded it on every side, and even close to the windows; everything had a coarsely rustic and somewhat abandoned air. There was no road by which to reach the place; it could only be approached on horseback, or by obtaining, through the complaisance of the neighbours, a passage across their fields. But the locality pleased me. The house, situated half way up a hill, commanded a narrow, solitary, and silent valley. There was no village, not even a roof in sight, but some extremely verdant meadows, bushy thickets sprinkled with lofty trees, a running

stream serpentining through the plain, and a spring of pure and living water close to the house itself. It was a picturesque without being an uncommon landscape, at once rural and smiling. I promised to myself to furnish the house commodiously, to remove the walls, to form plantations, lawns, slopes, allies, and groves; to induce the government to open roads, of which the country stood much in need;—and finally I purchased Val-Richer.

It was not alone the aspect of the place that attracted me. There was a history attached to it, and great names were mixed up with the traditions of the abbey. It had been originally founded towards the middle of the twelfth century, at first near Vire, from donations given to St. Bernard and to Nivard his brother. Some years later, the monks found this first residence confined and unhealthy; the monastery, by the aid of new gifts, was removed to the valley called Richer, near Cambremer, a fief dependent on the bishopric of Bayeux; and a disciple of St. Bernard, Thomas, monk of Clairvaux, became the first abbot. When, seven hundred years after, I became proprietor of this land and house, which had no longer lord of the soil or monks, an old resident, assistant to the mayor of St. Ouen-le-Paing, the chief place of my township, said to me one day, "Sir, if you wish, I will take you to a spot in the woods of Val-Richer where the Saint retired to pray." "What saint?" replied I. "Ah! I do not know his name, but there was a saint who once dwelt at Val-Richer, and was accustomed to perform his devotions in the wood, at

a place still remembered." I questioned some persons better informed than the substitute of St. Ouen-le-Paing, and soon discovered, through the most learned Norman archæologists, that the celebrated Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas à Becket, during his exile in France, from 1165 to 1170, had visited Lisieux, and from thence proceeded to Val-Richer, the abbot of which, Robert I., was a friend of his; that he had sojourned there for several months, leading the life of the monks, participating in the same labours and pious exercises; and that the remains of the ecclesiastical ornaments he used in celebrating the mass had been for a long time preserved.[1] Such reminiscences could not be indifferent to a historian who had become a land-owner in Normandy, and they added, in my eyes, an additional charm to my establishment at Val-Richer.

In 1836 it was still far from being an establishment. Not only would the condition of the house alone prevent this, but the state of public affairs, and the impending future, glimpses of which revealed themselves, rendered it little probable that I should be able to live beyond the circle of politics, or indulge in a lengthened residence in the country. At the precise moment when I busied myself in the acquisition of Val-Richer, the ministry of M. Thiers tottered, and observers with but little experience already foretold its fall and successors.

M. Thiers had attained power with the King's

See Historic Documents, No. VII.

favour, and was accepted with a good grace, I might almost say with good-will, by the foreign cabinets and their representatives in Paris. His brilliant, fertile, and flexible mind, the facility of his character, the animation and unreserved freedom of his conversation, rendered communication with him equally agreeable and accommodating; and nearly all the diplomatists, more especially the ambassadors of Austria and Russia, and the Prussian minister, yielded themselves to it with the eagerness and complaisance which resemble seriously premeditated partiality. The English ambassador, Lord Granville, was more reserved. He entertained a sincere friendship for the Duke de Broglie, and regretted his retirement. I do not think M. Thiers deceived himself as to the value of these appearances, but they gratified him, nevertheless, and what pleases ever exercises a certain influence. It soon became a generally received notion that the Anglo-French alliance was beginning to cool, and that the government of King Louis-Philippe inclined towards the great powers of the Continent. The conjecture was superficial, and grossly exaggerated. M. Thiers, as I think, always continued to attach the same importance to the intimacy of France and England; only, in 1836, he believed he had found in the other European cabinets, particularly at Vienna, dispositions more favourable than usual; and he met them graciously in his turn, promising to extract advantage therefrom for the Prince he served, and for his own personal credit.

But whatever pains were taken, on either side, to prolong and display it, the diplomatic honey-moon endured but for a short space, and led to nothing. Its course was disturbed and curtailed by sundry incidents. In France, in Belgium, and in Switzerland, the secret revolutionary practices of the political refugees against their old governments still continued. This led to the temporary occupation of the republic of Cracow by the three northern powers, and to strong European remonstrances with the federal government of Switzerland to obtain the expulsion of the conspirators. In both matters, M. Thiers associated himself with the Prince Metternich, either by manifest concurrence or positive action. In this he only acted in strict conformity with the rules of public law, and the legitimate interests of European order. But this policy, of which the English cabinet had no knowledge, excited noisy anger in the French opposition, created unpleasant embarrassments in Switzerland, and failed in producing the expected advantage to the government of King Louis-Philippe. At this period, the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours carried out the visit to Germany projected and prepared under the preceding cabinet. Everywhere, in Vienna as in Berlin, from the people and the authorities, their reception was most flattering; but the negotiations officiously entered into for the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the arch-duchess Maria-Teresa, daughter of the arch-duke Charles, were unsuccessful. The arch-duke exhibited no unwillingness; the French ambassador at

Vienna, M. de Ste: Aulaire, who had dissuaded the attempt, exerted himself with equal tact and zeal for its accomplishment; but the prejudices of the Emperor of Austria, his family, and court, against a government born of the revolution of 1830 proved too strong; and, despite the guarded reserve on both sides, this diplomatic enterprise, from which M. Thiers had probably expected to derive reputation and future stability for himself and his party, furnished him with nothing but the occasion for a false step at the Tuileries and a check in Europe.

At home, and while the Princes were still absent on their travels, a sinister incident—the attempt of the assassin Alibaud—threw the cabinet into great disquietude. On the 25th of June, as the King, accompanied by the Queen and Madame Adelaide, was passing under the wicket of the Tuileries to return to Neuilly, the end of a cane was placed upon the door of the carriage; a shot was fired; the carriage became filled with smoke; the ball lodged above the opposite door, and the wadding remained in the King's hair. He was bowing at the moment, to salute the National Guard, who presented arms: this accidental motion saved him. The excitement was general and profound. Of what use, then, were all the attempts at conciliating parties—the proclamations of amnesty—the prospective hopes of the policy of concession? Had new paths been entered on only to encounter in them the same crimes and perils, in addition to the mistake?

It was said, that in consequence of this abortive crime, a desire was evinced to raise once more the flag

of the policy of resistance; that overtures were made to call back to the cabinet its most decided representatives; that on this subject I had held an interview with M. Thiers; that the Ministry of Finance had been offered to M. Duchâtel; that we had rejected these propositions; and that I had even left Paris to avoid any further discussion. There was no truth whatever in these assertions, beyond the report of them, which spread abroad, and revealed the trouble by which minds were then possessed. By turns, people promise themselves, from various lines of policy, more than can possibly be accomplished. The policy of resistance had not restrained Fieschi; the policy of concession had no effect on Alibaud. There are blows which no human hand can calculate on warding, and it is not by such incidents that the merits of the maxims and conduct of a government can be measured. What justly impressed the public in this circumstance was,—the utter emptiness of the confidences and promises of the third party. The cabinet was sensibly weakened, but it was destined to give way before other events, and from different causes.

At the moment of its formation it found the Spanish government in a most unfavourable vein, both as regarded Spain herself and her relations with France. In the month of September 1835, the last representative of the moderate party, the Count of Toreno, had fallen, and was succeeded by one of the most unsteady, as well as the boldest, amongst the chiefs of the radicals —M. Mendizabal. Spain then entered on a path which of necessity could only end in the revolutionary re-

establishment of the constitution of 1812, and in the diplomatic preponderance of England, formerly the ally and supporter of the authors of that work, essentially anarchical, whether ruling over a monarchy or a republic. "The King's government ought not to remain ignorant," the Count de Rayneval wrote to the Duke de Broglie, on the 15th of September 1835, "that Mr. Villiers has taken a most active part in all the manœuvres which have for their object the removal of M. de Toreno and the triumph of M. de Mendizabal. . . . . This public support given by the minister of England to a man who, in spite of his protestations of moderation and attachment to the Queen and the form of government Spain has received from her, the extreme liberals continue to regard as their leader, has inspired them with the most lively satisfaction. They believe themselves sure of the protection of the British cabinet under any excesses in which they may indulge." Scarcely in possession of power, M. Mendizabal, in fact, assumed openly the attitude of the particular friend, I will not say exactly of the *protégé*, of England. Not only did he reject all idea of French intervention, declaring that he was able to suppress the Carlist insurrection with the Spanish forces alone, but he went so far as to express an indiscreet malevolence towards France. "Some days since," M. de Rayneval wrote to the Duke de Broglie on the 22nd of September, "two persons who formerly held posts in the administration, called on him to demand passports for France. He told them that he could have wished not to see them leave Spain at this moment, their departure

evincing little confidence in the existing government, but that nevertheless he should not oppose it; yet as a friend he advised them to go anywhere but to France, for it was possible that within a very short time the relations of Spain with that country would entirely change their character." This anti-French ostentation did not last long. M. Mendizabal discovered that it injured him materially in Spain, with the nation as with the Cortés; and, equally fickle and presumptuous, he abruptly changed his attitude and language. "Now," M. de Rayneval wrote on the 15th of November, "this minister, who seemed disposed to do without France altogether, repeats to all the world that it is upon France alone that the firm establishment of the throne of Queen Isabella depends; that whatever efforts the Spanish government may make, it will never bring the civil war entirely to a close unless the French cabinet, while still confining itself within the limits of the stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance, lends it a sincere and effectual aid." But this clamorous conversion, imposed by necessity, was more apparent than real; after all, it was upon England that M. Mendizabal relied, being ready to assure her aid by conceding everything that the English cabinet might require. On the 4th of December 1835, M. de Rayneval wrote to the Duke de Broglie: "I have just ascertained with certainty, but under the seal of the most profound secresy, that the difficulty of introducing into, and passing through the Chambers a custom-house bill, has determined M. Mendizabal to conclude a treaty of commerce with England, taking advantage, on this

point, of the latitude which the Royal Statute has left to the crown; that this negotiation is carried on between M. Mendizabal and Mr. Villiers alone, without letting any of the officials of the Secretary of State's department into the secret; that for the necessary writings they employ a private secretary, whom M. Mendizabal has brought from England; in fine, that the greater part of the articles are already drawn up, and that M. Mendizabal has ordered the necessary powers to be prepared for signing the act which he has clandestinely arranged. I pray the King's government to forward to me its instructions on this subject as speedily as possible, and I await your answer with impatience." The answer anticipated the request. Aware, on his part, of the negotiation in progress at Madrid, the Duke de Broglie had, on the 28th of November, instructed M. de Rayneval to remind M. de Mendizabal that all existing treaties assured to France, in Spain, the treatment of the most favoured nation. The ambassador was called upon to explain to the Spanish minister that it was not merely nominal, but actual equality that we claimed, by equivalents calculated to satisfy French commerce. Finally, he was ordered to announce to him that if commercial arrangements were concluded between England and Spain from which France was excluded, the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance would thereby receive a blow which perhaps Spain would speedily repent. This announcement, solemnly repeated on the 12th and 19th of December[1], arrested the pending negotiation;

[1] See Historic Documents, No. VIII.

but the general position was, in consequence, rather aggravated than alleviated. M. Mendizabal more than ever regarded England as his support, while the English cabinet looked upon M. Mendizabal and his party as those from whom their Spanish policy had the most to expect.

M. Thiers had scarcely entered on power, when a proposition came from London which occasioned him some surprise. The English cabinet, which had repudiated intervention when the moderate party and M. Martinez de la Rosa governed Spain, now took the initiative in that movement when M. Mendizabal had become minister. "It proposed to the French government to march a corps d'armée into Spain, and to occupy certain valleys in the Basque Provinces, amongst others that of Bastan, while English forces should take possession of St. Sebastian and the harbour of Passages; an arrangement which would enable the Spanish army, then commanded by General Cordova, to pursue the insurgent Carlists to extremity, without caring for the points occupied by its allies. I have not before me the actual text of the English proposition, nor of the answer returned by M. Thiers, on the 18th of March 1836. He formally rejected it, not without regret, as he admitted himself some months later in a debate of which this question became the object, but with ample reason according to my opinion. I find in a despatch addressed by M. de Rayneval to M. Thiers, on the 31st of March, details which prevent any misconception as to the true motive and character of the English proposal. "I

had been informed," he says, "by Mr. Villiers of the new part which England was preparing herself to play in the affairs of Spain, and of the part she proposed to you. He has not concealed from me that the first idea of this project proceeded from himself; but he refrained from saying that M. Mendizabal was aware of, and approved of it, which nevertheless appears to me beyond all doubt. I foresaw the negative reply of the King's government; and as it was natural to suppose that before acting, the cabinet of London would assure itself of the consent of Spain, which the language of M. Mendizabal in no way implied, I persuaded myself for a moment that this project would not be followed up. But I was soon undeceived. Scarcely had I received your despatch, than we ascertained here, at once by an English courier and by an express from General Cordova, that the British government had not only taken the resolution of interfering directly in the war against the Pretender, but had already adopted measures, and issued the necessary orders on this subject. The astonishment of the public was great at seeing the English cabinet, without any previous indication, thus suddenly change its system, and M. Mendizabal act in the same manner, by the acceptance, not to say the demand of those foreign succours, which only a short time since he so disdainfully rejected. Queen Christina had some slight intimation of this affair two days before the opening of the Cortés. She said to M. Mendizabal that she would not accept the direct aid of England, unless France consented to contribute

hers. As soon as she was informed that all was arranged, and even, as it may be said, carried into execution, without her consent, and in some degree without her knowledge, she evinced the most violent irritation, to such an extent, that for two days she refused to see M. Mendizabal. . . . . She accused him of having failed in his duty towards her and the state by a clandestine negotiation, and of having rendered himself guilty of treason by furnishing the English with the opportunity, which they had long sought, of taking possession of some of the ports of Biscay. . . . . I have been enabled to judge myself of the dissatisfaction of this princess . . . . . I have had, on the same subject, two conversations with M. Mendizabal. He has anxiously endeavoured to persuade me, that the project in question was settled in London without his knowledge. At the same time he endeavoured to exculpate himself from the reproach of inconsistency by accepting foreign intervention. He assumed that the name could not be given to the present proceeding of England, and that we were to blame in persisting to see intervention in the military operation proposed to us by the British cabinet. After listening to the explanations I thought it my duty to give him as to what had passed in Paris on this topic, he again took up the question of intervention properly so called, and this time with the air of a man who had only weak scruples against such a measure."

In this state of minds at Madrid, London, and Paris, the refusal of intervention, pronounced in the

terms and with the reserve employed by M. Thiers, amounted merely to an adjournment of the question; clear and positive for the present, it did not confine itself to the freedom of action which a judicious government should always preserve; it distinctly allowed glimpses of its anticipations, and of the chances of a contrary resolution. "With whatever name it may be covered," he wrote to M. de Rayneval, on the 30th of April, "within whatever limit it may be proposed to restrain it, even to the occupation of the Bastan, armed intervention is still repulsed, at this moment, by the same considerations which up to this point have prevented us from consenting to it. Without any prejudgment on the changes which different circumstances might sooner or later produce in our determination, we feel bound to declare, that as long as things remain in their present state, any attempt to obtain from us an armed co-operation would prove fruitless. Such steps, which, like those already taken, could not fail to become public, would amount to gratuitous imprudence, since, while bringing into new light the distress of the Queen's government, and exposing it to a mortifying refusal, they could only produce the effect of weakening still more its remains of moral strength. Its friends, therefore, cannot too strongly advise abstention from this course."

The permanence and progress of the two scourges which desolated Spain, civil war and the spirit of revolution, rendered this forbearance in Madrid, and this expectant reserve in Paris, more and more difficult. In the Basque Provinces, the Carlist bands and

the royal troops, while combating with ineffectual animosity, gave themselves up mutually to revolting cruelties, nearly always tolerated, and sometimes commanded by their chiefs. Fresh partisans of the rebellion, even more audacious than the first insurgents, overran Spain in every sense, spread terror even to the gates of Madrid, and seemed to be protected in their erratic courses, alternately by the weakness of the authorities and the favour of the populace. At the same time, plots of secret societies and democratic passions burst forth in the provinces of the south, at Barcelona, Valencia, Malaga, Seville, Cordova, and Cadiz; raising in all quarters the cry of "*Long live the Constitution of* 1812 !" and leading on every side to scenes of bloodshed. Impotent to repress these excesses, the Spanish government at one moment endeavoured to palliate, at another to appease them, by adopting measures agreeable to the liberal and systematic reformers,—such as the suppression of all the religious corporations, the closing of the convents, the sale of their property, the repeated dissolution of the Cortés, in which the moderates predominated, and their convocation according to more democratic laws, which nevertheless brought back the same party in a majority, or in a close condition to re-establish one. Men soon exhaust themselves in exercising the double trade of daring innovators, or rulers without strength. M. Mendizabal fell. M. Isturitz succeeded him; more moderate and deliberative, and more independent of English influence; but, despite his good intentions, nearly as ineffective in

putting an end to the civil war, in re-establishing order in the state, in the finances, in the streets, and in securing the future of the constitutional monarchy, by rendering real and practical for all Spaniards the rights and guarantees which it had promised them. Even in Madrid, on the 17th of July and the 3rd of August, revolutionary anarchy exhibited itself, and would have triumphed there from that time, but for the energy of a man, destined to be for a moment its conqueror, and speedily its victim. Being informed that an assembly of national guards, horse and foot, had met on the Prado to proclaim the constitution of 1812, General Quesada, Captain-General of Castille, a rigid disciplinarian, an excellent soldier, and a staunch Spaniard, repaired thither about ten o'clock in the evening, with an escort of only twenty carabineers, and exulting in the opportunity of displaying his authority and courage in the presence of rebels, apostrophised them instantly thus:—"You are poltroons and assassins; you are not men. I am tired of these games of women and children. I want battle and blood. Let those who desire the constitution select from all these houses that which suits them best; let them occupy it, and I undertake to dislodge them with these twenty soldiers. You have hired men to kill me, but I defy you all." "All were silent," wrote M. de Bois le Comte, who had just arrived at Madrid, whither he had been despatched by M. Thiers, and who gathered these details from eye-witnesses. "'Well,' added General Quesada, 'what are you doing there?' Why have you come?' Some

officers replied, 'We heard the *générale* beaten, and we assembled in consequence: are we to disperse?' 'No, keep together, on the contrary, for I am determined to exterminate you once for all.' The national guards were divided amongst themselves: some had revealed the plot to the authorities, and promised their assistance for the maintenance of order. When Quesada summoned them to keep their word, they excused themselves timidly. 'Go, go,' he said, 'you mean well, but you are cowards; go your ways, for you impede me.' All the national guards retired gradually, and the Prado was evacuated. Towards one in the morning, Quesada went to the 'Plaza major.' He found the national guards there, accompanied by some grumblers. 'I require your quarter,' he said to the guards; 'which will you prefer, to surrender or defend it? Take your choice, it is the same to me. If you mean to keep it, fight at once.' The national guards yielded up the quarter, which was immediately occupied by the Queen Regent's regiment.'"[1]

Few generals were so energetic or fortunate in the suppression of revolts as General Quesada, who evidently could not always expect the same success. Arriving one upon the other at Paris, these new evidences of the lamentable state of Spain excited in the government the most contrary impressions and intentions. The adversaries and partisans of intervention, King Louis-Philippe and M. Thiers, found

[1] M. de Bois le Comte to M. Thiers; despatch of the 22nd of April, 1836.

in them decisive reasons in support of their respective policy. According to M. Thiers, civil war was the cause of all the evils of Spain; the Carlist insurrection alone fomented revolutionary terrors and passions. Let the civil war be extinguished, and Spain would become governable; since the authority of Queen Isabella was not in a condition to stifle the contest, it belonged to France to accomplish that work. By the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, she was pledged to do so. Moreover, the interest of France commanded it as much as that of Spain. The France of 1830 could not suffer the triumph of Don Carlos in the latter country. In the opinion of King Louis-Philippe, on the contrary, the more the civil war and anarchy continued to display themselves obstinately in Spain, the less ought France to take upon herself to bring it to an end. Whatever might be her successes at first, she would undertake an impracticable work; neither the Carlist insurrection nor the anarchy in Spain were superficial accidents, momentary and easy to be subdued. Both found in the traditions, manners, and passions of the Spaniards, deeply-seated roots, and for a long time they would spring up again incessantly, and with increased vigour, when foreigners attempted to repress them. It would therefore not be in a hasty expedition of war, but in a long occupation, and in a close association with the Spanish government, that France would find herself involved. Far from prescribing such a line of conduct, French interests absolutely interdicted it. France had enough to do to establish order and liberty at home. On her own

account she had nothing to fear from the Carlist insurrection in Spain, which, in any case, would be in no condition to attempt aught against us. Besides, despite its momentary triumph, it was very probable that this insurrection would not ultimately succeed, and that in the midst of varying chances, gloomy trials, and protracted efforts, the constitutional government of Queen Isabella might triumph in the long run. But that it was for Spain herself to reach this end, for she alone could accomplish it. In this France ought to assist, but not to take the lead. The treaty of the Quadruple Alliance imposed no such necessity on us. We had already fulfilled and exceeded the obligations contracted, by the indirect aid we had already given, and were still giving, to the Queen of Spain. We were not called upon, as was the Restoration in 1823, to exhibit beyond the Pyrenees proofs of political boldness and of the fidelity of our army. If we embarked in a direct and extended intervention, similar to that of the former epoch, we should doom ourselves either to retire speedily, leaving Spain a prey to incalculable disorders, or to assume for an indefinite period the responsibility of her government and of her future destiny. The King neither ought, nor would he consent to impose such a burden on France.

An attempt was made to reconcile the two lines of policy. The King agreed that the indirect succour afforded to Spain should receive new extension. Arms and munitions of war were forwarded. The foreign legion, already in the service of Queen Isa-

bella, had been reduced by its campaigns to 2500 men; it was arranged that it should be augmented to 6000, by recruiting in France, in the name of the Spanish government and its agents. A French general of reputation (General Bugeaud, and even Marshal Clauzel were spoken of) was to be appointed to the command of this corps, with which some Spanish regiments were to be associated, but it was to remain officially under the orders of the general in chief of the Spanish army. M. Thiers, on his side, appeared to content himself with this development of indirect co-operation, and M. de Bois le Comte, who at this precise epoch was despatched to Madrid where M. de Rayneval had fallen seriously ill, was instructed to announce to the Spanish cabinet that the French government would go no farther. In rendering account to M. Thiers, on the 9th of August 1836, of his arrival at Madrid and of his first interview with M. Isturitz, "I began," he wrote, "by telling him in the most decided and unqualified manner that he must renounce all idea of direct intervention; that the King's government saw with regret that, in spite of all we had represented on the impossibility of our adopting that course, the Spanish cabinet had never abandoned the hope of one day persuading us to it; that I must destroy that illusion, which had exercised a fatal influence, for by always recurring to that perspective as a last resource, he and his ministry had prevented the royal cause from developing its full energy and from employing all its means."

But the most determined words suffice not to settle

questions and to dissipate hopes which have been long brooding in the minds of nations. On the 12th of August 1836, three days after he had communicated with M. Isturitz, in the terms I have just quoted, M. de Bois le Comte again wrote to M. Thiers: "The Spaniards are so accustomed to see us interfere in their affairs, and regulate their disputes of succession, from the days of Henry of Transtamare to those of Philip V., Ferdinand VII., his father, and Queen Isabella, that the idea of our finally adopting the same course now is so profoundly received, that it can with the greatest difficulty be eradicated from their minds. They believe that they should let us say what we please, and that we shall inevitably wind up by direct intervention, not being able to tolerate in Spain either revolutionary anarchy or the restoration of Don Carlos. I have found this conviction in M. Isturitz and the Queen Regent, and in her whole court; to combat it, I have employed the full force of the expressions which your Excellency used to convince me of the firm resolve of the government to refuse, at all times, direct intervention. I believe I have at last persuaded Queen Christina and M. Isturitz, and have made them comprehend that they must seek their safety in their own energy, and consider us henceforward as their most powerful prop, but no longer as the vital principle of their cause. But this impression which I have been enabled to produce on the Queen and her cabinet, is not received by the public. The coincidence of my arrival with the success of the Carlists, and with the proclamation in

Arragon and in Andalusia, of the constitution of 1812, has inspired all minds with a confidence that I was at last the herald of the intervention so anxiously desired. Some even say that I announced it positively; others, that I proclaimed a measure which would inevitably lead to it."

It was necessary to emerge from this position, which held minds in uncertainty—at Paris in action, and at Madrid in expectation; to choose, in fine, between indirect assistance and direct and complete intervention. The discussion was renewed in the council, and became daily more animated and clear. The King thought he had a right to complain that in the execution of the measures of indirect aid to which he had recently consented, the stipulated limits had been exceeded; the recruiting for the foreign legion, fixed at 6000 men, already, he said, amounted to 8000, and was still actively going on, not through the medium of General Alava, as had been arranged, but by the aides de camp of the Minister for War himself, Marshal Maison. Questions, explanations, and retorts, succeeded each other incessantly in the council, in which six of the ministers coincided with M. Thiers, and one only, the Count de Montalivet, with the King. The two lines of policy were in presence and approached a crisis, both supported by a sincere conviction, and relying, one on the urgency of existing circumstances, and the desire of Spain evidently pronounced in favour of intervention; the other, on prospective considerations and the feeling of France, which clearly showed itself opposed to the measure.

"Nothing can incline the King to intervention," said M. Thiers one day to his Majesty, "and nothing can lead me to renounce it."

In the meanwhile news reached Paris that, on the 12th of August, at St. Ildefonso, where the Regent and the young Queen then resided, the two regiments on duty—one of provincial militia, the other of the Guards—suddenly broke out into insurrection, marched upon the palace of La Granja, and clamorously proclaimed the constitution of 1812. Queen Christina, with remarkable courage and self-possession, vainly opposed to this sedition her personal influence and resistance. In the absence of all effective force, she was compelled to give way, and finally authorized these troops "to swear the constitution until the assembly of the Cortés." On the 13th of August, in the square of St. Ildefonso, officers and soldiers took the oath. On the 14th, a similar insurrection broke out in Madrid. General Quesada suppressed it for the moment; but on the 15th, when what had taken place at St. Ildefonso transpired in the capital, the movement became irresistible; the Isturitz cabinet broke up, and a new ministry, composed of old partisans of the constitution of 1812, was forced on the Queen Regent, under the presidency of M. Calatrava. On the 17th of August, the two Queens re-entered Madrid, the Cortés, which had been on the point of assembling, were dissolved, and on the 21st of August a royal decree convoked new ones for the 24th of October, according to the system prescribed by the constitution of 1812, and to bring it into operation.

As I have spoken of General Quesada, and his attitude in presence of sedition, I shall here repeat textually what M. de Bois le Comte communicated on the 30th of August with reference to his death and character. It is the lawful right of great hearts sacrificed to savage violence, that the remembrance of their last moments should be preserved with respect, for the glory of their names, as well as for the instruction of the living. The stoic Thrasea, condemned to death by Nero, said to his son-in-law, Helvidius Priscus, when ordering his veins to be opened: "Behold, young man! you are born in times when the soul requires to be fortified by firm examples."[1] We have seen days when such examples were as necessary in France as in Rome under Nero. Those days are far removed from us; but even now, and sheltered from mortal dangers, it is well to know how to preserve our honour. "The first idea of the revolutionists on becoming masters of the capital," says M. de Bois le Comte, "was to prevent the escape of Quesada. Warned too late, he took the road to Burgos, and had scarcely entered on it, when he was followed by a crowd of the militia. He soon discovered that he could not escape their pursuit. Having reached Hortaleza, one league from Madrid, he took refuge in a house. The soldiers had already arrived. A little girl saw him, and asked if he wished to speak with the parish priest. "Undoubtedly," replied he, "I require the priest, for I am about to die." Resigned to his fate, he traversed

[1] "Specte, juvenis; in ea tempora natus, et quibus firmare animum expediat constantibus exemplis."—*Tacit. Annal.* lib. xvi. cap. 35.

the chamber with rapid steps, without seeking to conceal himself, and passing his hand through his hair, according to his habitual gesture. The militia-men dared not to attack him hand to hand; they fired on him through the bars of the window; the ball entered his body. He looked on them, saying, 'If you wish to kill me you must fire a second time; once is not sufficient." Several shots then followed; they broke open the door, and pierced him with swords. The fury of the murderers glutted itself in a thousand atrocities perpetrated on his still breathing body and continued on his corpse. Thus fell a true Spaniard, extreme in his good qualities as in his faults; a fiery soldier of the faith in 1823; an anarchical promoter of the overthrow of M. Zéa Bermudez in 1833; having, under all conflicting circumstances, avowedly attacked and repressed, with unswerving energy, the same boasters and bravado,—the Carlists, the men of the clubs, and the men of the revolution. He saw his fate, and marched to it without illusion, hope, or anxiety. Singly he restrained the revolutionary movement at Madrid and disarmed it, when the Queen's cause encountered shipwreck on another point and swept him away in its fall."

The murder of Quesada, the flight of the principal leaders of the moderate party, the sanguinary clamours which were raised against them, the intelligence from the provinces, which announced almost every where the same excitement, threw the honest and peaceable population into consternation filled with alarm. "I do not believe in a reign of terror in Spain," M. de Bois

le Comte wrote to M. Thiers, "but minds are powerfully stirred up. Not a newspaper has yet condemned the murder of Quesada, committed six days ago. Not one has dared to raise a doubt on the perfect spontaneity with which the Queen has accepted the constitution. The editorship of all the moderate journals has been changed; there is not at this moment in Madrid a single opposition paper. As to a Carlist journal, nobody has ever thought it possible to establish one. With such popular habits, it is difficult to exercise a government here, based upon publicity and free discussion. . . . . As to us, the intelligent section of the revolutionists would like to conciliate France, and entreat her support. The savage, ignorant portion, which predominates in the streets and barracks, and unfortunately also in the secret societies, from whence this movement springs, affects to brave us; and for the last few days you hear perpetually repeated in the coffee-houses of Madrid this sentence, which has become proverbial: — '*Ea ver ahora, lo que haran esos picaros de Franceses.*' 'We shall see now what these French rogues will do.'"[1]

Perplexity increased in the council, already so disturbed, when all these particulars successively reached Paris. To whose advantage would intervention henceforth tend, supposing it should be adopted? What government were we going to support in Spain? Would Queen Christina remain Regent? What attitude would the English cabinet assume towards the men

[1] Despatches of M. de Bois le Comte, of the 17th and 21st of August, 1836.

who brought back the constitution of 1812 by violence? M. Mendizabal, to whom it had seemed so partial, was, according to all accounts, the principal fomenter of the insurrection of St. Ildefonso and of Madrid. The future of Spain was charged with dark clouds and storms in the darkness. More determined than ever not to involve in them France and her government, the King demanded that the troops assembled on the Pyrenees should be removed, to render it quite clear that they could not enter Spain in aid of revolutionary power, and of the obscure contingencies it seemed to develop. The cabinet formally refused this measure, declaring that it would be a decided and open disavowal of intervention. "We must break the ice," said M. Thiers; the King will not consent to intervention; we wish it; I retire." His colleagues, with the exception of M. de Montalivet, seconded his resignation. "Gentlemen," said the King, "it is then understood that the cabinet is dissolved. I request you not to speak of it, and to remain at your posts while I look for your successors." No doubt or complaint could be raised. The King and his advisers separated in consequence of a profound disagreement on a serious question, which would be carried before the Chambers and the country. Each exercised an indisputable privilege, guaranteed by their mutual influence and dignity in the government of the state.

CHAPTER III.

MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE WITH M. MOLÉ.

MY RELATIONS WITH COUNT MOLÉ. — FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 6TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1836. — DIFFERENT SENTIMENTS OF MY POLITICAL FRIENDS. — FROM WHAT MOTIVES AND ON WHAT CONDITIONS I JOINED THE CABINET. — ITS FIRST ACTS. — STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ALGERIA. — EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINE. — MARSHAL CLAUZEL. — THE COMMANDANT CHANGARNIER. — GENERAL TRÉZEL. — ILL SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION. — RETREAT OF THE ARMY. — CONSPIRACY OF STRASBOURG. — PRINCE LOUIS BONAPARTE. — HIS FAILURE AND EMBARKATION AT L'ORIENT. — MOTIVES OF THE CABINET FOR NOT BRINGING HIM BEFORE THE TRIBUNALS. — OPENING OF THE SESSION OF THE CHAMBERS. — ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE. — DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS. — PROSECUTION OF THE CONSPIRATORS OF STRASBOURG BEFORE THE COURT OF ASSIZES AT COLMAR. — ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED. — BILLS PRESENTED TO THE CHAMBERS. — ON THE DISJUNCTION OF CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCESSES; ON THE PLACE OF TRANSPORTATION; AND ON THE NON-REVELATION OF PLOTS AGAINST THE KING'S LIFE. — ON THE DOTATION OF THE DUKE DE NEMOURS. — PRESENTIMENTS OF KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE ON THE FUTURE OF HIS FAMILY. — THE BILL ON DISJUNCTION REJECTED BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. — THE CABINET BREAKS UP. — DIFFERENT ATTEMPTS TO FORM A NEW MINISTRY. — THE KING SENDS FOR ME. — MY PROPOSITIONS AND ENDEAVOURS. — THEY MISCARRY. — I RETIRE, WITH MM. DUCHÂTEL, GASPARIN AND PERSIL. — M. MOLÉ FORMS THE CABINET OF THE 15TH OF APRIL, 1837.

(1836—1837.)

Long before the crisis exploded, I had left Paris with my mother and children to pass some weeks in Normandy, at first at Lisieux, and subsequently at the seat of the Duke de Broglie. I wished, even in

the eyes of the idle gossips, to remain a stranger to the fall of the cabinet, and to avoid finding myself engaged in any of the combinations connected with the selection of its successors. I was bent on preserving, in this future, my entire liberty. The public, who had been surprised by the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832, felt, without regretting it, the retirement of that of the 22nd of February 1836 to be sudden, and seemed weary of ministerial crises. From this conviction, and my own choice, I found it convenient to keep aloof."

An attempt was made to change my plan. I received from Count Molé an invitation to visit and converse with him. I declined the overture, and he understood me, for he wrote thus from Acosta on the 18th of August: "On my arrival I found your answer. I should be grieved to cause you the slightest disturbance, and I hasten to tell you so. I shall myself be moving about in the neighbourhood of Paris until the session recals me there. You know without doubt that all the resignations have been tendered and accepted. The telegraphic despatch announcing the events at St. Ildefonso has changed or adjourned everything."

There were many reasons and chances why M. Molé should succeed M. Thiers. In 1830 he had held, with favour from the King and the public, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since the Spanish politics began to agitate people's minds, he had openly declared against intervention. His name, his social position, his experience of the great.

functions of government under the Empire and the Restoration, his personal merit, the prudent tone and charm of his conversation, his dignified and polished manners, gave him high consideration with the party of order, and seemed to point him out expressly for the conduct of foreign affairs. He was ambitious, and he had a right to be so. M. Bertin de Veaux, who knew him well, and was a competent judge, often said to me, "No one surpasses M. Molé in the great intrigue of politics. There he is full of activity, long foresight, skilful solicitude, discreet regard for individuals, and of becoming ingenuity without display. There is pleasure in being connected with him." He then added, with a smile, "more pleasure than safety." In truth, M. Molé was reproached with being exclusively occupied with himself and his personal success, and of forgetting too easily his associates and what they had a right to expect from him.

I had no old intimacy with M. Molé. Before the Restoration, when he was grand judge, minister of justice, and in favour with the Emperor Napoleon, I had sometimes met him in society; amongst other places, at the house of Madame de la Briche, his mother-in-law, and also at that of Madame de Rémusat, but he was then cold and silent. I was young, and of the liberal opposition; we saw each other without becoming acquainted. Under the Restoration, and when he joined the cabinet of the Duke of Richelieu as Minister of Marine, we had more frequent communication, but without attaining habits of familiarity. I was connected with M.

Decazes, who thought he had reason to complain of M. Molé, and this misunderstanding extended to their friends. The Revolution of 1830 brought us more closely together, and both in the first cabinet of the government of July, and during the administration of M. Casimir Périer, we thought and acted nearly always in unison, but still without close and personal attachment. While the cabinet of the 11th October 1832 lasted, M. Molé was habitually, and in accordance with his position and character, in the ranks of the advocates of order. Nevertheless, he separated himself from the ministry in some circumstances which were considered decisive, and which seemed to us to require immoveable resolution; amongst others in the course of the great trial instituted in the Chamber of Peers against the insurgents of April 1834. He entertained, also, in respect to our foreign relations, if not a distinct policy, at least a political tendency opposed to that of the cabinet, and particularly of the Duke de Broglie. He held less closely to the English alliance, and seemed more disposed to seek the friendship of the Continental courts. From these various causes a certain coldness sprang up between us.

But in 1835, after the attempt of Fieschi, and especially in 1836, on the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832, the most friendly and habitual relations were formed between M. Molé and me. He was sedulous to cultivate them. We often met at the house of the Countess de Castellane, one of those persons the most admirably adapted to

bring together men she wished to unite, as she could equally have succeeded in embroiling them, had such been her object. Animated, but attractive and gentle, of an original turn of mind, easy and fertile, without displaying any pretension beyond the desire of pleasing and amusing, full of art, yet apparently natural, seductive, while seeming to be interested and charmed, comprehending and enjoying everything,—literature, the fine arts, and politics,—and with the habitual air of caring for nothing beyond the pleasure of indulging in the conversation, or of promoting the enjoyments or interests of those she sought to attract to her drawing-rooms, or win over to her views. Her circle was limited; comprising some men of the world, some distinguished by genius, with a few foreigners, diplomatists and travellers. Conversation was unrestricted at her parties. Towards those she had reasons for wishing to please, she knew how to practise graceful, affectionate, and refined distinctions. I was included in these, with the avowed and not inconvenient object of establishing habits of friendly intelligence and agreement between M. Molé and myself. In this she succeeded without difficulty, for at that period, and on the questions in the order of the day, there was no discord between us. We mutually aided in the duration and transactions of M. Thiers's cabinet, estimating them nearly always in the same spirit, and with similar conjectures as to the future.

I was at Broglie when the resignation of M. Thiers became a public fact, and was announced in the

Moniteur of the 26th of August. I immediately received two letters, dated on the same day, one from M. Bertin de Veaux, the other from M. Molé. "My dear friend," M. Bertin de Veaux began, "I have told you several times through your son, and once through the Duke de Broglie, not to appear in Paris. The fate of M. Thiers was then uncertain, and I did not wish that he, or any one else, should be able to say that you had come to precipitate his fall. To-day, the *Moniteur* has spoken, and the course must be changed. Your presence now will surely be useful; it is even necessary, for in such critical circumstances minutes are precious. Hasten, then, to return. Be assured that I consider your interest as my own, and that I would not advise you to what I should abstain from myself." M. Molé said to me: "You will now comprehend the reasons which made me wish to see you. I received this evening, at Acosta, a letter from the King, urging me to repair to him. I have just left him, having stated my desire to come to an understanding with you before proceeding farther. Moments are valuable. I hope you will think so with me."

Looking upon things as they actually stood, my position was simple. It was on the Spanish question, and to evade intervention that the new cabinet was forming, and I was opposed to intervention. The question was to return, internally and externally, towards the policy, principles, and persons, of the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832. The King demanded my co-operation in an important conjuncture,

both as regarded himself and the country, and in which I approved of his resistance to the preceding cabinet. He required, he said, in the Chamber of Deputies, either M. Thiers or me, and on this point the public, as well as the Chambers, were of the same opinion. No concession was required from me, no obstacle was raised which might have furnished me with a pretext for refusal.

Amongst my political friends, sentiments were divided. Some regretted that I should resume office so soon; I had too recently left it: experience of the mischief accruing from a deviation from the policy of resistance had neither been sufficiently long nor complete; the reaction which called us back towards that system was only commencing; during my retirement, my position had increased with repose; it would advance and consolidate itself still more if I remained for an interval unconnected with power, and I could resume it at a future period with all the authority I might require. This, amongst others, was the opinion of M. Duvergier de Hauranne, who displayed at that time towards me tokens of sagacity, fidelity, and, I may add, of moderation, which nothing that has since passed between us either can or ought to prevent me from acknowledging. Others, and I may say the greater part, considered my return as natural and necessary. I had not sought it; I was entirely a stranger to the fall of M. Thiers; I had not even opened my mouth on the question before which he succumbed. They would not admit that I could deny myself to the King's desire when my opinion accorded

with his, or to the opportunity of adding his rank and influence to the political party I espoused. To this opinion, some added, that on resuming office I should explicitly demand the lead. "I do not think I deceive myself;" thus wrote to me from Nismes the president of the royal court, M. de Daunant, one of my oldest and most judicious friends, "in telling you that you are generally expected to be at the head of the new cabinet. The serious difficulties that previously existed have, without doubt, been augmented by the wavering policy adopted during the last six months. A longer trial would in all probability have completed its discredit; but I hope that this unhappy essay, and the confidence you inspire, will rally round you honest and courageous men." The Duke de Broglie, with his unaffected and magnanimous generosity, expressed the same idea to me with increased energy: "The new ministry," he wrote, "ought to receive you as leader, not only in fact, but in name; at all events, you will have the responsibility, and should possess the command. A ministry with two presidents, —one nominal, the other actual,—has in reality none; therein is comprised an inevitable and rapid dissolvent." In fine, nearly all accorded in thinking and saying,—that to restore the policy for a moment laid aside, the new cabinet ought to present it under a new aspect. M. Duchâtel wrote to me, on the 23rd of August, from La Rochelle, where he was presiding over the General Council: "If a crisis comes on unexpectedly, you should use your freedom. I cannot write to you in detail; but my opinion is, that two things are neces-

sary: first, not to revive the past, but to create anew; secondly, to be most careful in all that is substituted." The Duke de Broglie was even more explicit: "The new ministry ought to be truly new, and it should be the fruit of new combinations which may surprise the public. If it were to present itself as a resurrection, as a weakened and faded counter-trial of the ministry which displaced itself six months ago — as that same ministry, in fact, less such important members as Thiers and Humann, — such an attempt would be mortal; it would not last for a month."

This was the precise source of my discontent. To construct a new cabinet would be to separate myself from the Duke de Broglie. I had recently resigned office with him, M. Duchâtel, and M. Persil. To return with two only of my associates, without the most intimate of the three, and to take upon myself his post as President of the Council, no matter what might be the weight of political motives, and of the advice of the Duke himself, would convey an appearance of desertion and infidelity, which grieved and deeply wounded me.

King Louis-Philippe, in this emergency, committed an error, too common on the part of princes, who, to spare themselves a momentary embarrassment of conversation, frequently assume airs of lightness, indifference and oblivion. If, after the resignation of M. Thiers, the King had invited the Duke de Broglie, not to resume office, but to converse with him, in honest sincerity, on the position, and to discuss its compatibilities and exigencies, with the necessity of new

combinations of persons in maintaining the old policy, he would have found him perfectly disinterested, in mind and heart, and without any desire to return to power, much more disposed to decline the offer if made to him, and ready to give the new cabinet his loyal support. The King did not thoroughly know the Duke de Broglie: on this occasion he neither sent for nor wrote to him, nor bestowed on him any token of confiding and affectionate remembrance. The Duke de Broglie felt himself wounded, as did his friends around him; nobly wounded, as becomes such lofty souls; the sentiment had no influence on his conduct. Neither his devotion to the King, nor our mutual friendship, nor the sincerity of his concurrence in our common policy, wavered for a single moment. But nevertheless the cabinet about to be formed found in this an unpleasant incident, and I myself a source of regret, which prejudicially influenced my resolutions.

I started for Paris, and on my arrival received this note from the King:—"My dear former Minister, I understand you are at last in Paris. I have impatiently expected you, and I pray you to let me see you as soon as you can. I wish it could be this evening, should my note reach you in time. If you find it too late to come to Neuilly to-night, I propose to you to-morrow morning at ten o'clock, or the Tuileries at twelve. You know the sentiments I entertain for you." I saw the King; I had interviews with M. Molé and M. Duchâtel. I collected the impressions and opinions of those of my friends who were then in Paris, and I confined myself to demanding that my two

colleagues in the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832, M. Duchâtel and M. Persil, should re-enter into the new ministry, the one as Minister of Finance, the other as Chancellor; that M. de Gasparin should be called to the Ministry of the Interior, in which he already discharged the functions of Under Secretary of State; and that M. de Rémusat should replace him in the latter post. I thus secured to my political friends half of the seats; and two of the most important departments in the cabinet. For myself, I only desired to resume the ministry of Public Instruction; and on these terms I accepted the alliance with M. Molé, as minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Council.

These arrangements were dictated by my personal feelings rather than by political utility and foresight. In consenting to return to office without the Duke de Broglie, I was bent on not procuring for myself any advance of position, any gratification of ambition or self-love; and I flattered myself that in a council thus formed, having in the Ministry of the Interior two of my staunchest friends, I should exercise upon the general government of the country, although confined within my own modest department, all the influence which the policy I represented could require. I deceived myself. There is no such thing as ruling effectually by factitious combinations and indirect means. Setting aside my affections, and consulting policy alone, I had to choose between two lines of conduct. I might refuse to enter a cabinet which I had not formed myself, and which, moreover, wanted

several of the principal elements which had given to the ministry of the 11th of October 1832 its strength and authority. Or I might propose for my object to reconstruct that cabinet at some future day, or another equivalent to it; and I might have remained until then in that position of watchfulness and expectancy which affords to personal difficulties time for obliteration, and to reconciliations the opportunity of being brought about under the pressure of necessity. This would have been, perhaps, the most effectual and prudent course. When I decided to enter the cabinet of M. Molé, I ought to have surmounted my own internal feelings and embarrassments; I should have taken the ministry of the Interior, thereby directly assuring to myself the power, the responsibility of which would evidently weigh upon me, and should have transferred my two friends, M. de Rémusat and M. Gasparin, one to the ministry of Public Instruction, and the other to that of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works; two departments for which they were respectively well qualified. This would have been a more natural and powerful combination than that to which I had given my concurrence. But I yielded to my personal impressions, to the strong instances of the King, to the urgency of the position, and also to a tendency in my nature to accept too readily whatever cuts short the difficulties of the moment,—to exact too little as to means, and to have too much confidence in success.

After my adhesion, and the official appointment of the principal ministers, the cabinet still remained in-

complete for several days. The departments of War and Trade were not disposed of, which led to some difficulty. Marshal Soult declined to resume the portfolio of War under the presidency of Count Molé. Several persons desired, not without reason, that the Count de Montalivet should continue, as minister of Commerce, a member of the cabinet. In the preceding ministry, he alone had opposed intervention in Spain. He possessed courage, activity, tact, and considerable influence in the Chambers. But it suited him not to accept a department inferior to that which he had quitted, and in which his under-secretary of State, M. de Gasparin, had just replaced him. The King, moreover, preferred keeping M. de Montalivet near his own person, and holding him in reserve, that he might at need join any ministry whose tendencies he doubted. General Bernard and M. Martin du Nord were named for War and Trade; both men of merit, able and useful, but not called for by the public, who were weary of being kept in suspense for fifteen days.

The first measures of the cabinet were well received. The appointment of M. Gabriel Delessert as Prefect of Police obtained general approbation in Paris. He had exhibited rare courage in the outbreaks, and an indefatigable devotion to order. His family and himself decided with great reluctance, and from pure zeal for the public good, to accept these delicate functions. He was favourably regarded both for his compliance and hesitation. Soon after the formation of the cabinet, and at its recommendation, the King pardoned sixty-two criminals under sentence for political offences.

The ministers of Charles X., confined at Ham, MM. de Chantelouze and de Peyronnet, in the first instance, and a few days later, the Prince de Polignac and M. Guernon de Ranville, were set at liberty, without any of those restrictions which give to party passions a useless and vulgar gratification, and under the single condition, as regarded three of them, of remaining, on parole, in residences selected by themselves. The Prince de Polignac was banished from France for twenty years. The relations of M. Molé with the foreign cabinets and their representatives in Paris commenced under auspices of good-will and reciprocal confidence. I resumed my labours in the expansion and improvement of public instruction in all its degrees. The elementary schools received many encouragements. A chair of general pathology and therapeutics was instituted in the faculty of medicine at Montpellier. In presiding at the re-opening of the lectures of the great normal school in Paris, I applied myself to a clear definition of the character of public teaching as settled by the State, by affirming that in all its degrees, as already practised in the elementary department, it ought to, and could, reconcile itself with the privileges of liberty.[1] I used strenuous endeavours, in the question of publishing, for the suppression of spurious editions, both by legislative enactments and negotiations with foreign powers. My colleagues promoted with equal anxiety the legal and liberal ameliorations which their departments required

[1] See Historic Documents, No. IX.

or admitted. The public, and the Chambers, then on the point of re-assembling, followed with favouring expectation these first steps of a regular and enlightened ministry. But two events, both unexpected,—the ill success of the expedition against Constantine, and the conspiracy of Strasbourg,—quickly and seriously altered a position scarcely yet assured, and abruptly involved the new cabinet in great struggles and dangers.

The preceding ministry had determined on and prepared the expedition against Constantine. Marshal Clauzel has affirmed that M. Thiers adopted his plans of operation and conquest on all the important points of Algeria, and promised him the full means of execution that they required. Authentic documents indicate that the minister of War, Marshal Maison, had associated himself with this approbation and these promises, leaving, however, with regard to the expedition against Constantine, something undefined "as to the epoch when it would be convenient to undertake it, and the fresh orders Marshal Clauzel might expect before he entered upon action." When the cabinet of the 22nd of February 1836 fell, after its resignation, officially announced on the 30th of August, Marshal Maison wrote to Marshal Clauzel, "that the arrangements settled were, on the whole, confirmed by interviews and verbal communications between several of the King's ministers; but that they had not yet been made the subject of any deliberation in council, or received the definitive sanction of the government; that it rested with the new cabinet to accord or withhold that sanction, and, until then, nothing could be at-

tempted, no compromise risked; that he must confine himself within the limits of actual occupation, within those of the effective force at his command, and of the legislative credits, or at least of the expenditure prescribed and sanctioned." The retiring minister of War thought only of relieving himself from the responsibility of the projected enterprise, and of transferring it to his successors.

Marshal Clauzel was—and not without reason—surprised, offended, and embarrassed. Anxiously wishing to believe, and believing himself authorized, he had already commenced operations. From the 2nd of August 1836, he had given to General Rapatel, his substitute *ad interim* in Algeria, full instructions, which he also communicated to the minister of War, for the execution of what he called "the system of absolute rule in the ex-regency, definitively adopted, on my proposition, by the government." He had determined the distribution of troops throughout the whole territory of Algeria; put in motion those destined to occupy the province of Constantine; prescribed, both as regarded the means and persons, the measures to be adopted on the scene of action itself, and announced those which had already been transmitted, or were about to be forwarded, from Paris by the minister of War. All these preparatives and orders were known throughout the Regency, to the Arabs as well as to our own soldiers, at Constantine and in the city of Algiers; and Marshal Clauzel wound up his instructions to General Rapatel in these words: "By the 9th of October, at the latest, I shall repair to Bona to

assume direction of the military operations against Constantine." Disturbed, but not arrested in his designs, by the evasive and dubious letter addressed to him on the 20th of August by Marshal Maison, he replied thus on the instant: "Will you and the President of the Council be so kind as to recollect that you pressed me to set out for Algiers, that I took leave of you eight days before my departure, and that you said nothing to me of the council, in which the plan of operations to be carried out in Africa was to be discussed? You will find, when you recall that circumstance, that I deserve no reproaches." As soon as Marshal Clauzel was made acquainted with the formation of the cabinet of the 6th of September, he addressed to it despatches upon despatches, entreaties upon entreaties, demanding authority to enter on the campaign. "Constantine," he wrote on the 24th of September, "is an admirable field for colonization . . . it is there that we should strike and establish ourselves. All is ready. Shall we alone delay? Shall we not act when time and circumstances call upon us?"

Inheriting thus a position already defined and pressing, the cabinet at once adopted two resolutions: the one, to withdraw the general government of Algeria from the paths in which Marshal Clauzel had entangled it, and to remove the Marshal himself as soon as convenience allowed; the other, to sanction his prosecution of the enterprise against Constantine, and to furnish him with the means promised by the antecedent ministry. One of these resolutions was

clearly indicated to him, the other officially announced on the 27th of September by the new minister of War, General Bernard, in these terms: "It has appeared to the King's government that a plan so vast as that laid down in your letter of the 2nd of August to General Rapatel, could not be realized without an increase of expenditure which it does not feel justified in incurring, at least for the present. It is also felt that the exalted conceptions you have submitted require the most serious attention and call for the maturest reflection. For these reasons it would have been desired that the expedition against Constantine should have been suspended for the present; but his Majesty's government is impressed with the consequences that might ensue, in such a country as Africa, and in the present spirit of the native population, from the postponement of an expedition publicly announced, and when the prospect of that undertaking has already rallied several tribes to our cause . . . . It is therefore because the expedition to Constantine has been proclaimed, and for this reason alone, that the King's government now permits it; but merely as an operation necessitated by events exclusively special, and not intended to lead as a consequence to the execution of the general plan of occupation which you recommended . . . It must be well understood, Monsieur le Maréchal, that this expedition is to be carried out with the means (in numbers and material) now actually at your disposal. But you will observe that these means are superior to the allotment projected in your general plan of occupation, and at least equal to those named

in your instructions to General Rapatel of the 2nd of August last."

Even before the receipt of this letter, Marshal Clauzel had ceased to mistake his position. He was well aware that the new cabinet was opposed to the line of conduct in Algeria which, under the old ministry, he had caused to be adopted. Neither had he met on the ground itself all the facilities he anticipated. For six months previously, and in the prospect of a conquest which he held for certain, he had appointed, as Bey of Constantine, the lieutenant-colonel of Spahis, Youssouf, who pledged himself, by his secret understanding in that province, to secure the fall of the Turkish Bey Achmet, and the almost spontaneous surrender of the place. While waiting for the expedition, the Marshal had despatched Youssouf to Bona to prepare local arrangements, but the success of his envoy was very incomplete; with regard to the levy of native auxiliaries, the collecting of baggage mules, and the probability of capitulation, the results fell far below his promises. The Marshal sent his aide-de-camp, M. de Rancé, to demand reinforcements; General Bernard replied that the expedition against Constantine was all that the cabinet authorized, and as the provinces of Algeria and Oran were to remain on the defensive, it was from them that the reinforcements, if required, should be forwarded to Bona. Then commenced a controversy between the minister of War and the Marshal, governed on both sides by a tacit reference to the general plan of conquest and occupation, which the one refused to

adopt, and the other persisted in following. According to M. de Rancé, not 30,000, but 45,000 men were required for the operations against Constantine and the other provinces of Algeria. After a month of somewhat confused correspondence, General Bernard observed to the Marshal that he had 11,478 effective men at Bona, which gave 10,602 present under arms; that is to say, the force he had at first demanded for the expedition. He sent him in addition the necessary funds to pay 4000 native auxiliaries for six weeks, and finished by saying: "Now, Monsieur le Maréchal, either the means at your disposal are those which you yourself pronounced sufficient, and as your instructions to General Rapatel have induced the King's government to believe, or in your real judgment they are not so. In the first case, you have no reason to demand reinforcements; in the second, as you are merely permitted, not commanded, to undertake the expedition, you can, if you please, abandon it. It depends therefore solely on yourself to decide on this point according as you find the means you possess sufficient or insufficient."

To bestow on Marshal Clauzel a distinguished mark of confidence at the same time, and when he was left free to settle the question he had provoked himself, the Duke of Nemours embarked at Toulon to take part in the expedition to Constantine, as in the preceding year the Duke of Orleans had accompanied that to Mascara. And, to combine foresight with confidence, General Damrémont, an officer of acknowledged merit, who commanded at Marseilles, received

confidential orders to proceed to Algiers, and to hold himself in readiness to assume the government of the province if, as a rumour prevailed, Marshal Clauzel should tender his resignation.

The Marshal, who I believe had never hesitated, formed his resolution at once. Having reached Bona during the last days of October, he wrote on the 1st of November to General Rapatel, left in command at Algiers: "Send me, by the return of the steam frigate, the battalion of the 2nd light infantry commanded by Changarnier, the officer I have remarked, and who I promoted to be a lieutenant-colonel some months since." General Rapatel obeyed his orders; the Commandant Changarnier arrived at Bona with his battalion, and on the 13th of November 1836, Marshal Clauzel, taking with him 7000 men of all arms, with 2000 native auxiliaries, and leaving at Bona a garrison of 2000, already stricken by the autumnal fevers, began his march towards Constantine.

For several days before his departure, the weather was dreadful; the rain fell in a deluge, the plains were inundated, the snow covered the mountains. "These are not the long rains of winter, but only fertilizing showers which soon pass over," exclaimed those who were enthusiastic in hope. "I have confidence in the troops," wrote the Marshal; "I hope to inspire them with the same sentiment, and I depart for Constantine, where I shall soon arrive." A few less sanguine spirits, particularly in the military administration, participated not in this feeling, and betrayed many doubts as to the facility of the enterprise, the aptness

of the moment, and the extent of our resources." But the greater part of those present persuaded themselves that they were entering on an expedition of assured success, and almost on a party of pleasure. Much reliance was placed on the assertions and promises of Youssouf; he was already looked upon and treated as a powerful Bey; some officers only complained of the prospect that not a shot would be exchanged. The sun had reappeared, and seemed to confirm by its brilliancy these flattering expectations. The troops marched, the advanced guard on the 9th of November, Marshal Clauzel on the 13th. They had scarcely been in movement for twenty-four hours when the rain recommenced; the rivulets became torrents; the soldiers advanced laboriously; many fell behind; already some of the Arab auxiliaries deserted, carrying away a small but precious portion of the very limited supplies of the expedition. But the fine weather returned; for five days the army proceeded without suffering and without resistance; but on the 19th of November, when it reached the high table-lands in the vicinity of Constantine, rain, snow, hail, and cold once more came on with violence; the soldiers were unable to find on that fertile but denuded soil a morsel of wood to cook their rations or dry their clothes. At each passage of a torrent, at every bivouac, numbers of men were left behind, perishing of cold and fatigue, with spoiled or abandoned provisions. "We were there exposed," said Marshal Clauzel in his report, "to all the rigours of a winter in St. Petersburg, while the ground, entirely broken

up, recalled to the old officers the mud of Warsaw." On the 21st of November, the army at length arrived before Constantine. The strength of the place was instantly perceived, and how little it thought of surrendering. The red flag of the Arabs floated upon the principal battery. As soon as our troops were within range, a lively cannonade issued from the ramparts. Achmet Bey, at the head of a numerous cavalry, held the open country, and advanced to attack the brigade of our advanced guard, which, under the orders of General de Rigny, had occupied the eminences (*mamelons*) of Koudiat-Aly, in sight of the gate of Bab-el-Ouad. A bold and renowned Kabyle chief, Ben-Aïssa, commanded in the town, as the Bey's lieutenant. He executed a sortie with the Turkish garrison, and joined in the attack on the same brigade. The Arab horsemen and Turkish infantry were valiantly repulsed, but without any other result. Our forces were too weak to invest the place; no symptom of capitulation appeared; our ammunition and provisions were rapidly diminishing. Marshal Clauzel resolved to attempt a vigorous assault against the gates before which the two divisions of his small army were encamped, — the only chance, if there existed one at all, of carrying the place. The Rummel, and the ravine at the bottom of which it runs, separated the divisions. On the 23rd, at three in the afternoon, a soldier swam across the river, carrying, in a small piece of oilcloth wrapped round his head, the following note from the Marshal:— "General de Rigny, at midnight I shall attack the

gate of El-Kantara; you will assail that of Koudiat-Aly." The two attacks, one led by the Marshal in person and General Trézel, the other by General de Rigny and Lieutenant-Colonel Duvivier, were made with determined vigour, but without success. In the first, General Trézel, "who exposed himself," said the Marshal's report, "to the hottest fire, to regulate and encourage the troops," fell by a ball which passed through his neck. In the second, Lieutenant-Colonel Duvivier was for a moment on the point of gaining the place, but all who surrounded him, officers and soldiers, were struck down and compelled to retire. "By three in the morning the struggle had ceased," said one of the brave men present; "the ordinary silence was resumed, when the usual signal for the last nocturnal prayer issued from the minaret of the principal mosque of Constantine. Verses of the Koran, borne through the air, were repeated on the ramparts by thousands of calm, resolute, and confident voices. Our soldiers felt themselves compelled to esteem their enemies."

At the same moment, under the Marshal's direction, and in the obscurity of the night, the separated divisions of the army placed themselves in motion to unite in a single column, and to commence a retreat, now evidently inevitable. The two corps formed precipitately; the ambulances were hastily loaded with wounded men, picked up on the very instant from the ground on which they had fought, and with their hurts scarcely bandaged. The assembly of all the troops on the point fixed by the Marshal was not yet

completed when the sun rose. The garrison of Constantine, apprised by the sentinels on the ramparts, issued forth in detachments continually increasing in strength, and eager to push forward their attacks. In the midst of this disciplined agitation, the Commandant Changarnier, who covered with his battalion the march of the division conducted by General de Rigny towards the point of concentration indicated by the Marshal, perceived thirty or forty soldiers running across the front of the Arabs in an attempt to rejoin the French column. It was an outpost that had been forgotten. Facing instantly about, Colonel Changarnier led on his battalion to the charge, for the rescue of these lost men, and recovered nearly all, but not without losing a few of his own. Then halting at intervals, as the ground favoured him, he repeatedly checked the Arabs, obstinate in pursuit, and thus gained for the different corps sufficient time to unite and reorganize, according to the Marshal's orders, in a column of retreat. Towards eleven the combined march began; the battalion of the 2nd light infantry continued to cover it; the entire cavalry of Achmet Bey appeared to be preparing for a general charge. As soon as he saw their approach, Colonel Changarnier threw his battalion into a square, exclaiming, "Soldiers, look on those men; they are 6000 and you are 300; you see readily that the game is unequal." Then, when the cloud of Arab pursuers approached within twenty paces, he ordered a close, point-blank fire from two ranks, with loud shouts of "Long live the King!" His small force

strewed the soil with men and horses. The Arabs wheeled rapidly round. The Turkish garrison, which had issued from Constantine without provisions, returned to take their first meal. The French column continued its march in good order; on the close of that day, the 24th of November, when the battalion of the 2nd light infantry took its place in the bivouac, it was received with prolonged acclamations by the whole army, and Marshal Clauzel himself addressed the most cordial congratulations to Colonel Changarnier. On the following morning, the 25th of November, the march was resumed, and for five days the retreat went on, incessantly harassed by the Kabyles, distressed by the scarcity of provisions, and saddened by fatal incidents and deplorable losses; but directed by Marshal Clauzel with the resolute activity and firmness of soul which inspire troops with confidence in their leader, resignation under sufferings, and ardour in peril. On the 1st of December the little force reached Bona. Marshal Clauzel and the Duke of Nemours left that place on the 6th for Algiers, and on the 22nd the young Prince re-entered Paris, esteemed by the whole army for the calm courage he had evinced in his unassuming character of volunteer, and prepared to lay before the King his father, with scrupulous reserve, a recital of the mistakes, misfortunes, and heroic deeds of which he had been a witness.

I cannot here deny myself the satisfaction of paying a particular homage to one of the chiefs of that expedition, General Trézel, my friend, and, in 1847,

my colleague as minister of War. This brave man, as virtuous as he was valiant, had long served in Algeria, and there, as elsewhere, had won a distinguished reputation for both qualities. But after the check he sustained, on the 28th of June 1835, at La Macta, against Abd-el-Kader, he himself requested Marshal Maison to recall him; "for," said he, with rare candour, "I can no longer promise myself the confidence of the troops, and I shall submit without a murmur to the full censure and severity which the King's government may think I have deserved, hoping that it will not refuse to reward the brave men who have distinguished themselves in these two combats." Nevertheless, this reverse, so nobly avowed, weighed cruelly on him, and his heart was fixed on finding, by still serving in Algeria, a chance of repairing it. Being called in 1836 to the command of Bona, he naturally took part in the expedition to Constantine, and directed, under Marshal Clauzel, the second division of that small army. Arrived before Constantine, he saw at once that with such scanty means of attack there was no probability of success against serious resistance. An assault was however spoken of, and while it was preparing, he said to his young orderly officer, to whom he bore confidence and friendship, "My dear Morny, there are no human means of entering into that town; many of us will be killed under its walls; should I be amongst the number, which is probable, try to convey to my wife what may yet remain of me. You will find in my pocket a note for 500 francs; it is nearly all the

money I now have." During the night of the 23rd or 24th of November, when Marshal Clauzel endeavoured to force the gates of El-Kantara and Bab-el-Oued, General Trézel, entrusted with the attack on the first, approached close to the rampart, with M. de Morny by his side. The moon shone brightly; they were fired on. "My dear General," said the young officer, "if we remain here we shall both infallibly be killed; as for me, I should be no great loss, but if, as I scarcely think, an assault will be attempted, it would be a sad pity if you were not there." At this moment, some men of the engineers passed close to them, leading a mule loaded with shovels and pick-axes; a soldier and the mule were killed. Turning towards M. de Morny, General Trézel said to him, "I believe really you are in the right; but where can we place ourselves while waiting the assault?" At the very instant he fell with his face on the ground. On turning towards him, M. de Morny perceived a stain of mud on his temple, and thinking him dead, exclaimed with some impatience, "There, I told him so; he is killed because he would not listen to me; what absurd courage!" As he was endeavouring, with the aid of some soldiers, to place him in a blanket to carry off his body, the general came to himself and said, "Well! what has happened?" "How, General, you are not dead? what happiness!" "I only fainted, and was unable to speak; but I heard you grumble and say I was dead: I had only one anxiety; the fear of being left there." He was taken to the ambulance. A ball had gone

through his neck, but being very small, it passed between the vertebræ, throat, and the carotid artery. A musket ball would have killed him. He made the retreat in Marshal Clauzel's calash, as calm and thinking as little of himself as he had been under the ramparts of Constantine. I take pleasure in recording these reminiscences of that modest and incorruptible servant of France. He had an indomitable heart in a mean and insignificant body. To the manly and, at the same time, diffident simplicity of a soldier more practised in obedience and command than in discussion, he joined the respectful patriotism of a citizen devoted to order and to the laws. He had some of the prejudices but none of the weaknesses of his time. His firmness was not always exempt from obstinacy, but when he deceived himself, no personal view, no sentiment of doubtful purity mingled with his error. Duty was his law and devotedness his passion. Whether it were necessary to compromise or to reserve himself, to mount to the assault, or to retire from the world, neither emergency found him hesitating, and he was equally prepared for the effort or the sacrifice. He has not won the renown of the Catinats and Faberts, and he had neither their fortune nor genius in war; but in soul he was of their race, and I only render him justice when I place him by their side. I return to Marshal Clauzel, and to the consequences of this unfortunate campaign.

In the Chambers it became the subject of long debates. The Marshal himself took part in them,

without skill and with no just comprehension of his own or of the general position. He was a warrior eminent on the field of battle, but he continued what the revolution and the empire had made him, a patriot with habitual notions of violence and despotism, loving the greatness of France, and ever ready to serve her with his sword; but a stranger to all other political views, and to every sentiment of responsibility in the bosom of liberty. He had been obviously improvident, presumptuous, light, too little occupied with the fate of the men he commanded, seeking pre-eminently his personal success, no matter how weak were the chances, or how costly the price at which it might be purchased. When he arrived at Bona, under the shock of his repulse, and anxious to soften the displeasure of the cabinet, he wrote confidentially to General Bernard, while forwarding his official report: "I shall declare to the government, when it will and how it will, that the troops under my command were sufficient for the expedition, and I should either have taken or forced Constantine to surrender, with a portion of those who were reduced to a state of annihilation by the bad weather, if that portion could have been united with the rest." When the day of public debate came on, he could only defend himself by accusing the government of withholding from him the necessary forces, and of preparing to abandon Algeria; an absurd accusation, for the cabinet comprised none of the men who had suffered such an inclination to escape them; and I, on the contrary, was one of those who, on every

occasion, had most strenuously advocated the maintenance and future of our possessions in Africa. But the charge of indifference to the national greatness was the popular theme of attack, and to that Marshal Clauzel looked for his point of support. While this debate was in progress, he had ceased for two months to be governor-general of Algeria. Fully determined to repair the check received by France before Constantine, and not to incur again the risk of the mistakes that had led to it, we had, on the 12th of February, 1837, recalled Marshal Clauzel, appointing as his successor General de Damrémont, whose high military reputation and sound understanding promised us for the general administration of Algeria, as well as for the special conduct of the new expedition, the double guarantee of which we stood in need.[1]

The news of the disaster produced a lively emotion in France, which would have been even more painful, had it not been preceded and diverted by another excitement, arising from an incident of a different character. At the precise moment when Marshal Clauzel reached Bona, and was preparing to set out for Constantine, Prince Louis Bonaparte entered Strasbourg, and endeavoured by a military insurrection to overthrow the King and the Charter of 1830.

On the evening of the 31st of October, the Minister

[1] I insert amongst the "Historic Documents" (No. X.), a letter which General Damrémont transmitted to me from Marseilles, on the 10th of December, 1836, before the failure of the expedition against Constantine was known, and in which, from that date, he explained his views as to Algeria.

of the Interior, M. de Gasparin, brought to me a telegraphic dispatch which he had just received from Strasbourg, dated on the preceding eve the 30th, and which ran thus: —

"This morning, about six o'clock, Louis Napoleon, son of the Duchess of St. Leu, *who had in his confidence* the Colonel of Artillery Vaudrey, traversed the streets of Strasbourg with a party of . . ."

The despatch stopped there, and the director of the telegraphic lines, M. Alphonse Foy, had added to it this note: "The words underlined are doubtful. The mist which has enveloped the line neither allows us to receive the end of the dispatch nor to clear up the dubious passage."

We repaired instantly to the Tuileries, where, a few moments later, the entire cabinet assembled. We conversed, we conjectured, we weighed chances, we drew up eventual instructions, we discussed the measures to be adopted under various hypotheses. The Duke of Orleans prepared to leave us. We remained there by the King nearly the whole night, expecting news which arrived not. The Queen, Madame Adelaide, the Princes, went and came, demanding whether anything further had transpired. We slept from lassitude, and woke from impatience. I was struck by the sadness of the King, not that he seemed uneasy or subdued, but uncertainty as to the seriousness of the event occupied his thoughts; and these reiterated conspiracies, these attempts at civil war, republican, legitimist, and Bonapartist, this continual necessity of contending, repressing, and

punishing, weighed on him as a hateful burden. Despite his long experience and all that it had taught him of man's passions and the vicissitudes of life, he was and continued to be naturally easy, confiding, benevolent, and hopeful. He grew tired of having incessantly to watch, to defend himself, and of finding so many enemies on his steps.

On the following morning, the 1st of November, an aide-de-camp of General Voirol, commandant at Strasbourg, brought us the end of the event, as also of the telegraphic dispatch, and a detailed account of the abortive attempt. From Switzerland where he resided, and from the waters of Baden to which he often resorted, Prince Louis maintained in France, and especially at Strasbourg, constant communications. Neither amongst his adherents nor in himself did anything promise encouraging chances of success. A few old officers, enthusiastic women without position in the world, retired functionaries out of employment, and scattered malcontents were not the most effective agents against a power which had already lasted for six years; and which, in open day, had conquered all its enemies, republicans, and legitimists, conspirators and insurgents. Prince Louis was young, unknown in France by the army and by the people. Nobody had seen him; he had done nothing; some essays on the military art, "Political Reveries," a "Project for a Constitution;" and the praises of two or three democratic journals were not very powerful titles to the public favour and to the government of France. He had his name, though

even his name had remained barren under a concealed and entirely personal force; but he had faith in himself and in his destiny. While performing his duties as a captain of artillery in the Canton of Berne, and while publishing his pamphlets on which France bestowed little thought, he looked upon himself as the heir and representative, not only of a dynasty, but of the two ideas which had constituted the strength of that dynasty, — revolution without anarchy and military fame. Under calm, gentle, and unassuming manners, he combined, a little confusedly, an active sympathy for revolutionary enterprises and innovations, with the tastes and traditions of absolute power; and the pride of an exalted race, united in his mind with the ambitious instinct of a lofty future. He felt himself a prince, and he believed, with invincible confidence, that he was predestined to be an emperor. It was with this sentiment and in this faith that, on the 30th of October, 1836, at six in the morning, without any other support than a colonel and commandant of a battalion, previously won over to his cause, he traversed the streets of Strasbourg, and presented himself at the barracks of the 4th Regiment of Artillery, where, after two short addresses by Colonel Vaudrey and himself, he was received with shouts of *Long live the Emperor!* At the same moment some of his partisans repaired to the residences of the general commanding and the prefect, and, failing to persuade them, left them insufficiently guarded in their hotels. On arriving at the second barrack, which he proposed to carry, the

barrack Finckmall, occupied by the 46th Regiment of Infantry of the Line, Prince Louis encountered a different reception. Forewarned in time, Lieutenant-Colonel Talendier resolutely repulsed all efforts to seduce the fidelity of the soldiers. Colonel Paillot and the other officers of the regiment arrived, equally loyal and determined. On the spot itself, the Prince and those who accompanied him were arrested. The report spread rapidly, and the insurrectionary movements attempted in several corps, and on various points of the city, ceased on the instant. The General and Prefect had recovered their liberty, and took the necessary measures. Of the known adherents of Prince Louis in this enterprise of a few hours, one alone, M. de Persigny, his confidant and most intimate friend, effected his escape. The authorities of Strasbourg, when sending their reports to the King's government, demanded instructions as to the fate of the prisoners.

We learnt, at the same time, that on the same day, the 30th of October, at Vendôme, a corporal of the 1st Regiment of Hussars, in garrison at that town, had assembled at a public-house some of his comrades, and that they there resolved to sound "boot and saddle" the following night, to seize the officers, the civil functionaries, and to proclaim the republic. Being apprised while their meeting was still going on, the Lieutenant-Colonel instantly arrested the corporal and his accomplices. The corporal, after killing with a pistol-shot a quarter-master who was guarding him, escaped, wandered about during the whole day in the

environs of the town, and with a humbled spirit and subdued heart returned at night to Vendôme, to surrender himself. It has been frequently said, that there was no connection whatever between this miserable bungle and the attempt of Strasbourg. The coincidence implies, and I have reason to believe, that this conclusion is erroneous.

Our deliberation was short as to the conduct to be adopted in regard to the prisoners. On ascertaining the issue of the enterprise and the captivity of her son, Queen Hortense hurried to France under an assumed name, and, pausing near Paris, at Viry, in the house of the Duchess of Ragusa, from thence addressed her maternal supplications to the King and M. Molé. She might have spared them. The resolution of not bringing Prince Louis to trial, and of sending him to the United States of America, was already taken. This was the decided inclination of the King, and the unanimous advice of the Cabinet. For myself, I had never served or lauded the Emperor Napoleon the First; but I respect greatness and genius, even when I deplore their application, and I cannot think that the claims of such a man to the respect of the world descend with him into the tomb. The heir to the name, and according to the imperial system, to the throne of the Emperor Napoleon, had a right to be treated as of royal race, and to be subjected only to the exigencies of policy. On the 10th of November he was removed from the citadel of Strasbourg, and taken by post to Paris, where he passed several hours in the apartments of

the Prefect of Police, being visited only by M. Gabriel Delessert. Departing immediately for L'Orient, he arrived there on the night of the 13th or 14th, and was embarked on board the frigate *Andromède*, about to sail for Brazil, touching at New York. When the frigate was on the point of getting under way, the sub-prefect of L'Orient, M. Villemain, while paying his respects to Prince Louis, and before taking leave of him, inquired if, on arriving in the United States, he should find, at first, the resources he might require. "None," replied the Prince. "Well then, my Prince, the King has ordered me to place in your hands fifteen thousand francs in gold, which you will find in this little casket." The Prince took the casket, the sub-prefect went ashore, and the frigate sailed.

Twenty-five years (and what years!) have rolled on since that epoch. Their instruction is clear. Twice—in 1836 and in 1840,—with the perseverance of faith and enthusiasm, Prince Louis Napoleon endeavoured to overthrow the constitutional monarchy; both times he failed, and at the outset. In 1851, he destroyed the Republic at a blow, and since that day has reigned over France. The constitutional monarchy was a regular and free government, which gave guarantees for the true and complete interests of France. The France which desired this in 1789, in 1814, and in 1830, has never concurred frankly with its destroyers, and submitted to its fall in 1848 with astonishment and alarm. The Republic commenced in 1848 by anarchy, and led to nothing else. France

accepted and supported the empire as a haven of refuge against this anarchy. There are times when nations are swayed pre-eminently by their wishes, and others when they crouch signally under their fears. As these dispositions prevail, they seek in preference liberty or security. The first secret in the art of government is, not to mistake the ruling desire of the people governed.

With respect to the accomplices of Prince Louis, doubts arose as to the tribunal to which they were to be committed. We decided for that which was not the object of any popular objection, — the trial by jury. This, I think, was a weakness and an error. If ever enterprise bore the character of an attempt against the safety of the state, it was assuredly this of Strasbourg. It fell also, according to the Charter and our constitutional traditions, under the privileges of the House of Peers. The preceding cabinet had recently sent before that court the assassin Alibaud, a matter in which there was no political complication, and which involved no difficult question either of principle or circumstance. That of the conspiracy of Strasbourg belonged much more naturally to the same tribunal, and the step we had lately taken with reference to Prince Louis furnished an additional reason for sending his accomplices before the Chamber of Peers; for that court alone was capable of appreciating the propriety of the step, and not the less so of exercising equitable firmness in a general judgment on the affair and its actors. As to the inferior plot of Vendôme, the course was clear.

Soldiers only were implicated in it, and they were consigned to a court martial at Tours.

The session of the Chambers approached, and seemed likely to open under varied auspices, mixed with serene and cloudy prospects. Externally, the general aspect of affairs presented nothing but what was satisfactory. Peace was no longer endangered from any quarter. The preceding dispute between France and Switzerland on the subject of the refugees, had led to a suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries; but owing to the moderation of both governments this alienation of good neighbourship had ceased, the question was smoothed down, intercourse was renewed, and the subordinate incidents which had contributed to interrupt it no longer retained importance, except as supplying food for the polemics of the opposition. While declining intervention in Spain, we continued to fulfil, not only scrupulously but zealously, the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, and afforded to the government of Queen Isabella all the indirect support we could supply without engaging the French flag in her service. This policy produced its fruits. The Carlists protracted the civil war beyond the Pyrenees without decisive success. In spite of their local victories and their irruptions through Spain, the constitutional monarchy held its ground, obstinately and effectually defended. The Spanish radical party, possessed of power, felt the responsibility which weighed heavily and exclusively on their shoulders, and gradually became enlightened and moderate in their rule.

The new Cortés confirmed the regency of Queen Christina, and were preparing modifications in the constitution of 1812, calculated to render it less dangerous to order and monarchy. By recognising the independence of the American republics, the Spanish government escaped from a weighty burden, and placed itself in a condition to use all its energies for the pacification of Spain herself. The confidential negociations carrying on at Berlin and Schwerin for the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the Princess Helena of Mecklenburg promised a successful issue. "Taking all things together, M. Molé after some months of administration, presented himself to the Chambers, having faithfully and prudently put in practice the maxims in the name of which the cabinet had been formed, and having already gathered from them flattering results. But internally, the position was more complicated and less promising. The expedition to Constantine and the attempt at Strasbourg weighed on us, leaving serious questions to be settled and difficult duties to be discharged, which could not fail to excite animated debates.

On the 27th of December the King repaired to the Palais Bourbon, along the quay of the Tuileries, to open the session. The second legion of the National Guard, which lined the road, lowered their colours before him: he moved forward beyond the door of the carriage to return the salute; a shot was fired; the ball grazed the King's chest, passed between his two sons, the Duke of Nemours and the

Prince of Joinville, who, with the Duke of Orleans, were seated with him, and smashed a window on the opposite side, the fragments of which slightly wounded the two princes. The assassin was instantly seized, with great difficulty extricated from the indignation of the populace, and carried, in the first instance, to the guard-house of the Tuileries. The train continued its course, the King showed himself again at the carriage window, replying with his hand to the acclamations which greeted his passage. He arrived at the Palais Bourbon, where the Queen, Madame Adelaide, the Princess Marie, the Princess Clementine, the Duke of Aumale, and the Duke of Montpensier, awaited his coming in the gallery of the royal family. The report of the attempted assassination had already spread through the hall; anxious and hesitating looks were turned towards the Queen; all sat motionless and silent, as if anxious not to excite her first alarm by visible emotion. The Commandant Dumas, despatched on the instant by the King, appeared in the tribune, and said to the Queen, "Madame, the King is well, he is on the point of arriving; the Princes are unwounded." They followed without delay. The King ascended the estrade and sat down. His three sons remained standing by his side: some drops of blood stained their clothes. For several minutes the cheers were enthusiastically renewed, the whole assembly on their feet, members of the Chambers and spectators crying "*Long live the King!*" and turning alternately from his Majesty to the Queen. I never witnessed a display of public

emotion more animated and sympathetic. The King, with unaffected self-possession, delivered a calm address, filled with confidence for the future of France, and only slightly alluding, in a few words, to the recent attempt to which he had been exposed. "Supported by your loyal co-operation," he said, in conclusion, "I have been enabled to preserve our country from new revolutions, and to save the sacred depository of our institutions. Let us continue to increase our united efforts; with every successive day we shall witness the augmentation and firm establishment of order, confidence, and prosperity; and we shall obtain all the advantages a free country has a right to look for, which lives in peace under the ægis of a national government."

I saw and interrogated the assassin. He was a young man of coarse and vulgar appearance, rude and embarrassed, dogged rather than excited, answering questions curtly, with as little intelligence as emotion, as if desirous of hearing nothing more said on what he had done, and rejecting with stupid pride every appeal to repentance. It was soon found that his name was Meunier, that he led an idle and unsettled life, sometimes as an inferior clerk, at others as a workman, and that he was nephew to an honest merchant of Paris, who, recognising him with bitter mortification, spoke of him to the investigating magistrates as of a weak, unsettled character, addicted to bad habits, vicious reading, engaged in secret societies, and incapable of resisting the influence of his associates. The official examination and report fully

confirmed these statements. From routine, rather than from a just estimate of the circumstances, Meunier was sent before the Court of Peers. A few days after his attempt, the police discovered and seized, in the house of a mechanician named Champion, an infernal machine, fully prepared. Being instantly arrested, with three others compromised by the first interrogatories, the mechanician strangled himself in prison.

It was under the impression of these sinister incidents that the first acts of the Chambers, the preparation and discussion of their addresses, were carried out. There are salutary alarms and vexations; these latter were not, as I think, without their influence on the character of the ensuing debate, which was unusually grave and restrained. Parties still found therein an opportunity of repeating their ordinary assertions and accusations. Some again told us, with regard to Spain, that we attempted an impossibility in seeking to establish order with liberty by the hands of a power, the offspring of revolution: others,—that since 1830, there had been no essential difference between the various cabinets and their policy; that a single will governed, in a single and uniform system, and that, from this will and this system, neither France nor Spain could expect any good result. These worn out and monotonous attacks had little effect on the Chamber of Deputies, which bestowed scanty attention on them; and the debate, laying aside revolutionary themes, concentrated itself in the question essentially political,—namely, in the

controversy between the two cabinets of the 2nd of February and the 6th of September, which had formed opposite opinions on the interests and duties of France in her relations with Spain, and one of which advocated direct intervention, while the other limited itself to indirect assistance. M. Thiers, M. Passy, M. Sauzet, and M. Odilon Barrot, on the one side,—M. Molé, M. Hébert, M. de Rémusat, and myself, on the other, discussed, for four days, these opposite lines of policy, seriously, energetically, and sometimes even with a degree of acrimony, but without violence or subterfuge, with convictions and forethought equally sincere though essentially different, like men who can bear the weight of power under the eyes of their adversaries, free in spirit, and expecting the judgment of their country. No unforeseen deviation, no intemperate incident disturbed the debate; the Chamber was enabled to determine the points at issue in perfect freedom and tranquillity of argument. It pronounced a verdict in favour of the opponents of direct intervention, and events confirmed the decision. France abstained from interfering in Spain; nevertheless, Don Carlos was driven out, the constitutional government and Queen Isabella remained erect, and when France, to substantiate the policy she had always proclaimed, had occasion to appeal to the confidence and friendship of Spain, of her Queen, her Cortés, and her ministers, that confidence and friendship were not withheld.

A trifling fact in this debate, scarcely noticed by the public, nevertheless deserves to be recalled, as,

for some time, it was not without influence on our external position. During the sitting of the 14th of January 1837, in the Chamber of Deputies, while speaking of the danger on account of which our intervention in Spain was specially demanded, namely, the probability that absolutism would triumph with Don Carlos, M. Molé uttered this sentence, which, being in a written speech, was textually copied in the "Moniteur:" "We detest absolutism, and pity the nations who are so little aware of their own strength as to submit to it." If M. Molé had spoken to France alone, his words would have been received, at that time, with almost unqualified approbation; but all Europe heard him, and diplomatists are as susceptible as they outwardly appear indifferent; and there was something of forgetfulness in a minister of Foreign Affairs speaking thus openly before the subjects of absolute governments with whom we were living, and wished to live, on friendly terms. The ambassadors of Austria and Russia vehemently resented this language. They interchanged sentiments bitterly in their private conversations, and wrote to their courts saying that the words implied "an appeal to rebellion addressed to all nations." Nothing could be more remote from M. Molé's idea; but his usually clear and well-governed mind had not always, when he spoke in public, an exact appreciation of the bearing of his words, and he was sometimes unconscious of their full effect. Those we have alluded to infused for several months a degree of suspicion and coldness into his relations with more than one

of the great powers and their representatives in Paris.

In winding up this great debate we touched on the quarrel with Switzerland as to the refugees; and the expedition to Constantine was also introduced, but in a secondary light. The Swiss question was settled. The opposition expatiated with complaisance on a police incident connected with it; but the preceding minister of the Interior, the Count de Montalivet, with loyal courage, assumed the responsibility, and deprived the attack of its direct object and interest. On the expedition to Constantine all discussion was postponed for the present, it being destined to form the subject of a special inquiry and report in connection with the bill for supplementary credits. Two matters alone, the Spanish intervention and the conspiracy of Strasbourg, materially occupied the Chambers and the public. Precisely as the Chamber of Deputies pronounced on the first by voting its address, we were informed that in the court of assizes at Colmar the jury had decided the second by a full acquittal of all the accused. The absence of the principal author of the attempt, and the step which had liberated him from prosecution, had supplied the defenders of his accomplices with the argument, and party passions with the pretext, which led to such a defeat of truth and law. The two leading advocates, M. Ferdinand Barrot and M. Pasquier, summed up their whole pleading in this unique and specious manner of acting upon minds, some of which were weak and intimidated, others sanguine

and determined beforehand. "Gentlemen," said M. Ferdinand Barrot, "there was a prince amongst the accused, and, to use the terms of the indictment, royal clemency has set him at liberty, thus adding a noble action to your history. As I arrived here, this prince was approaching the soil of America, for him the land of hope and happiness. Already his spirit is more calm and peaceable; he breathes in tranquillity; already a mother can console him and dry the tears her child has shed. But behold, on this side, the sorrows and anguish of captivity, the accumulation of misfortunes! You, citizens, the organs of law and not the supporters of force, you will prove yourselves worthy of the mission confided to you. You will acquit, and your sentence will inscribe itself in the fairest pages of our judicial annals, for there is a principle established in our habits; it is this, 'equal justice to all.'" Under the shadow of this strange oblivion of facts, and of a confusion of ideas and duties not less extraordinary, the Bonapartist and revolutionary opposition, which had many adherents in Alsace, displayed itself with passionate boldness. It filled the hall of trial, crying out to the jury from all sides as they retired to deliberate; "Acquit them! acquit them!" and when the verdict of acquittal was declared, the transports which burst forth, and the rejoicings that followed, far exceeded the expression of sympathetic pity; they amounted to an explosion of the triumph and hopes of a party.

It would have been the height of blindness and imbecility to have mistaken the grave importance of

this position, and the duties it imposed on us. In the prosecution and repression of political conspiracies and outrages, the King's government had, from the beginning, practised a degree of persevering moderation and gentleness, to which, I do not hesitate to say, no parallel can be found in history. In no instance had any offence of this exclusive character, and untainted by any other crime, been followed by the infliction of capital punishment. On the preceding eve, when we learned that the court-martial at Tours had condemned Corporal Bruyant, the author of the insurrection of Vendôme, to death, the King commuted his sentence to deportation. By simply banishing Prince Louis Napoleon to the United States, he had performed an act of noble and intelligent equity. And this very act was taken advantage of to weaken his government, by withholding from it, in spite of the evidence of facts, the commonest protection of the laws, while, even in the bosom of the army, insubordination and defection were encouraged. We should have blushed for ourselves if we had accepted, in scandalous sloth, these victories of party passions over public duties; these legal falsehoods, this weakness of moral habits, from which hostile factions could not fail to extract increased confidence and audacity. After mature deliberation, and with one accord, we presented three distinct bills to the Chambers, to modify or complete the penal code, and to prevent, as far as the power of the laws could extend, a repetition of similar disorders. The object of the first was to render the penalty of transportation efficacious, by

making it real. A place was fixed on, in a particular district of the Isle of Bourbon, where the punishment was to be undergone, and the necessary funds were allocated for that establishment. The second enumerated certain crimes and offences named in the penal code and subsequent laws, and provided that, in case of participation and complicity between soldiers and civilians, the prosecutions should be distinct, and the soldiers handed over to courts-martial, while the civilians were delivered to the ordinary tribunals. The third restored three articles of the penal code of 1810, and punished, with certain legal exceptions, the non-revelation of plots formed and crimes projected against the life or person of the King. The first two of these bills were presented to the Chamber of Deputies, and the third to the Chamber of Peers.

We did not confine ourselves to these directly repressive measures. We resolved to deal with a question which had remained in suspense since 1830, and one of great, though indirect importance, as regarded the monarchy,—the question of dotation to the different branches of the royal family, an element of monarchical stability, and consequently of strength. This subject had hitherto been considered so delicate, so many attacks had already been launched against it by the opposition, and so many prejudices spread amongst the public, that, since 1832, no succeeding cabinet had ventured to ask from the Chambers the allocation of one million, which, according to the terms of the treaty concluded between France and Belgium on the 28th of July in that year, should have been pro-

posed in the following session, as a dowry for the Princess Louisa, who had become Queen of the Belgians. On the 26th of January 1837, we presented two bills to the Chamber of Deputies, one to fulfil the engagement contracted with the King of the Belgians, the other assigning to the Duke of Nemours, who had reached his majority in the preceding year, the domain of Rambouillet, with certain portions of the state forests.

On these two bills, particularly the last, we did not in the slightest degree deceive ourselves as to the obstacles they would encounter and the contests they would excite. The most inveterate enemies of King Louis-Philippe would hesitate to repeat to-day, with regard to his personal fortune, and his avidity in matters of private interest, the inconceivable errors and odious calumnies of which that prince has been the object. The facts, accounts, papers, all the details and documents of his private life, have been exposed to the most complete and unlooked-for publicity, and submitted to the most rigorous investigation. This trial has redounded to his honour, and the falsehoods which were heaped round his throne have vanished before his tomb. But in 1837 these lies were universally spread abroad, hawked about, and credited. Many who retailed, believed them. Those who taxed them with exaggeration and hostility were scarcely certain of their own thoughts, and amongst the rejecters some were not without a measure of uneasiness. King Louis-Philippe was himself one of the chief causes of this state of feeling. No prince, I would even say voluntarily, no man has more frequently con-

veyed the semblance of faults he possessed not, and of errors he never committed. He had been a participator in so many unforeseen disasters, had lived in the midst of so many ruins, and had himself suffered so many privations, that he ever retained an extreme mistrust of the future, and a lively apprehension of the fatal chances which might still reach him and his family. At one time he recalled, with just pride, the days of his wandering and impoverished life; at another he spoke of it with a bitter reminiscence, and a presentiment filled with alarm. In September 1843, during the first visit of Queen Victoria to the Château d'Eu, while walking one day in the garden of the castle, in front of some wall-trees covered with fine peaches, the King gathered one and offered it to the Queen, who wished to eat it, but was at a loss how to peel off the skin. The King took a small knife from his pocket, saying, "One who has been a poor devil like me, living on forty sous a day, always carries a knife!" And he joined in the general smile at this allusion to his poverty. On another occasion I happened to be alone with the King. He spoke to me of his domestic position, of the future of his family, of the chances that still weighed upon them; and he grew warm while entering into the detail of his expenses, his debts, and the absurdities in which people indulged as to his property. He took me suddenly by both hands, and said with extreme emotion, "I tell you, my dear minister, that my children will want bread." When under the empire of this feeling, he anxiously sought, for himself and for

those belonging to him, some guarantees for the future, and at the same time expressed his solicitudes and complaints with a freedom and intemperance of language which sometimes astonished his friendly auditors, supplied his enemies with suspicions in support of their credulity or inventions, and inspired the public with that mistrustful bias against which we had to contend when, in the name of justice and sound policy, we asked for the dotations which the King seemed to solicit as a greedy and anxious plaintiff.

We did not therefore feel, on the introduction of these bills, particularly easy as to the result; but the coldness with which they were received, in the Chamber of Deputies, and without, exceeded our expectation; and this coldness extended itself to the three penal enactments we proposed at the same time. Our adversaries congratulated themselves on the ground of attack we offered; our friends appeared embarrassed by the position in which we placed them, and saddened by the effort we demanded. We recognized all the omens of a difficult and dangerous combat.

It was on the bill relating to prosecutions in case of crimes committed conjunctively by soldiers and civilians that the struggle began in earnest. This bill had nothing in it contrary to the essential principles of law, either in a moral or an equitable sense; it established no exceptional tribunal, it removed no one from his ordinary judges, while its political seasonableness was evident. But it was in disaccord with the maxims and traditions of French jurisprudence; it presented certain difficulties of execution, mostly specious, with

a few that were real though not insurmountable. The lawyers fastened on this discussion, and protracted it for seven days. Out of thirty-one speakers who took part in it, twenty were magistrates or advocates. They were much divided amongst themselves; eleven attacked the bill, and nine defended it. But the opposers had with them the instincts and habits of the greater portion of their auditors. They raised difficulties in profusion which the defenders of the bill could not so readily resolve. MM. Dupin and Nicod displayed in this attack as much ardour as ability and address. M. de Lamartine and M. de Salvandy supported the bill with resolute independence of spirit and the inspiration of eloquence, but without much effect. Some of the principal political orators of the Chamber, M. Thiers and M. Odilon Barrot, amongst others, took no part in the debate. I intended to speak: I had studied the question, taken notes, and prepared the plan of my discourse [1], but, at the convenient moment, some of my steadiest friends urged me to remain silent. I should excite, they said, more animated passions; I should draw into the arena adversaries who had hitherto held aloof, and should probably augment the dangers of the question. I yielded to this advice. It was an error. I know not whether I could in any way have altered the result of the discussion, and I incline to think not; the opposition had united its entire strength, and had also on its side, in

[1] I insert amongst the Historic Documents No. XI. this plan and these notes, which, although the question and position are alike extinct, may still retain some interest.

this instance, all the weaknesses of the government party. But for the position of the cabinet, and more particularly for my own, it would have been better to have taken my part in this great debate. Be that as it may, its issue was against us; the bill for the disjunction of tribunals was rejected by a majority of two voices.

All the other bills we presented were stricken by this check as a single gust of wind overthrows the most varied and divided trees. The selection of the Isle of Bourbon, and of the district of Salasie in that island, as the locality for transportation, embraced difficulties and inconveniences. The bill on the non-revelation of plots formed and crimes projected against the life or person of the King, gave rise to strong moral objections and evil reminiscences. M. Royer-Collard announced that he should oppose it strenuously. On the dotation proposed for the Duke of Nemours, all the controversies were reopened to which the assessment of the civil list had given rise in 1831 and 1832. Why should the princes have hereditary appanages? why landed property? Would it not be better to give them pensions on the state, or simply dotations for life? In 1837, as in 1831, all political and monarchical foresight was banished from these discussions. Researches were made into the revenues of the private estate, and the value of the portions of forest land which the bill added to the domain of Rambouillet; and the opposition press raised doubts and suspicions on this subject which could not be immediately re-

futed, and which, while waiting the refutation, chilled and embarrassed the most friendly minds. Political bodies have their impressions of alarm and panics like armies. The cabinet was looked upon, in the Chambers and by the public, as in a state of defeat, and consequently approaching a crisis.

Its composition and internal state rendered it little suited to an energetic and long defence. M. Molé could live better with superiors than with equals. He had well served the Emperor Napoleon, and submitted with a good grace to the presidency of the Duke of Richelieu; but when the hierarchy of relative positions was not so clearly determined, when men found themselves by the side of each other, with their advantages and objections, their personal merits and defects, and in a condition to be either associates or rivals, M. Molé became mistrustful, suspicious, susceptible, jealous, and alternately given over to uncertainty and to ill-founded and misplaced pretensions. On the part of his colleagues, every unexpected step, the slightest negligence, appeared then to him an act of secret malevolence and premeditated hostility. The most trivial offence to his self-love operated as a rankling wound. His political education had not been in the bosom of free institutions; he had formed and developed himself under a system ignorant of the conditions and struggles of representative government; thus he was better adapted to hold an insulated and entirely personal line of conduct than to enter into the combinations and movements of a great assembly. He was of excellent judgment

in a council, skilful in management, and agreeable in manner in his intercourse with individuals, but party engagements and ties were unsuited to him. He found them embarrassing in general policy, compromising rather than profitable to himself, and he felt justified in disregarding them according to the exigencies of public affairs or of his own position. No serious misunderstanding or visible quarrel occurred between him and me during our short alliance; on the main point of the leading questions we were habitually agreed, but the difference of our characters and political habits soon manifested itself and rendered our relations less cordial in reality than in appearance. We acted together with mutual watchfulness, and without a reciprocal feeling of perfect confidence. M. Molé, moreover, persuaded himself, and quite erroneously, that M. de Gasparin, more my friend than his, sought to injure him to serve me; and mistrust of all that emanated from the minister of the Interior became one of his most uneasy prepossessions. Nothing was more foreign to the intentions and conduct of M. de Gasparin, a man ever true and loyal in public as in private life. He devoted himself to the duties of his department with no other object or care than that of discharging them faithfully. Unfortunately, being more practised in administration than in policy, he wanted, in the Chambers and in the Tribune, the ease and authority which the many, important, and delicate affairs he had to handle required. Modest even to timidity, though firm to the extreme, in danger, he did not always combat

with promptitude and success. When the hour of reverse arrived, when the refusal of the bill for disjunction threw confusion into our ranks, these internal weaknesses and discrepancies in the cabinet became evident. In the Chambers and with the public, a general impression went abroad that it would infallibly fall unless it modified, according to its enemies, its policy, and to its friends, its composition.

At first, partial changes only were spoken of, which should leave intact the basis on which the ministry had been formed,—the alliance between M. Molé and me. The retirement alone of M. de Gasparin seemed to be insisted on, and, with his accustomed disinterestedness, he hastened to resign. I declared that if M. de Gasparin left the cabinet, I should only remain myself on the condition of occupying the post of minister of the Interior, and of being succeeded in that of Public Instruction by one of my own friends, M. de Rémusat, in preference to any other. I had felt the insufficiency of indirect influences, and was resolved to submit to no combination in the government which did not strengthen the policy I maintained, and my own position in its support. M. Molé formally rejected this modification. From that moment, my own position became perfectly clear, and, to speak truly, I required not this symptom to enlighten it. The question was not simply personal or partial; it involved an entire change of politics. The check which the policy of resistance had so recently met with in the Chamber of Deputies had seriously compromised it in the eyes of the public and in the opinion of some of its defenders.

The majority which, until then, had firmly supported it, appeared weary and wavering. Was it possible to advance further, or even to persevere in the path in which we encountered so many adversaries and such doubtful allies? Had the time arrived to loosen the reins and try other modes of government? As if on the day succeeding a great and decisive victory, an amnesty was again proposed; it was asked whether such a proceeding would not finally disarm conspirators and assassins. The King himself, without being shaken in his convictions, began to be moved and perplexed in his resolves. It was under the pressure of this general hesitation that the ministerial crisis developed itself. I remained the representative of the policy of resistance; M. Molé was preparing to become leader of the policy of concession. Our rupture, and the total dissolution of the cabinet, became, within a few days, accomplished facts. Nothing then remained but to ascertain under what maxims and standard the new administration should be formed.

On the 5th of April, the King sent for me, told me that M. Molé had tendered his resignation, and required me to lay before him the elements of a cabinet. I expected this trial: I had already spoken of it with my friends, especially with the Duke de Broglie and M. Duchâtel, and I knew their dispositions. As far back as the 29th of March, the Duke de Broglie, who had absented himself with scrupulous reserve, wrote to me as follows: "If, which God forbid, the King should send for me spontaneously and entirely at his own suggestion, I could only, in my soul and conscience,

give him one advice, namely, to try a ministry founded on a reconciliation between the men who for six years have co-operated in defending the actual government; reserving for debate the conditions of the reconciliation and the various applications of the principle." I instantly decided on my course. After first seeing M. Molé, and receiving from him a confirmation of his retirement, I sought M. Thiers, who did not expect me, and proposed to him to reconstruct the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832. In that case he would have resumed the ministry of the Interior; the Duke de Broglie, Foreign Affairs with the Presidency of the Council; M. Duchâtel, the Finances; and I should have continued in the ministry of Public Instruction. Our conversation was long, unreserved, without embittering allusions or subterfuges. M. Thiers declined my proposal. He felt that what had passed within a year, the question of Spanish intervention, ever in controversy between the King and himself, and his position in the Chamber of Deputies, prevented him from accepting it. I returned to the Tuileries; I related to the King my fruitless visit, and prayed him to think of other means and other persons than myself to form a cabinet.

During eight days the King sent for, sometimes singly, at other times together, Marshal Soult, M. Thiers, General Sébastiani, and M. Dupin. He discussed with them the various pending questions and every possible form of combination, pressing them to lay some one before him that could meet the exigencies of the position. They tried several, but without success;

they were unable to agree either as to the persons or measures. M. Molé had no share in these efforts, complaining merely of the prolongation of the crisis, and betraying symptoms that, at need, he could terminate it. On the 12th of April, a report was spread that, in concert with M. de Montalivet, he had applied himself to the work. On the same day the King sent for me again, and demanded if, with my own particular friends, I could form a cabinet. Without extenuating in the slightest degree either the peril or difficulty of the enterprise, I asked him, in my turn, if I might rely on two men of courage as colleagues, who enjoyed his confidence,—M. de Montalivet and the Duke of Montebello. In addition to M. Duchâtel, I selected amongst my friends M. de Rémusat and M. Dumon. I mentioned the name of General Bugeaud. "It is too dangerous," observed the King, with a feeling of kind hesitation; "I cannot, I dare not." "I understand, sire," I replied; "the King will find less compromising means," and, so saying, I retired. Two days later M. Molé's cabinet was formed, and the "Moniteur" of the 15th of April announced that, under his presidency, M. Barthe, M. de Montalivet, M. Lacave-Laplagne, and M. de Salvandy had replaced, in the departments of Justice, the Interior, Finance, and Public Instruction, M. Persil, M. de Gasparin, M. Duchâtel, and myself.

I was not mistaken as to the sense and bearing of this change. The measures which M. Molé and I had adopted and presented in concert were immediately renounced. The bill for the dotation to the Duke of

Nemours was withdrawn. Those on transportation and the non-revealment of conspiracies fell to the ground. A general amnesty was publicly announced. In place of the policy of resistance, a new course was proclaimed, which received the name, not of concession, but of conciliation.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COALITION.

MY DISPOSITION ON LEAVING OFFICE. — FAMILY AFFLICTIONS. — THE DUCHESS OF ORLEANS; HER ARRIVAL AT FONTAINEBLEAU; HER MARRIAGE; HER ENTRY INTO PARIS. — CHARACTER OF THE PALACE OF FONTAINEBLEAU. — ACCIDENTS AT THE CHAMP DE MARS. — OPENING OF THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES. — MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DUCHESS OF ORLEANS. — THE PRINCESS MARIE; HER MARRIAGE; HER PURSUITS; HER DEATH. — WHAT IS DUE TO THE MEMORY OF THE DEAD. — LADY HOLLAND AND HOLLAND HOUSE. — GREAT NUMBER OF EMINENT MEN WHO DIED BETWEEN 1836 AND 1839. — THEIR CHARACTERS. — M. RAYNOUARD AND M. FLAUGERGUES. — M. DE MARBOIS AND THE ABBÉ DE PRADT. — BARON LOUIS. — MARSHAL LOBAU AND GENERAL HAXO. — M. SILVESTRE DE SACY. — M. LAROMIGUIÈRE. — DR. BROUSSAIS. — PRINCE TALLEYRAND. — HIS LAST VISIT TO THE INSTITUTE. — HIS LATEST ACTS. — COUNT DE MONTLOSIER. — DIFFICULTIES OF M. MOLÉ'S POSITION. — HOW HE SURMOUNTED OR POSTPONED THEM. — HIS INTERNAL MEASURES. — FAVOURABLE EXTERNAL INCIDENTS. — WAR WITH MEXICO. — WITH BUENOS AYRES. — TREATY WITH HAYTI. — SECOND EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINE; ITS SUCCESS. — RETURN OF PRINCE LOUIS BONAPARTE TO SWITZERLAND. — FINAL ADOPTION OF THE TREATY OF THE TWENTY-FOUR ARTICLES ON THE LIMITS OF BELGIUM. — EVACUATION OF ANCONA. — MY ATTITUDE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. — MY SPEECHES IN MAY 1837, IN THE DEBATE ON SECRET SUPPLIES. — DISPLEASURE OF M. MOLÉ. — DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. — CHARACTER OF THAT MEASURE AND OF THE ELECTIONS. — SESSION OF 1837–1838. — SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE CABINET. — ITS POSITION AFTER THE SESSION. — SESSION OF 1838–1839. — THE COALITION. — ITS GENERAL CAUSES. — MY PERSONAL MOTIVES. — WAS IT A MISTAKE? — DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE ADDRESS. — GOOD ATTITUDE OF M. MOLÉ. — DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. — RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS. — RETIREMENT OF THE MOLÉ

CABINET. — VAIN ATTEMPTS TO FORM A COALITION MINISTRY. — PROVISIONAL CABINET. — RIOT OF THE 12TH OF MAY 1839. — FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 12TH OF MAY 1839.

(1837—1839.)

HAVING left the ministry on the 15th of April 1837, I passed nearly three years without returning to public employment. This was my longest vacation between 1830 and 1848. Much has been said of my ambition and the ardour of my struggles to maintain or resume office. I have been represented as a man possessed by a single passion and obstinate in the pursuit of a single object. These inferior moralists know little of human nature, of the infinite variety of its inclinations, and of the vicissitudes of the soul in connection with the incidents of life. Ambition has its days; so also has indifference. Great contests animate and please, the resources of mind and character are thereby developed; but there is no power that does not become weary and call for repose. Neither does destiny reside exclusively in the arena of politics, and he who escapes from it will, perhaps, encounter under his domestic roof, more piercing wounds than the blows of his fiercest adversaries. Such was my position in April 1837. Two months before, on the 15th of February, I lost my eldest son, an excellent and engaging youth who had already reached manhood. He was almost twenty-two, and promised me a companion equally amiable and sure. It was not that he evinced much inclination for the career of politics. Endowed with dis-

tinguished intellect, he had completed his literary and scientific classes with unusual success; following the lectures of the Normal School, and being admitted after a strict examination into the Polytechnic, although without the intention of becoming a student there. His disposition was modest, independent, and refined; somewhat concentrated within himself, more anxious for confidential intimacy than for celebrity, and inclined to enjoy the exalted pleasures of life rather than to court its triumphs. I know not whether he would have taken an important part in the public affairs of his country, but he would assuredly have proved one of those chosen spirits who embellish domestic life and reflect honour on human nature. A pleurisy snatched him from me, and left the bitter conviction that the malady had existed long before it was observed. This is one of the saddest and most enduring impressions left by the trials which have stricken me in my dearest affections. We seldom apprehend evil sufficiently or in time.

I never felt more disposed to bend under the weight of affliction. Within a month after this shock, the great debates in the Chambers commenced. Besides the general policy, I had to support, on my own account, the long discussion on the bill presented by me a year before, on the subject of secondary instruction. Then followed the ministerial crisis. I was aided in my heavy task by the universal sympathy evinced towards me at this severe moment; a sympathy the more consoling as I recog-

nized in it, beyond personal consideration for myself, a general sentiment of the dawning merits of my son, and of the tender justice which men voluntarily accord to a young life, suddenly extinguished in the midst of brilliant hopes, without having yet engaged in combat or experienced disappointment. M. Dupin, at that time President of the Chamber of Deputies, overwhelmed me, amongst others, with friendly attention. This man, sometimes so harsh, and so constantly occupied with himself, has a heart open to natural feelings, to family afflictions, and knows how to treat them with respect, even beyond his own domestic circle, and without any tie of personal attachment. In the midst of these tokens of a sympathy which I have some right to call public, it happened nevertheless one day that in the Chamber of Deputies an adversary of mine, more from routine, as I believe, than through premeditated intention, spoke of my determined attempts to retain power. I could not listen silently to this unseasonable attack. "Several times already in the course of my life," I said, "I have accepted and resigned office, and, on my own personal account, I am profoundly indifferent to these variations of political fortune. I associate with them no interest beyond that of the public, and of the cause to which I belong, and which I honour myself by supporting. You may believe me, gentlemen, when I tell you, it has pleased God to make me well acquainted with the joys and sorrows which leave the soul inaccessible and cold to all other pleasures and evils." This was indeed the

sentiment I carried back to my unpretending home, when I re-entered it with my aged mother and my three young children.

It was not public business, but political festivals which brought the first occasions for my again leaving it. Two days after the completion of his ministry, M. Molé announced to the Chambers the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the Princess Helena of Mecklenbourg-Schwerin. The Duke de Broglie had left Paris as minister extraordinary to make official demand of the princess's hand, and to conduct her to France. I was invited to Fontainebleau, where the nuptials were to be celebrated. I arrived there on the 29th of May. The court was brilliant, and the public satisfied. The future, they said, was secure. It was well known that other alliances had been attempted without success; a good feeling was entertained towards the young princess for her confidence in the destiny, perhaps a stormy one, which opened before her. It was related that before leaving Schwerin, she replied to the expressed uneasiness of her family, "I had rather be Duchess of Orleans for a single year, than pass my life in looking from these windows to see who enters the court of the castle." High opinions were expressed of her mind, her ideas, and her tastes. Amongst the French liberals, her being a Protestant was far from unacceptable; this was recognized as a consecration and pledge of religious liberty. When she presented herself, the first impressions confirmed anticipated hopes. On the 29th of May, at five in the afternoon,

all the invited guests assembled in the gallery of Francis I., which opens on the vestibule of the grand staircase of the court of the White Horse, through which the princess was to enter. At half-past six, the King, the Queen, the princes and princesses, also arrived to receive her. Her approach was announced. At seven o'clock, under a flourish of drums and trumpets, accompanied by the acclamations of the crowd and the soldiers, she arrived, and found the Duke of Orleans with the Duke of Nemours, at the foot of the staircase, and the King himself at the top. On approaching him, and in this first meeting with the royal family, the expression of her features, her manners, and her words, were perfectly noble and simple, affectionately dignified, modest, and unembarrassed, as of one already at ease in her new position, and naturally born for distinction and happiness. On the following day, the 30th of May, a little before nine in the evening, the solemn celebration of the marriage commenced. There were three successive ceremonies; the civil contract, in the gallery of Henry II., performed by M. Pasquier, who two days before had received from the King the title of chancellor. He was the hundred and forty-sixth chancellor of France, since Saint Boniface, who was invested with that dignity in 752, on the accession of Pepin the Short. After the civil marriage, the Catholic form was celebrated in the chapel of Henri Quatre, by the Bishop of Meaux, the Abbé Gallard; and the Lutheran in the hall named after Louis-Philippe, by M. Cuvier, President of the Consistory

of the Confession of Augsbourg at Paris. In the midst of these ceremonies and amongst spectators so mingled, the impression was as varied as the situations and creeds. Some congratulated themselves, others evinced regret; and a portion took part in the complicated scene with indifferent curiosity and a slight degree of surprise, more struck, as I believe, by its novelty than by its imposing grandeur. But the success of the event, and the person who occupied in it the leading place, effaced or restrained these differences of opinion; and during the four days passed by the court at Fontainebleau in promenades in the park, in spectacles and fêtes of every kind, the prevailing sentiment was that of sympathy and satisfaction.

I know no palace to be compared to Fontainebleau for such solemnities. It stamps on them from the first moment a lofty character. So many kings and so many ages have left their impress on the walls, that when history is now acted there, it is in presence of past records, and new events link themselves with old ones, as with their own ancestors. From the narrow winding staircase, which in a corner of the oldest buildings leads to the small chamber of Louis the Young, to the grand apartments constructed or restored in recent days, we traverse the abodes of Francis I., Henry II., Henry IV., Louis XIII., Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon, Louis XVIII., and Louis-Philippe. We assist in their labours, we contemplate their magnificence. Within two centuries alone, and without speaking of other great trans-

actions, five royal marriages or their accompanying fêtes have taken place within that residence. It was at Fontainebleau that the natural son of Henry IV. and Gabrielle d'Estrées, Cæsar, Duke of Vendôme, espoused Gabrielle of Lorraine. Louis XIV., after his marriage at Saint-Jean-de-Luz with the Infanta Maria Teresa, conducted the young queen to Fontainebleau, and passed nine months in the palace, in the midst of the most brilliant festivals. The King of Spain, Charles II., who bequeathed his dominions to Philip V., was united at Fontainebleau to Maria Louisa of Orleans, niece of Louis XIV. The marriage of Louis XV. with Maria Leczinsky was celebrated there. At a later period, that of Prince Jerome Bonaparte with the daughter of the King of Wurtemberg; and more recently, it was there that Louis XVIII. received the Duchess of Berry. You cannot move a step without encountering the most striking reminiscences. While we were attending the marriage of the Duke of Orleans, the Duchess de Broglie occupied the apartments of Madame de Maintenon. One morning when I was dressing in a cabinet which had formerly been a portion of the Gallery of Stags, I perceived, at the bottom of the wall, a marble plate on which I read: "In this window Queen Christina of Sweden, in 1657, ordered the death of her equerry, Monaldeschi." Everywhere throughout this palace, the walls speak, the dead appear, and seem to re-assemble to greet the living who arrive in their turn.

Towards four o'clock on the 4th of June I beheld

that royal family, which I had seen at Fontainebleau in all the pomp of a court, re-enter Paris, surrounded by an entire nation. The King and the princes were on horseback; the Queen, the Duchess of Orleans, and the princesses, in an open carriage. From the Arch of the Star to the Pavilion of the Clock, the national guard and the regular troops lined the road. An immense crowd, curious and joyful, filled the Elysian Fields and the garden of the Tuileries. The cortége advanced slowly along those vast alleys of chestnuts and lilacs in flower. The sky was clear, the sun brilliant, and the air balmy. The young princess raised herself from time to time in her carriage to obtain a more perfect view of the grandeur and effect of the spectacle, with which she was delighted. Never, perhaps, did so tragical a destiny open with such a flattering dawn.

I cannot say that even from that period sorrows were not speedily mixed with joys, and hostile manœuvres with acclamations of attachment. During one of the popular fêtes, at the egress from the Champ de Mars, the obstruction of the crowd and the narrowness of the passage led to deplorable accidents. In the world and in the press many hostile voices dwelt on these with secret complaisance, comparing them to the misfortunes which, sixty-seven years before, in the square of Louis XV., had accompanied the nuptials of Louis XVI. with Marie Antoinette;—a melancholy presage of a cruel future.

The very effect of the festivals, the splendours of

the court, the magnificence of royalty, the presents offered to the Duchess of Orleans, her *trousseau*, her toilet-table, the descriptions which such subjects furnish to flattery and curiosity, served as a text to democratic enemies for remarks and commentaries addressed to envious and hateful passions. Nothing is so easy as to place in painful contrast good and evil fortune, riches and want, — all that unequal distribution of property and poverty, of enjoyment and suffering, which varies according to times, institutions, and manners, but which still continues, in different degrees, the permanent condition of humanity. In presence of this formidable fact, Christian faith has its dogmas and promises; philosophy, its explanations and precepts; policy, its duties and effectual means,—if not of making it disappear altogether, at least of restraint and palliation. But these are little heeded by anarchical factions, who are much more intent on turning the wound to advantage than desirous of curing it; and the very amusements of the people furnish them with an opportunity for irritation. These efforts were not spared at the marriage of the Duke of Orleans, but they obtained little success at the moment. The instincts of the people are simple and upright; they take their portion of enjoyment in great events, without seeking in them subjects of complaint or anger. The satisfaction and good feeling of the public, in the days to which I here refer, were animated and sincere; but factions at war with a government have no occasion for prompt success; they feed themselves on their

passion, their labour, and their hopes; and if the moral and political forces, whose mission it is to combat them, are not incessantly vigilant and active, the venom penetrates and diffuses itself, and sooner or later the social body becomes infected. A woman of spirit said of ghosts, "I do not believe in, but I fear them." We are bound to believe in the demons of anarchy, and to watch them with the wise apprehension which speaks of intelligence and foresight, but has no taste of fear.

The fête which followed that of the marriage was neither a courtly nor a popular festival. I do not remember any exhibition more imposing than that of the inauguration of the museum of Versailles, nor any assembly which brought more vividly into contact and contrast the France of the seventeenth and the France of the nineteenth century; those two conditions of society, the one truly and naturally the daughter of the other, and at the same time so totally distinct, and separated by the profound abyss of the Revolution. Even in the mind of King Louis-Philippe himself, the first idea of this museum was only an expedient to save from barbarous destruction and vulgar appropriation a palace and gardens, the magnificent work and residence of the most powerful and brilliant of his ancestors. This idea, grand and beautiful in itself, expanded, rose, and carried with it the attachment, I should say rather, the passionate enthusiasm of the King, and the approbation of the public. The entire history and glory of France, as is said in the official inscription on the monument,

— revived in canvas and marble, and replaced under the eyes of present and future generations; events and persons, great deeds of war and civil life; the association of all French names, ages, and destinies in these galleries of the dead called back to the contemplation of the living;—here is abundant matter to engage reflecting thought and popular imagination. The undertaking, when scarcely commenced by the King, was hailed with delight, and he devoted himself to it with the pride of a descendant of Louis XIV., the self-respect of an inventor, and the assiduity of an architect. He took pleasure in discussing, directing, and closely watching the different labourers as he traversed those extensive halls, the greater part of which still empty, he saw in anticipation adorned and peopled according to his desire. And on the arrival of the day when the work was sufficiently advanced to be presented to the public,—on that 10th of June 1837, when he summoned and himself conducted a nation of guests through the palace restored in honour of old France, and transformed for the convenience of France of the present time,—that day was undoubtedly one of the most animated and agreeable of his busy and chequered life. Was he personally much impressed by the novelty of the spectacle of which he was the director? Did he on the instant fathom its great and original character? I suspect not. Very probably King Louis-Philippe on that day was absorbed in the pleasure and success of his enterprise. But I still retain the idea which impressed me as I looked

on that eager, anxious crowd which hurried in some confusion from chamber to chamber in the suite of the King. It was new France — mixed, democratic, citizen—France, invading the palace of Louis XIV.: peers, deputies, warriors, magistrates, public functionaries, scholars, authors, and artists. A pacific but a sovereign invasion; conquerors somewhat astonished in the midst of their victory, but ill constituted to enjoy it, although determined to keep what they had won. The representatives of the ancient French society, the inheritors of its great names and brilliant recollections were not absent; they circulated familiarly through all the windings of the old abode of royalty, but they exhibited more of familiar ease than they preserved of importance. A people who had achieved their own greatness and for their own profit, and were endeavouring to be free, evidently ruled in the palace of the great King, and replaced his court.

The dramatic fête which wound up the day had also its contrasts. The old theatre, recently restored, was resplendent in colour and light. The King intended that the master-piece of Molière, the *Misanthrope*, should be represented there without alteration or omission; not a line was to be expunged. The furniture of the scene was exactly that of the seventeenth century; the costumes, faithfully copied from the same date, were distributed to the performers; all the adjuncts of representation on the stage and in front, were excellent, and probably far superior to what had ever been exhibited to the eyes of Louis XIV.

under the superintendence of Molière. But the effect was common-place and cold; more in default of truth than from deficiency of talent. The actors had no feeling of the general manners of the seventeenth century, nor of the simply aristocratic character of the personages, nor of their frank wit and natural language in the midst of the refinements and subtle frivolities of their every-day life. The style was inconsistent with the dresses, and the accent with the words. Mademoiselle Mars played Celimène as a coquette of Marivaux', not as a contemporary of Madame de Sablé and Madame de Montespan. The incongruity was more glaring at Versailles and in the palace of Louis XIV., than at Paris and in the theatre of the Rue de Richelieu.

From Fontainebleau and Versailles I proceeded to Compiègne, where, towards the beginning of September in the same year, 1837, the Duke of Orleans, who commanded a camp of twenty thousand men, invited me to pass several days. The castle of Compiègne, notwithstanding its extent and splendour, has nothing to engross and satisfy the imagination. The ancient origin and important historical reminiscences of the place have disappeared in the recent and massive buildings of Louis XIV. We must look for them in books, for we forget them in courts, pavilions, apartments, and staircases where they are not recalled. But this visit to Compiègne, at that time, had for me an exclusive charm. It was there that I began to know the Duchess of Orleans, whom the Duke her husband took pleasure

in introducing to the army and to his guests, and who did the honours of the castle with admirable grace. Being often seated near her at table, we conversed much on many topics, for she had reflected, and took an interest in everything with the ardour and fascination of an exalted, rich, and cultivated mind; ready, perhaps too much so, to admit impressions which conveyed noble enjoyment, and more generous in her susceptibilities than fastidious in taste or judgment. We did not always agree, and she listened graciously to my objections; a little astonished at times, and scarcely allowing me to think that she was much touched by my remarks. I left her charmed with the superiority of her understanding and the elevation of her sentiments, and convinced that she possessed a truly royal soul, not always perhaps to be enlightened by the trials of life, but of which they would never subdue the courage nor impair the dignity.

On the 17th of October 1837, four months after the marriage of the Duke of Orleans, his second sister, the Princess Marie, espoused, at the Trianon, Duke Alexander of Wurtemberg, and within less than fifteen months afterwards she died at Pisa, far from her family, leaving behind her works and a name singularly celebrated for a princess whose life was circumscribed to twenty-five years. She had received from heaven those gifts of invention and sentiment in the domain of the arts which astonish and move, at a distance as in close observation and in all ranks, the imagination of men. She and the Duke of Orleans were undoubtedly the most brilliant and popular of

the royal family, and both were cut off in the flower of their popularity and youth, before prospects of the most flattering future. Although the strongly original bent of the Princess Marie's genius and character appeared pre-eminently in the region of art, it was not confined to that sphere alone. The same ardent and expansive nature developed itself in every object of her occupation, and her taste included all great conceptions. One day, in the park at Neuilly, at the commencement of the summer of 1838, we were discoursing of the most agreeable employments of life. She indulged herself by imagining the position of a lady of eminent station, escaping from the yoke of her rank, from the etiquette and monotony of the court, and, without descending from her refined habits, surrounding herself with a diversified, accomplished, and animated circle. The portrait drawn by Bossuet of the Princess Palatine, Anne of Gonzaga, in a funeral oration, and some of his beautiful expressions, recurred to my memory. I repeated them to the Princess Marie: "The genius of the Princess Palatine found itself equally adapted to business and recreation. The court never beheld any one more engaging; and, without speaking of the acuteness of her mind or the infinite fertility of her resources, everything yielded to the sweet charm of her conversation . . . to such an extent did she attract confidence, and so natural was it for her to win over hearts! She declared to the leaders of parties the extent to which she would pledge herself, and they believed her incapable of deceiving or of being deceived. Her par-

ticular disposition was to conciliate opposing interests, and, while raising herself above them, to find the secret place, and, as it were, the tie by which they might be bound together . . . immoveable in her friendships and incapable of failure in any human duty." The Princess Marie was pleased by the image of such a character and life. "Yes," she said to me, "to belong to all, to see all, to take part in all, without becoming the slave of anything; delightful conversations, sometimes a participation in great affairs, liberty, friends, and the house of my aunt Adelaide in the street of Varennes, to receive them;—here would indeed be perfect happiness." She was not permitted this enjoyment, but the sight of the misfortunes and afflictions of her family was spared to her. God distributes his severities and favours without reference to the foresight of men.

I have always entertained, even before reaching old age, an enduring affection for the dead. The infinite and unforeseen variety of the blows of the destroyer incessantly recurs to me in thought at the aspect of the healthiest and happiest lives. Enduring sorrows inspire me with a profound and sympathetic respect for the souls who feel them. Readiness of oblivion impresses me with regret for those who have passed so rapidly from the hearts where they thought they possessed such strong hold; and it gratifies me to cherish reminiscences which I perceive so easily effaced. During my residence in London, in 1840, I went one evening to pay a visit at Holland House. Lord Holland was dining out,

I do not recollect where. I found Lady Holland alone in that long library where, above the books, portraits are placed of the celebrated politicians, philosophers, and writers who had been the friends and habitual visitants of the family. I asked Lady Holland if it often happened that she found herself thus alone. "No," she replied, "very seldom; but when it occurs I am not without resources;" and pointing to the portraits, she observed, "I entreat the friends you see there to descend from above; I know the place that each preferred, the arm-chair in which he was accustomed to sit: they come: I find myself again with Fox, Romilly, Mackintosh, Sheridan, and Horner; they speak to me, and I am no longer by myself." And this haughty, imperious, and capricious woman, who, in the midst of the triumphs she had won by her beauty and talents, retained the reputation of coldness and egotism, appeared, as she thus spoke, to be visibly and sincerely affected. From this incident I have preserved a favourable impression of her. Those who forget not have loved sincerely, and the fidelity of the memory is one of the surest pledges of the value of the heart.

I do not wish to incur the reproach of forgetfulness towards the men with whom I have lived, and who nearly all received me, while yet young and unknown, with signal indulgence. At the precise epoch of which I am now treating, within the short space of three years, from 1836 to 1839, I saw a great number of them disappear in succession, my immediate predecessors or contemporaries; some were my friends, and all

truly distinguished; men who, in extremely unequal degrees as under very opposite pretensions, obtained sufficient mark to preserve a little place in the world's remembrance, and to give me a right of saying something of them as to my own.

The two first, by the date of their deaths in 1836, M. Raynouard and M. Flaugergues, were the last survivors of that committee of the Legislative Body who, in 1813, attempted the first essay, I will not say of resistance, but of sincere warning, to the Emperor Napoleon, who, after a long succession of triumphs, had reached the most fatal reverses and stood on the brink of ruin. M. Raynouard was a native of Provence, honest and acute, quick in manner and speech, but moderate in spirit, sincerely liberal, and capable of firmness in a moment of crisis, while at the same time anxious to avoid difficult positions and the necessity of exercising the courage which would never have failed him. After the Hundred Days he retired from political life, and gave himself up entirely, not, as he had done at an earlier period, to poetry and the drama, but to learned letters,—to the history of the French language and literature, especially in the provinces of the south, and to the labours of the two academies to which he belonged in the Institute. He enjoyed without disturbance, to his latest day, independence and respect in his labours, repose, and the intimacy of some select friends. M. Flaugergues, born in Rouergue, was a man of simple manners and harsh exterior, upright in heart, and firm in temper, even to obstinacy; without originality,

but not destitute of pretension in his political ideas, and a subtle though a heavy reasoner. Not having, like M. Raynouard, the tastes of literary life for a refuge, he continued to occupy modest public functions up to the day when, under the ministry of M. de Villèle, his conscientious independence led to his dismissal. From that period he lived in retirement, as did his colleague of the committee of the five, but much more obscure and forgotten. Both were honourable types of upright men, faithful to their liberal convictions, but discouraged rather than enlightened by experience, and resolved, from wisdom and probity, to repel the iniquitous and absurd consequences of the revolutionary spirit, without having learnt to discover its vices clearly, and to oppose them resolutely.

Some months later, two persons died whose lives had been more actively and constantly political,—M. de Marbois, at the age of ninety-two, who reckoned seventy-one years of public service; and the Abbé de Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, who for more than twenty years had exchanged his episcopal seat, whence the Catholics ejected him, for a pension of twelve thousand francs, and lived on his estate at Breuil in Auvergne, incessantly occupied in sending forth pamphlets and newspaper articles, and in making excursions to Paris. I have already mentioned what were, in 1815 and 1816, my relations with M. de Marbois. They continued, up to his death, frequent and affectionate. I often met the Abbé de Pradt in society, where he was the most inexhaustible and wearisome of talkers, determined to consider his

auditors as untiring as himself. A comparison of the lives of these two men, and of the position each made for himself, would form a curious study and supply a highly moral conclusion. Both were mixed up, from their youth and almost to their decease, with the events and affairs of their time; in public duties, in assemblies, at the court, abroad, and in exile. Both served and even adulated nearly all the authorities which have succeeded each other with us, and authorities of the most opposite character. Both acted, wrote, and spoke much; but in these vicissitudes of their lives they were stamped, or rather they stamped themselves, with extremely different seals. The radical defect of repeated revolutions is to forget and kill respect. The Abbé de Pradt ran full tilt into this vice of his age. M. de Marbois continued always a stranger to it. Whatever might be his situation, M. de Marbois, honest and serious, sincerely respected his ideas, his cause, his country, his party, and himself. The Abbé de Pradt, vain and thoughtless, respected nothing, neither persons, ideas, cause, party, nor master: he alternately praised and abused all, extolled them to the clouds or turned them into ridicule. Thus, the one lived and died honoured by his superiors, his equals, even by his adversaries and indifferent persons who disagreed with him; the other was universally treated without the least consideration by those even whom he served or amused; and despite his rare intelligence, and without being absolutely corrupt, he ended his life in equal disrepute with the State and the Church, as a politician and as

a priest. The world takes men at their word, and holds them in no higher estimation than they appear to hold themselves.

A statesman who had been thrice charged to restore the finances of France, exhausted by war, or utterly deranged by revolutions, and who as often floated them again by credit, while founding credit on order and probity,—Baron Louis,—died also in the course of this same year, 1837. He was endowed with an expanded, steady, and unsophisticated mind, which proposed to itself but one end, never losing sight of it, and resolutely exacting from every one all its conditions. Independently of the signal services he rendered in the direct exercise of power, no one more essentially contributed to infuse and establish solidly, in all branches of our financial administration, those wholesome maxims, those strong habits and traditions which until now have protected, and will, I trust, ever protect it against ignorant chimeras, thoughtless innovations, and the greedy pretensions which disorder alone can satiate.

Another valiant defender of a different species of order, still more urgent, if not more essential,—Marshal Count de Lobau,—terminated at the same epoch his life, so often hazarded and spared on fields of battle. Under manners of little refinement, he possessed a mind judicious and sensible to shrewdness, with as much devotion to the duties of the citizen as to those of the soldier. For seven years he commanded the national guard of Paris with tranquil resolution, and a blunt but intelligent and

prudent authority in his brief mode of speech. A few months before his death the army also lost one of its eminent chiefs—the General of Engineers, Haxo—recently celebrated at the siege of Antwerp; an officer and a man of mark, of highly-cultivated faculties beyond his special vocation, and of the most honourable character. His rare capacity and the just confidence he inspired would have fitted him for a more exalted career, had he not been possessed by a mania, which, sometimes vitiating his judgment, rendered him always troublesome and occasionally impracticable,—the mania of criticizing, objecting, and contradicting, as if indispensably required to prove the originality and independence of his thought. One of his friends said, "Haxo never agrees with anybody; thus no one ever agrees with him."

Death seems to have its days for seeking, in all careers, select victims for immolation. While striking so many distinguished men devoted to the service of the State, it reached also, in their retirement and in the midst of scientific labours, an academician, a metaphysician, and a physician, all three eminent and famous, M. Silvestre de Sacy, M. Laromiguière, and Doctor Broussais. I have nothing to say here of their special merits in their respective sciences, but I preserve a clear remembrance of their characters and physiognomy. M. Silvestre de Sacy joined the knowledge of his own time to the manners of bygone ages. Active, with calmness and gravity, he was found equal to numerous and diversified functions without ceasing to take his learned studies for the central object of life.

When called to a situation which connected him with politics, he performed its duties scrupulously, rather than in the light of his appropriate and selected mission; and while engaged in worldly affairs, retained his attachment to his austere home. His vast erudition, far from unsettling, had confirmed his Christian faith, and all the overthrows he had witnessed and participated in, had neither affected his domestic habits nor the regularity of his piety. The revolution which assailed and altered everything around him, seemed never to have reached himself; and if it had not taken place, I believe he would still have remained the same moral individual. I never knew a man on whom external circumstances and agencies obtained such slender hold, and who, for the regulation of his life, listened more exclusively to the voice of his own judgment and conscience in solitary communion with the soul. A rare and admirable example of moral health, for it is even more difficult for minds than bodies to escape contagion.

In opposition to M. de Sacy, M. Laromiguière followed the current of modern influences and ideas. In intellectual order and with the refined discipline of his spirit, he was a disciple of the eighteenth century, and the steady friend of the most faithful philosophic representatives of that great epoch—Condorcet, Tracy, Cabaris, Volney, and Garat. But while habitually partaking their opinions and society, M. Laromiguière held himself absolutely aloof from politics, a stranger to all worldly ambition, to all appearance of self-aggrandizement, solely addicted to

the study and teaching of philosophy, and practising its tenets with as much wisdom as he took delight in imparting them to others. I know not whether, in the history of metaphysics, there remains any important trace of his labours, amongst others of his attempt to enlarge and elevate the sensualistic doctrine of his master, Condillac, by leading him a step towards spiritualism. His idea on this subject was ingenious and well stated rather than original and profound. But what will survive M. Laromiguière in the memories of the present age, will be the charm of his person and instruction. His disposition was gentle and accessible with dignity, his mind clear and elegant; always animated and never aggressive, he delighted in conversation and argument, but disliked contest and carefully avoided it, even within the range of philosophy, while maintaining his opinions with becoming firmness. He was sincere, without passion; defending himself well and never accepting defeat, but little bent on pursuing victory; more solicitous for his independence and repose than jealous of propagating his doctrines, and leaving them without much solicitude to their fate, provided they disturbed not his own.

In this particular, no one less resembled M. Laromiguière than Doctor Broussais; in proportion as one loved tolerant and pacific science, the other preferred it warlike and predominating. I have formed no opinion, and I have no right to adopt one, on the physiological and medical theories of Doctor Broussais, and no one is more opposed than I am to the general

philosophical ideas he sought to deduce from them; but it was impossible to know him without being struck, I will even say moved, by the energy of his convictions, and his devotion to obtain their triumph. He was one of those natures, intellectually powerful and vehemently personal, in whom the love of truth and self-esteem mingle and unite so closely that it is difficult to discern the respective portions of either in the transports and infatuations of passion. Doctor Broussais experienced in his scientific life the fate of more than one eminent politician. He won and lost great conquests; he saw his reputation increase and decline, he enjoyed in the young learned world popular favour, and experienced the bitterness of being abandoned. I am convinced that neither errors nor reverses weakened his faith in his own ideas and his hopes for their future. He was of those who even in falling impart a step in advance to their followers, and who have more claims to respect in their decline than to enthusiasm during their triumph.

Amongst the many deaths of these three years, I have not yet named the most celebrated of all; of him who occupied the greatest share of public attention during his life, and who attracted equal notice at the moment of his decease,—Prince Talleyrand. After his resignation of the English embassy, he lived alternately in Paris and at his seat of Valençay; always well received by King Louis-Philippe, but not invariably finding in this passive favour the means of escaping from vacuum and ennui. He had been from its origin a member of the

class of moral and political sciences in the Institute, and he re-entered it of right in 1832, when I caused its re-establishment. A fancy seized him in 1838 to deliver a lecture there, and, in effect, on the 3rd of March, at a private sitting, he read to us a notice of Count Reinhard, a learned and honest diplomatist, who had long served under his orders, either in the bureaux or in various foreign posts, and who had even been for a moment, in 1799, minister for Foreign Affairs. The lecturer was greater than his subject. He had too much taste to exaggerate it ; a just sentiment of proportion and accordance formed one of the intellectual qualities of M. de Talleyrand, and his empiricism, when he chose to practise it, was perfectly delicate and concealed. While praising M. Reinhard, he left him his true position and stature; but he scattered through his notice, on the subject of study and diplomacy, a multitude of reflections ingeniously acute, and brilliant passages without appearing to study novelty or effect. It was written with that natural elegance, which, in a modest topic and in a short composition, supplies the place of talent, without its pretension. This reading, at which several members of other academies of the Institute were present, including M. Royer Collard and M. Villemain, met with general success. Particular attention was excited by an extremely just eulogium, but one little expected, of high theological studies, of their influence on the vigour as well as on the refinement of the mind, and of the able ecclesiastical politicians they had formed, especially the Cardinal Chancellor Du-

prat, the Cardinal d'Ossat, and the Cardinal de Polignac. M. de Talleyrand evidently experienced a bold satisfaction in recalling that he also had studied in the Seminary, and in proving that if, since, he had bestowed little thought on the duties of that position, he, at least, had not forgotten the advantages he derived from it. His listeners felt obliged to him for having offered a work to the Institute, destined, probably, to be his last, and the least devout readily forgave the great philosophic dignitary, who treated them with this act of deference, for his compliments to the theologians.

Their good feeling towards him was speedily subjected to a more difficult trial. A few weeks after his lecture at the academy, M. de Talleyrand fell seriously ill. Death approached him. How would he receive it? What would be his own final judgment on his past life? At the moment of appearing before the Sovereign Judge, by what acts or denials, by what words or silence would he manifest the state of his soul? On the mere report of his illness, the heads and zealous believers of the Catholic Church busied themselves vehemently with these questions. Around his bed, affectionate solicitudes and pious entreaties were not wanting. On the other hand, amongst those of his contemporaries who had, like himself, professed and practised the philosophic ideas of the eighteenth century and the revolution, several dreaded, on his part, a contradiction of his life, a desertion of his cause, a symptom of weakness and hypocrisy. To speak only of the external and known

acts of his last days, what M. de Talleyrand did, he was consistent in doing, and his death merited no reproach either of falsehood or vacillation. Independently of all inward faith in his relations with the church to which he belonged, he had been deficient in imperative duties, and had committed great scandals. In submitting to an acknowledgment of these errors, and in avowing his penitence, he performed an act honest in itself and in accordance with the opinion of the world. It was neither an abjuration of his general ideas, nor an abandonment of his political cause, but a solemn apology after notorious irregularities. He might have done this without hypocrisy, for he was one of those who, even in the licence of their lives, maintain, through natural elevation of mind, the instinct of moral order, and willingly render to that feeling the respect which is its due, when no longer called upon to sacrifice to it their interests or their passions.

I know not what may have been the religious disposition of M. de Talleyrand at the last hour, and under the solitary trembling of the soul on the point of separation from this world. Death has authoritative influences, equally unexpected and secret, which no one here below can penetrate. But a characteristic fact deserves to be recorded. When, on his death-bed, a letter was handed to him for signature which he had addressed to the Pope, he desired that it might be dated on the day when he read his notice of Count Reinhard to the Institute. He was anxious to prove he had written that letter

with unimpaired mental faculties, and to associate his deed of submission to the Church with his last act of fidelity to his friends and the recollections of his life.

In the same year, 1838, some months after the death of M. de Talleyrand, an aged man of eighty-four, like himself, one of his colleagues and adversaries in the Constituent Assembly of 1789, the Count of Montlosier, was called to the same tribunal. He possessed one of the strongest and most original minds I have ever met with; his character, his understanding and ability, whether as orator or author, even his person and manners, all were marked by the double physiognomy of solitude and combat. He seemed to have passed his life far from the world, in his mountains of Auvergne, meditating on its volcanoes or their congenial studies, and to have descended amongst men for the single purpose of dispute. Liberal and aristocratic, monarchical and independent, his opinions on religion, politics, history, and literature were all profoundly personal,—the fruit of his solitary reflections and researches,—and he maintained them as men defend their houses or their lives. He was at once filled with pride, capable of devotion, and passionately obstinate in disconnected and incoherent ideas and sentiments. There were in him the elements of superiority, but method and harmony were utterly deficient, and he consumed in imperfect labours, in generous but almost uniformly futile efforts, in extreme contests, a rare energy of mind and spirit, and a life of unusual duration.

When he beheld its term at hand, he called faith and the Christian Church to his aid in that formidable transition. He had always respected and frequently defended them. They had neither defection nor scandal to reproach him with. He declared himself ready to disavow, in a general sense, all that either in his conduct or writings might have appeared contrary to their dogmas or precepts. But he was asked to retract expressly the ideas he had sometimes maintained on the relation of the Church with the State, on the part of the clergy in our Christian societies, and on religious congregations. He hesitated, sorrow-stricken and undecided. Explanations and amendments were spoken of and proposed to him, and while the question was still in argument, he died in a medley of submission and resistance, neither a deserter nor a rebel, but ever an independent.

I have acquitted myself, if such a discharge is possible, towards the dead of the age in which I have lived, and who occupied such different and unequal positions. It only remains for me here to notify the date of the decease of a lady, whose friendship during nearly twenty years afforded me unqualified delight in days of happiness, and was even more consolatory in those of sorrow. The Duchess de Broglie died of a brain fever, on the 22nd of September, 1838. She was one of the most noble, rare, and charming creatures I have ever seen, and of whom I shall only say, in the words of Saint Simon, when deploring the loss of the Duke of

Burgundy: "May the mercy of God permit me to behold her eternally, where, beyond all doubt, his goodness has placed her!" I return to the living, to their agitations and struggles.

In forming the cabinet of the 15th of April, M. Molé undertook a difficult task. He abandoned the policy of resistance, which, in general thesis, he wished to maintain. He adopted the policy of the third party without belonging to it, and without ranging himself in the ranks of that section as one of its own natural adherents. By his ideas, habits, and tastes, he was a man of order and authority; the maxims and tendencies of the democratic opposition inspired him with much more disquietude than sympathy, and yet it was to the desires of this very democratic opposition that he yielded, and towards which he inclined when he withdrew the repressive and monarchical bills he had himself presented, and proclaimed an amnesty in the midst of the combat, not on the morrow of a victory, but of a defeat. A single power which acts without discussion, can, on a given day, and for several days, change thus abruptly, attitude, direction, and language; but it was in presence of great free assemblies, and when it was impossible to escape from their debates, that M. Molé accomplished this sudden manœuvre. His new policy might be good or bad, but his parliamentary position was weak and false. He had to govern with and by the Chambers, and in the Chambers he was without a friendly and tried party, without a steady and defined standard, floating between two leading

opinions of the house, and momentarily inclined towards that from which he could promise himself no certain support, and the least in accordance with his own dispositions.

He diminished or adjourned with much sagacity and tact the difficulties of this position. The gravity of his appearance and demeanour relieved him from all semblance of versatility or weakness. The charm of his intercourse and conversation drew towards him the men of no previously decided party, and conciliated good-will even in the ranks where he reckoned on no political adhesion. He knew how to arrange and recommend measures calculated to give to opposing opinions the required satisfaction or suitable compensation. Four days after having pardoned the abettors of revolutionary plots, he re-opened and restored to public worship the church of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois, which had remained closed since the riot of the 13th of February, 1831, finally delivering the Catholics from that revolutionary outrage; then followed the restoration of the crucifix in the hall of the Royal Court at Paris. While serving the house of Bourbon, he failed not to remember his *début* in public life, and when occasion offered, he rendered honourable and friendly offices to the family or ancient adherents of the Emperor Napoleon. He proposed and carried the vote for a pension of 100,000 francs to the Countess of Lipano, ex-Queen of Naples. While watchful over religious and moral observances, he took equal care of material interests, and presented many bills to the

Chamber of Deputies for the establishment of railroads to be completed by the co-operation of private speculation with the state. Several important laws, the greater part of which had been proposed by preceding cabinets, and amongst others, those on the duties of municipal authorities and general departmental councils, were definitively debated, adopted, and promulgated in the course of his ministry. To him belonged the honour of effectually shutting up the gaming-houses of Paris, a measure voted during the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, on the proposition of M. Humann. By the care of his colleagues, MM. Barthe, Montalivet, Salvandy, and Lacave-Laplagne, the internal administration at this epoch was both enlightened and active; and the name of M. Molé, his imperious character, blended with frigid politeness, his position near King Louis-Philippe, with whom he was at the same time deferential and exacting, respectful and susceptible, imparted a unity to his cabinet, which, although not predominantly powerful, was far from being deficient in dignity.

In the conduct of foreign affairs, he had this good fortune,—that no profound disagreement, no compromising question sprang up during his administration between the great European powers. The English cabinet was less confidential and colder with him than it had been with M. Casimir Périer and the Duke de Broglie. The cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and Saint Petersbourg, well pleased at a relaxation of ties between the two great constitutional states,

reciprocated friendly relations with M. Molé, praising his principles and regulations, but showing themselves more disposed to profit by than to meet them with a substantial return. The attitude altogether was more agreeable than secure; not strong enough to surmount grave difficulties, should they present themselves, but which offered no provocation, and sufficed for the necessities of the moment.

Moreover, incidents occurred, in the secondary regions of external policy, which marked the cabinet of M. Molé with good fortune, which he readily seized and turned to account. In America, amongst the greater portion of the new states formed from the ruins of the Spanish supremacy, violent and precarious governments outraged at every moment the principles of public right, invaded the interests of the resident or foreign merchants, and rejected with ignorant and improvident arrogance the remonstrances of the European governments. In March 1838, facts of this nature led to a rupture with Mexico; at first the suspension of diplomatic relations, then the blockade of the Mexican ports, and finally war. A French squadron, commanded by Admiral Baudin, which the Prince de Joinville hastened to join, commenced vigorous hostilities, carried by assault the fortress of Saint Jean d' Ulloa, said to be impregnable, subsequently Vera Cruz, and compelled the Mexican government, despite its bravadoes and revolutionary fluctuations to sign a treaty of peace on the 9th of March, 1839, which satisfied the demands of France. In Southern America, at

the mouth of the La Plata, between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, analogous causes, complicated by the internal discords of the two republics, produced the explosion of similar events, and led to the commencement, in June 1838, of that series of negotiations, combats, and ineffectual attempts at peace, destined for ten years to occupy French diplomacy, naval interference, and parliamentary debates. The black republic of Hayti failed to keep the engagements contracted in 1825, under the ministry of M. de Villèle, in return for the acknowledgment of its independence. M. Molé reminded it of these contracts; first, by negotiation, secondly, by the presence of a squadron; and on the 12th of February, 1838, a fresh treaty was concluded, which confirmed the independence of the new state, fixed the indemnity to the colonists at sixty millions, and stipulated for an immediate instalment. These distant enterprises, bravely executed and carried to a successful issue, excited the interest of the public, and animated without compromising the foreign policy of the cabinet.

A more important and durable success was sought for and found in Algeria. It had been decided, under the preceding ministry, before my rupture with M. Molé, that a second expedition should be undertaken against Constantine to revenge the check we had received there. It took place between the 2nd of October and the 3rd of November, 1837, under the command of General Damrémont, who prepared it with provident activity, conducted it under heavy difficulties to the walls of the place; and while visiting

the works in the trenches with the Duke of Nemours, was struck down by a cannon shot, which, without allowing him to feel death, gloriously terminated his honourable life. This mournful accident, far from abating, redoubled the ardour of the attack; the senior officer present, the general of artillery Valée, already possessing the confidence and esteem of the army, to which he had added new titles since the commencement of the expedition, at once assumed the command; and on the day following the death of General Damrémont, the 13th of October, the assault was given with a vigour worthy of the best era of our best soldiers. The Duke of Nemours commanded, with intrepid coolness, the column of attack; several of our bravest officers, amongst others Colonels Combes and Lamoricière, found there, the first his death, the second a dangerous wound. But the place was carried; its fall determined the submission of the surrounding tribes, and the expedition resulted in a conquest which definitively added the province of Constantine to the number of French possessions in Africa.

Four months previously, General Bugeaud, despatched into the province of Oran to arrest the progress of Abd-el-Kader, had concluded with that able leader a treaty known by the name of the treaty of the Tafna: a precarious peace, since severely criticised, and which supplied important objections to minds preoccupied with our future prospects in Algeria, but which, at the moment of its conclusion, was opportune and advantageous. Spectators are

prone to judge political transactions by their own fixed and general views, not according to the existing circumstances and special objects which have determined the actors. A fertile source of error and injustice. By the taking of Constantine, the temporary pacification of the province of Oran, and the administration, little popular, but able and honest, of Marshal Valée, who succeeded General Damrémont as governor-general, the ministry of M. Molé was, for Algeria, a period of prudent extension and effectual consolidation

Three great questions, the return of Prince Louis Bonaparte from America to Switzerland, on the death of his mother Queen Hortense,—the execution of the treaty denominated, of the twenty-four articles which definitively settled the territorial limits of Belgium,—and the evacuation of Ancona by the French troops, were, externally, the leading affairs of the ministry of M. Molé, and were settled in a manner which excited the most vehement attacks. The events, passions, and contests of that time are already so far removed from us, and the repose of my present life throws so much light on my perceptions of the past, that I may say, without embarrassment or reserve, what I think to-day of the policy of M. Molé on those three points, and of the objections to which it gave rise.

In demanding from Switzerland the removal of Prince Louis Bonaparte, M. Molé was fully justified. It was the only method, if not of stifling, at least of rendering more difficult and perilous, the designs

publicly avowed and pursued by the prince against the government of France. Public right authorized this requisition, and the simplest political foresight commanded it. Perhaps M. Molé did not adopt the most eligible diplomatic proceedings; perhaps, in form, he may have neglected the circumspection best calculated to attain his object. His ability was sometimes rather superficial; but, after all, his step was as legitimate as necessary, and it succeeded without the employment of other means than a few momentary demonstrations, and without more inconvenience than the clamour of the violent democrats in Switzerland, and the ill humour, more apparent than real, of the federal government of the Republic, sufficiently moderate to practise, but too timid or too weak to avow openly the principles of public right and sound sense.

I must say the same of the attitude of M. Molé in relation to the treaty of the twenty-four articles on the territorial limits of Belgium. In 1834 the Belgians were eager to accept this treaty as the pledge of their independence acknowledged by Europe. In the subsequent negotiations to which the prolonged refusal of the King of Holland gave rise, the French government had vainly endeavoured to obtain for Belgium the entire possession of the duchies of Luxembourg and Limbourg. On the 11th of December, 1838, the conference of London maintained the treaty of the twenty-four articles which the King of Holland at last appeared disposed to accept. We had evidently reached the term of the

concessions of the great European powers to the new state. The English cabinet, on this point, was in perfect accordance with the three cabinets of the north, and more decided than any other not to exceed the limits which the treaty of the twenty-four articles had assigned. The conclusive and unanimous adoption of this treaty was equally important to the formation of the Belgic state and to the consolidation of European peace. M. Molé acted wisely in adhering to it, and in not allowing France, when the essential points were obtained, to remain isolated in Europe, and Belgium still in suspense.

The evacuation of Ancona was a more complex question. The Pope demanded it. Austria, at the same time, engaged to abandon the Legations. The law of nations was not doubtful, but events have taken upon themselves to show how much, from that period, the great European cabinets have wanted resolute and persevering foresight in the affairs of Italy. In 1831, in presence of insurrection, they had recommended and obtained in the Roman States reforms insufficient to satisfy popular passions, but which would have become salutary had they been real. Nothing lowers or compromises power more than submission without renouncement, and a belief that it is justified in neglecting its promises as soon as it finds them difficult to accomplish or capable of being avoided. Sustained, in fact, by the court of Vienna, the Papal government readily seized every opportunity and motive for nullifying the reforms it had decreed, and which the European cabinets, care-

less or ill-disposed, took no pains to maintain by rendering them serious and effective. After all that has passed since that epoch, and in face of what is passing now, I persist in thinking that the Roman question,—that is to say, the reform of the internal government of the Roman States, might be effected without the temporal spoliation of the Papacy. The work is difficult, but not impossible, and it was then, as now, a work of necessity. They deceive themselves strangely who believe that, in presence of the events in which we are all participators, the Roman question is on the point of being determined. It is not the solution which approaches, it is the chaos that begins. No one can estimate the perturbation which would be, I do not wish to say will be, thrown into the social and moral condition of Europe by the disorganization of the Catholic Church, and the prostration of the base on which it reposes. The honour and safety of the Christian world require that the government of the Roman States should be reformed, but not that the Papacy should be overthrown. From 1831 to 1838 a decided action exercised upon the court of Rome by the great European powers would have attained this double end. By the occupation of Ancona, that military and diplomatic coup de main of M. Casimir Périer, France was in a position to place herself at the head of the important work. She could, from that point, at once press upon the courts of Rome and Vienna, encourage and equally restrain the hopes of the Roman populations, and infuse into the government of the Papal States a

profound reform without subverting Italy and denaturalizing the Papacy. By giving up Ancona, M. Molé deprived France of all means of action and chance of success. The court of Rome fell back into its habitual inertness; Austria reassumed in Italy her immovable preponderance; and the Roman question found itself still more loaded with embarrassments and perils.

In the midst of all these foreign and domestic incidents, and throughout the whole duration of M. Molé's cabinet, I preserved a tranquil attitude, free in my language, but a stranger to all active or disguised hostility. On several occasions, including the intervention in Spain, the affairs of Algeria, the treaty of the Tafna, and the Greek loan, I spoke in support of the policy and demands of the cabinet, either because they linked themselves to the acts of the preceding administration, or because I found them conformable to public right and the interests of the country. Twice only I was led, in the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, to mark distinctly my opinion and personal position; not attacking the cabinet, but caring little for the displeasure it might feel, or the result that might ensue.

During the first days of May 1837, a fortnight after my rupture with M. Molé, the Chamber of Deputies discussed the demand for extraordinary secret funds presented by the cabinet. In the course of this debate, I was called upon to name the causes of my retirement. I explained myself with reserve, avoiding all personal controversy, but insisting on

the necessity of a strong and homogeneous organization of the different parties and the ministry, for the mutual interest of liberty and power. On this occasion I spoke of the democracy and the middle class, of their relations and mission in our social state, and in the bosom of free institutions. M. Odilon-Barrot, in reply, repeated the reproach he had already addressed to me more than once. "You wish," he said, "to establish an exclusive system which would tend to no less than a division of France into hostile castes. The middle class rejects this ill-omened present, this monopoly of victory. You forget then that all the triumphs of our revolution were gained by the world at large; you forget that the blood which has flowed, at home and abroad, for the independence or liberty of France, is the blood of the whole world."

"No," I exclaimed, "I do not forget this. It is true, our Charter contains rights which have been conquered for all the world, which are the price of the blood of all the world. These rights are, equality in public charges, equal admission to all public employment, liberty of labour, liberty of worship, the liberty of the press, and individual liberty! These rights, amongst us, are those of the whole world; they belong to all classes of Frenchmen; they are well worthy of having been conquered by the battles we have fought, and the victories we have won.

"There is yet another reward of these battles and victories; yourselves, gentlemen, the government of which you form a part, this Chamber, our consti-

tutional royalty, this is what the blood of all France has conquered; this is what the entire nation has received from victory as the price of its efforts and its courage. Do you find this insufficient for noble ambition and generous sentiments? Will it be necessary, after this, to establish that absurd political equality, that blind universality of political rights which hides itself at the bottom of every theory lately enunciated from this tribune? Do not say that I refuse to, or dispute with, the French nation, the price of its victories, the price of its blood poured forth in our fifty years of revolutions. But, apparently, France has not intended to live always in revolution; she has assuredly reckoned that at the close of these combats, and for the security of all the privileges she has conquered, a regular, fixed order would be established, a free and reasonable government, capable of guaranteeing the rights of all by the direct and active interposition of that part of the nation truly capable of exercising political power. This is what I meant to say when I spoke of the necessity of instituting and organizing the middle class. Have I assigned the limits of that class? Have you heard me say where it was to commence or end? I have carefully abstained from doing so. I have neither distinguished it from any superior section, nor from the inferior orders. I have simply stated this general fact, that in a great country such as France there exists a class not devoted to manual labour, not living by wages, able to dedicate a considerable portion of its time and faculties to public

business; possessing not only the necessary fortune for such an undertaking, but also the lights and independence without which a similar work could never be accomplished. When, by the course of time, this natural limit of political capacity shall be removed, when knowledge, the progress of wealth, and all the causes which change the state of society shall have rendered a greater number of men capable of exercising political power with sound judgment and independence, then the legal boundary will also change. It is the perfection of our government that political rights, limited to those who are capable of exercising them, may extend as capacity extends; and such is at the same time the admirable virtue of this government, that it excites incessantly the extension of that capacity; that it scatters on all sides learning, intelligence, and independence; so that, while assigning a limit to political rights, at the same moment it labours to displace that limit, to extend it, and thus to elevate the nation at large.

"How can you believe, how could any one believe, that it ever entered my mind to constitute the middle class in a narrow privileged form, to remould it into something resembling our ancient aristocracies? Allow me to say, that in so doing I should have renounced the opinions I have maintained through life; I should have abandoned the cause I have ever defended, the work in which I have had the honour to assist under your eyes and by your hands. When I applied myself to spread education throughout the country, when I sought to elevate in intellectual

order the classes who live by labour, to give them the knowledge they require for their position,—this was on my part, and on the part of the entire government, a continued incitement to acquire universal information, to rise to a higher sphere. It was the beginning of that work of civilization, of that generally ascending movement, the desire of which is implanted in human nature, and which it is the duty of all administrations to encourage. I repel, therefore, I repel utterly these accusations of a narrow system, foreign to the general interests and sentiments of the nation, and solely applicable to the individual advantage of a special class of citizens. I repel them most emphatically, and at the same time I assert that the moment has arrived for shaking off those worn-out revolutionary ideas, those absurd prepossessions of absolute equality in political rights, which, wherever they have prevailed, have extinguished real justice and liberty.

"Much is said of democracy. I am accused of disowning its rights and interests. Ah! gentlemen, what has so often injured democracy is, that it has not acquired a true feeling of human dignity; it has neither understood nor chosen to admit that variety, that hierarchy of positions which naturally develop themselves in the social state, and which allow without reserve the ascendant tendency in individuals, and mutual competition according to relative merit. Neither liberty nor the advancement of the working classes have satisfied democracy; it demands levelling; and this is the reason why it has so often and

so rapidly ruined the societies in which it has predominated.

"For myself, I am one of those determined to oppose the levelling principle, no matter under what form it may present itself. I am resolved to call upon the whole nation to advance, but at the same time reminding it, that advancement has its special and imperative conditions; that it requires capacity, intelligence, virtue, industry, and a host of inciting agencies which all men are not able to command.

"I desire that wherever these agencies are found, wherever there is capacity, virtue and industry, the democratic class may elevate itself to the highest positions of the state; that it may ascend this tribune, raise its voice here, and exercise its influence over all the affairs of the country. But you possess this privilege already, gentlemen; you have no occasion to demand it. You live in the midst of a society more completely thrown open to progress and the expectation of equality, than any that has ever yet appeared. Never has there been seen such a concourse of individuals raised to the highest rank in every career: we have nearly all won our positions by the sweat of our brows and on the field of battle."

M. Odilon-Barrot: "If this were to begin again, ——"

M. Guizot: "M. Odilon-Barrot is right; it is to begin again, to-day and for ever."

M. Odilon-Barrot: "You have mistaken my idea. These illustrative cases occurred in a time of equality, and if that were to be repeated——"

M. Guizot: "It seems to me that the honourable M. Barrot is indulging here in a strange illusion. I spoke just now of every kind of illustration. . . . . The honourable M. Barrot himself supplies a faithful instance; he has won his position in our own days, under our eyes, in the midst of us, under the system of which I speak, and not at any other epoch. There are many men who in opposite careers have raised and are raising themselves as he has done. I should repudiate absolutely an advantage applicable to a single generation, even though it were my own case. I do not understand that after all the political victories of the French nation, we have conquered for ourselves alone the rights that we possess. No, we have won them for our children, for our grandchildren, and for our descendants throughout all ages. This is what I understand, this is what I am proud of; this is true liberty, generous and productive liberty, in the midst of that envious, jealous, uneasy, and shuffling democracy which seeks to reduce everything to its own level, and is discontented if it sees one head raise itself above another.

"God forbid that our country should continue infected by such a deplorable disease! I explain it to myself in the times it has passed through, in the struggles it has sustained; when it laboured to overthrow absolute power and privilege, it called to its aid, indiscriminately, every variety of force, dangerous or useful, lawful or unlawful, good and evil passions. All these appeared upon the fields of action, and all looked for their share in the plunder.

But to-day the contest is over, peace is made, the treaty concluded: that treaty is the Charter and free government. I do not desire that my country should repeat anew what it has accomplished. I accept 1791, 1792, even the following years; while condemning them I accept them in history; but I do not desire them for the future, and I hold it is a duty of conscience to warn my country as often as I see it inclining in that direction.

"Such is my policy, gentlemen, my only policy. Such is the sense in which I understand the words middle class and democracy, liberty and equality, so often repeated, and a moment since in this tribune. Nothing, gentlemen, will induce me to deviate from the meaning I attach to them. I have risked for it all that man can hold most dear in public life,—I have risked popularity. I have not been unacquainted with popularity. You may remember, gentlemen, M. Barrot may remember, a time when we served together, when we fought under the same flag. At that time he may recollect that I was popular; I have beheld popular applause frequently present itself before me; I enjoyed it much, very much; it was a beautiful and delightful emotion. I have renounced it,—yes, I have renounced it. I know that such popularity does not attach itself to the ideas I am now defending, to the policy I maintain at present; but I know also there is another kind of popularity, the confidence we inspire in the social interests of a great country, the confidence of those regular and conservative interests which I regard as the founda-

tion on which society is based. This is the confidence I have sought for in place of that seductive and delightful popularity with which I was formerly acquainted. I aspire to the esteem and confidence of the friends of order, of lawful and liberal order ; to the confidence of men who believe that France is in possession of the rights and institutions she has been seeking since 1789, and that her most important occupation at present should be to preserve and strengthen them.

"This is the cause to which I have devoted myself; this is the popularity I covet. This will console me for the rest, and I shall envy no one the possession of any other kind of popularity, however genial it may be."

The Chamber was profoundly moved and satisfied. Nothing gratifies men more than to see their own ideas clearly elucidated, and to recognize themselves in an image which raises them in their own eyes. From that time people began to adopt what has since become the favourite common-place expression in the policy of the extreme parties. They imputed to the general body of the citizens the design of becoming, and the accusation of having already become, a new privileged class, the inheritors of the old nobility, to the exclusion of and at the expense of the people. They taxed them with thinking of nothing but their own interests, with coldness, egotism, sordid views, and mean-spirited propensities. I have some right to speak of the weaknesses of the middle class, for perhaps, more than any one else, I have suffered from

their inconveniences and borne their weight. It is true, that called abruptly, although by the natural course of things, to take a preponderating part in the government of France, this class has not always proved equal to its novel and arduous task. The grandeur of thought and the resolution of experience were sometimes deficient. It has been occasionally too much alarmed at the political fermentation, to which it yielded too readily; it has not always known how alternately to undertake and how to persevere enough. It was not itself exempt from the errors and mischievous tendencies against which it contended; but, in spite of its improvidences and mistakes, it was not less the true, honest, and faithful representative of the general interests of French society, such as that society had been made by the Revolution. No desire of exclusive privilege or oppressive system entered into its calculation; no evil of that character could result from the institutions it loved and supported. These were truly free and open institutions, unmingled with any species of tyranny, accessible to all rights and to unrestricted progress. The declared partisans of universal and immediate equality alone had any pretence for taxing the citizen class with usurpation and injustice. With the exception of this radical section all shades of opinion, interests, and parties enjoyed the perspective of an unfettered career. All could advance according to their true merit and actual strength. A day will come when the storm which then began to raise itself against the middle class will be pronounced one

of the most senseless aberrations of popular credulity ever engendered by revolutionary passion; and I merely anticipated that day when, in May 1837, I defended that class and the institutions in which it predominated against the gathering tempest. Its gratitude was testified with unusual ardour. Two hundred and six deputies joined in requesting permission to reprint a portion of my two speeches, and to circulate them in their departments. More than thirty thousand copies were speedily distributed. The opposition itself, while maintaining its attitude, took pleasure in this grand parliamentary scene; and the effect produced in the Chamber spread itself throughout the country, as much as such effects can extend beyond the place and the day where the presence of the individual speakers and the power of words have impressed the spectators.

The cabinet was injured by the echo of this debate in which it had taken so small a share. The opposition, by whom it was received favourably as long as the question involved the overthrow of the preceding government, took pleasure in fomenting the discontent of the new ministers by proclaiming the importance of the men they had separated from. M. Thiers came to their aid, as he had promised the King; but extraneous support cannot restore the power it tries to uphold. M. Molé, of a delicate and susceptible nature, felt these wounds keenly; the more so that beyond the Chambers the marriage of the Duke of Orleans, the amnesty, and the second expedition to Constantine inspired him with satisfac-

tion and the confidence of success. Irritated by this contrast, he considered the moment propitious for giving himself a parliamentary position in harmony with his external strength. He proposed to the King the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. No political or general necessity called for this step. The Chamber had adopted all the propositions of the ministry, who still held a majority, while the opposition was more ironical than aggressive. It was evidently to gratify his self-love and ease that M. Molé desired the dissolution. The King consented to it with some reluctance. The elections took place, not as a public struggle between the great opinions and parties of the country, but as a mingled conflict of candidates, supported or rejected by the Administration as they were presumed to be friendly or hostile. Out of 459 deputies, 152, springing from very opposite ranks, were replaced by new-comers; and amongst those who lost their seats were several of my own particular friends, staunch defenders of the policy of resistance, who looked upon it as enervated and compromised by the attitude of M. Molé. The number included MM. D'Haubersaert, Giraud, Renouard, &c., who were especially opposed and expelled by the cabinet. These elections, thus conducted, without defined principles and any declared standard, produced a disorganised Chamber, with no steady, public engagements, governed by individual interests and feelings, in the bosom of which M. Molé might possibly find the scattered elements of a favourable majority, but wherein the

great governing party, commenced under M. Casimir Périer, and already disunited by the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, underwent a new crisis of disruption and enfeeblement.

When the session opened, the consequences of this state of parties and minds speedily manifested itself. In both Chambers the addresses were all that the cabinet could desire. Amongst the bills presented, those of minor importance, or such as had already been the object of long debates in preceding Chambers, were readily passed. But when great and difficult questions arose, where the cabinet had to adopt and carry its resolutions on the conversion of the funds, and on constructing the general net-work of railroads, then its weakness appeared. Political authority was found wanting. It rested on no party strongly knit together, bound to it by fixed convictions, and determined to support it in the interest of their common cause. Its definitive intentions were vacillating. It carried into the debates little power and brilliancy. The two propositions I have alluded to were thrown out, and the elections looked upon as victorious eventuated in a cold and barren session.

The only debate essentially political, the demand for a new and extraordinary credit on account of the secret funds, was marked by the same character, and I took part in it myself with indifference and embarrassment. I neither wished to refuse the secret supplies, nor to assume towards the ministry an attitude of general and permanent opposition. I confined myself to noting with regret the instability of power,

the decline of the Chamber itself, and the weakness it imparted to the entire government. I was coldly listened to as I spoke. My old adversaries of the Left asked, with a smile, if I was not myself tainted with weakness and decay. I saw the coming storm, I warned others of its approach; but I was not desirous of being accused of raising it.

After the session of 1838, and in the interval which separated it from that of 1839, the flaw in M. Molé's position developed itself rapidly. He had exhausted the influence which his accession to office gave him, the adhesion of the Third Party, and even of the Left. These transient allies abandoned him, and he failed to acquire, in the course of his administration, new and personal force. His prudence, his favourable attitude, his well-timed and agreeable language preserved for him, in the Chamber and with the country, a degree of favour unaccompanied by real power. Europe esteemed him, and congratulated herself on his policy, but without relying on his strength. He still enjoyed a tranquil and easy present, but his future in perspective was menaced and weak.

No sooner had the session of 1839 commenced than the mischief burst forth; all causes of discontent expressed themselves loudly; animated by the same humour the different shades of opposition drew towards each other. It was asked if they should accept indefinitely a decaying and wavering administration, seeking support alternately from opposing ranks, passing from resistance to concession, from concession to resistance, and which, under the guise

of conciliation, placed the government beyond the influence of all clear, steady, and consistent opinions, and drove from its side their most approved representatives? Why did not this conciliation so much vaunted penetrate the bosom of the opposition itself? Why did not M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and M. Guizot, endeavour to understand each other and act in concert, even for a moment, and with a special and decided object? When M. Molé separated from M. Guizot, had not M. Molé arranged with M. Thiers and M. Odilon-Barrot to change policy, and substitute concession for resistance? This bad example became contagious at the very moment when its mischievous results were making themselves felt. The coalition worked its effects on minds and in conversation before passing into speeches and votes.

I embarked in it openly and actively. Before estimating the fact and its consequences I shall state the motives by which I was determined.

I was earnestly bent on recalling the government to a more decided and consistent policy. For nine years I had alternately defended and carried the standard of resolute authority in presence of audacious freedom. I suffered in my inmost soul when I saw this flag, not abandoned, but half wound up and shrouded. It is the natural and admirable effect of free government, that the great parties of which it is formed attach themselves to principles, and desire to proclaim while practising them. It is essential that minds should be satisfied and elevated at the same time that interests are guaranteed and confided. I

do not think I go too far when I affirm that, during the administration of M. Casimir Périer, and that of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, the Chamber and the public participated in this double satisfaction. M. Molé gave it not to them; he sufficed from day to day for the necessities of order under a free system, but without exercising or securing liberty and order in durability by his personal influence. It was a regular and rational government; but vigour and intellectual riches were wanting to it; the drama was greater and more animated than the actors.

Amongst the causes of this unproductive languor was the inadequate share taken by the Chamber of Deputies. It neither held the place nor played the part to which it was called by the nature of our institutions, and the state of parties. Five political groups constituted and gave life to this assembly. At the extremities the Republicans and the Legitimists were expressed, I will not say led, by M. Garnier-Pages and M. Berryer; between these two factions, important by ideas and talent if not by number, stood the Right Centre, the Left Centre, and the Left, represented by M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and myself. None of these groups, not more those who accepted than the others who rejected the new system had, by their avowed chiefs, a direct and effective action in the government. The principal and habitual agents were in the rank of spectators divested of responsibility, and tempted to give themselves up to the pleasures of criticism. From conviction as

much as from position, I felt strongly what I shall permit myself to call this parliamentary disorder, and I considered it urgent in the interest of power and of liberty, of the crown and of the country, that the Chamber of Deputies, and its public interpreters, should resume in public affairs their natural share of influence and personal responsibility.

Another consideration moved me. Since the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, and my separation from M. Thiers, the basis of the government had become closely contracted; rivalries, jealousies, internal and unforeseen difficulties, tended to restrict it still more from day to day. An opportunity occurred of escaping from this narrow track, and of widening the circle of future cabinets by the introduction of men who, despite the difference of their positions and habits, adopted in reality the same ideas, inclined towards the same end, and were not of necessity, as they had not always been, incompatible. Between M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and myself, when our hearts were sounded, there were no insurmountable barriers, no irrevocable engagements; we had for eighteen months made many material advances. Had not the moment arrived for a more decisive step? All three unconnected with the administration of M. Molé, we had ceased to oppose each other. Was it not possible to come to an understanding, and reconstruct together a great constitutional party capable of establishing on enlarged foundations the free and monarchical government we mutually desired to establish, and the destinies of

which our dissensions, under the fire of its enemies, were capable of compromising? The importance of such a work was evident, and however slight might be the chance of success, it was assuredly worth the attempt.

I was too well acquainted with human weaknesses, including my own, to doubt that personal feelings might mingle with these views of public interest. Egotism is infinitely skilful in insinuating and concealing itself in the bosom of the sincerest patriotism; and I will not affirm that the recollection of my rupture with M. Molé, in 1837, and the secret desire of personal retaliation, while supporting a good public cause, may have been without its influence on my adhesion to the coalition in 1839, and the ardour with which I accompanied it. Even with the most honest of men political life is not the chosen avocation of saints: it has its necessities and obscurities which, with a good or ill grace, we recognize while submitting to them; it excites passions and supplies opportunities for self-complaisance, from which no one, if he conscientiously examines his soul after the trial, can feel confident of having entirely escaped; and he who has not made up his mind to bear with tranquillity the weight of the complications and imperfections inherent in the most upright public life, will do well to confine himself to privacy and pure speculation.

Be this as it may, I relate without addition or reserve the disposition I brought to the committee on the address. The various shades of the opposition

were present there in a majority. They agreed without difficulty, and the draft of the address presented on the 4th of January, 1839, to the Chamber of Deputies, was their free and deliberate work.[1] The external policy of the cabinet was therein formally censured as to the evacuation of Ancona. On the negotiations in the affairs of Belgium and Switzerland, the address maintained reserve in which intentional anxiety was manifested. Internally, the cabinet was considered insufficient to establish between the Crown and the Chambers that steady understanding and active harmony, which, under the representative system, can alone guarantee the strength and security of power by concentrating all responsibility in its advisers. I think to-day, as I thought then, that on this participation of the Chambers in the government of the country, the drafts of the address, otherwise sincerely and avowedly monarchical, did not exceed the limits of constitutional right. The general tone wanted neither measure nor conformity in its coldness. But the attack was palpable and direct. No one affected to misunderstand it; and the cabinet accepted the contest as frankly as it was offered by the opposition.

The struggle was fiercer than the opposition looked for. During twelve days M. Molé displayed a firmness and presence of mind, a becoming and able perseverance which animated the zeal, at first a little wavering, of his partisans, and compelled his op-

[1] See Historic Documents, No. XII.

ponents to redouble their efforts. On all the paragraphs in the draft of the address, in which the policy of the cabinet was directly or indirectly incriminated, amendments were proposed to rebut the censure; and after long debates, in which M. Molé, faithfully seconded by his supporters, nobly defended himself, nearly all the amendments were adopted by very weak majorities, but despite the combined efforts of the leaders of all the different degrees of opposition. Thus we were definitively led to vote against the address so amended, which was adopted in revenge, with a mixture of satisfaction and anger, by the partisans of the cabinet, mortally stricken but still erect on the ground it had so valiantly defended.

In this combat it found a brilliant ally. M. de Lamartine, who until then had held a little aloof from the militant policy, took an energetic part against the coalition. I cannot encounter the name of M. de Lamartine in my reminiscences, or himself in our streets, without an impression of profound melancholy. No man ever received from God more valuable gifts,—gifts of person and position, of intellectual power and social elevation. Neither have favourable circumstances been withheld from him, in addition to those original advantages; every chance, as well as every means of success, have attended his steps. He grappled them with ardour; for a moment he played a lofty part in a lofty drama; he reached the end of the highest ambition, and enjoyed its most consummate glories. Where is he now? I speak not of the reverses of his public career, nor of the

trials of his private life. In our days who has not fallen? Who has not experienced the blows of fate, the anguish of the soul, the inflictions of fortune? Labour, disappointment, sacrifice, and suffering have held in all times, and will continue to hold, their place and portion in the destiny of man, — with the exalted more than with the humble. What surprises and saddens me is that M. de Lamartine should be astonished or irritated at this. It is not alone the pain of his position, but the state of his feelings, such as he has revealed them to us, which I cannot contemplate without melancholy. How can a spectator who looks on events from such a height, be so intensely moved by the accidents which affect himself? How can such a sagacious appreciator of other men be possessed of so little self-knowledge? How does he abandon himself to so much bitterness after such extensive enjoyment of the favours of Heaven and of the world? In that richly endowed nature there must be great blanks and a want of controlling harmony, to cause his fall into such internal trouble and its manifestation with so much vehemence. I have seen too little of M. de Lamartine to know and understand him thoroughly: he seemed to me like a beautiful tree covered with flowers, without fruit that ripens or roots that hold; a brilliant meteor without fixed place, and with no assigned course in the general system of the firmament; a great spirit incessantly passing and repassing from the regions of light to those of clouds, and catching at every step a glimpse of truth without being arrested by it; a

noble heart, open to all generous sympathies, but still governed by personal prepossessions. And I am more confirmed in my general impression of this eminent man, as I perceived in his first appearance in the midst of our debates, in his speeches of the 10th and 19th of January, 1839, on the coalition, the features I recognize at present. He attacked the coalition warmly, but without rescuing and almost giving up M. Molé, for he wished to please the opposition as well as the friends of the cabinet. He defended the prerogative of the crown while treating constitutional monarchy as a government of transition, and occasionally suffering his republican tendencies to escape. He paid compliments and made advances alternately to all the parties which divided the Chamber, without classing himself with any one in particular, endeavouring to draw them to himself without giving himself to them; and when in the midst of this flattering description of all the internal fractions of the assembly, M. Arago demanded from his place, "And what of the social party?" "I am asked what is the social party," replied M. de Lamartine; "Gentlemen, it is no longer a party, it is an idea;" casting around his blandishments, so to speak, in all directions, to obtain universal admiration and assent. His language was that of a great but superficial ambitionist, more greedy of incense than of empire, ready to rush with haughty improvidence into the most hazardous attempts, prodigal to all of hopes and promises, but offering nothing beyond vague and incoherent perspectives which disappoint

the desires they excite. To be effective and truly great, policy demands a more distinct end; a firmer and more simple choice between ideas, designs, and parties. In his attack on the coalition, M. de Lamartine was, on the side of the cabinet, the oratorical ornament of the debate; but he left it, more celebrated than influential, without obtaining the serious confidence even of those to whom he had lent his eloquent support.

The address being voted, M. Molé and his colleagues, justly considering their success too weak for the burden, tendered their resignations to the King. Called upon by his Majesty, Marshal Soult attempted, without success, to form a cabinet. M. Molé resumed office, and the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was immediately announced. This was the second time, within two years, in which M. Molé, to carry on his government, had been obliged to appeal to the country. A single session had sufficed to compromise the existence of the cabinet in a Chamber assembled by himself, and the election of which he regarded as his triumph.

This single fact established a strong presumption against him. But the coalition, on its side, if it had materially shaken the cabinet, had also seriously compromised the opposition. We had been deficient in plan and foresight. Some of our complaints against the foreign policy of M. Molé were, in reality, extremely questionable, and had been effectually disputed in the debate; we had fallen into the common error of parties under a representative system, of

exaggeration; and on the points on which our attacks were founded, such, for instance, as the evacuation of Ancona, time and events had not yet vindicated our views. Our second mistake, want of foresight, was even more weighty. We had not sufficiently calculated the effect which would be produced upon reflecting and honest men, friends of order, and spectators rather than actors in the political struggles, by the reconciliation and alliance of parties so lately in antagonism, and whose maxims, traditions, and tendencies still continued so distinct. Not only did these judges of the field, who formed the centre of the Chamber, blame the coalition, and experience severe uneasiness while witnessing its progress, but anger sprang up in their hearts with censure and inquietude. They opposed the coalition, at first for the cabinet, but subsequently on their own account. They displayed in this opposition an unusual degree of ardour, accord, and perseverance; and the government party, dismembered and dispersed since the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, came to itself, and, without its old leaders, once more formed round M. Molé, at the precise moment when we were accusing M. Molé and his cabinet of being a government too weak, too much estranged from the Chamber of Deputies, and unable to secure for the country and crown the active co-operation of all the constitutional powers. Never, for three years, had the government party been so compact, nor the cabinet so certain of its support, as on the day when, the victory between the ministry and the coalition being

still undecided, the King, on the demand of M. Molé, and to sustain him to the end, appealed to the country by declaring the dissolution. Springing up under such auspices, the elections were strenuously contested, and carried through as a grand pell-mell of opinions and alliances. I endeavoured in several printed letters to explain fully the reasons of public interest which had induced me to join the coalition, and the fidelity I intended to preserve to the policy I had advocated for nine years, while demanding what I considered the legitimate and necessary influence of the Chambers in the government.[1] The elections gave the coalition an evident but limited triumph. M. Molé and his colleagues perceived that in the new Chamber of Deputies they were unequal to the struggle; they accordingly retired definitively, and the coalition was called to form a cabinet.

The work appeared to be easy, and the solution naturally indicated. M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and myself, had participated together in the attack; we were now to share in the victory, and to pass from concert in opposition to concert in office. But in this transition M. Odilon and I encountered an obstacle, which in the debates on the coalition we had ourselves overlooked. Our maxims, tendencies, conduct, and words had been for nine years profoundly different; from the first months of 1830 we had been not only divided but opposed. We had recently, in our provisional alliance, reminded each other of this

[1] See Historic Documents, No. XIII.

past, and declared our intention of not contradicting it. The temptation of governing in common was interdicted to us by the general state of parties, and by our own honour. We entertained no such idea. It was understood that M. Odilon-Barrot and I could not enter the ministry together.

Between M. Thiers and me no similar difficulty existed. We had maintained and practised the same policy together; we could conjointly resume power; our past dealings and our present and prospective union created no point of insurmountable embarrassment. Could we not also, when forming a cabinet in concert, accept M. Odilon-Barrot as President of the Chamber of Deputies? Here was an office unconnected with the government and the opposition, independent without being hostile. By the gravity of his character and manners, by the elevation of his mind, by his respect for law and liberty, M. Odilon was eminently well suited to the post. The reconciliation which the coalition had brought about between us, authorized the friendly relations without common action or responsibility, which ought to be established between the ministry and the President of the Chamber. I declared my readiness to admit this combination.

But when M. Thiers and M. Barrot proposed it at the meetings of the Left, Centre and the Left they encountered an opposition to my admission to the new cabinet in any capacity, which they surmounted with difficulty; and their success was limited to a stipulation by their friends that I should resume the

ministry of Public Instruction, and M. Duchâtel that of Finance. This was all that our recent allies of the coalition would allow to us, the old defenders of the policy of resistance, in the parliamentary government about to be restored.

I had lately given a proof, by contenting myself, in the cabinet of M. Molé, with the portfolio of Public Instruction, of the little personal importance I attached to any specific department, when I felt otherwise confident that the general policy to which I was devoted would prevail in the government. I was not in 1839 more exacting than in 1836. I had some right to feel surprised at the opposition I encountered from the victorious coalition, for I had not been amongst the least in its struggle and triumph. More than once, in the course of that great debate, several of the coalescing parties had been tempted to compromise, and to accept, at the sacrifice of the resolute and clear address we had drawn up, a few of the somewhat equivocal amendments proposed by the friends of M. Molé. I had rejected and defeated these inclinations. As long as the battle lasts all appearance of hesitation and retreat is an error, even though we may repent of having engaged. Assuredly M. Duchâtel and I exhibited no very exorbitant pretensions when proposing to join the cabinet about to be formed under the presidency of Marshal Soult; we only required two departments out of nine; but it was at least reasonable, that if not in number, in quality these departments should sufficiently guarantee our influence and action. The

more decided I had been in the coalition, the more I determined to remain, when in power, faithful to the policy of order and resistance. To satisfy what I regarded as a right, and a specific interest of the parliamentary system, I had separated at the moment from the body of my friends; the end obtained, I was anxious to re-establish their position as well as my own, to rally them round the government of which they were the natural and necessary allies, and to assure their influence in the new cabinet, together with their support to its measures. This, with me, was a question of political duty and personal dignity. I declared that I could not join the ministry unless, while M. Thiers filled, according to his desire, the department of Foreign Affairs, and some of his friends were appointed to other posts, M. Duchâtel should receive the portfolio of Finance, and I that of the Interior. I laid little stress on the numerical equality of offices; but I demanded absolutely, for my cause, a real division of power.

M. Thiers, and I believe also M. Odilon-Barrot, endeavoured, but without success, to induce their opponents to accept this arrangement. In the Left and Left Centre, they were as determined that I should not exercise a direct and important action in the government as I was resolved not to be satisfied with an indirect and ineffective influence. Men are much more governed by their instincts and prejudices than by their real and well-considered intentions. The greater portion of the members of the Left and Left Centre had, in reality, no other end or desire than the

establishment of the constitutional monarchy; but they had lived, and still lived, under the empire of revolutionary theories, traditions, and routines. Although they had no design to react the Revolution, they accepted it helter-skelter, and without examination. I had endeavoured, on the contrary, to submit this contemporaneous past to a free inquiry, to separate openly the good from the evil, the truth from the falsehood, the sound grain from the chaff; and to show that our misfortunes and mistakes since 1789, had not resulted from imprudent exaggerations or accidents beyond the reach of foresight, but were the natural consequences of the false ideas, bad passions and extravagant pretensions with which that great social and intellectual movement had been infected, and from which it was imperatively necessary that it should be purified. In this difficult undertaking I had clashed with cherished sentiments, wounded susceptible vanities, offended superstitions, and disturbed rooted habits. I was looked upon as aggressive, officious, and compromising. They wished to do without me, and without having incessantly to dispute or reckon with me on the affairs of the new system we were all vowed to defend.

The lofty and liberal spirits, the leaders of the parties, felt the vice of this disposition of their supporters, and the advantage of my concurrence in the work we were pursuing together. But in our days it is the error of the most distinguished men to want confidence in themselves, in their own ideas and personal strength, and to yield too readily to

extraneous impressions and desires. Of what use is it to them to hold their heads above the crowd, if they do not profit by this superiority to extend their views and march more directly to their end? They know not what additional power they would wield if they acted with greater independence, and in the plenitude of their own convictions. I am far from denying the value of popular feelings and the necessity of considering them; but they ought to be anticipated and justly estimated beforehand, instead of waiting until they expound and decide themselves; for, in fact, peoples and parties trust to those who regulate their affairs skilfully, in preference to leaders who obey them.

The combination called "the Cabinet of the great Coalition," and which united all the components of its strength, being set aside, every variety was tried from which I and my friends could be excluded. Propositions were made, debates and negotiations were entered into to form, at one time, a ministry from the Left Centre allied to the Left; at another, from the Left Centre exclusively, or rather, from the Left Centre reinforced from the Centre, properly so called, amongst the adherents of M. Molé. It was round Marshal Soult, and under the flag of his Presidency, that this attempt was carried on; he applied himself to the work with supple and tenacious judgment, though with some degree of confusion, holding himself apart from the internal dissensions of the Chamber, ready to treat with the influential men of all sections, but determined not to surrender power to the Left,

to pay full deference to the sentiments of the King, and not to separate himself from the old party of resistance, the only firm support of government. M. Thiers was the essential soul, destined to be the real chief in all these prospective cabinets; but he also had his reserves and conditions from which he was disinclined to recede. It was his fundamental notion to make the Left Centre, and also the moderate portion of the Left, the rallying points of the old party of resistance; but he encountered in all these groups, and in the Left Centre itself, rivalries, jealousies, suspicions, and demands, impossible to surmount. By rejecting my friends and myself they had scattered the necessary and natural strength of the government they wished to create from the coalition; they endeavoured through the mediation of the Duke de Broglie to redeem this error, as people recal steps when they perceive the danger, without a full conviction of the mistake. A wish was expressed to include the Duke de Broglie and M. Duchâtel in the new cabinet, leaving me and also M. Thiers aside. This was met by a peremptory refusal. A universal feeling existed that the proposed course was incomplete and precarious, the responsibility of which no one felt disposed to accept; and every day witnessed the renunciation and failure of the combination which on the eve they were eager to negotiate, and believed to be on the point of accomplishment.

The King looked on during this laborious confusion as a highly interested spectator, indulging a slight

cast of ridicule in his remarks, always too freely communicated; but without opposing any obstacles to the various combinations attempted, or indicating any refusal. On the 29th of March he desired M. Thiers to form a cabinet himself, and accepted, as to general policy, and particularly towards Spain, the propositions which, eight days before, and through the medium of Marshal Soult, M. Thiers had submitted to him. M. Thiers replied, "That he would have undertaken the mission twelve days earlier, but that now it was impossible, as the position was completely vitiated, and the combination which promised success had been essayed in vain. A few days later, the King said to one of the ministerial candidates, "I am prepared for every thing; I will accept all; I will submit to all; but for the general interest of which I am guardian, I am bound to caution you that it is quite a different affair to treat the King as vanquished, or to propose palatable conditions to him. You may force on me a ministry to which I must submit, or may give me one to which I can unite myself. In the first case, I shall not oppose it secretly; I shall never betray my cabinet, be it what it may; but I warn you that I shall not hold myself pledged to it, and that if any incident places it in danger I shall do nothing to prevent its fall. In the second case, I will support it frankly."

In using this language the King exercised only his constitutional prerogative; and, in the estimation of thinking and loyal men, he merited praise rather

than censure. But in the opinion of the public, to whom his words were more or less amplified, and who distorted them in their turn, he would have acted more prudently had he declared with less openness his feeling and intention.

At the expiration of three weeks, thus consumed in abortive efforts to construct a ministry, and which had tended only to aggravate the difficulties, it was felt to be absolutely necessary to take a step beyond this position, so unsatisfactory and compromising to all the authorities. It was pre-eminently essential to the crown to show that the confusion produced by such prolonged hesitation and delay in the government of the country was not its act, and to throw the responsibility on the Chamber of Deputies. It was expected, moreover, that the Chamber being called to resume its labours and practical debates on public affairs, instead of wasting time in idle conversations in the hall of conferences, would clearly demonstrate its ideas and wishes; that a majority would be declared, that the doubts of parties would reach a termination, and that a cabinet would finally be formed, affording a glimpse of that most likely to be accepted and supported by the Parliament. Here was another token of that general timidity, of the absence of that provident and firm initiative I have alluded to above, as one of the most embarrassing weaknesses of our time. Neither the King nor the leaders of the different parties and fractions of parties were disposed to hazard of themselves a solution of the question, as to when or how a majority could be

formed in the Chamber capable of sustaining a ministry, and of pointing out its course by anticipation. To organize the government, the Chamber was called upon to understand and organize itself; and to place it in a position to reply, the King, on the 31st of March, 1839, appointed provisional ministers, called into office to resume the suspended duties of administration and of the Chambers, without having themselves the slightest prospect of becoming a definitive and permanent cabinet. This was merely an expedient to satisfy appearances and current affairs, while waiting a permanent solution; and a means of ascertaining the parliamentary majority so much sought for and so completely concealed. With a meritorious devotion to the service of their King and country, seven honourable men, experienced in administrative functions, and little mixed up with political struggles, MM. de Gasparin, Girod de l'Ain, Gautier, the Duke of Montebello, Rupinier, Parant, and General Cubières undertook this unambitious mission. The provisional ministry commenced their duties by proclaiming their own character, and the active session immediately resumed its course.

The Chamber of Deputies in its first step was called upon for an act which revealed its bias, and the nature of its internal majority. It had to elect a President. This choice necessarily divided it into two parties, each proposing a candidate, and thus consolidating the fragments into which it had been broken up. Neither of the two principal sections, the Centre, properly so named, and the Left, possessed a majority

in itself, and was therefore unable by its own strength to return its candidate. It was in the floating group, in the Left Centre, that the two fixed divisions were compelled mutually to seek the balance they required. The Left Centre had been for some time the habitual ally of the Left, and seemed disposed, in this new trial, to continue its aid. But, on a closer view, my friends and I concluded that the Left Centre was not homogeneous, and that we also might possibly find allies in its ranks. By the side of men undecided through interest or pusillanimity, from malice or a taste for intrigue, there were there, in fact, others of distinguished character, conscientious in their doubts, independent even to insanity, and to whom neither the domination nor declared alliance of the Left, nor perhaps even the empire of the eminent leader of the Left Centre, M. Thiers, would afford satisfaction. M. Passy and M. Sauzet, in particular, appeared to us animated by these dispositions, and inclined to exercise an act of liberty, in selecting the President of the Chamber. We induced the Centre, the old party of resistance, not without difficulty, to adopt for their candidate M. Passy, who allowed himself to be put in nomination. How many voices from the Left Centre would join us to carry his election? We knew not, but in any case an important result was thus attained. The Chamber bisected itself into two great divisions, and the old party of government, from which the coalition had for a moment estranged us, re-formed in mutual

concert, with a good prospect of regaining the majority it had so recently lost.

M. Thiers did not mistake the importance of this attempt, and used his utmost efforts to retain the Left Centre intact in its alliance with the Left, and to enable these two sections to place M. Odilon-Barrot in the presidential chair. Repairing one day to the sitting, I met M. Thiers in the Tuileries, and we walked together for some moments conversing freely on this new position. "You have long profited," I said to him, "by the hesitating dispositions of the Left Centre; it is now our turn; we shall fight you with your own weapons; you will see that M. Passy will be appointed. He did not believe in this result, and persisted openly in supporting the canvass of M. Odilon-Barrot. On the 6th of April, M. Passy was elected President of the Chamber by 226 votes; M. Barrot only obtained 193.

This was a step towards the re-organization of the government party, and the formation of a solid cabinet; but this step was far from being promptly decisive. The President being appointed, they began to negotiate, to feel their way, to try the various combinations already attempted, and other analogous proceedings. Summonses were addressed to the parties who had engaged in them; in the tribune we had long and animated explanations. Nothing resulted; the same hesitations and incompatibilities were everywhere encountered. For the moment, the nomination of M. Passy to the Presidency had only

increased the dismemberment of the Left Centre from the other parties, and thrown into the Left a new ferment of suspicion and ill-humour. The victorious coalition appeared destined to end in a sterile and impotent confusion.

On the 24th of April, the King wrote to say he desired to see me.[1] I repaired to the Tuileries. After explaining his embarrassments, "which are also yours," he said, "for the coalition has created them for us, for you as well as for me," he asked if I should object to some of my friends, naming M. Duchâtel and M. Dumon, joining a cabinet with myself. "I have not the slightest objection, Sire, provided the composition of the cabinet gives to the policy I and my friends have supported, and intend always to support, effectual guarantees." "Be assured," replied the King, "that I wish this as much as you; no one has less desire that the government should be given over to the Left; God knows where the army would lead its leaders. But you see the strait that we are in. It is only a ministry somewhat neutral, a ministry in which great self-loves will not be brought into collision, that can extricate us from it."—"Let this ministry be formed, Sire, let it reconcile and unite the two Centres; I shall not only refrain from dissuading my friends to join it, but I will support it with my utmost power." The King took my hand with warm satisfaction, mingled with a tinge of satire; nothing suited him better than a cabinet, which, while putting an end to his embar-

[1] See Historic Documents, No. XIV.

rassments, was, at the same time, an acknowledgment of error by the coalition.

My friends met; under their remonstrances and mine, M. Duchâtel declared himself disposed, provided he was not left alone, to follow the path indicated by the King. Nevertheless, uncertainty still continued; various combinations were sought and sounded for under every signification; an address to the King was proposed in the Chamber to press for a conclusion; a committee was appointed to draw it up. No one felt disposed to assume the responsibility of a positive solution, for the success of any solution appeared doubtful. In presence of this parliamentary hesitation, revolutionary excitement sprang up once more in Paris. Permanent conspirators, clubs of secret societies, particularly the society called at first *of the Families*, and subsequently *of the Seasons*, met, communicated information, lists of numbers, and hopes; the rank and file urged on the chiefs: could they ever expect a more favourable opportunity? could they ever find themselves in presence of a more disturbed and undecided power? A sudden resolution was taken. On the 22nd of May, about three in the afternoon, a band of three or four hundred men issued forth in Paris, shouting *Long live the Republic!* breaking open the armourers' shops, firing in the streets, assailing the stations of the national guards and regular troops, and directing their infuriated attempts against the Guildhall, the Hall of Justice, and the Prefecture of Police. By this headlong and unforeseen attack, a few posts

were carried; officers, municipal guards, and national guards were killed, some resisting the insurgents, others endeavouring to parley with them. In a few minutes several quarters of Paris became the theatre of confused tumults and sanguinary encounters, and without speaking of the slain, the number of which was never ascertained, 143 wounded men, insurgents or defenders of order, soldiers or civilians, were successively carried to the different hospitals. Towards five o'clock this frantic effort was completely strangled, and the principal leaders were in the hands of the magistrates. In the evening, a great number of persons, peers, deputies, officers, public functionaries, and partisans of the government or of the opposition, presented themselves at the Tuileries; Marshal Soult had repaired thither on the first report of the outbreak, and I find, in notes taken by his son, the Marquis of Dalmatia, at the very moment, these plain phrases: "In the midst of this concourse of people, the idea struck my father of profiting by it to put an end to the general hesitation, and at last to form a ministry. He obtained the King's consent. As any of the persons arrived who were considered fit for office, the King called them into the cabinet where he was sitting with my father. M. Dufaure, who happened accidentally to be one of the last, and who had been sent for, was somewhat more tardy than the rest in making up his mind; but the weight of impending circumstances prevailed over his doubts, and before the evening closed, the revolutionary outbreak had effected what all the parliamentary agita-

tion had vainly attempted for two months: the cabinet of the 12th of May 1839 was formed."

This was precisely the ministry the King had hinted at and desired. Marshal Soult, President, as minister for Foreign Affairs; General Schneider and Admiral Duperré in the departments of War and the Marine; three men from the Right Centre, MM. Duchâtel, Villemain, and Cunin Gridaine; and three from the Left Centre, MM. Passy, Dufaure, and Teste;—these divided political influence together. M. Odilon Barrot, M. Thiers, and myself, were entirely excluded. In the conflict of passions, pretensions, and hesitations of the various parties and fractions of parties into which the Chamber of Deputies was broken up, such was the result of the coalition.

It was not to be expected that a cabinet thus formed would openly adopt and practise the decided and consistent policy we so anxiously desired. Separated until now by ideas, position, and tendencies, the new ministers had been drawn together and united under the pressure of a sudden necessity, to escape from an urgent danger, without concert or understanding on the questions to be solved or the principles of the government they undertook. Incoherent in composition, the ministry could scarcely be other than vacillating in conduct, at least as much so as that of M. Molé had been. On this essential point, the coalition, therefore, had not gained the end proposed. In the common error, my friends enjoyed only this advantage, that the Left looked upon the formation of the new cabinet as a defeat, and instantly

began to oppose it. M. Passy quitted the presidential chair of the Chamber; it was necessary to replace him. The ministry selected for their candidate M. Sauzet; the opposition chose M. Thiers. M. Sauzet was elected by a majority of seven only, but after a contest in which the two parties classified themselves distinctly and measured their mutual strength. The cabinet, although recruited from the Left Centre, commenced operations, not by a concession to the Left, as M. Molé had done, but by a battle and victory which satisfied and rallied at the outset the old party of resistance.

The coalition scarcely succeeded better in another of its patriotic expectations. The new ministry contained, it is true, members of the Left Centre, as also of the Right Centre; several honourable and well-esteemed men, until then divided, had now combined; but looking at the position in its entirety, it could scarcely be said that the basis of the government was enlarged, or that the crown had gathered to its councils all the leading elements of the great party sincerely anxious to establish constitutional monarchy. The principal leaders, the most practised orators, were not in office; parliamentary government was neither more complete nor more fortified and arrayed in its full force than it had been under the administration of M. Molé.

On one point alone, the capital point in truth, the coalition had gained its object. The necessary influence of the Chamber of Deputies in the construction and composition of a ministry could no longer

be disputed or avoided. In spite of its internal dissensions and weaknesses, that Chamber had made manifest the extent to which, on questions of persons and conduct, it could be depended on. Government had remained for two months uncertain, and, as it were, in suspense, until the Chamber had resumed its fitting place and part. While defending his prerogative, and notwithstanding his displeasure and desires, sometimes too freely exhibited, the King had waited, with judicious patience, until the Chamber had, so to speak, disentangled itself, and indicated the combinations and men capable of giving the crown authoritative counsels and effective support. The country had taken a decisive step in the path of free government; the parliamentary system was acknowledged and accepted in its first and vital condition.

In this confused *mêlange* of opposite results, the errors were more apparent than the success, and the coalition felt neither satisfied with nor proud of its victory. It had overthrown the cabinet it attacked, but it had failed in forming the ministry it proposed. It had brought to light the peremptory importance of the Chamber of Deputies in government, but also its inability to create a government of itself. The coalescing parties had exhibited little political sagacity and many petty passions. While submitting to a check, the crown had inflicted a severe blow on its conquerors. On my own personal account, at the distance and in the repose from which I now contemplate that noisy incident, I incline to think that I should have done more wisely to have taken no

active part in it, and to have remained passive in my tent, instead of issuing forth in arms to combat in a listed field. After what had passed between M. Molé and myself, neither my conviction nor my honour permitted me to defend him; but I was not called on to assail, and might have marked my censure by silence. He would have fallen nevertheless, and the government party would then have rallied round me with eagerness. On the contrary, it felt irritated at my attacks, and by what was designated, on my part, a bad example of opposition. It cost me much time and many trials before I could recover its confidence and resume my place in its ranks. I foresaw this evil, and regretted my resolution while taking it. But we do not easily disconnect ourselves from a long-cherished and intimate idea. It was really a free government I anxiously wished to found, and the acknowledged influence of the Chamber of Deputies was, in my eyes, its most essential condition. In my enthusiasm to obtain this end, I committed the error of not paying sufficient regard to the general sentiment of my political camp, and of consulting my individual feeling, and the aspiration of my own mind, rather than the maintenance of my situation. A rare mistake in our days, and which, to speak the truth, I can readily forgive myself for, when I call it to remembrance.

CHAPTER V.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

SITUATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 12TH OF MAY 1839, ON ITS ACCESSION.—MY OWN POSITION.—HOW I EMPLOYED MY POLITICAL LEISURE.—I AM REQUESTED TO SUPERINTEND THE TRANSLATION AND PUBLICATION IN FRANCE OF THE LETTERS AND WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON.—I UNDERTAKE THE CHARGE.—GREAT INTEREST WITH WHICH THIS WORK INSPIRES ME.—MY "HISTORICAL STUDY" ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF WASHINGTON.—ITS SUCCESS.—TESTIMONIALS OF GRATITUDE RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICANS.—LETTER FROM KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE.—REVIVAL OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.—WHY THAT NAME WAS GIVEN TO THE QUARREL BETWEEN THE SULTAN AND THE PACHA OF EGYPT.—GENERAL STATE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.—DISPOSITIONS AND POLICY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN POWERS.—WAR BREAKS OUT BETWEEN MAHMOUD AND MEHEMET ALI.—GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.—DEATH OF THE SULTAN MAHMOUD.—BATTLE OF NEZIB.—DISAGREEMENT COMMENCES BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION BETWEEN THE SULTAN AND THE PACHA.—VICISSITUDES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LONDON.—ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA.—SHE PLACES HERSELF AT THE DISPOSAL OF ENGLAND.—FRANCE PERSISTS IN HER OPPOSITION, AND THE ENGLISH CABINET IN ITS RESOLUTIONS.—GENERAL SEBASTIANI.—M. DE BRUNNOW IN LONDON.—LORD PALMERSTON.—THE FRENCH CABINET OFFERS ME THE EMBASSY TO LONDON.—I ACCEPT IT.—MY REASONS.—KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE EVINCES OPPOSITION.—HIS MOTIVES.—THE CABINET INSISTS.—THE KING YIELDS.—MY APPOINTMENT.—THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES REFUSES THE DOTATION PROPOSED FOR THE DUKE OF NEMOURS.—UNCERTAIN POSITION OF THE CABINET.—I LEAVE PARIS FOR LONDON.

(*From* 12*th May* 1839, *to* 25*th Feb.* 1840.)

THE formation of the cabinet of the 12th of May produced in the Chambers and in Paris a feeling of satisfaction more general than warm. A term was

thus given to the longest ministerial crisis that had yet been known. Not that the solution appeared permanently secured, but at last there was a ministry; public uneasiness was put an end to, and even those who were not satisfied were glad to be relieved from their hesitations and embarrassments.

The cabinet also had within itself, and on its own account, causes for satisfaction and confidence. Its members could not be taxed with intrigue and ambition: the urgency of the public interest and peril had alone decided them. In accepting office they performed an act of devotion and courage. They were well disposed and in friendly relations towards each other, although, until then, they had marched in different ranks. M. Duchâtel and M. Villemain on the one side, M. Dufaure and M. Passy on the other, mutually recognized themselves as men of worth and honour, enlightened and moderate in their views, and capable of combining loyally in the management of public affairs. They had common ties of reason and integrity, divested of all troublesome rivalship. The Chambers appeared to be satisfied with their appointment, and received them with an expression of good-will which called for care to preserve rather than for efforts to conquer a majority.

For my own part, I determined to support the cabinet firmly. I had confidence in the friends who there represented my opinions; I felt neither ill-humour nor impatience; in the Chambers I was commended for having laid aside all personal considerations; the King felt obliged to me for having

aided him to emerge from the crisis. From the complicated and militant attitude in which the coalition had entangled me, I subsided into a clear and calm position: it suited me for the present, and left me unfettered for the future.

An unexpected incident filled up the leisure and revived the animation of suspended politics. The founder, both by the sword and by law, of the Republic of the United States of America,—Washington,—had left, at his death, two hundred volumes in folio, including his entire correspondence, the letters he had received, as well as those he had written, during the course of his public life. The Congress of the United States purchased these precious documents from his heirs, and lodged them in the archives of the nation. A skilful editor, Mr. Jared Sparks, already known by important historical labours,—amongst others, by the publication of the "Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States during the War of Independence,"—examined, classified, and arranged in order this great collection. He did more; he traversed Europe and America; the public depositories and private collections of France and England were freely opened to him; he sought out and collected every document tending to complete the authentic biography of a great man, which forms, in fact, the history of the cradle of a great people; and, as the fruit of this patriotic undertaking, a complete and beautiful edition of the "Writings and Letters of Washington" appeared at Boston between 1834 and 1837. As soon as it was completed, in 1838, the

American editors, anxious that Washington should be as well known in France as in his own country, entreated me to select, from this vast series, such letters and documents as might appear to me specially calculated to interest French readers, and to superintend the translation and publication. I most willingly undertook the task.

At that time I had not particularly or deeply studied the foundation of the American Republic. I was occupied with constitutional monarchy, and the more I have advanced in the experience of government, the more I feel convinced that it is the only form suited to France; but I have always felt, and still cherish, an ardent sympathy for the great nation which has formed itself in Northern America, and for the great political trial it braved. It is now a mere hackneyed phrase to say that we should lay more stress on the practical results of governments than on their names and forms. I suspect this common-place expression is more frequently repeated than well understood or adopted. In spite of so many unfortunate experiments, the name and form of the Republic maintain in our days a dangerous power, for they still comprise the dream of many ardent and generous spirits,—a dream to which our existing habits and new social position often lend the appearance of a possible and approaching reality. There are, moreover, between some of the principles of constitutional monarchy and those of a republic, affinities which seem to render natural the passage from one to the other, and maintain, for republican

hopes and tendencies, a strength which their repeated checks would otherwise seem to have taken from them. A serious investigation of the originating causes and first steps of the great American democracy, has therefore, for us, as much importance as attraction. In no other inquiry on the nature of government can we better learn to penetrate beyond appearances, to estimate the end rather than the outward form, and to recognize what are, in all cases, the true characteristic and imperious conditions of liberty.

Besides the event itself, another fact in the foundation of the United States of America powerfully attracted and interested me,—the individual who had directed the movement in war and in peace, Washington;—a great man by compulsion, as we may say, and against his own choice, who found himself equal to all situations and tasks, without seeking or desiring any; who felt no natural or ardent necessity to undertake the great deeds he was capable of and has accomplished; and who might have lived on, a small proprietor, agriculturist, and unambitious hunter, had not necessity and duty transformed him into the general of an army and the founder of a nation.

As I more closely studied the event and the man, I became the more attracted and enlightened, as well in the convictions of my public life as in my solitary thoughts. I passed and repassed incessantly from France to America, from America to France. I saw before me two social conditions, profoundly different:

the one old and catholic, free in spirit, without public liberty, overflowing with monarchical traditions, aristocratic remembrances, and democratic passions, mixed up throughout all history with the affairs of Europe and of the world; the other, new and protestant, trained to republican habits, although faithful to the legal and respectful manners of the mother-country, without rivals or neighbours, isolated in space, careless of the past and boldly confident in the future. These two societies had recently accomplished two revolutions as opposite in character as themselves, — America a revolution of national independence, France a revolution of social re-casting; and to both succeeded the labour of the formation of two governments equally distinct from each other, the one republican and federative, the other monarchical and unitarian, but both inspired by the same wish and tending to the same end, — political liberty. For a man called to take part in this difficult object of the France of 1789, the establishment of the United States in 1776 presented a grand spectacle for contemplation and a productive source of instruction.

When, in the progress of the American event, I closely examined the man who had directed it, the subject became much more striking, and the information more clear. I beheld Washington possessed from his first movements by a judicious and virtuous apprehension, — the dread of popular and anarchical violence. He had, amongst the earliest, accepted and proclaimed the dangerous enterprise of the American revolution;

for nine years he had sustained it to ultimate triumph, by war. As soon as he applied his hand to government, he devoted himself to a policy of resistance and peace,— the only course which, in his eyes, could establish national independence and liberty in his country.

Two features predominate in the character of Washington: a profound attachment to the cause he had adopted, and a firm independence of judgment and conduct in the service of his country. He was a genuine Anglo-American planter, strongly imbued with English traditions and American manners, sympathizing perfectly with the general sentiment and desire of his fellow-countrymen, but whose mind, imperturbably sound, rejected all public passions, prejudices, and caprices, judging them with equal freedom and calmness whenever they presented themselves before him; never quarrelling with them abruptly; but ever resolved to resist when they compromised the policy which, in his strong conviction, the public interest called on him to maintain. While possessing the instinct and natural gift of authority, he was eminently prudent and scrupulous in the exercise of government: full of respect for men in general, and for the common rights of all, but without any democratic bias, and dignified in manner, on all occasions, almost to severity. An admirable compound of lofty intelligence and tempered judgment, as of pride without ambition, which commanded, at the same time, respect and confidence, and raised

him to the undisputed leadership of a people who saw in him their most disinterested, their safest, ablest, and worthiest servant.

I took continually increasing pleasure in the contemplation of this noble portrait, less varied in its lineaments, less brilliant and warm than that of other great men in the same rank, but marvellously serene, harmonious, pure from egotism, powerful in wisdom and virtue, and perfectly adapted to his country, his time, and his mission. The "Historical Study" which I dedicated to the life and character of Washington, obtained, in America as in Europe, a success which gratified me sincerely on my own account, and as a symptom of the general state of minds. In our epoch of transformation and transition we are attainted by many social and moral diseases; there are many follies in our heads, many evil passions and weaknesses in our hearts. But the pure springs are not all dried up; honest impulses are not entirely extinct; and when men witness the appearance, in a brilliant personification, of health of mind and soul, they bow down with respect, and voluntarily adopt it for counsellor and guide. Washington is not alone a grand political model; he is also an encouraging example; for, through all the obstacles, dangers, misfortunes, and mistakes inseparable from any great human enterprise, he triumphed beyond his expectation, and even during his life obtained as much success for his cause as glory for his name.

I do not hesitate to introduce here two evidences of the effect produced by this historical portrait of

Washington, and of its appreciation by the most competent judges. Shortly after the work had been translated and published in the United States, the following letter was addressed to me by twenty-five Americans of distinction: —

"Sir,

"The undersigned, citizens of the United States of America, sojourners in Paris, being deeply impressed with the friendly spirit and general excellence of the Introduction to your valuable edition of the 'Life and Writings of Washington,' have united for the purpose of soliciting you to sit for your picture to an American artist who has earned a high reputation in his profession. Our ulterior purpose is to transmit the portrait to the speakers of our Congress, and to request for it a place in the library of that body, as a permanent memorial of the profound respect we entertain for your personal character and intellectual trophies, and, in particular, of the gratitude which all Americans should feel for your liberal agency in exhibiting anew to Europe the true nature of their revolution, and the distinctive pre-eminence of its hero." [1]

This double intention was accomplished. Mr. Healy, a clever American artist, painted my portrait, which was placed at Washington in the library of the Hall of Congress, and I received from him as a present the portrait of Washington, with that of

[1] See Historic Documents, No. XV.

Hamilton, undoubtedly the most eminent, in character and power of thought, of the political associates of the founder of the American Republic, and who, in Europe at least, has not attained, in that great history, his due position.

It was at Val-Richer, far from the noise of the world and of state complications, that I wrote this "Historical Study." I presented a copy to King Louis-Philippe, who, during his residence in the United States, had been personally acquainted with Washington, of whom he had related to me some remarkable anecdotes. On my return to Paris I received the following letter, dated the 26th of December 1839:

"My dear late Minister,

"If I have so long delayed my reply, it is because I wished to thank you myself for your work on Washington, and to tell you how much I should be gratified if I could command time to read and talk over it with you. You know too well how completely I am deprived of these tranquil relaxations. Nevertheless I shall endeavour, at least, to read the Introduction, which I hear spoken of as a masterpiece. My three years' residence in America produced an important influence on my political opinions and judgment on the march of human events. The puritanic and democratic revolution, vanquished in England, and driven for refuge to the little States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, overflowed and subdued all the other ele-

ments of population in the vast continent on which the European tempest had impelled it. For, although the Dutch at New York, the English catholics under Lord Baltimore at Baltimore (1632), and, earlier than either, the French (under Henry IV.), had attempted this great colonization, all were extinguished under the puritanic democracy, and the fragments of the *Long Parliament* and its army. But Washington was neither puritan nor aristocrat; still less was he a democrat. He was essentially a man of order and government, seeking ever to combine and use to the best advantage the often discordant and always weak elements with which he had to combat, and to rescue his country from anarchy. I feel convinced that you have drawn him thus, and my confidence on this point adds much to my regret at not having time to read your Washington; but it always gives me pleasure to repeat the assurance of my sentiments towards you."

While applying myself to this labour, delighted at finding between the policy of Washington in the dawning government of the United States, and that which my friends and I had maintained since 1830, an evident analogy, new perspectives opened themselves before me. France ceased to be violently disturbed in the interior. Public order and the security of the constitutional monarchy seemed to be no longer menaced. Our foreign affairs became the principal occupation of minds and the prevailing interest of the moment. I was on the point of being called upon to

take an active part. The Eastern question sprang up again, more complicated and urgent than before.

I say the *Eastern question*, for this was in fact the name given by all the world to the quarrel between the Sultan Mahmoud, and his subject the Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali. Why was this sounding title applied to a local contest? Egypt is not the whole Ottoman empire. The Ottoman empire is not the entire East. The rebellion, even the dismemberment of a province, cannot comprise the fate of a sovereignty. The great states of Western Europe have alternately lost or acquired, either by internal dissension or war, considerable territories; yet under the aspect of these circumstances no one has spoken of the *Western question*. Why then has a term never used in the territorial crises of Christian Europe, been considered and admitted to be perfectly natural and legitimate when the Ottoman empire is in argument?

It is that there is at present in the Ottoman empire no local or partial question. If a shock is felt in a corner of the edifice, if a single stone is detached, the entire building appears to be, and is in fact, ready to fall. Opinions may differ as to the degree of strength and probable life still remaining to this great invalid; but no one seriously believes in his cure. His death, more or less imminent, more or less natural, is a fact which governs the entire position, a presentiment which agitates all Europe. The Egyptian question was in 1839 the question of the Ottoman empire itself. And the question of the

Ottoman empire is in reality the Eastern question, not only of the European but of the Asiatic East; for Asia is now the theatre of the leading ambitions and rivalries of the great powers of Europe; and the Ottoman empire is the highway, the gate, and the key of Asia. In that quarter lies for the European and Christian world an immense future, already visible and perhaps impending.

Nothing can be more simple than that, at the prospect of such a future, political philosophers and speculative theorists should excite themselves; that they should give way to all the freedom of their thoughts, that they should imagine twenty solutions of the great problem laid before them. All these inventions, more or less brilliant and specious, we have seen displayed; some have proposed the resurrection of the Ottoman empire; others have suggested its decease, violently precipitated with such and such a partition of the spoils; others again, the foundation in its place of a great Arabian sovereignty; and there have not been wanting those who proposed the erection of a new Christian empire at Constantinople. These are all freaks of fancy or illusive meditation, diplomatic or warlike utopianisms. Let practical and serious politicians deride them; this also is perfectly natural. When we undertake to direct affairs, when we assume the responsibility of events, we weigh the collective difficulties of a problem, and estimate the full variety of solutions so cavalierly offered. But if serious politicians have a right to smile at chimeras, they are not privileged to disown or forget facts.

Now, I do not hesitate to affirm that the incurable illness and inevitable death of the Ottoman empire are certain facts, the definitive explosion of which may be more or less at hand; but from this hour every rational politician, whether it pleases him or not, is bound to look upon the issue with the deepest interest.

I have already stated what, in the presence of these facts, was the respective attitude of the great European powers. Two amongst them, England and Austria, seemed to overlook the future entirely, and to be anxious only to maintain and defend the Ottoman empire in its actually existing state. Russia, on the contrary, followed step by step its progressive decline, and was preparing to profit by its fall, without exciting by accelerating or anticipating the catastrophe, the premeditated resistance of Europe. Prussia lent herself with indifferent curiosity and alternating complaisance to the conservative or destroying efforts of Russia, Austria, and England. I was appealed to on the 2nd of July 1839, in the Chamber of Deputies, to characterize with precision the policy which France ought to adopt in these circumstances. I shall repeat here my words of that epoch, for they still convey the true expression of my thought: "We have no occasion," I said, "to search far for the policy suitable to France; we find it long since established. It is a traditional, secular policy, it is our national policy. It consists in the maintenance of the European equilibrium by the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, according to the po-

sition of the times and within the limits of the possible, those two laws for the government of states.

"If I sought for illustrative names, I should encounter those of Henry IV., Richelieu, Louis XIV., and Napoleon; they all practised this policy and no other.

"What did the orators of yesterday say to you? That this is in fact the best policy, and, if still available, should be still followed. They have merely denied or called in question its possibility, and then each produced his own system in place of that which he declared impracticable.

"This, then, is the true question: Is the national and historical policy of France, the maintenance of the European equilibrium by the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, still practicable?

"The answer depends on two things;—the state of the Ottoman empire itself, and the state of the great European powers.

"As to the Ottoman empire, I am far from contesting its decline; the fact is evident. Nevertheless, Gentlemen, take care; be not too rapid in your foresight. Empires which have lasted long are extremely slow in falling; the catastrophe is long foreseen and expected before it happens. Providence, which participates not in the impatient precipitations of the human mind, seems to take pleasure in falsifying the predictions of which the Ottoman empire is at present the object. It has given this contradiction on the same soil, within the same walls, by perpetuating there another empire, the Greek empire, not for

years but for ages, after the most intelligent spirits of the time had prophesied its ruin.

"I might confine myself to this general answer, and the contradiction would probably suffice. But let us go more deeply into facts; let us examine more closely how the decline of the Ottoman empire has operated for the last fifty years, with the circumstances which have accompanied and still accompany it down to our own days.

"That empire has lost much; it has lost provinces equal to kingdoms. How has it lost them? Not by conquest, for a long time; many years have elapsed since any European power took any possession by war or open force from the Ottoman empire. The Crimea is the last dependency thus snatched away; for I speak not of the regency of Algiers, which had become almost entirely estranged.

"What then has happened? How has the Ottoman empire nearly lost the Danubian Principalities, Greece entirely, and Egypt more than half? Here are stones, allow me the expression, which have fallen naturally from the building. I readily accord that foreign intrigues and ambition have had some share in producing these events; but they have not created them; they would not even have carried them to an end. They arise from natural, spontaneous dismemberment. These provinces, by their own action and internal movement, have detached themselves from the Ottoman empire, which had no power to retain them.

"And once detached, what has become of them?

Have they fallen into the hands of any given European power? Not yet; they have laboured to make themselves independent states, to stand alone, under specific protectorship more or less pressing, more or less dangerous, but which has left and still leaves them the title of distinct peoples, of new sovereignties in the great family of nations.

"And do you believe, Gentlemen, that without this perspective, without the hope of seeing these fragments of the Ottoman empire transform themselves thus into new states;—do you believe that we should take such a lively interest, such an active part, in what has passed in the East,—in the fate of Greece, for example? No, certainly, not. If the question had been to detach from the Ottoman empire a particular province to bestow it on some other power, assuredly you would not have witnessed amongst us the national impulse which hastened to the rescue of Greece and saved her.

"What I say of Greece I shall say also of Egypt: in spite of evident distinctions, here is an analogous fact. It is not we who have so nearly severed Egypt from the Ottoman empire. Undoubtedly, by our expedition of 1798, by the examples and triumphs of the French army and its glorious chief, we reckon for something in the apparition of this new power. It has not, however, proceeded from our act; it also is a natural dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, attempted and nearly accomplished by the genius and controlling will of a single man. Mehemet Ali has made Egypt what it is by taking possession of

the movement imparted from us. We protected this new state from its origin, and still more recently, in 1833, as under the Restoration we had protected the dawn of Greece, and for the same reasons. We beheld in Egypt a natural dislocation of the Ottoman empire, and perhaps a rising power destined at some future day to become independent and to play its part in the affairs of the world. Consider well, Gentlemen, what has passed during the last thirty years in the East, and in all the dominions under the Ottoman rule. You will recognize everywhere the same fact. You will see that empire naturally dismember itself on certain points, not for the advantage of any specific power amongst the great states of Europe, but to commence, to attempt at least, the formation of some new and independent sovereignty. No one, in Europe, would have consented that conquest should bestow such acquisitions on any of the old kingdoms. This is the true cause of the course which the progressive disorganization of the Ottoman empire has taken, and it is to these conditions and within these limits that France has given her accord. To maintain the Ottoman empire for the equilibrium of Europe, and when by the force of events, by the natural progress of facts, some dismemberment takes place, some province detaches itself from that declining power, to favour the transformation of that province into a new and independent sovereignty which may take its place in the family of nations, and assist at a future day in the new European equilibrium, destined to replace that whose elements will

exist no longer: — such is the policy suitable to France; to this she has been naturally led, and in this, according to my opinion, she will do well to persevere."

Such were the dispositions of the great European cabinets when they learned, towards the middle of May 1839, that the arrangement concluded on the 5th of May 1833, at Kutaieh, between the Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali, was broken; that the Turkish army had passed the Euphrates on the 21st of April to attack that of the Pacha, commanded by his son Ibrahim; and that thus the Eastern question was revived with all its chances and embarrassments.

In a first impulse of displeasure and equity, it was asked who was the aggressor? Even the English cabinet, despite its disposition to side with the Sultan, appeared anxious on this point. "The actual event," said Lord Palmerston to Baron de Bourqueney, at that time chargé d'affaires in London, "surprises us: the fact of aggression, attributed by the new telegraph to the Turks, has its moral importance, for there is a principle of justice, the power of which we cannot deny, in a first disposition to throw back the consequences of war on the aggressor." [1] It was soon established beyond doubt that the aggressive movement came from Constantinople. For several months everything in that city presaged and announced preparations for war. On the 16th of May Admiral Roussin wrote as follows to Marshal Soult: — "Emissaries arrive daily from Egypt and Syria, secretly

[1] See Historic Documents, No. XVI.

despatched by the Sultan; they report to him that all the populations are ready to rise against Mehemet Ali at the first signal. Tahar Pacha, despatched two months ago to the camp of Hafiz Pacha, was ostensibly charged to order him to remain within the frontier; but he had private instructions from the Sultan; they are not positively avowed, but surmised. The Sultan is determined to destroy his vassal or to perish; he declares this openly. It is not known or believed that the army has passed the frontier; but it is supposed to be so near that point as to render the attack of the Egyptians inevitable, and this the Sultan ardently desires." The Consul-General of England at Alexandria, Colonel Campbell, wrote thus to Lord Palmerston on the 28th of May: "The passionate violence of the Sultan, who is acting contrary to the advice of the ambassadors at Constantinople, will not only exhaust his resources, but will materially weaken his moral influence in Turkey; while the moderate and prudent conduct of Ibrahim Pacha,—who, in obedience to the orders of his father, has abstained from every act of hostility,—will elevate Mehemet Ali, and increase his power over men's minds throughout the Ottoman empire." Finally, the English ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, so prejudiced against Mehemet Ali and always ready to condemn him, had written on the 20th of May to Lord Palmerston in these words: "The Sultan has declared that he would die rather than not destroy his rebellious vassal;" and again, on the 22nd: "I am convinced that the Sublime Porte has definitively resolved to

make war upon the Pacha of Egypt. It does not appear that hostilities have yet commenced." [1]

How could Mahmoud have restrained his passion? Lord Ponsonby himself urged him to gratify it. When the aggressive intentions of the Porte became evident, Admiral Roussin addressed the Sultan with animated remonstrances; Lord Ponsonby refused to second them. "This refusal is much to be lamented," wrote Marshal Soult, on the 6th of July, to M. de Bourqueney; "the silence alone of the English ambassador, in such a conjuncture, is a positive encouragement to the rash projects of the Porte." M. de Bourqueney was instructed to communicate on this subject with Lord Palmerston. "I am not charged," he said, "with any official complaint; some strange facts have taken place; I am directed to place before you the documents which verify them, and to await the explanations which you may consider due to the mutual confidence of our two cabinets." "Lord Palmerston rang the bell," continues M. de Bourqueney; "he ordered the last four months of the correspondence of Lord Ponsonby to be brought to him, and also the last two years of that of Colonel Campbell. 'Let us speak of Lord Ponsonby first,' said he to me; 'I will prove to you that my instructions have never varied on this fundamental point, that the English ambassador should do his utmost to restrain the warlike propensities of the Sultan; we have constantly repeated to Lord Ponsonby, "Prevent war from

[1] See Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant, Part I. pp. 28, 56, 106, 153.

breaking out."' Lord Palmerston then made me read seven or eight despatches written by him to Lord Ponsonby between the end of January and the middle of June, and all founded on this general datum. 'Now,' he continued, 'I cannot conceal from you that the personal opinion of Lord Ponsonby — an opinion in which I do not at all participate—has ever been opposed to the maintenance of the *status quo* of Kutaieh; he even preferred extreme measures, as susceptible at least of a favourable issue; but I have good reason to believe that, in his official relations at Constantinople, the ambassador has subordinated his personal convictions to his instructions: this at least I am bound to infer from his correspondence.' And Lord Palmerston then read to me, at hazard, all the last despatches of Lord Ponsonby, in evidence of his pacific efforts with the Sultan. I observed to Lord Palmerston that it seemed to me very difficult to reject the impression that the personal opinions of the ambassador, readily penetrated on the spot, and transparent even in the despatches I had just read, must have detracted in some degree from the efficacy of his peaceful action at Constantinople. Lord Palmerston, without directly concurring in the same sentiment, replied in such a manner as to convince me that he entertained similar apprehensions. In any other country the result of this conversation would have been the probable recall of Lord Ponsonby. Here matters are differently arranged. Foreign affairs are regulated by internal influences."[1]

[1] The Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult, July 9th, 1839.

The question as to whether the Sultan or the Pacha had recommenced the war soon disappeared before the importance of the event, and the uneasiness it inspired. The feeling was simultaneous in Paris and London; both cabinets had the same desire to arrest the struggle in the East, and to prevent Russia from taking advantage of it to increase her predominance at Constantinople. Marshal Soult immediately despatched two of his aides-de-camp, one to Constantinople, the other to Alexandria, to demand the immediate suspension of hostilities, and to convey themselves the respective orders to the Turkish and Egyptian armies. A credit of ten millions was called for in the Chambers, to give our naval armaments the necessary development. Baron de Bourqueney received orders to communicate to the English cabinet all the information that reached Paris, all the ideas that sprang up, and all the measures that were preparing in consequence of the new position, and to establish between the two governments the most frank and intimate co-operation. "In thus exposing to the cabinet of London our full and comprehensive view of the important circumstances of the moment," the Duke of Dalmatia wrote, "we tender to it an unequivocal pledge of our confidence, and of our desire to act reciprocally in the most perfect accordance." [1]

The English cabinet received these overtures with satisfaction unhesitatingly declared. "We understand each other on all points," said Lord Palmerston

[1] Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney, June 17th, 1839.

to Baron de Bourqueney, after reading Marshal Soult's despatch; "our agreement will be complete. Principle, end, means of execution, all are full of reason, simplicity, and foresight. This is not the communication of one government to another; call it rather a bond between colleagues, between members of the same cabinet." When practical measures came to be considered, the understanding proved to be prompt and effective. The respective strength of the French and English fleets was settled without the slightest difficulty, as also were the instructions to the two admirals to act in concert for the prevention of hostilities. In order to combine the five great powers in one common action, and to profit by the influence of Austria at Constantinople, Marshal Soult proposed Vienna for the seat of general deliberation. Lord Palmerston at first suggested some doubts as to this arrangement. He feared, he said, that the influence of Russia might exercise itself more effectually on Prince Metternich in Vienna, than on Count Appony in Paris, or on Prince Esterhazy in London; but he soon conceded the point. "I have uttered my thoughts quite openly before you," he said to M. de Bourqueney. "I see the for and against, and, taking all together, I think the for will carry it; but I must consult the cabinet; I will let you know its decision;" and the decision of the English cabinet was favourable to the Marshal's proposition. It was agreed that some Austrian men-of-war should join the French and English fleets in the Mediterranean. There was also full concert on the idea and terms of

a solemn declaration, by which the powers pledged themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and to accept no portion of its territory. A more difficult question presented itself. What was to be done, if in virtue of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and on a demand from the Porte, Russian ships and troops should arrive suddenly at Constantinople to protect the Sultan against the Pacha? The French cabinet had expressed some anxiety to M. de Bourqueney, as to the dispositions of the English ministry under this hypothesis. The Duke of Montebello, at that time provisional minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to him on the 30th of May, to this effect:—"I fear that in London they may treat too lightly the idea of a new Russian expedition to Constantinople." Marshal Soult was speedily satisfied on this point. M. de Bourqueney replied on the 17th of June: "The council has debated on the probable case, in which, uncalled for by circumstances, and exceeding even the bounds of reasonable anticipation, we should find the Russians established at Constantinople, or in march towards the capital of the Ottoman empire. This paramount question has been argued under the strong effect produced by the phrase in your Excellency's despatch, No. 16: 'I fear that in London they may treat too lightly the idea of a new Russian expedition.' The council is of opinion that in this case our squadrons should appear before Constantinople as friends, if the Sultan accepted our aid, and by force if he refused it. The question of the military passage of the Dardanelles

has also been debated. It is considered possible, but dangerous during the six winter months, when the wind sets from the Mediterranean. During the six others it is looked upon as easy; but troops for disembarkation will be required. I need scarcely add, that the idea of this last measure is, if I may so express myself, an extreme conjecture; and that our influence must be exerted to induce England to act upon it. Marshal Soult immediately replied to these dispositions of the English cabinet:—"We think," he wrote to Baron de Bourqueney, "that at the same moment when the Russians arrive at Constantinople, the great interests of the European equilibrium, and perhaps still more the jealousies of public opinion, justly exacting, would require that the flags of England and France should display themselves there also:" and he forwarded to M. de Bourqueney the draft of a note which Admiral Roussin was to be instructed to present to the Porte, concluding thus:—"The King's government feels convinced that it only anticipates the intentions of the Sublime Porte, in requiring that in case the land or sea forces of one or more of the allied courts should be summoned to Constantinople, orders would be given to open at once the passage of the Dardanelles to a French squadron, hastening, on its part, to protect the Sultan's throne from perils, the imminence of which would render such a measure imperative."

There was some difference of opinion and plan between the two cabinets, as to the terms and mode of execution of this step; but these secondary diffi-

culties were easily smoothed, and produced no check to the active harmony of the two governments. Assured of the co-operation of England, King Louis-Philippe and his advisers evinced as little hesitation in 1839, to act energetically in the East, and to force the Dardanelles if necessary, than they had shown in 1832, by entering Belgium and laying siege to Antwerp.

In presence of these sudden events, of the diplomatic movement they excited throughout Europe, and above all of the intimate understanding between Paris and London, the Court of Russia looked on in silence and remained in suspense, visibly disturbed by the impending future, and doubtful of the attitude it would have to assume. The hereditary grand duke, now the Emperor Alexander II., was at that time in London accompanied by Count Orloff. "Whenever I have met Count Orloff during the last five days," M. de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal Soult on the 29th of May, "he has denied with affectation, in my presence, the authenticity of the news of the resumption of hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians. He founds his assertion on the last letters of the Emperor. Your Excellency knows that he assumes freely to be the confidant of the Imperial thought. He has held the same language to nearly all the members of the diplomatic body." And some days later, on the 17th of June, the envoy continued — "The Russian embassy listens, watches, but hesitates both in action and language. There have been many Russians during the last month in London, and

amongst them some enjoying the highest confidence of the Emperor. I venture with timidity an opinion hastily formed; but it appears to me that in that quarter they are not prepared for extreme measures." Precisely at the same date, the instructions of Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, at that time Russian ambassador in London, fully confirmed Baron de Bourqueney's conjecture. "Far from seeking to provoke a complication in the Levant," the vice-chancellor of Russia wrote, "we are using our utmost endeavours to prevent it; and in place of availing ourselves eagerly of our treaty of alliance with the Porte, we are foremost in desiring to ward off the renewal of a crisis which would compel us against our will, to resume a military attitude on the shores of the Bosphorus."[1] Three weeks later, on the 8th of July, the English ambassador at St. Petersbourg, Lord Clanricarde, wrote as follows to Lord Palmerston: "On all occasions Count Nesselrode has expressed to me the desire of the Russian government to avoid the possibility of a *casus fœderis* in virtue of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. He has held the same language to all my colleagues, and I believe this desire to be as sincere on his part as it is anxiously conveyed." Facts soon proved that the pacific inquietudes of the Russian cabinet were genuine. It consented without difficulty to the proposals for common deliberation submitted by Prince Metternich, and on the 11th of July, Lord Beauvale, the ambassador of England at Vienna was able to

[1] Correspondence on the affairs of the Levant, Part I. p. 98.

write thus to Lord Palmerston: "The plan of pacification between the Porte and Mehemet Ali is already sketched out, and may be considered as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. France alone remains. Prince Metternich expects the English government to persuade France."[1]

While the diplomatists were conversing or corresponding, events had hurried on and materially altered the position. The aide-de-camp despatched by Marshal Soult to Egypt, Colonel Callier, had obtained from Mehemet Ali a letter commanding his son Ibrahim to suspend hostilities; but when Colonel Callier reached the Egyptian head-quarters, he found not only the war commenced, but the Turkish army beaten and destroyed. Five days before his arrival, on the 21st of June, 1839, a battle had been fought near the village of Nezib, and after two hours of weak combat, the forces of the Sultan, general and soldiers, fled in confusion, leaving in the hands of the victor 9000 prisoners, their artillery and their camp. When the news of this defeat reached Constantinople, the Sultan Mahmoud had ceased to live. He expired six days before, on the 30th of June, cursing with frenzy the name of Mehemet Ali, and nevertheless granting an order to Marshal Soult's second aide-de-camp, Colonel Foltz, for the suspension of hostilities. Fifteen days had scarcely elapsed from the accession of the young son of Mahmoud, the Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne of his father, when the commander-in-chief of the maritime forces, the Capitan-Pacha Achmet-

[1] Correspondence on the affairs of the Levant, Part I. pp. 169, 177.

Feruzi, who had recently left the Sea of Marmara, carried his squadron consisting of nineteen men of war to Alexandria, and surrendered it to Mehemet Ali. Within three weeks Turkey had lost her sovereign, her army, and her fleet.

So many disasters, rapidly accumulated, plunged Constantinople into utter dismay. The young Sultan and his ministers expected to see the Pacha of Egypt advance immediately by land and sea, against the capital of the empire. They hastened to anticipate him by peaceful arrangements. His old enemy, the grand vizier Khosrew-Pacha, wrote thus on the 5th of July: "His Highness, actuated by justice and wisdom, qualities with which heaven has blessed him, has declared on mounting the throne that 'the Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, having indulged in certain offensive proceedings against my late father of glorious memory, many events have occurred in consequence, and even recently preparations have been undertaken. But I neither desire the tranquillity of my subjects to be disturbed, nor Mussulman blood to be shed. I therefore forget the past, and provided that Mehemet Ali performs without scruple the duties of subjection and vassalage, I bestow on him my sovereign pardon; I reserve for him a magnificent decoration similar to that of my other illustrious viziers, and I grant to his sons the hereditary succession to the government of Egypt.'" Two days before, on the 3rd of July, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nourri-Effendi, convened at his palace the representatives of the five great powers, and communicated to them this resolution

of the Sultan. "We inquired," Lord Ponsonby wrote on the 5th to the Consul-general of England, at Alexandria, "whether it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, of Mecca, of Medina, or of St. Jean d'Acre, and the answer was in the negative." The Porte, however, was far from being firmly resolved on these limits to its concessions, for on the 22nd of July following, the first dragoman of the English embassy at Constantinople, M. Frederic Pisani, wrote to Lord Ponsonby, saying, "The Porte is well disposed to treat with Mehemet Ali on the following bases, proposed, as it affirms, by Prince Metternich, and approved of by the cabinet of St. James's: 1. The government of Egypt to be assigned hereditarily to Mehemet Ali; 2. the government of all Syria to Ibrahim Pacha; 3. on the death of Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pacha to succeed to the government of Egypt, and Syria to return again as formerly, to the immediate authority of the Porte."

Prince Metternich had neither proposed, nor had the English cabinet approved of these conditions; but the Porte, treating exclusively with the Pacha of Egypt had given reason to believe that it was prepared to concede them.

When the news of this direct negotiation between Constantinople and Alexandria, with its probable issue, reached the European cabinets, very opposite impressions were produced. At St. Petersbourg warm satisfaction was expressed, with a ready approval that the Turco-Egyptian question should be debated and settled between the interested parties themselves.

Russia thus escaped from the common intervention of the great powers in the affairs of the East, and from the necessity of losing, by association with them, her isolated and independent position. On the 27th of July, Count Nesselrode forwarded instructions on this subject to M. de Kisseleff, Russian chargé d'affaires in London [1], and on the 9th of August following, M. de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal Soult: "Lord Palmerston informed me yesterday that according to news from Berlin, Russia withdrew from the projected negotiations at Vienna. M. de Kisseleff, who followed me at Lord Palmerston's, was charged with a communication to the same effect. It is from a feeling of respect for the independence of sovereign states, that the Russian cabinet declines all intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. Before the events in Syria, previous to the death of the Sultan, when there appeared no other possible issue than war to the differences between the Porte and Egypt, the Russian cabinet might have agreed in opinion with the other powers of Europe, on the advantage of opening a negotiation irrespective of the parties immediately concerned; but now when the Porte itself anticipates a reconciliation, and proposes acceptable terms of adjustment to Egypt, it feels disposed to allow the negotiation at Constantinople to proceed without interference, and merely to second it by good intentions. Such is the spirit of Count Nesselrode's communication. The King's government will feel no surprise at this over-

[1] Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant, Part. I. p. 157.

ture from the cabinet of St. Petersbourg; your Excellency's correspondence has repeatedly announced it. Here, where they readily adopt what they wish to believe, more confidence had been entertained, not in the sincerity of the dispositions of Russia, but in the necessities of the European position. Greater astonishment has therefore been evinced than will be expressed in Paris. But, finally, the motives of M. de Nesselrode's last despatch have been understood, and an evident proof thereby conveyed that if the Imperial cabinet does not believe the fitting moment to be arrived for committing itself openly with Europe on the affairs of the East, it is at least determined to struggle diplomatically against the written guarantees which might threaten to enchain the future. Lord Palmerston received the communication of M. de Kisseleff courteously, but without permitting him to deceive himself as to the opinion he had formed of it."

Lord Palmerston felt perfectly at ease in declining the overture of the Russian court, and in allowing it to appear that he correctly estimated its motives. He knew beforehand with certainty, that in this new phase of the Egyptian question, the policy of England would meet with the adhesion and co-operation of France. As early as the 26th of July, on learning the pacific overtures of the Porte to Mehemet Ali, Marshal Soult had written to Baron de Bourquency: "The rapidity with which events proceed excite apprehension that the crisis may unravel itself by some arrangement in which the European powers will have no time to interfere, so that the interests essential to

general policy might not be sufficiently considered. For England as for France, for Austria also, although she does not openly avow it, the principal, the true object of concert is to control Russia, and to accustom her to treat in common on Eastern affairs. I think, therefore, that the powers, while giving full approbation to the conciliatory sentiments manifested by the Porte, ought to compel it to precipitate nothing, and to treat with the Viceroy only through the intermediation of the allies, whose concurrence would undoubtedly furnish means of obtaining less disadvantageous and better secured conditions."[1] Lord Palmerston eagerly accepted this perseverance of the French cabinet to make the accommodation between the Porte and Egypt a European question. "He is strongly impressed," M. de Bourqueney replied to Marshal Soult, "with a fear that the Russian cabinet may urge the authorities at Constantinople to a direct settlement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, which would cause the negotiations at Vienna, and the contingent guarantees, to fail, by rendering them useless; but he thinks that even in the admitted case of direct intervention, we should continue our efforts to educe from the moral concurrence of the four courts an act to which the fifth would be constrained to subscribe."

This result was easily accomplished. The court of Russia, as circumspect in conduct as haughty in attitude, considered it more important not to become isolated in Europe than to maintain its isolated posi-

[1] Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult, July 27th, 1839.

tion at Constantinople. It ceased to insist that the Porte, from respect to its independence, should be left alone in presence of Mehemet Ali, and free to negotiate directly with him on its own proposals. The Emperor Nicholas declared himself ready to act in concert with England, Austria, France and Prussia, if they still felt themselves called upon to take the negotiations in hand; and on the 27th of July, the representatives of the five courts at Constantinople addressed the following note to the Porte: "The undersigned have this morning received instructions from their respective governments, in virtue of which they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte that the five powers are perfectly agreed upon the Eastern question, and also to require that all definitive arrangements may be suspended until their concurrence is obtained, while waiting the effect of the interest they conjointly feel and exert."

At this step the English ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, expressed unbounded joy. On the 29th of July he wrote to Lord Palmerston: "On the morning of the 27th, Baron de Stürmer received Prince Metternich's instructions, and on the same evening the note was signed and remitted. I beg here to express, with all humility, my approbation of the activity and promptitude with which the Baron has acted. I consider this measure as the most salutary it was possible to adopt. It was also extremely opportune, as the Ottoman ministry had resolved on concessions to the Pacha of Egypt, which at this moment would have been on the road to Alexandria, and would have

deplorably complicated the affairs of this empire. Our step has given the grand vizier strength and courage to resist the Pacha and to defend the rights and interests of the Sultan. It will also, I think, secure the tranquillity of the capital, and, in consequence, the security of its foreign and Christian inhabitants. It opens the path to every measure that her Majesty's government may consider good and useful to be adopted. It has given her Majesty's government a position which enables it to guarantee the future integrity and independence of Turkey."[1]

The French cabinet was not slow in discovering that this step placed it in a less convenient and powerful position than that which England expected to obtain. It had pledged itself to prevent the Eastern question from being settled in the East itself between the two interested parties, and to decide it in the West, by mutual accordance of the five great powers; it had declared to the Porte "that this accordance was assured;" while far from feeling convinced of this assurance, it had already begun to perceive how much its views on the definitive arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha differed from those of England: As far back as the 16th of June, Lord Palmerston had said to M. de Bourqueney: "We must open a negotiation at Constantinople and Alexandria, on the double basis of the establishment of the hereditary succession in Egypt of the family of Mehemet Ali, and of the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops. The

[1] Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant, Part I. pp. 292, 293.

opinion of the Council is that we shall encounter no serious difficulty at Constantinople; and that if any should present itself at Alexandria, it would suffice to convince the Pacha of our union to overcome it." Without at first formally rejecting this view of the English cabinet, and without a frank explanation of what was to be conceded to Mehemet Ali, Marshal Soult instructed M. de Bourqueney to express different dispositions. "It is necessary," he wrote to him, on the 26th of July, "that the firmness—I had almost said the severity—of the advice which the powers may tender should be tempered by a tone of moderation and good-will, which, while checking the boldness of Mehemet Ali, may not too deeply wound his pride and ambition. There would undoubtedly be affectation in seeming to believe that after the success which the mad aggression of the Porte has opened to him, he has nothing more to expect than he had a right to demand before. This would be to deny the empire of facts and the necessities of the position. If the Viceroy were to convince himself that he had nothing to expect from the equity of the powers, he would revolt against their imperious representations, and his irritation might lead, from one moment to another, to consequences the simple possibility of which is sufficient to startle every calculating mind." When M. de Bourqueney communicated to Lord Palmerston this despatch, at once clear and vague, the English minister, in reply, developed his entire thought. "The more I reflect," he said, "on this Eastern question (and I assure you I divest my mind of all prepossession on

the subject exclusively English), the more I arrive at this conclusion: that France and England can only desire identically the same thing,—the security and strength of the Ottoman empire; or, if these words are too ambitious, its return to a state which leaves the least possible chance for foreign intervention. Well; we shall only attain this object by placing the desert between the Sultan and his vassal. Let Mehemet Ali remain master of his Egypt, let him obtain the heirship which has been the constant aim of his efforts; but let there be no nearer vicinity, and consequently no possible collision between the rival powers. Russia covets (prospectively) the European provinces, and at the bottom of her heart she rejoices to see the Asiatic limbs separate themselves from the Ottoman body. Can we promote this interest? Evidently not. They speak of the material difficulties we shall encounter in accomplishing our end. I think Mehemet Ali could not slight a sincere desire expressed in common by the great powers; but should he do so, his rights would not be strengthened by contemning the counsels of Europe, and if force became necessary, the result could neither be long nor doubtful. Such is the well-considered opinion of the English cabinet. If we thought that Mehemet Ali could seat himself, strong and respected, upon the Ottoman throne, and possess the empire in its independence and integrity, we should say,—let it be so; but feeling convinced that if any thing still survives in Turkey, it is a religious reverence for the imperial family, and that the whole nation will never consent to look on Mehemet as a descendant of

the Prophet, God forbid that we should embark in such a policy! We should find a second South America in the East; and this last would have neighbours who would not suffer it to consume itself eternally in intestine struggles." And six days later, returning to the conversation with ardour,—"I cannot sufficiently repeat to you," observed Lord Palmerston to M. de Bourqueney, "how entirely my conviction is divested of all political considerations exclusively English. But I suppose Egypt and Syria hereditarily invested in the family of Mehemet Ali, and I ask myself how Europe can flatter herself that the slightest incident may not occur to sever the last and feeble tie which will unite these provinces to the Ottoman empire? Independence must follow in the track of heirship. And do you consider what Europe will then say when Russia resumes her long-indulged craving after the European provinces?—that the Ottoman Empire, dismembered by the separation of a part of the Asiatic dependencies, is no longer worth the risk of a war for its maintenance. Such is the train of ideas I follow in judging this important question. But at the same time, I lay no stress on the infallibility of my own opinion: I perfectly conceive that another may be adopted; and I look for no French prepossession in the views expressed by Marshal Soult. I am so strongly impressed with the good faith of that policy, that here is an argument which would convince me if I were disposed to doubt it: France requires the exercise of influence in Egypt; this is and ought to be; it is one of those data which must be admitted in general policy.

Well; you wish to make Egypt stronger than we do,—and, nevertheless, your influence over the sovereign of Egypt, be he who he may, would increase by reason of his weakness. You see that I seek for no mental reservation, under the divergence of our two points of view."

However they might differ, it was not the divergence of these two points of view in the general policy which, as regarded the French cabinet, formed the difficulty of the question and situation. In its perseverance in demanding for Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of Syria, it was decided by two motives less systematic and more direct. The cause of Mehemet Ali was extremely popular in France. Influenced, as I have said, by our recent reminiscences, and by an indefinable and instinctive confusion of our conquests with his conquests, of our glory with his glory, we took a warm interest in the fortunes of the Pacha, and looked upon them as immediately connected with the power of France. The brilliant debates of which this matter had lately been the subject, the remarkable report of M. Jouffroy on the ten millions demanded by the cabinet for our maritime armaments, the eagerness of the Chambers to vote this credit,—all had combined to increase the importance of the question, and to elevate the sovereign of Egypt. We had, moreover, an extremely exaggerated idea of his strength; we pictured him as able and determined to confront the powers, if they resisted his desires, with a desperate opposition, and to plunge in flames, at first the East, and subse-

quently Europe itself. Governed by the public feeling, and deceived by its own presentiments, the French ministry persisted in contravening, on this point, the views of the English cabinet, and in supporting the Pacha in his pretensions to the hereditary government of Syria, which England persevered in peremptorily refusing.

This was, on our part, a serious error; an error which, from the first moment, entangled our policy in an evil path, and which we had the less excuse for falling into, as it was in contradiction with the conduct we had pursued, a few years before, in an analogous conjuncture. When Europe determined to sanction a first dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, and to establish the kingdom of Greece, we demanded, in addition, for the new state, a more extensive territory; we wished to bestow on it Thessaly, Candia, and better frontiers. On this point we were opposed by the English government, and renounced a portion of our plan, justly attributing more importance to the actual establishment of a new sovereignty than to its extent, and to our general success than to a partial disappointment. In 1839 we were in a similar position, which recommended the same forbearance. Looking at things as they were, and in themselves, it would assuredly have been better that instead of falling back under the power of the Porte, Syria should remain in the hands of Mehemet Ali. By his close vicinity, by the vigour of his administration, the energy of his power, and his freedom from all Mohammedan fanaticism, the Pacha of Egypt

would have maintained in that country, for the benefit of its different populations, and above all for the advantage of the Christians, more order and security than the Porte was either able or disposed to afford. If this solution had been then adopted, Europe would perhaps have escaped the lamentable spectacles and inextricable embarrassments at this moment presented by Syria. But for France and her government it would have been a much wiser and more skilful policy to have confirmed, in concert with England, the principal conquest of Mehemet Ali, than to have separated from the British cabinet to second the Pacha in all his desires. Egypt, held in hereditary possession by princes almost independent, was a great additional step in the course of the partial and natural dismemberment of the Ottoman empire recognized by Europe, and in the formation or preparation of new states. Such, in that crisis, was the true policy of France; she had recently proclaimed it openly, and exercised it with success; she compromised it through an inconsiderate exigency, at the moment when she could have illustrated it by a new and brilliant application.

One fact alone should have revealed to France the danger of her obstinate demand,—the satisfaction unreservedly evinced by the English cabinet, as it had betrayed itself in the correspondence of Lord Ponsonby, when informed that the Russian minister at Constantinople, M. de Bouténeff, had signed the note of the 27th of July, which detached the Porte from all direct communication with Mehemet Ali, and pro-

mised the concurrence and support of the five great powers. Baron de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal Soult[1]: "This sudden adhesion of the Russian minister to a step of such importance was little expected. In London, as undoubtedly in Paris, people reasoned on the general datum that the Russian cabinet had not only declined to participate in the common negotiation at Vienna, but was labouring to render it useless, by encouraging the conclusion of a direct arrangement between the sovereign and the vassal, without any (at least apparent) external intervention. . . . . A great change has taken place within the last eight-and-thirty hours in the spirit of the members of the English cabinet. The possibility of the concurrence of Russia was not previously admitted; now it is hoped for: the co-operation of Austria was hoped for to the end; it has now become certain. It is therefore concluded that the time has arrived for relaxing, in some degree, the threatening and suspicious attitude assumed towards Russia, without prejudice to its subsequent resumption, in a more decided form, should circumstances so require."

There was as little expectation in Paris as in London that Russia would suddenly renounce her isolated position, and accede fully to the common action of the five powers. But without believing in such a resolution, the possibility and danger were foreseen. On the 1st of August Marshal Soult wrote to Baron de Bourqueney: "I have never expected that in the actual question Russia could be brought to associate

[1] Despatch of the 18th of August, 1839.

herself frankly with the other cabinets in a policy so opposed to her own. I thought that while appearing to work to that end, while adopting towards Russia the most conciliatory style, the sole object we could propose to ourselves would be to restrain and intimidate her to a certain point by a demonstration of the perfect understanding between the other great powers united in one common interest. With this object in view, it would be essential that the powers, more particularly France and England, should hold a language with the cabinet of St. Petersbourg entirely uniform, and should only act by concerted measures. Thus I saw with regret the step which Lord Clanricarde was instructed to take with M. de Nesselrode. The Russian government will naturally deduce from thence that on one point at least,—the limits to be imposed on Mehemet Ali,—England expected to find more sympathy with it than with the other cabinets. It will be led to conclude, very erroneously without doubt, that an alliance in which such divergencies manifested themselves could possess few homogeneous or imposing elements."

The French cabinet might regret the step which, by an order from Lord Palmerston, dated the 9th of July preceding, Lord Clanricarde had taken with the Russian government[1], but it had no right either to express astonishment or complaint. That step was perfectly simple, and the natural result of the general position. Lord Palmerston directed Lord Clanricarde to make the same communications and proposi-

[1] Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant, Part I. pp. 156, 158.

tions at St. Petersbourg which Lord Granville was commissioned to deliver in Paris. He had given to the representatives of England at the four great continental courts the same instructions on the Egyptian question, and had manifested in all quarters the same views founded on the same reasons. In his conversations with Baron de Bourqueney, he expressed without reserve his mistrust of Russia and his desire for a close connection with France. But he could not exclude Russia from the European concurrence he demanded, nor address her in a language different from that adopted towards the other powers. In allowing itself to be led away, on this occasion, by an impulse of exclusive humour, the French cabinet fell into the mistake which Prince Metternich pointed out when he said, "France, in speaking to others, is too often disposed to think herself single; when we negotiate, we are many."

Two incidents, nearly simultaneous, occurred at this epoch, to hasten without changing the course of the negotiation. At the commencement of September 1839, General Sebastiani, who until then had been on leave of absence in Paris, returned to London to resume his post as ambassador; and a few days later, Baron de Brunnow arrived from St. Petersburg, specially instructed to treat of the affairs of the East, and to superintend the Russian legation in general. Both were able negotiators, although of extremely different characters. General Sebastiani possessed a firm, calm, sagacious mind, clear but not complicated, a little slow and unimaginative, not particularly

ready with tongue or pen, but imperturbably judicious and provident; prompt to recognize the attainable end, and how to demand or concede for its accomplishment. Baron de Brunnow, brought up in the designs and traditions of the Russian chancery, was well-informed, clever, persevering without obstinacy, neither exacting nor impatient, an eloquent and lively talker, an experienced and ready reporter, dexterous in unravelling the aims of others, and in enveloping his own under a thick mantle of concessions, reserves, and commentaries. They began to work, from the moment of their arrival, the one to lead back Lord Palmerston to the paths to which France still held, the other to persuade him that Russia would follow in those in which he was disposed to march.

General Sebastiani speedily delivered his government from all illusion. On the 5th of September he wrote to Marshal Soult: "I have to announce to your Excellency that the impression resulting from my first interview with Lord Palmerston is, that the English government desires with us, to the same extent, and with as little mental reservation, the maintenance of the Ottoman empire in its full independence and integrity, and that it wishes to accomplish this end pacifically and without compromising the great powers amongst themselves. . . . . But I cannot conceal from your Excellency the disposition of the English cabinet to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali to obtain the restitution of the Ottoman fleet, and to force him to accept the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt as the basis of the

intervening accommodation with the Porte. This disposition may from time to time yield, upon certain points, to the representations of France, but it ever re-appears; and if it encounters on our part an invincible and absolute repugnance to the adoption of any compulsive means whatever against the Viceroy, I fear that they will become persuaded here that it is useless to continue a negotiation which takes beforehand from their counsels the sanction, should it eventually become necessary, of force."

On the 14th and 17th of September, General Sebastiani, returning from Broadlands, Lord Palmerston's country seat, where he had passed two days, again wrote to Marshal Soult: "In the midst of our conference, Lord Palmerston's courier from London arrived, bringing despatches from St. Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople. Lord Palmerston read them all to me. Lord Ponsonby writes from Constantinople that the divan has re-assembled, and has decided that nothing should be ceded to Mehemet Ali beyond the hereditary investiture of Egypt. From Vienna Lord Beauvale announces that the Austrian cabinet adopts more and more the English point of view as to the necessity of confining to Egypt the territorial possessions of the Viceroy. At Berlin, the same favour towards the English project. Finally, Lord Clanricarde writes from St. Petersbourg that the Russian cabinet coincides sincerely with the intentions of the British ministry; that it accords in opinion with the bases of the projected arrangement, and offers its co-operation. 'Judge,' continued Lord

Palmerston, 'whether it is possible to renounce a system we have adopted, at the very moment when it combines the wishes and efforts of nearly all the powers in concert with whom we have undertaken to settle pacifically the question of the East. This system, I cannot too often repeat to you, is founded on a single basis. The dangers of the Porte at this moment proceed from its vassal alone. There are others which threaten, but they belong to the future. It is from the perils of the present that we must furnish a guarantee. We have given a serious warning to the power from whence the prospective mischief may be expected. Mehemet Ali must be rendered incapable of repeating, and perhaps of rendering more decisive, the blows he has already inflicted on the Ottoman empire. Such is the general datum on which all the determinations of the English cabinet are founded. I am here only its organ; but I cannot sufficiently express to you how profoundly grieved I am to see the French cabinet, with which we have entered upon the question in such perfect cordiality, separate from us and from all the other powers. I allow fully for the particular circumstances in which you are placed; I know that you have prejudices of public opinion to deal with; but whatever may be the cause of our misunderstanding, I bitterly deplore it, and nothing would be more agreeable to us than to obtain a glimpse of its probable termination.' I asked Lord Palmerston whether he did not find matter for reflection in this facility with which Russia anticipated the English project. It is an extremely ephemeral con-

junction, I added, a coincidence of views too fortuitous to demand the sacrifice of an alliance of principles and sentiments. 'Yes,' answered Lord Palmerston, 'we are perfectly well aware that this is entirely an arrangement of circumstance, which will not prevent the two lines of policy from resuming in due time their natural walk; but how reject it, when it comes in aid of the interests we wish to defend, and when, by the simple admission of our mutual concurrence, it seems to renounce the exclusive protectorate and almost preponderating influence against which we are contending? I tell you, moreover, frankly, and I am far indeed from being pleased at it, I feel convinced that the Russian cabinet, in its blind and senseless prejudice against France, has been strongly prepossessed with an anxiety to place our disagreement in evidence, and to take part with our view against yours. There is no imaginable conciliation which Russia has not practised towards us during the last year to divide our two governments; we have remained cold to all her advances; we started with you, and we wish to continue marching with you; but how can you expect us to abandon our point at the very moment when Russia yields accordance, and when the two other powers have already adopted it? The French cabinet seems at this moment to separate itself, not alone from us, but from the combined European movement. We are unwilling to abandon the hope of its return. . . . The formal and preliminary renunciation of all coercive measures against Mehemet Ali would, in fact, raise a

barrier between France and England. Declare at least that you do not sanction all the pretensions of the Pacha, and that these pretensions, if they remained in their full integrity, would find you disposed, as our allies, in case of need to employ force. The negotiation then can take its course. If the French cabinet persists, on the contrary, in proclaiming beforehand that under no circumstances will it consent to use compulsion against the Pacha, there is no longer any possible unity in the question.' "

General Sebastiani concluded his despatch by saying, "To-day M. de Brunnow is to have his first audience of Lord Palmerston."

Notwithstanding the information transmitted, and the opinion clearly conveyed, although with some reserve, by our ambassador, the French cabinet persisted in its attitude. It was resolved not to compel Mehemet Ali to renounce the hereditary possession of Syria, and not to associate itself, if he maintained his pretensions, with coercive measures against him. The English government felt perplexed. Eager as the conciliatory overtures of Russia had been, the first proposals of M. de Brunnow were not satisfactory. While accepting European concert on the affairs of the East, the cabinet of St. Petersbourg demanded that her men-of-war and troops should enter alone into the Sea of Marmara to defend the Porte in the name of Europe. This was, at the same time, to abandon and maintain the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. Russia renounced the protection of Constantinople in virtue of an exclusive right and on

her own account; but she remained, in fact, its sole defender. In London, as in Paris, offence was taken at this mixture of obstinacy and condescension. Several members of the English cabinet, however, accorded with hesitation Lord Palmerston's views as to the conditions of settlement between the Sultan and his vassal. In the hope of obtaining the concurrence of France, a concession was determined on to the advantage of Mehemet Ali. General Sebastiani wrote to Marshal Soult on the 3rd of October: "The English cabinet does not adopt the propositions presented by Baron de Brunnow. Lord Palmerston announced this morning to the Russian envoy that France, on her part, could not consent to the exclusion of the allied fleets from the Sea of Marmara in the event of Russian forces entering the Bosphorus; and that England would not detach herself from France, with whom she had acted in perfect unity from the commencement of the negotiation. This point being laid down, Lord Palmerston suggested, instead of the convention presented by the Russian cabinet, an agreement between the five powers, by which they should regulate their respective action in the existing crisis of the affairs of the East, without acknowledging any privilege to the Russian flag not accorded to those of France, England, and Austria. Russia, in case of resistance on the part of Mehemet Ali to the conditions proposed to him, to employ her troops in Asia Minor, but on her own side of the Taurus. The independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire under the reigning dynasty to be

stipulated for, for the longest possible time; finally, the closing of the Dardanelles to become a principle of public European law. Passing from this European act to the conditions of the impending arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha, Lord Palmerston, pressed by my arguments, and by a desire, which I believe sincere, to perform an act of deference towards France, consented, after a long discussion, to add to the hereditary investiture of Egypt, in favour of Mehemet Ali, the possession, equally hereditary, of the pachalic of Acre. The town of Acre alone to remain to the Porte, and the frontier to be marked out from the glacis of that fortress in the direction of Lake Tiberias."

The French cabinet was disturbed by this offer. It had always felt convinced that Mehemet Ali would support his pretensions with equal force and perseverance, and that the English government would never go to the extreme of allying itself in the East with Russia. Popular opinion in France, moreover, and the periodical press, maintained with daily increasing ardour the cause of the Pacha of Egypt, watched anxiously for all rumours, all appearances, however slight, of any arrangement entered into to his detriment with the English cabinet, and treated them beforehand as acts of anti-national baseness. Marshal Soult replied on the 14th of October to General Sebastiani: "The King's government, after having maturely weighed the objections of the cabinet of London, feels bound to persist in the views I have already communicated to you on the basis of

a settlement of the affairs of the East. If our own interest alone were concerned, we might make concessions in favour of our desire to bind more closely our alliance with England; but the question is not of that nature. It consists solely in determining conditions which, while combining in just measure the rights of the Sultan and the future security of his throne with the pretensions of Mehemet 'Ali, may tend to the pacification of the Ottoman empire. We feel convinced that the proposals of the British cabinet could not attain this end, and that, rather than submit to them, Mehemet 'Ali, who would see in them his ruin, would plunge into the chances of a resistance less dangerous to himself but more embarrassing and compromising for Europe. . . . . We should decline driving him to this course, even though we felt absolutely certain that our refusal would be the signal for a close alliance between England and Russia. Fortunately, this certainty is far from existing; the reasons which have once already caused the failure of such a strange combination, subsist still in all their strength. I do not believe they can escape the penetration of Lord Palmerston, and I know positively that some of his colleagues are very deeply impressed by them. Finally, if, contrary to all appearance, this combination should be realized, without doubt we should sincerely lament it as the rupture of an alliance to which we attach so much value; but we should apprehend little from its immediate effects, because a coalition contrary to the nature of things, and

condemned beforehand, even in England, by public opinion, would necessarily be tainted with impotence."

Being instructed to deliver such a peremptory answer to the concessional offers of the English cabinet, General Sebastiani, on the 18th of October, reported the result of his interview with Lord Palmerston in these terms: "I have laid before Lord Palmerston your Excellency's communication. I repeated all the considerations which determine the King's government to persist in its first resolutions relative to the basis of the impending treaty between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. Lord Palmerston listened to me with the most earnest attention. When I concluded, he replied in these plain words: 'I announce to you, in the name of the Council, that the concession we had agreed to of a portion of the pachalic of Acre is withdrawn.' I endeavoured to resume the general question in debate; Lord Palmerston met me invariably by a polite but freezing silence. I have repeated textually to your Excellency the only words I could extract from him. My efforts naturally ceased at the point which my own personal dignity no longer suffered me to exceed."

Lord Palmerston, in reality, felt little regret that his offer of ceding the pachalic of Acre to Mehemet Ali was not accepted by France. He had made it in consideration of the anxiety of some of his colleagues rather than of his own will and with the desire of success. Although he had rejected the first propositions of the Russian court as to the common action of the

five powers in the East, his interviews with Baron de Brunnow had given him confidence that the Northern court would greatly extend its complaisance; and he did not deceive himself. M. de Brunnow, after demanding fresh instructions from St. Petersbourg, quitted London towards the middle of October to return to his post in Germany at Darmstadt; "I believe," General Sebastiani wrote to Marshal Soult, on the 8th of October, 1839, "that he refrained from commencing his journey suddenly, to avoid giving too much notoriety to the rejection of his proposals; but I know that he does not in the slightest degree beguile himself as to the possibility of the adhesion of his court to a common naval movement in the Bosphorus; and what proves it is, that he does not wait the answer from St. Petersbourg to his last despatches." It was General Sebastiani who deceived himself on the probable sense of that answer. It was fully conformable to the hopes of Lord Palmerston, and on the 6th of December, 1839, the French ambassador was called upon to write to his government as follows: "I forward without delay to your Excellency the confidential information which Lord Palmerston has just communicated to me, and which he only received himself yesterday evening from the Russian chargé d'affaires. M. de Brunnow will return immediately to England with full powers to ratify a convention relative to the affairs of the East. The principle of the simultaneous admission of the allied flags into the waters of Constantinople, or of their general exclusion, will thus be formally decided. In

case of interference, the number and force of the ships admitted under each flag will be settled by a particular convention. The importance of this communication will impress on your Excellency the value I attach to the most complete instructions and commands."

The French cabinet felt surprised and disturbed. It was not prepared to see Russia abandon so clearly her privileged position with Turkey, and so ready to admit that French, English, and Austrian ships of war should appear simultaneously with her own in the waters of Constantinople. She thus lost one of her leading arguments against the ideas and plan of Lord Palmerston. On the 9th of December, 1839, Marshal Soult instructed General Sebastiani to convey to the English government his satisfaction at the unlooked-for concession of the court of Russia. "The King's government," he said, "acknowledging, with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention entered into on such bases would materially change the aspect of affairs, would find in it a sufficient motive to reconsider the Eastern question, even with regard to the points on which each of the powers seemed to have formed its opinion so absolutely that prolonged debate appeared impossible." But, at the same time that he announced these conciliatory dispositions, the Duke of Dalmatia evinced much uneasiness as to the secret motives which could have determined the court of Russia to such a falsification of its policy, raising doubts on the results which Lord Palmerston promised himself; and some days after, returning to the

theme which he had already often availed himself of to repulse the urgencies of the English cabinet while exciting its suspicions, he wrote to General Sebastiani: "I repeat to you that all these tactics resolve themselves into two words; Russia seeks to break up the Anglo-French alliance, to which Europe owes for ten years the preservation of peace. The cabinet of London cannot fail to see this as clearly as we do; and as I am certain it would deplore such a result equally with ourselves, as I feel convinced that result could not be less injurious to England than to France, I feel no hesitation in calling the most serious attention of Lord Palmerston and his colleagues to the existing state of things."

This immovable position, this diplomatic monotony, utterly ineffective in London, disturbed and wearied the soundest politicians in the French cabinet, M. Duchâtel, M. Villemain, M. Passy, and M. Dufaure. They asked whether there were no means of trying a new course, and of exercising more influence over the ideas and proceedings of the English government. They sympathised little with General Sebastiani. From his antecedents he was looked upon as too favourable to Turkey, and so nearly in accord with the opinions of Lord Palmerston as to be ill fitted for the strenuous support of opposite views. He appeared to them to be neither a true representative of the French government, nor an effective interpreter of the policy for which the recent debates in our Chambers had established a predominance. I had advocated that policy in the Chamber of Deputies;

I had compared it with that of the other great powers, particularly of England, applying myself to extract from thence the general convenience of Europe. I had repeated these words of Lord Chatham: "I argue not with any one who tells me that the maintenance of the Ottoman empire is not, with England, a question of life and death;" and I added, with eagerness, "As to myself, gentlemen, I am less timid. I do not think that for such powers as England and France there exist thus in the distance, and with certainty, questions of life and death; but Lord Chatham was passionately impressed with the importance of maintaining the Ottoman empire; and England still sides so strongly with his opinion, that she devotes herself to that cause, even, as I think, with a degree of superstition. She has often shown herself hostile to the new states that have been formed, or have tended to form themselves, out of the natural dismemberments of the Turkish sovereignty. Greece, for instance, has not always found in England a friend; Egypt still less so. I shall not enter into an examination of the motives which, under such circumstances, have influenced the English government. I believe that it has sometimes deceived itself, and has sacrificed great policy to small, the general and permanent interests of Great Britain to secondary considerations. The first of all British interests is, that Russia should not predominate in the East. If I may be permitted to express in this place an opinion on the policy of a great foreign country, there is, I think, a degree of weakness on the part of England in listening to

jealous susceptibilities, or to any momentary commercial interest, in place of employing all her efforts, all her influence, for the consolidation of those new and independent states, which may become, and ought to become, effectual barriers against the indefinite aggrandizement of the only power whose rivalry in the East England can have reason to apprehend."

In this language was perceived a real sympathy with, and a firm independence towards the English policy, pledges of mutual understanding and resistance, and perhaps also the chances of an effectual result. Parliamentary considerations combined themselves with diplomatic motives. Present in the Chamber, but not a member of the cabinet, I was to the latter a source of uneasiness, if not of embarrassment. I supported it loyally, but I had no share in its responsibility. Absent from Paris, I should no longer inconvenience it in the debates, while I should become more closely associated with it. After coming to an understanding with Marshal Soult and all their colleagues, those amongst the ministers who were my private friends asked me if I would accept the embassy in London, and if the cabinet should make the formal proposition to the King.

The proposal suited me. I foresaw that the forthcoming session would be as embarrassing to myself on account of the cabinet, as to the cabinet on my account. Its policy had been ineffective, and its position was evidently precarious. By absence, I removed myself from parliamentary intrigues and struggles, and assumed an isolated position, at once

friendly and independent. I shared, moreover, to a certain extent, in the illusions of the partisans of Mehemet-Ali; I believed in his power, in the dangers which the peace of Europe might incur from his obstinate resistance, and I thought it possible that, in this respect, some influence might be exercised over the ideas and resolutions of the English government. Some months before, the ministers, my friends, had proposed to me the embassy to Constantinople, which I formally declined; Constantinople removed me too far from Paris, and involved me too directly in the affairs of the East. London only connected me with them remotely, and left me in close propinquity with the affairs of France. I accepted the offer of the cabinet.

King Louis-Philippe, in the first instance, objected to it. He was much attached to General Sebastiani, who had served him zealously, from whom he expected an accordance, at once constant and enlightened with his own policy, and who, in London, was in friendly relations with the English cabinet, and especially with Lord Palmerston. The King felt no want of confidence in me, in my general views, and in my firmness in sustaining them; but I was a man of the Chamber as well as of the government; I was anxious for the close union and concerted action of the tribune and the crown; I had recently taken a prominent part in the coalition: the King knew how to lay his displeasures aside, but was unable to forget them. He resisted for some time the proposal of the cabinet. Meanwhile, the position, externally

and internally, became more and more urgent; Russia was gaining ground in London, yet the English cabinet still hesitated to separate itself openly from France. It debated various projects of convention; it declared that the presence of a Turkish plenipotentiary was indispensable to the negotiation; it evidently wished to gain time, and to leave a door open to France. "I cannot persuade myself," said Lord Palmerston to Baron de Bourqueney, "that we shall be unable to re-establish concert between all the great powers. I will accede to the most liberal terms which according to my ideas can be possibly granted to Mehemet Ali, to afford France a facility of accepting the bases of the pending arrangement."[1] Was it not an urgent matter to turn these delays and doubts to advantage? The cabinet persisted strenuously; even the ministers who were not my personal friends, M. Dufaure amongst others, declared themselves resolved to make my appointment a cabinet question. The King yielded. I had several interviews with him. He received me with a mixture of good-will and ill-humour, passing from a token of confidence to a mark of displeasure. "They are very exacting," he said to me one morning; "but I understand the matter; people are always glad to bestow an income of 300,000 livres on a friend." "Sire," I replied, "my friends and I are amongst those who would rather give than receive an income of 300,000 livres." The question of the

[1] Despatches of the 28th of January and 21st of February, 1840.

dotation of 500,000 livres per annum, demanded for the Duke of Nemours, was then on the point of coming on. The King smiled and resumed his temper. On the 5th of February my appointment was signed and published. Fifteen days later, the rejection of the bill of dotation, without debate, placed the cabinet in an extremely uncertain position, and I took my departure for London on the 25th of February, 1840, anxious to escape from the troubles, hesitations, practices, and attempts of the Chamber and the court, which were on the point of displaying themselves.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

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No. I.

(Page 26.)

The Duke de Broglie to the Marshal Marquis Maison, Ambassador of France in Russia.

Paris, 28th Oct. 1833.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

THE government near which you are called to represent the King's administration, is perhaps that whose relations with France have been the most essentially changed by the Revolution of July.

Before the events of 1830, France and Russia were united in an alliance which seemed to draw closer from day to day. This alliance, based on the strongest ties which can exist between two States, a community of adversaries and a total absence of all points of contact and motives for rivalry, had resisted the utmost efforts of Austria for its dissolution. If M. de Metternich had succeeded for the moment in throwing coldness upon it by disquieting the Emperor Alexander as to the strength and stability of our government, by making him dread that, carried away by the revolutionary movement, we might not be in a position to lend him profitable aid in

circumstances under which he might desire to rely on us, these insinuations too lavishly offered had ended by losing nearly all their effect. The Emperor Nicholas, who then showed himself less suspicious, less impassioned than his predecessor, and, above all, less governed by the theories of absolutism, had moreover learned, in the midst of the embarrassments in which for a time the Turkish war had placed him, the frankness and efficacy of our co-operation. This important circumstance, even by having raised France from the inferiority of position in which she had seen herself as regarded Russia since the events of 1814, and from having placed her in the condition of exercising in her turn the character of protector towards that power, had given additional strength and solidity to an alliance which, between two states of the first rank, could, as was evident, only subsist on the footing of perfect equality.

The Revolution of July has completely changed this position.

On the one hand, it has excited in several quarters, especially in Poland and in Belgium, questions in which the inclinations and interests of the cabinet of St. Petersburg have found themselves in absolute opposition to ours. On the other, by a consequence less immediate, but which has not delayed to develop itself, it has produced between France and England a juxtaposition the simple fact of which would have sufficed to modify the nature of our relations with the court of Russia. Finally, this revolution, a powerful reaction against the spirit of the treaties of 1815, and of the Holy Alliance, or rather against the facts and doctrines which during ten years have invested Russia with a sort of European dictatorship, attacked, at the same time, that power in all the susceptible points of its ambition and pride. Beyond all other motives, perhaps this last suffices to inspire the Emperor Nicholas and his subjects with a lively irritation against the new order of things established in France.

More than once it has been thought that this feeling would manifest itself by some sudden stroke; those hostile aspirations which the force of events alone has probably dissipated, have formed besides an insurmountable barrier in the more circumspect policy of Prussia and Austria. But the necessity which thus restrained the unfriendly sentiments of the sovereign of the North, from that cause alone increased their bitterness and intensity. Every one knows how they came to light on several occasions in proceedings which, while they revealed the impotent rage of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, fortunately wounded only its own dignity.

The position of the French embassy in Russia became therefore the more delicate, as in that country the higher classes model their attitude and political impressions on those of the sovereign. The King's representative found himself everywhere exposed to difficulties and dangers which elsewhere he would only have encountered at the court. I need not remind you of the trials your predecessor had to undergo. You know that, by a singular refinement, the Emperor Nicholas, while loading the Duke of Treviso with personal attentions ostensibly bestowed on his military reputation, while at the same time affectedly abstaining from addressing a single word to him in his diplomatic capacity, evidently intended to demonstrate the coldness of the reception accorded to the ambassador of the King of the French.

We have reason to think, Marshal, that you will not have to submit to similar treatment. We find an unequivocal guarantee on this point in the assurances, entirely spontaneous, which the Russian government has at several intervals transmitted to us of the satisfaction it feels at the selection of the new representative of his Majesty, and of the eagerness with which your arrival is expected. It would be difficult not to see in these multiplied protestations a sort of honourable reparation for a proceeding the inconvenience of which has at length been undoubtedly acknowledged.

Be this as it may, if, notwithstanding our anticipations, the Emperor Nicholas should resume, as regards you, the attitude he perseveringly maintained towards the Duke of Treviso, he would thereby point out to you the course you should adopt. Renouncing from that moment direct intercourse with the Emperor, as inconsistent with the dignity of France, and consequently with your own, your duty then would confine itself to the discussion of such official matters with the vice-chancellor as may be strictly required by the exigencies of the service, and you will await further orders from the King.

If it should happen, as we have no reason to foresee, since this hypothesis has not been realized under circumstances in which it seemed much less improbable,—if it should happen, I say, that the discontent of the Emperor Nicholas, newly awakened by some fresh incident, should display itself towards you by any more decided symptoms than coldness and reserve;—if, which seems to us impossible, he should address words to you at which the King's government would have a right to take offence, I need not tell you that, without waiting an order of recall, you will at once demand your passports and leave the direction of the embassy under a chargé d'affaires. But, I repeat, this painful supposition will not be realized.

I have pointed out to you the ground on which you are to place yourself at St. Petersburg. I must now enter into some details on the political relations of France and Russia.

In these latter days, the diplomacy of the two cabinets has had few direct communications. In the ferment of spirits it would have been too difficult to have come to a mutual understanding. It was through the interposition of Prussia and Austria, allies of Russia, but more calm and moderate, that the varying incidents of the Hollandic-Belgian affair have been negotiated. As to the Greek question, become entirely secondary since the Revolution of July, and in which,

in consequence of their antecedents, the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin could not possibly interfere, it has gone on, in some manner, at hazard. France and Russia, without mutual concert or explanation, have not ceased their endeavours to incline it towards their respective policy. The same has also occurred more signally with respect to questions in which the two courts were not naturally called upon to a common or simultaneous action.

It would have been desirable, until more conciliatory feelings had entirely replaced the irritation of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, that the two powers should continue to abstain from all immediate contact, too apt to awaken exasperated feelings scarcely in a degree calmed down; but to accomplish this it would have been necessary that no important event should place in collision their essential interests, and the susceptibilities of their national pride. We could hardly expect this at a time so fertile in sudden changes.

The events of the East added a new crisis to those which already menaced the repose of Europe. The King's government foresaw, at an early period, all the embarrassments and dangers of which the contest between the Porte and Mehemet Ali might furnish the principle. Solely occupied with the desire of avoiding them, it has never ceased to employ, with that view, its utmost influence at Alexandria and Constantinople. To induce the Porte to concessions evidently indispensable, and which, granted a little sooner, would have been less onerous,—to restrain the Viceroy of Egypt, as much by prudent representations as by an imposing display,—to confine his demands within reasonable limits,—and to pacify thus the Ottoman empire without incurring the risks of foreign intervention:—such were the objects we avowed, and in which we had the concurrence of England. This plan was unquestionably the best in itself, and the most favourable for the interest of Europe at large, which it rescued from threatening complications; and also for the advantage of the

Sultan, whom it preserved from the humiliation and perils inseparable from the course into which he had suffered himself to be drawn.

Unfortunately, Russia did not bring to this question views of equal disinterestedness. She desired to profit by the difficult position in which the Grand Seignor found himself, and through the weakness of that unfortunate monarch to transform into a species of sovereignty and protectorate the preponderance she already exercised at Constantinople. Not content with astonishing the world by the spectacle of a Russian fleet and army introduced into the Bosphorus, and to the very gates of Constantinople, under the pretext of affording Mahmoud the succour which did not ameliorate a single condition of the peace, the Russian government, as if it had resolved to brave the other powers, alarmed and uneasy at such an unprecedented fact, thought to consecrate by a solemn act the menacing position it had assumed; and, at the moment when consenting to withdraw its forces, compelled the Porte to sign a treaty of alliance by which the latter formally bound itself not only to become the enemy of all the foes of Russia, but also to close the Dardanelles against foreign flags whenever the cabinet of St. Petersburg should find itself engaged in war.

We do not exaggerate to ourselves, Marshal, the bearing of engagements subscribed to under such circumstances. We recognize that intrinsically they are not of a nature to produce much change in the state of things which has actually existed since the last events. But it seems to us evident that the cabinet of St. Petersburg has wished to proclaim openly in the face of Europe, to establish as a principle of public law, exclusive and exceptional preponderance in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. By this provocation, the infallible effects of which, we are strongly disposed to think had not been well calculated, we were forced to emerge from the reserve within which, from views of conciliation, we had

consented to restrain ourselves up to that time. We found it necessary, in concert with England, to protest against the consequences of a treaty which tended to change, without our participation, the relations of the powers in the East; and a declaration to this effect, a copy of which I subjoin, has been transmitted first to the Porte, and subsequently to the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

We cannot yet learn how it will be received by the Imperial Government. Perhaps it may consider its dignity involved in preserving, on this subject, absolute silence; and in that case you will only have to follow its example. If, on the contrary, it should indulge in recriminations, the statement I have here drawn up will place you in a condition to reply in terms which, as you will readily understand, ought to be, at the same time, firm, moderate, and exempt from all bitterness and irritation. You might add that we have no idea of contesting with Russia the high influence appertaining to her in the affairs of the Porte, and which results from the force of events. But to seek to convert that influence into an instrument of exclusion and injury against other states is to call for and necessitate, on their part, the most just and energetic opposition. However serious and difficult the Eastern question may be, it is not, nevertheless, the most delicate of those which have sprung up, within the last three years, between France and Russia. The subject of Poland has, in a very different manner, contributed to divide the two nations, and to exasperate the Emperor Nicholas against us. I shall not recapitulate these sad details. You know the reserve we never ceased to exercise in a matter to which it was impossible for us to remain indifferent. While the contest was still pending, that reserve was naturally suggested to us by the promises of moderation and clemency which M. de Mortemart had received. After the fall of Warsaw and a fatal experience had compelled us to acknowledge that our intercession in favour of the unhappy Poles served only to enhance the resentment

of an implacable victor, we felt that a duty of humanity prescribed to us, for the moment, a most painful silence. We should have continued to preserve it if the cabinet of St. Petersburg had not, some time since, indulged in the unfortunate suggestion of inserting in its official "Gazette" an article the object of which was to present the question of the existence of Poland as placed beyond general policy, and subjected exclusively to the will of Russia. Not to have disputed such an assertion would have been to admit it on our own account. We found it necessary to take it up in a semi-official publication, the irrefragable arguments of which you may develop if, which is unlikely, the discussion should be pressed upon you.

It only remains for me, Marshal, in concluding, and in recapitulating your instructions, to explain to you, in a few words, the aspect under which we regard our future relations with Russia. Your judicious apprehension will easily deduce from thence the rules of conduct you have to follow, according to the conjunctures in the midst of which you will find yourself.

Without undervaluing the advantages which, at another epoch, the intimate alliance of the cabinet of St. Petersburg afforded to us, we understand perfectly that, under existing circumstances, not only is it impossible to re-establish it, but that there would even be a dangerous blindness in seeming to desire it, and to direct the combinations of our policy ostensibly towards that end. Invincible obstacles at present oppose themselves to a close union, which otherwise would be without object between two cabinets whose tendencies have no longer anything in common. As, notwithstanding this, a future, more or less nearly connected with both, may give rise to questions in which it would be equally the interest of France and Russia to concert and mutually understand each other, we ought, without affectation, and without lending ourselves to advances which might possibly be

turned against us, to endeavour to replace ourselves in those friendly relations, at least apparent, with the Russian government, which do not invariably end in a complete reconciliation, but which, when such an event is destined to take place, infallibly precede it. It is nearly on this footing that we at present stand with Prussia and Austria. Our only desirable point at this moment is to reach the same position with regard to Russia, and this is the result which the King's government recommends to your enlightened zeal.

No. II.

(Page 63.)

M. Mignet to the Duke de Broglie.

Madrid, Oct. 12th, 1833.

My Lord Duke,

I hasten to inform you of the first results of the mission with which the King's government has charged me, and to communicate the information I have collected since my arrival here.

I reached Madrid on the morning of the 10th. I was delayed some hours at Vittoria, where a popular insurrection in favour of Don Carlos had just burst forth. The royalist volunteers held military possession of that city, and debated as to whether they should allow me to pass. The fear of offending France, whose determinations they were yet unacquainted with, undoubtedly decided them to permit me to continue my journey. I had learned at Bayonne the revolt of Bilbao, and the bad feeling in the Basque Provinces. These dispositions are generally participated in all the countries bordering on our frontier. Without customs, almost without imposts, denuded of garrisons, except on a few military points, and enjoying many privileges to which they pertinaciously cling, these countries seem to me opposed to every kind of innovation from self-interest.

The absence of knowledge and the want of commerce, except on the coast of Catalonia, strengthen their estrangement from all that might change their condition. From

Vittoria I passed through nothing but tranquil districts, and they continue so to this moment.

On my arrival I waited on the Count de Rayneval. The uncertainty in which he had been left as to the part which France intended to take relative to the Spanish succession had kept him entirely inactive since the death of King Ferdinand. I acquainted him with the resolutions of the King's government, and I was happy to find that they accorded with his own views. The despatch which you received from him immediately after my departure will have apprised you that in the various courses to be selected in this weighty conjuncture, M. de Rayneval confined himself strictly to that which has been adopted by the government. I have detailed to him the motives which have determined the King and his council to sacrifice the Salic law to that which formerly regulated the succession to the Spanish monarchy. France has always had, and will continue to have, the strongest desire to secure her rear in Europe by causing Spain to adopt, and by supporting that country in the maintenance of her own systems. She cannot make front to the north but by resting on the Pyrenees as a secure base. The intervention of Louis XIV., and that of Napoleon in the Peninsula, resulted from this permanent necessity of France. The Salic law represented under the old monarchy the alliance of the two countries which the dynasty of Napoleon was destined to represent under the Empire. To-day the interest is the same, and in the competition of two dynasties, one of which, founded on a system contrary to ours, enters into the Northern alliance, and makes the Peninsula the head-quarters of the malcontents and conspirators of France, while the other relies on our friendship, rejects our adversaries, and is inevitably called to follow our directions,—the King's government is bound to declare for the latter. The female succession has become (for France), under existing circumstances, what in other times and positions the Salic law had been. These

arguments had impressed themselves on the Count de Rayneval, who warmly approves the resolution of the government.

The end being fixed, nothing remained but the course to follow, which was equally pointed out by your despatch and by the oral instructions you delivered to me. To acknowledge, sustain, and direct this government;—such, summarily, is the policy of France, and the duties imposed on her ambassador. M. de Rayneval has found the plan as sound as the object.

To fulfil the first part of the intentions of our government, he hastened, on the day of my arrival, to present himself to M. de Zéa and to the Queen Regent. He announced to them that France recognized the young Queen, and offered to support her. This intelligence was received with extreme joy, emotion, and gratitude. As M. de Rayneval will undoubtedly, in his despatch of this day, give you an account of his conference with the Queen, I shall enter into no details on that subject. The Spanish government has hastened to make them known through the "Madrid Gazette," which you will receive with our despatches, expecting to find in this publicity an accession of strength. It does not seem to me to reject the idea of recurring to the assistance of France, should circumstances render it desirable, and this is an eventuality for which minds are preparing themselves. The French government should also prepare itself, determine its resolutions on this point, and arrange its resources. Let us now estimate, as far as I can judge, the actual position of the government which the interest and inclination of France incline her to support.

This government has in its favour a fact, powerful in all countries, and which seems to be additionally so with a nation accustomed to obedience and slow in its determinations. It is an administration composed of the Queen's partisans, of loyal captains-general, with finances in a tolerably flourishing state, an army well commanded, better dis-

ciplined than it has been for a long time, in which there has been no defection, and the fidelity and co-operation of which appear to be secured. It has also the Liberal party, which has no hope but in the triumph of that cause. This party predominates on the coast and in the greater part of the commercial towns, but is not numerous in the interior of the country. Finally, it has in its favour the limited capacity of Don Carlos, with the fear inspired by his wife, the people he has about him, and the tribunal of the Inquisition.

But it has against it the clergy, forming a compact organization which continues to exercise a powerful influence over the masses, and, with very few exceptions, is favourable to Don Carlos; the corps of royalist volunteers, who, inferior in discipline and arms to the regular troops, are much more numerous, and scattered over the entire surface of the country; the democratic spirit of particular localities, which is the opposite of liberalism, and dreads reforms as abolition of privileges; and the popularity of the infant Don Carlos, who, in the eyes of a people with all the nationality of isolation, represents the country, while the Queen Regent has to struggle with the disadvantage of being a foreigner.

With such formidable enemies to confront, the government and the Queen's party require the closest unanimity. Unhappily there is already division amongst them. The Council of Regency has a more liberal bias than the ministry, and according to all appearance they are not likely to work together. The Queen, who at this moment acts under the advice of M. de Zéa, is, it is said, on cold terms with her sister; and M. de Zéa has estranged the Liberals by his manifesto of the 4th of October. This want of harmony under such pressing circumstances presents an unfavourable augury. M. de Zéa governs alone since the accession of the young Queen, as he did during the last six months of the reign of Ferdinand. He has superior qualities and high reputation in the opinion of everybody; courage, firmness, and rare activity.

But he is perhaps wanting in the prudence and address demanded by such a complicated position. He seems to rely exclusively on authority. He is generally reproached with having unnecessarily alienated the Liberals, if not by granting them nothing at present, at least by leaving them no hope for the future; and with having compromised the Queen by inducing her to abandon those who had declared in her favour. In acting thus, his object appears to have been to retain the confidence of the purely royalist party, by re-assuring it as to the maintenance of unlimited power and individual privileges. He has thought that the absolutists, confirmed in their interests and opinions, would contest with less ardour the cause of Don Carlos, thus rendered more personal and less political. Has he deceived himself? This, time will speedily show; and this is what we may apprehend from the insurrectionary movements at Bilbao, Vittoria, Talavera, and Logrono on the Ebro. But, be this as it may, all agree in looking upon him as the only man capable, by his firmness, of establishing the Queen's authority, always provided that he does not fail in handling it adroitly when confirmed. The Liberals have no one of equal vigour to face immediate difficulties, and who could advantageously replace him for the interest of the Queen and of France.

As the energy of the first minister and the support of the Liberals are equally essential to the Queen's cause, I deemed it proper to name conciliation to M. de Zéa in the interview I had with him yesterday. M. de Zéa volunteered to me his confession of faith in regard to parties, as he has done on several occasions to M. de Rayneval. He spoke with deeply-rooted animosity against the Carlists. He said they had raised the banner of revolt, but that his arm was long and strong enough to seize and beat it down; that it would then be seen whether he feared or was able to manage them; that he knew his country, and what would be the influence over it of a good cause, and firm resolution; that in 1824, despite

the urgency of the clergy, and against the advice of all his colleagues, he had dared to attack the inquisition directly in face, and had overthrown it; that he gloried in this, and in the credit he now assumed of having done more than any one else to secure the throne to the young Queen, by removing the obstacles to her accession (the Princess of Beirà and the infant Don Carlos), and by giving her certain supports in the oaths of the Cortés, and the organization of a strong ministry and a loyal army; that the cause to which he had devoted himself was that of the nation and of justice; that the Queen Regent had resolved to transmit the trust of royal power to her daughter, intact, as she had received it; that Spain was not sufficiently advanced to support another form of authority; that the Queen and her government were nevertheless far removed from being friends to superstition and darkness; that they rejected both, and sought, on the contrary, to enlighten and improve their country; that this was their constant thought, and would evince itself as soon as the commotions were put down, and legislature could supersede contest. As to the Liberals, he declared that he desired no better than to come to a friendly understanding with those amongst them who were not animated by the spirit of faction; that there were many of them reasonable men, who would associate with him in defending the Queen's rights, and were readily employed; that, in short, he opened his arms to all who presented themselves in sincerity. While developing his system and intentions, which I here recapitulate, he repeated several times that he piqued himself on yielding to no Spaniard in conviction and loyalty, but that he was still liable to error, and was anxious, above all things, to profit by the counsels of those who tendered proofs of so much friendly interest in the authority of his sovereign.

Although it may be difficult to deal with a mind so strongly prepossessed, I thought it right to enter on the reasons which rendered the union of the different partisans of the

Queen most desirable. Mr. Villiers, who had seen M. de Zéa before my interview with him, has informed me that he spoke to him in a similar strain, and that it is possible this common language of those who interest themselves most in the Queen's government may induce M. de Zéa, by his future acts and selections, to diminish the impressions produced by his manifesto. He has commissioned me to make known to my government his own good intentions, and the unqualified gratitude of the Regent. That Princess, to whom I had the honour of being presented to-day by M. de Rayneval, and of placing in her hands the letter intrusted to me by the Queen her aunt, repeated to me personally the same sentiments towards their majesties, and appeared to be much affected by those which I conveyed to her on their part.

She received me graciously, as did the two Infantas, to whom I also delivered the letters and compliments of the Queen. There was no allusion to public affairs, and indeed there could be none in these court audiences, which the ambassador may repeat, although I cannot.

The situation of Spain to-day is much less encouraging than that of Portugal, and on this subject, my Lord Duke, I abstain from speaking, as M. de Rayneval will include it in his despatch. It is impossible at present to conjecture the result. The extent to which the Carlist insurrection may spread is unknown, or whether the vigour of the first minister, who has sent troops to repress it in the north of the Peninsula, where it has already intercepted the principal high road of communication with the continent, will be seconded by forces sufficient to assure a triumph. The presence of Don Carlos on the Spanish territory would enormously increase his chances. It is not exactly known where he is, since he left Santarem to approach Spain in the character of *Pretender* to the throne.

A report is circulated that the insurgent Biscayans have invited him to join them. It will, however, soon be ascer-

tained what has become of him, and at the same time an estimate formed of the strength of the opposing parties. Meanwhile France should prepare herself to maintain her interests, and the resolutions which the King's government may consider it proper to adopt.

I believe that my presence here, now that the impulse has been given and received, will be less profitable than it might be in Paris, where I could enter more fully into the details of information which are never sufficiently conveyed in formal despatches.

Our government has here an able representative, full of the resources, intelligence, and penetration which are indispensable in a land of intrigue; one who possesses much experience, and an intimate knowledge of the Peninsula, is well looked upon, well informed, in perfect understanding with Mr. Villiers on all points, and entering warmly into the plan adopted by the council,—a plan to the execution of which he desires to devote himself, and is bent on rendering successful.

I conclude my over-long letter, in praying you, my Lord Duke, to accept the assurance of my high consideration and respectful attachment.

(Signed) MIGNET.

No. III.

(Page 76.)

The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.

Jan. 20th, 1834.

It is unnecessary for me to tell you that the situation of Spain has been for a long time the object of our most anxious solicitude. We say it with regret, that she seems herself to aggravate it greatly. It is not in the attempts of Don Carlos's party that we see the principal and immediate source of the dangers which threaten the Peninsula and the throne of Queen Isabella; that party has proved that, left to itself, its chances of success are few, and the errors and disagreements of the Queen's partisans can alone improve them. Unfortunately, these divisions, instead of diminishing, have become more serious every day, and nothing indicates that the course pursued by the ministry of the Regent is likely to lead to their termination. M. de Zéa, confident in the sincerity of his intentions and the frequently successful courage which he has at such extremely varying periods opposed to the efforts of the factious, persists, almost alone, in the system he proclaimed on his accession to power, and at the moment of the late King's death. He does not abandon the idea of improving the civil government and legislation of Spain; he labours for this object with surprising activity; but determined to preserve to the royal authority the independence which he considers necessary to its bene-

ficial action, he wishes it to rely solely on itself, and to abstain from all engagements; that in accepting the co-operation of loyal and enlightened men, it should yield no concession of principles to the opinions of which they are the representatives.

On the other hand, the adversaries of M. de Zéa (and we must recollect they form an immense majority amongst the partisans of the Queen), even those who are not led away either by a revolutionary tendency, or a purely theoretical bias, refuse to recognize a pledge for the future prosperity of their country in reforms established by a simple act of arbitrary power, and which another act of the same kind might speedily revoke; they believe that these reforms have no real value, and could inspire no just confidence unless they are guaranteed in some specific form by the consent of the nation: in fine, they are convinced that this consent would give a support to the Queen's authority far more solid than that which it can find in titles importunately contested. We are not now called upon to decide between these views. An exact knowledge of the state of minds in Spain could alone have placed us in a condition to distinguish which of the two is founded on truth; and at our distance from the theatre of events we must wait until enlightened by facts. You know, moreover, with what religious anxiety we have avoided any step that might lead to a suspicion of our being disposed to mix ourselves up with the internal government of Spain. A feeling of delicacy, which M. de Zéa has undoubtedly appreciated, has compelled us to push this reserve even to a scruple, at a moment when the necessity, on the part of the Queen's government, of requiring our aid, might have apparently given to our representations a totally different character from that of simple advice. I will not conceal from you that this consideration alone sufficed to prevent us from expressing, at the time, the regret we felt for an act which the enemies of M. de Zéa have since

turned into such a powerful weapon against him,— his notorious manifesto of the 4th of October. We also feared, by the slightest indications of censure, to encourage adversaries, or to diminish the means of success to a minister we never ceased to hold in the highest esteem; and being resolved to excite no obstacles in his path, we have not hesitated, on our own account, to endure the mischievous consequences of the passive and expectant attitude to which we resigned ourselves. We have allowed the opinion to gain ground, in France as well as in Spain, that not only did the King's government employ its entire credit with the Queen to maintain M. de Zéa in power, but that it also attaches to that support the condition of setting aside all constitutional enactments and liberal innovations. I repeat, that we neither desired to interfere gratuitously in the internal affairs of Spain, nor to offer any obstacle to the realization of a system in which such a man as M. de Zéa declared that he saw the only prospect of safety for the country. Meanwhile events have advanced, and they are of a nature to make us apprehend that M. de Zéa has not thoroughly estimated the necessities of the actual condition of Spain. If, until now, he has succeeded in keeping the government isolated from all parties and opinions, we believe that the regency has rather drawn from that isolation a principle of weakness than of real independence. The choice it has made, the measures it has necessarily decreed, and which might have won popularity if the whole character of its proceedings had indicated the result of a system, have produced no other effect than that of conveying (erroneously, without doubt) an appearance of inconsistency, and of yielding up to the enemies of the ministry important positions, whence they may, in future, direct their attacks with more efficacy. The party which calls for reforms, convinced that those hitherto obtained have been reluctantly yielded under the plea of concession, and that the slightest pretext would be taken for

retracting them, far from finding therein a motive for rallying round the first depositaries of power, seeks only with augmented ardour to overthrow them, because these very reforms supply an index of their weakness. Even some of the men called to the most important posts, convinced that they owe their appointment solely to the irresistible empire of public opinion, second more or less the efforts of the opposition.

The royal authority thus progressively weakens itself. The measures which ought to strengthen lead to its ruin, because it is placed in a false position. Anarchy reigns in all minds, and begins even to mingle with the acts of power, which, disarming itself by degrees, without allaying the discontents and exigencies by which it is weakened, will, in all probability, be at last reduced to the point of no longer being able to deny to force the concessions which it considers incompatible with its safety.

A catastrophe appears to be imminent. It is impossible that so clear a mind as that of M. de Zéa can deceive itself on this point; and however convinced he might be, at another time, of the soundness of the system to which he has linked his name, and of the perils attending any combinations founded on other principles, we should find it difficult to persuade ourselves that he will wish singly to persevere in a struggle so unequal, a struggle which his courage might still prolong, but in which he would ultimately fall, and in which, perhaps (and this consideration ought pre-eminently to move a heart like his), he would not fall alone. We admit, readily, that an accommodation, at the point matters have now reached, may present important obstacles, and that it may even give rise to real dangers; but in that course the dangers are only possible, in any other they are certain. A choice must be made. In such a state of things M. de Zéa has necessarily traced out for himself a plan of conduct. He cannot have contemplated abandoning the destinies of his country to the hazard, or, to

speak more correctly, to the certainties of a desperate combat. The interests of Spain are, in these days, too closely united to those of France to permit us to remain indifferent to the future which prepares itself for that country; and we should be guilty towards France herself were we not to exert our utmost efforts to avert the misfortunes which menace our neighbours. It is in the name of these common interests, Count, and in that of the kind feeling which the King has ever cherished for his august niece, that you will invite M. de Zéa to communicate to you his views and projects. Frank and complete explanations, such as may be expected from a man equally well known for his rectitude and firmness, we absolutely require. They alone can determine our doubts, and prescribe to us the course we have to follow in our relations with Spain. I expect them with impatience.

No. IV.

(Page 83.)

The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.

March 18th, 1834.

I cannot conceal from you that the intelligence from Spain produces a most painful impression on the King's government, and that the situation of that country has been the object of the most serious deliberations of the council.

I need not repeat the lively interest manifested by France, from the first moment, for the consolidation of Queen Isabella's throne. On the day when we learned the death of Ferdinand VII. we hastened to recognize the authority of the Regent. We did more; we offered her our support, not indeed with the idea of sustaining against the wishes of the Spanish nation an authority they might desire to reject, but to give to that power which we thus thought, and still think, based upon the leading moral forces and most honourable influences of the country, the time necessary to organize and place itself in a condition to sustain the struggle against a faction which, during twelve years of almost absolute rule, had possessed every means of preparing itself for the combat.

Far from wishing to impose upon Spain a government chosen by us, our sole thought has been to secure to the sound national majority, the possibility of unfettered manifestation. We judged, moreover, that by the position and

antecedents of the men who had avowed themselves its defenders, the Queen's government would naturally find itself disposed to recall Spain to paths of improvement, progress, and salutary reform; and assuredly this expectation contributed not a little to the promptitude with which we declared in its favour. But, penetrated with the most profound respect for the independence of nations, we have sedulously avoided, at the moment when the position of that government might render our aid so precious, all that might lead to a belief that we attached to it conditions relating to the forms of its internal system: we abstained for a long time, as you are well aware, from offering on this point, and in this sense, the slightest official advice.

Such were our scruples that we even refrained from expressing any opinion on the manifesto on the 4th of October, by which the ministers of the Regent proclaimed their determination to maintain absolute power, while, at the same time, they announced measures of clemency and administrative reform. Nevertheless, we foresaw from that moment, that this imprudent declaration would become the germ of mistrust and suspicion amongst the Queen's friends; that it would entail the fall of its authors; and that, as it would be impossible to carry out its principles,—authority, by thus compelling itself to make a retrograde movement, would find that it had struck a first and fatal blow against that spontaneity of action so invaluable to it in epochs of political regeneration.

Our expectations, unfortunately, were soon verified.

Loud complaints resounded in opposition to the system recently announced. The Regent was in no condition to impose silence on an opinion from whence her entire strength was derived. She persuaded herself that, in default of political institutions, it might be satisfied by concessions of another character.

Undoubtedly, it would be unjust to deny all the good

which the Regent has already done. The recall of the exiles, the termination of proscriptions, the admission to public employment of all that Spain contains of able and honourable men, the creation of a civil legislature so long desired, the important reforms introduced into the organization of the tribunals: — all these measures, and others in addition, which Queen Christina has carried through in the space of a few weeks, would have sufficed in ordinary times to render beneficent and illustrious a long reign.

If, under existing circumstances, they have passed almost without notice, it is that public opinion believed itself entitled to expect something better, and that taught by long experience to dread the uncertainties and variations of absolute power, it was not disposed to place much confidence in partial amendments,—the fruit of a generous impulse, and a pressure of circumstances which might disappear before fresh combinations. It is, in fine, that in the eyes of the men who have, until now, supported the regency, the only complete and enduring reform, the only one which could place all others on a solid basis, and assure them a sufficient guarantee, is the establishment of a representative system.

The natural results of this fatal discord between the system adopted by the regency, and the almost unanimous conviction of its adherents, speedily manifested themselves.

To the anxious welcome with which it was at first hailed, has succeeded a feeling of suspicion, undoubtedly unjust, but extremely difficult to assuage. Authority has lost its action. Even at Madrid, its orders are with difficulty executed. In the provinces, the captains-general most devoted to the Queen's cause, have found it necessary for her service, and not to exasperate the disturbed and discontented populations, to act, in a manner, independently, and to pay no attention to the instructions they receive.

Encouraged by these symptoms of weakness and anarchy, the partisans of the Pretender raise their heads. In the

districts from whence they have never been completely expelled, they increase in number and audacity. Their progress even threatens to extend to points where, at the outset, their attempts failed.

To contend against their numerous bands, to accomplish their extinction, the army, despite its loyalty, is evidently too weak, and the exhausted state of the treasury, unfortunately, does not permit the frame-work to reach the necessary expansion. An energetic union of the Queen's friends could alone supply this deficiency. It is enough to say how much we deplore the causes which, up to this moment, have rendered this union impossible, and which, detaching towards other prepossessions the thoughts and efforts of the constitutionalists, have left the field open to their bitterest enemies.

We had reason to think, for the last two months, that these causes were about to disappear. When the Regent, yielding to an imperious necessity, determined to dismiss M. de Zéa, when she called to her councils men whose names awakened powerful sympathies, the enthusiasm and hopes which then displayed themselves seemed to restore to power all its moral strength.

Unhappily these sentiments, which attached themselves even less to the persons of the new ministers than to the idea of which they were looked upon as representatives, were soon suffered to waste away. When days, weeks, and whole months passed on, and no official manifestation announced to Spain an actual change of system, astonishment sprang up at these delays and this silence. Fears arose that all was to be again placed in question. Injurious suspicions pervaded the public mind, and the accusations that resounded assumed a more serious character than those which had within two months displaced M. de Zéa. At that period, in fact, the attack was confined to the ministry, to which was imputed the only obstacle which shackled the benevolent and liberal action

of an august will. To-day—I speak it with sorrow—complaints are directed against a higher source.

The evil I am now pointing out is great indeed; it may become irreparable if suffered to increase.

It would be vain to expect that public impatience could be calmed by these ameliorations of detail, and by reforms similar to those I have now recapitulated. Such means, which were unsuccessful when hearts were less open to hope, must fail completely at the present crisis. Uneasy and suspicious as minds now are, they would see in concessions thus successively yielded, nothing but artifices intended to abuse them. Far from feeling the slightest gratitude, they would irritate themselves more and more with what they would interpret as a fresh symptom of fear and bad faith. Royalty would become weaker through its own benefactions, and when finally determined to enter on a new course, would cease to retain the strength necessary to follow it to a successful end. Perseverance in such a system would be to accelerate its own ruin, and to expose itself gratuitously to great dangers which may yet be avoided.

Let the Regent then hasten to escape from the false position in which she finds herself involved; let her adopt, finally, a plan of conduct calculated to settle all these doubts, to rally round her all reasonable spirits, and to secure to the government the confidence it so imperatively needs. Perhaps it still preserves the requisite authority for decreeing firmly and maturely, according to the inspirations of prudence, the changes to be effected in the institutions of the country. A little later, this liberty may escape from it, and public opinion, more exacting as it becomes more suspicious, would impose its own law. New delays, instead of diminishing the difficulties which press so exclusively, would serve only to aggravate them. These difficulties, besides, are more formidable than the Spanish government appears disposed to consider them. It is, unquestionably, an arduous as well as

a great and noble task to regenerate a nation by modifying its legislature. But we believe that the dangers of such an enterprise are singularly exaggerated when an attempt is made to confound the present epoch with former ones, the conditions of which were absolutely different,—those of 1812 and 1820.

In the first place, sufficient regard is not paid to the disposition of minds. In 1812 and 1820, ideas of innovation existed only in a small number of heads who ill comprehended them, exaggerated them in consequence, and with this dangerous prepossession gave themselves up to the most unlimited utopianisms.

To-day the so-called party of reform has been instructed by the experience of its errors and the misfortunes to which they have led. By becoming moderate, and by rejecting impracticable theories, it has fortified itself with the adhesion of a great number of men whom its extravagance alone had estranged. It is now at once active and more numerous: its moral and material strength have increased together.

In 1812 the monarchy was absent; in 1820 it was vanquished and captive. All was carried on without it, in spite of it, against it, because there was a rooted determination to consider it hostile to liberty, and a predominant dread of placing it in a position to overthrow the constitution.

There is nothing similar in the situation of the existing government. Far from being considered as the natural adversary of reform and rational liberty, every one knows that their causes are inseparably united; that it will fall with them; that it has itself taken the initiative in ameliorations: all, notwithstanding the suspicions which begin to break forth, are disposed to leave to it this free action. Nothing is required but increased activity.

We find here, Count, great advantages and a vast superiority of position. Royalty has never ceased to be powerful in Spain, more so, perhaps, than in any other part of Europe; it

is therefore called upon to yield something to the general movement of the human mind, and to seek new supports in place of those which time has broken. But these supports would become useful and effective instruments when accepted with frankness and without mental reservation. It is not in Spain that monarchy has to fear abolition. For a long time to come the Spanish people will see in their sovereigns the direct representatives of divinity; for a long time they will be the objects of a kind of worship which could not be attacked with impunity; and if, under the late reigns, this enthusiastic sentiment has appeared to suffer a momentary check, it is because the princes to whom it was applied have seemed to forget that such homage rendered by a nation so noble, demands in return from him who receives it, not only generous and warm-hearted feelings, but requires to be encouraged by external evidences of that simple and exalted majesty, those rigid habits, perhaps verging on austerity, which in former ages have characterised the most illustrious predecessors of Queen Isabella.

I have now explained to your Excellency the aspect in which we regard the actual condition of Spain. You have been already instructed several times to speak in this sense to the Regent's ministers. It is now the intention of the King and his council that you should communicate directly with her Catholic Majesty, to whose reading you may even submit the present despatch. The Queen will undoubtedly recognize in such a step a new pledge of the tender affection of which the King, her uncle, has already given her so many proofs, an additional evidence of the friendly sentiments which have so long united France and Spain, rendered still more ardent by recent events which have blended the interests of the two states. She will understand how weighty existing circumstances appear to us, when the French government, so careful of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, has ventured to tender such pressing advice to Spain.

The considerations you are instructed to lay before her Catholic Majesty are those which we believe the best calculated to make an impression upon her heart, because they are drawn from the internal state, and in accordance with the wishes and wants of a people whose happiness is confided to her care. We might add, that in the interest even of the respect which Spain has a right to claim from foreign governments, the close of that system of temporization to which she is now subjected will be a wise and well-combined measure.

It would be fruitless, in dispute of this assumption, to allege the little sympathy of some of those governments with the principles laid down by the partisans of the Regent; it is not the less true that they look upon Spain, at present, as forced by her position to admit at least a portion of those principles; and that the power of the Regent will continue to retain, in their eyes, a provisional character, up to the period when it must submit to that condition of its existence. It is, therefore, certain, that the Spanish government, from the moment when it thus determines, will acquire more strength, and inspire more confidence, not only in its allies, but even with the states by which it is as yet unrecognised.

2. *The Same to the Same.*

March 19th, 1834.

The King has judged it proper to prescribe to you, under existing circumstances, a direct communication with Queen Christina. His Majesty thinks the time has come for making known openly to that Princess the impression with which we regard the situation of Spain; and our judgment on the course her government has pursued to this day. But in a despatch intended to be placed under the eyes of the Regent, it was impossible to include certain considerations, to describe particular views, without weakening the character

of a communication made in the King's own name. We, therefore, feel the propriety of leaving it to you to make a verbal exposition to Queen Christina of many observations and counsels, the effect of which may be the more impressive as being laid before her in the freedom of a confidential interview. It is thus, for instance, that in discussing the question of the Cortés, you will not omit to introduce the importance of offering, in the mode of forming the national representation, and particularly in the constitution of the higher Chamber, those guarantees of legal and regular independence, no less essential to the stability of the throne of the young Queen Isabella, than conformable with the principles of a wise and true liberty in the kingdom. On this point our opinion is known to you; you will, therefore, create the opportunity of imparting it to the Regent. You will equally have to show her how important it is that power should be composed of elements perfectly homogeneous. Until now, the composition of the cabinet has not presented this accordance of principles, this identity of views, without which, authority, divided and tortured into opposing interpretations, can have neither strength nor consideration. I shall not enlarge farther on this subject; your reports satisfy me that there is no occasion to suggest to you the arguments and opinions which we desire to impress on the attention of Queen Christina.

In conclusion, it is not our wish that you should maintain any mystery with M. de la Rosa as to the general character and spirit of the step which the King prescribes to you.

No. V.

(Page 110.)

The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.

Count, *Paris, 23rd May,* 1835.

I have received the despatches you have done me the honour to write, up to No. 32 inclusive. The King's government has learnt, with a sentiment of much pain, the disorders which agitated Madrid on the day of the 11th inst., and which have again called forth the courage and self-possession of M. Martinez de la Rosa.

It was easy to foresee that the late events in Navarre, by deceiving the hopes which had been founded on General Valdes for the conclusion of the civil war, would augment in Spain the number of advocates for French intervention. Minds are naturally led, when difficult circumstances continue, to adopt the means which promise the readiest termination, without troubling themselves much as to the inconveniences they produce in other respects. What most surprises us is that men so enlightened as the Regent's ministers should suffer themselves to be led to participate in this impression.

I am disinclined at present to decide absolutely on the question of intervention; it has not been formally proposed, and consequently the council has not been called upon to discuss it. If it should present itself hereafter, our determination would be guided by an estimate of the circumstances which have rise to it; but without anticipating eventualities,

I feel it my duty, at present, to direct your attention to the serious objections which such a measure would excite.

The Regent's ministers cannot be ignorant how unpopular the idea of intervention is in France. Without speaking of the obstacles it would encounter from the passions of the different parties, the mass of the nation, prepossessed with unfortunate reminiscences, would only recognise in it an opportunity for new expences and inextricable embarrassments; and the King's government, supposing it possible not to regard this repugnance, would incur a responsibility the more onerous that it would have no confidence in the success of the enterprise for which it would consent to the risk.

In England, a serious opposition of a totally different character would be declared against the march of a French army beyond the Pyrenees. Nothing, perhaps, would be better calculated to revive the old national jealousies. The ministry in office, whatever might be its personal dispositions, would see itself compelled to adopt the public sentiment, and if disposed to resist it, it is more than probable that the weak majority on which it relies would speedily give way; that an administration taken from other ranks would come into power; and to obey the impulse which had carried it there, would commence by breaking the salutary alliance which at this moment unites England to France and Spain.

It is not less evident that the other powers would regard this intervention with at least equal displeasure; and without openly resenting it, would strive to embarrass us in the complications which the general position of Europe might easily originate. Undoubtedly this consideration would not of itself restrain us, but, combined with all those I have pointed out, it has also a certain weight.

I need not add that the intervention condemned in France and England by public opinion, and rejected in the rest of Europe by the policy of the cabinets, would find in Spain itself a number of opponents; that it would take, in appear-

ance, from the Queen's government the character of nationality, which is the first of moral forces; and that, on the contrary, it would strengthen the party of Don Carlos, by supplying it with an opportunity of presenting itself as the defender of the independence of the country.

An absolute necessity alone could explain why the Spanish cabinet should determine to brave such consequences by calling in the aid of a French army. If it had lost all hope of pacifying Navarre through its own efforts; if it had reason to believe its existence threatened by the progress of the insurrection, we might then understand that in despair of the cause it would be driven to appeal to such an extreme resource. Fortunately, matters are far removed from that emergency.

The Queen's authority has not ceased to be acknowledged throughout nearly the whole monarchy. Almost everywhere the attempts in favour of the Pretender have been vigorously put down. Some small mountainous districts alone, situated at one extremity of the Peninsula, have been able until now, owing to the difficulties of the ground and the well-known energy of the inhabitants, to maintain themselves in a state of revolt which applies more to particular and local grievances than to the common interests of the country at large. A skilful leader has there united, independently of the volunteers who casually swell his numbers, ten or twelve thousand men, organized with some degree of regularity, although badly armed; he has also at his disposal two hundred horses and nine pieces of cannon.

With this force, and relying, moreover, on the sympathies of the population, he has, up to this period, been able to repulse the attacks of more numerous troops, but chiefly composed of young, inexperienced soldiers, engaged in positions where numbers are of little importance, and cavalry and artillery are almost useless. But it is evident that were he to emerge from his mountains, he would lose the advantages from which he

derives superiority, and that he would find himself abandoned by the greater portion of his companions in arms: the Navarrese and Biscayans in particular, exclusively attached to their soil and institutions, and accustomed from time immemorial to consider themselves a distinct people from the rest of Spain, would certainly refuse to fight at a distance from their homes, for a cause which could no longer be that of their franchises and privileges.

Zumalacarreguy, even if so disposed, would fail to draw them to Castille; and he is not likely to form such a wish; for he well understands that in the midst of the vast plains which cover that country, his hopes of success would be materially diminished.

The insurrection in Navarre and Biscay, therefore, has nothing in it which directly threatens the throne of Queen Isabella. Undoubtedly, by the moral effect it produces throughout Spain, it constitutes a danger I do not pretend to disavow; it keeps up a baneful agitation; it revives the hopes of parties, and their dependence on the chances of events. It is both important and pressing to bring it to an end: but once more, the state of things does not assume the character of that desperate urgency which no longer permits a choice of means; and the despondency which might induce the Queen's government to proclaim its own impotence by a demand for our intervention would in no manner be justified.

We are certainly not inclined to refuse the assistance and succour which we are able to afford, without compromising at once ourselves and our allies. Between an armed interference and what we have already done, there are intermediate steps which might reconcile many difficulties. It belongs not to the King's government to point these out to the cabinet of Madrid; we might be erroneous judges of what the necessities of the position require and admit. But if, laying aside all notions of direct intervention, which nothing could sanction at this moment, the Spanish ministry were to apply to us

with confidence to take part in its views and exigencies, if it would indicate what it thinks we could effect, the question would present itself under a totally different aspect. What we ask of it, above all, is not to take from the cause of the young Queen the features of independence and nationality; and that the employment of the resources which the government may obtain from its allies should be directed by none but *Spanish* hands.

Whatever may be the propositions which Spain might judge fitting to be made to us, it would be essential that she should communicate them at the same time to the other two powers who took part in the treaty of the 22nd of April, and that in some degree she should also obtain their concurrence, or, at least, that of England. All that tends to place beyond doubt the maintenance of that treaty, and to connect with it the consequences of the measures that might be adopted, would be sound policy. The reasons are so evident that I do not think it necessary to detail them.

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2. *The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.*

Count, *Paris, July 14th*, 1835.

I have received the despatches you have done me the honour to write under the dates of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of July.

The King's government sees with regret that at Madrid an erroneous idea is still entertained of the nature of the motives which have induced us to refuse direct intervention in the affairs of Spain. Owing to a false interpretation of the terms in which that refusal was expressed, they seem resolved to look upon it as merely a provisional adjournment. They appear to think that a closer investigation of the state of the Peninsula, and more pressing instances on the part of the Spanish

cabinet, would induce us, in the actual state of things, to rescind our determination.

This is a mistake which it becomes important to rectify. Undoubtedly, the King's government does not propose to establish the absolute doctrine of non-intervention in all cases whatever. It has no desire to lay down in principle that there might not have been and never may be circumstances in which intervention would be reciprocally advantageous to France and Spain, and therefore legitimate. It is for the reservation of eventualities, entirely hypothetical, that we have given our refusal the circumspection which has deceived the Spanish cabinet. But such has been our only object; and it would be a great mistake to apply in any other sense the expressions we have used.

It is necessary that this should be clearly understood. Before pausing on the resolution adopted, we had carefully examined all sides of the question. We calculated every possible and probable chance, and it is only after the maturest deliberation that our choice has bounded itself by the measure which we consider, not exempt from all serious inconveniences, but subjected to less weighty objections than any of the others proposed.

It would, therefore, be useless, by any considerations of detail, drawn from the particular position of the Spanish government, to attempt to shake our decision. Besides that such considerations change nothing in the nature of the question, and that they merge more or less in those which have already been presented to us, they could not, evidently, prevail against motives founded on the most essential interests of France.

Any fresh insistance on this point would therefore be worse than futile. All that tends to prolong the illusion of the Spanish government, and induces it to make new efforts with this object, could have no other result than to induce mutually unpleasant explanations, and at the same time to impress on

its proceedings, the uncertainty so strongly calculated to paralyze all vigorous determination; to prevent it from employing with advantage the real resources of which it can dispose, as well as those we offer, and to retain it in the deceitful expectations of an assistance it cannot receive.

It rests with you, Count, to call back the cabinet of Madrid to a more just appreciation of the true state of things. I cannot too strongly recommend you to use your utmost efforts to effect this object.

No. VI.

(Page 127.)

To M. Guizot, Deputy, Paris.

Sir, *Algiers, May 27th,* 1836.

The colonists of Algeria remember with gratitude that during the dangers which last year so formidably threatened their existence, your credit and the power of your eloquence decided the success of their cause, which you identified with that of France. They then devoted themselves to their labours, animated by hope, the nourisher of new-born establishments, and the only incentive that can promote the entire development of colonization. When, subsequently, between the interval of the two sessions, the adversaries of the colony announced fresh hostilities, our confidence in the interest you had evinced prevented us at first from entertaining serious alarm. Moreover, how could we persuade ourselves that after the solemn recognition of our possessions in Africa, they would, in the following year, renew the attacks against which a colony more securely established than ours would find it difficult to oppose effectual defence? Despite our hopes, we are again compelled to combat, and we have recourse to our former defenders. The Colonial Society, whose solicitude extends to everything which involves the general interest, is too strongly impressed with the influence of your advocacy, not to intreat you to repeat in the tribune the arguments of reason and experience, which from your lips have already obtained such signal success in our

favour. Our gratitude and acknowledgments will be but feeble returns for all we owe you; but the glory of bringing triumph to a cause so dear to the country and to humanity, is a noble and estimable reward, sufficient to satisfy great minds, and which men of elevated thought have ever desired to win.

We have the honour to forward to you such details as we have been able to collect on the progress of the colony, convinced that your ability will induce a conviction of their value, and that the vote of the Chamber, while dissipating our apprehensions, will consolidate our future, and afford you an additional triumph.

Deign to accept, Sir, the assurance of our highest consideration.

FILHON, President.
ROSEY, Vice-President.
CH. SOLVET, Vice-President.

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2. *The Same to the Same.*

Sir, *Algiers, June 29th,* 1836.

In the debate in the Chamber of Deputies which determines, as we hope at least, the fate of the colony of Algiers, and attaches it irrevocably to the mother-country, your speeches, equally wise and benevolent, have convinced us that we had good reason to found our hope on your patriotism and eloquence. With such an ally we are henceforward confident of the future. The Colonial Society, powerfully moved at the news of the success of the cause of Algeria, forgets not to whom it owes its triumph, and hastens to offer you the testimony of its gratitude. It takes pride in enumerating you amongst the firmest supporters of a colony, the importance of which

to France and to humanity you have so completely recognised.

Deign, Sir, to accept the assurance of our highest consideration. The President of the Colonial Society,

FILHON.
ROSEY, First Vice-President.
SOLVET, Vice-President.

No. VII.

(Page 141.)

Account of the Abbey of Val-Richer.

(Taken from the *History of the Diocese of Bayeux*, by M. Hermant, parish priest of Saint Pierre de Malbot: a work commenced in 1705, and ended in 1726. It forms three volumes in folio, the first of which only has been printed; the second and third, in manuscript, are in the library of Caen.)

"The church of Val-Richer can boast that, under the rule of Abbot Robert, the first of that name, Thomas-à-Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury and Chancellor of England (who received the crown of martyrdom in 1170), when flying from the anger of his Prince, sought refuge there for a considerable time, wearing the habit of the Cistercians, which he had received from the hands of the sovereign pontiff; occupying himself, like the other monks, in prayer, in manual labour, in vigils, and in all the painful exercises of penitential and monastic life. They even preserved there the sacred ornaments he was accustomed to use in the holy sacrifice of the mass, as precious relics; but they were despoiled by the barbarities which the Calvinists exercised in 1562 on all that was worthy of respect and veneration. The spot is still shown in a small wood adjoining the abbey, where he often retired to occupy himself in the contemplation of heavenly matters."

No. VIII.

(Page 148.)

1. *The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Count de Rayneval at Madrid.*

Count, *Paris, December 12th,* 1835.

I see by your despatch of the 4th of December, No. 96, that M. de Mendizabal was on the eve of concluding with Mr. Villiers a treaty of commerce, and that the greater part of the articles were already drawn up. On this occasion you ask me to acquaint you immediately with the intentions of the King's government. I shall without delay forward to you detailed instructions on the subject. But it appears to me that in the mean time you can positively demand from M. de Mendizabal (with reservation), the clause in our treaties with Spain, which assures to us the treatment of the most favoured nation. This clause is formal and peremptory, and gives us the right of openly claiming for ourselves all the advantages which may be awarded to England in the convention of which you have apprised me. Accept, &c.

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2. *The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Count de Rayneval, at Madrid.*

Count, *Paris, December 19th,* 1835.

I have received the despatches you have done me the honour to write, up to No. 98 inclusive.

The King's government gives the fullest approbation to

the measure you have adopted to prevent French interests from being injured by the arrangements in negotiation between Spain and England. You have well understood that to prevent such an untoward result, it would not suffice to associate ourselves, after the treaties which secure to us the privileges of the most favoured nation, with the stipulations accorded to England; that thus an apparent equality could, in fact, be nothing more than the most absolute inequality; and that this hypothesis would become, for instance, a reality in cases where a reduction of duties would bear on produce belonging exclusively, or only partially, to British manufacture. Such reductions ought evidently to be balanced by others, of which French merchandize would be the object in turn. I am led to believe that such is the sense of the promise contained in M. de Mendizabal's note, and my answer conveys this to him. In fact, it would be an insult to his loyalty to suppose that, under the appearance of a declaration satisfactory to us, he has simply accorded a guarantee absolutely deceptive, and so much the more superfluous that, as I have just remarked, it is explicitly contained in the treaties which give us a right to demand the usage of the most favoured nation.

I am far, moreover, from thinking that this is an opportune moment for concluding the commercial negotiations entered upon at Madrid. The simple fact of their existence has already given, in France, an unfavourable confirmation to the opinion, which, from the first moment, represented M. de Mendizabal as inclined to rely on the support of England, and to direct all his combinations with this tendency. The only method of gradually doing away with these impressions, would be to abandon altogether the negotiations in question. It will be fruitless to say that when terminated, their result will dissipate uneasiness, and tranquillize suspicions, by proving that they have been conducted in a spirit equally favourable to all the allies of Spain.

Whatever may be the result, whatever care may be taken to establish in the modifications introduced into the tariff of customs, an equal balance between English and French interests, this equality will not be sufficiently evident to prevent complaint on the part of those on either side, who, right or wrong, would believe themselves injured. We may be sure that our southern departments, which already submit impatiently to the sacrifices imposed on their commerce by the aid we lend to the cause of Queen Isabella, would eagerly receive the reports spread by malevolence or prejudice as to the damage, perhaps imaginary, of which these innovations would become, in their eyes, the source. The animated disputes already excited in our journals of the South by the imprudent as well as unjust recriminations indulged in at Madrid, against the pretended facilities accorded to smuggling in favour of Don Carlos, would speedily assume an additional character of violence. More than ever the King's government would be accused, in that particular, of sacrificing the commerce of France to that of England, by attaching itself too scrupulously to the observance of the clauses in the convention of the 22nd of April, and the additional articles; and perhaps would soon find itself incapable of resisting demands which would base themselves, in part at least, on the wounded sentiment of national pride; it might even be constrained, if not to abandon, at least to modify, the line of conduct, which its sincere attachment to the cause of the Queen has, up to this period, enabled it to follow in the midst of so many difficulties.

It is for M. Mendizabal to judge whether it is desirable to provoke such eventualities by measures which the interest of Spain assuredly does not call for at this moment, and which that of England may the more readily permit to be postponed in the present state of the Peninsula, as the scale of customs, whatever may be its proscriptions, opposes no very formidable barriers to the movements

of commerce. I beg you will draw the attention of the minister to this point. Repeat to him emphatically that he would vainly flatter himself with the hope of obviating the inconveniencies I have pointed out, by granting us advantages equal to those conceded to England. Such an equality not being capable of mathematical demonstration, the blindness of passions and interests would ever be prepared to deny it. . . . . .

No. IX.

(Page 179.)

Speech of M. Guizot, Minister of Public Affairs, on the reopening of the Lectures of the Normal School.

Gentlemen, *Paris, Oct. 21st,* 1836.

After the flattering Report which has just been read, I have only to congratulate myself and you on the state of the school.

In every department, both as regards discipline and study, progress, gradually more marked during six years, is newly confirmed and developed. I have no encouragement higher than this to offer you. Such a well-merited result is a recompence for the noblest efforts. Your present life, gentlemen, is extremely toilsome; your labours are silent and almost obscure; but your future is full of greatness. Yes, gentlemen, of greatness; I use the word designedly. A double career awaits you. On leaving this school you will proceed to teach in our establishments of public instruction what you learn here to-day; and you will not only teach, but you will do so in the name of the state, appointed by it, and holding from that source your mission. This principle, on which the existence even of the University is based, will take root and extend itself more and more in our institutions and our laws. It presides at present over the whole system of elementary instruction. It is consecrated and explained in the new propositions of which secondary education has

already been made the object. It will obtain, I feel confident, in our plan of superior teaching, the same place and the same empire. It alone can establish truly national education, real public instruction, while, at the same time, it harmonizes wonderfully with the rights of liberty. You will speak and act, gentlemen, in the name of this principle, and your presence will infuse into it the authority, stability, and dignity which emanate from public power, and expand over all who speak and act as its representatives.

This is not all, gentlemen, neither does teaching include your whole career. To you also, to a certain extent, the state confides the disinterested culture of letters, science, philosophy, history, of all branches of intellectual activity. You are not alone charged to distribute, through instruction, the riches already acquired by the human mind: you are called to increase them. Those great literary and scientific works, that continued search after truth, which formerly occupied so many learned societies, so many illustrious corporations, to-day especially belong to you;—you are appointed to gather in this noble inheritance. In the midst of the perpetually increasing empire of special destinations and professions which characterizes our modern society, your particular avocation is intellectual life, the pure love and free culture of truth and knowledge. Their future conquests belong to your domain, as well as the direction of those which they possess already. There are, I know not how many unknown glories awaiting you, and these, I feel assured, you will take possession of, for France and for yourselves.

Have no doubt on the question, gentlemen. This double object of your existence, this double career opened before you, will extend from day to day your own importance and that of the school. The actual modesty of your lives and labours will not extinguish their importance. Remain modest, and, nevertheless, confident in your destiny. Entertain wise pretensions and elevated thoughts; you have a right

to do so. I cannot take upon myself to guarantee the accomplishment of the legitimate desires of your honourable principal for the distinct, definitive, and adequate establishof this great seminary; but I shall devote myself to it with my utmost power; and be assured that sooner or later you will obtain it. The Normal School will take too strong a hold in France, for France to abstain from giving it on our soil and in our streets the position it requires.

No. X.

(Page 196.)

General Count de Damrémont to M. Guizot.

Marseilles, Dec. 10th, 1836.

Sir and Minister,

I have forwarded an account to the government of the mission I undertook by its order, to Marshal Clauzel; but the particular interest you evinced in that mission, which you were kind enough to impart to me at the moment of my taking leave, and which you also entertain for the fate of our possessions in Africa, make it my duty to communicate to you directly the results of my voyage to Algeria. I am, moreover, encouraged by the kindness with which you have always received my remarks on the questions connected with this important subject.

You have, without doubt, been made acquainted with my reports to the minister of War. I have drawn up, as far as depended on myself and my position allowed, an exact description of the state of affairs; and as that state is partly to be ascribed to the system hitherto adopted, and partly to the men who exercise it, I have found it necessary to speak equally of persons and things. This duty has been frequently a painful one, for there were sad revelations to be made.

Moreover, I have said little that was not known before. Public notoriety had quite recognised these imputations, more or less precise in character; and in the greater number

of cases I have only added a more direct and authentic testimony to those already supplied.

You will appreciate the motives which, even with you, and in this entirely confidential communication, restrain me from pressing on details of a certain order, to occupy myself exclusively with the system adopted in Africa, and with that which it would be desirable to substitute in this place.

I have already had the honour to lay before you my ideas on this point, and the satisfaction of finding that they met your approbation and were entirely in conformity with your own personal views. All that I have seen and heard in Africa, all that I have been able to collect, has served only to confirm and render more profound my conviction that the only system capable of producing fruits is that of a restrained, progressive occupation, pacific in its spirit, such as you have so well conceived and repeatedly proclaimed in the Chambers.

To establish ourselves first at Algiers, and on the most important points of the coast or territory; to select those points sparingly, following the nature and configuration of the ground they command, and the facilities of defending and cultivating them, such as Algiers and Bona; or being guided by their topographical position, if favourable to relations with the interior of the country, and to the influences desirable to create and exercise them, as at Oran; to settle in these localities firmly, powerfully, and permanently, and to convert each into an essential French territory.

To open to colonization all that can be protected, but effectually and continually protected; to attract capital and industry by the most infallible of all encouragements, the most powerful of guarantees,—material security; to create populations of European race, connected with us by blood and community of interest; to make these populations centres of power, and by and by of wealth, on which we may found and at all times rest our action over the remainder of the country.

Through these, to form amicable relations with the indigenous inhabitants, purchase their commodities, and stimulate them to exertion by opening a market to their produce; to incline them to labour by the allurement of profit to which they are extremely sensible; to attach them to the soil by proprietorship and material interests; to see them, under the spur of these interests, mingle with us, improve their cultivation, their habits, and their industry, in imitation of ours; to impregnate them gradually with our customs, manners, and civilization; and to lead them to submit themselves to us, as much from their own wants as from a dread of our power.

To join thus agricultural colonization, where it can be established under assured protection, to commercial colonization in all quarters where the inhabitants are willing to barter their goods for ours; to reconcile the conquered with the conquering population, by giving them the means of living side by side in the interchange of mutual services: — such is a summary of this system which, in my opinion, is founded on a correct estimate of things as they exist, and which, to ensure success, requires application, consistency, and steady perseverance.

Thus conceived, the occupation may be accomplished with the means which the Chambers seem resolved to devote to that object. As economy is a primary advantage, it is also one which escapes the discussions invariably attendant on a demand for fresh sacrifices, and which incessantly hold the fate of the colony in a precarious condition.

We shall only occupy what we can keep and defend. But by proportioning the occupation to the forces we may have at disposal, and by concentrating those forces on the small number of fixed points, on those points we shall be masters. On all the others we shall act and influence by information, exercised with care, in turning to advantage the numerous divisions amongst the indigenous septs, and the frequent rivalries between the chiefs; by means of temptation judiciously employed; and, if necessary, by force of arms,

confined, of course, to the most serious cases, when the question may be to chastise a hostile or to protect a friendly tribe. But by no longer carrying on a war of conquest, the occasions for an appeal to force will be rare, and when we hold the natives by the bonds of their material interests, we shall retain a powerful means of action; and a simple threat to break off mutual relations and close our markets would keep them in a state of wholesome apprehension.

Meanwhile, our establishment in Africa will take root in the soil; it will assume a fixed character, and will produce within an approximate time substantial results, the reward and absolution for sacrifices already made, and an encouragement for others to be risked in future.

To appreciate more clearly these ideas, we must look at the effects of different notions in the mode of their application to the colony of Algeria.

Military expeditions have been multiplied, and many towns taken; the greater portion of which were speedily abandoned, and as speedily the enemy, who had been driven out, resumed possession of them. We occupied Bougia, we left there a numerous garrison, we constructed magnificent military works at an enormous expense. What do they protect? what do they defend? We placed a force at Tlemcen; it is blocked up in the Casbah. Of what use is it? But this garrison, five hundred in number, requires every six months an expedition to revictual it. At this moment a new expedition of five thousand men is about to leave Oran with all the chances of war, and in an execrable season, to carry supplies to the five hundred at Tlemcen.

But these different expeditions, which have cost so many men destroyed by the enemy or by the diseases of the climate, and the enormous expenditure of matériel in enterprises which have left no result even when successful, have they, at least, produced a salutary influence on the minds of the natives? Have they increased security in the places origi-

ginally occupied? On the contrary, the natives attack us with undiminished audacity and inveteracy at Oran, at Bona, and at Algiers itself. The radius sheltered from their attacks becomes daily more restricted. Two years ago we could travel without danger to a distance of twelve leagues from Algiers and fifteen from Bona. At present it is difficult to go beyond the walls with impunity, and our perpetual incursions, while they irritate the Arabs, remove from them all idea of peace and friendly understanding, and keep them in a constant spirit of hostility and warfare.

To-day we march on Constantine; but Constantine taken, what will be done next? A French garrison might be left there, but to support that garrison the same course will be adopted as at Tlemcen; a strong corps must be established at Bona, which every six months will have to place itself in movement to revictual the garrison of Constantine.

To keep up such a system, fifty thousand men, at least, would be required; but having only limited resources, and wishing to occupy too many points at a time, we are compelled to send in one direction the troops required for another, and thus to endanger the disarmed post. The natives then resume their courage and return; the colonists, if any have establishments there, become alarmed, and fall into helpless despondency. In no quarter is there stability or safety, and day by day all has to be commenced anew.

To go to Constantine, Algiers was stripped, and the Arabs immediately appeared upon the walls. If they knew how to combine, and were well commanded, this imprudence might have led to a lamentable result. Algiers has thus been compromised. What will the taking of Constantine produce as an equivalent for so great a risk, and what has been gained by the capture of Bougia, Tlemcen, Mascara, and Médéah? A heavy loss of men and money, perpetual occasions for expenditure, but nothing for the progress of our settlement in Africa.

These opinions are those of all in Algeria who have any

knowledge of the correct state of things, and have carried into that country thoughts of the future, or interests unconnected with intrigue.

The last expedition has been looked upon with much pain. Deep regret is expressed at this perseverance in a system, the disastrous effects of which the residents are in a better position of estimating than any one else.

I cannot refrain from my own observations on the subject. This expedition will add one more to the difficulties of a return to the only direction which I consider reasonable and sound. The occupation of Tlemcen, Bougia, and so many other points is incompatible with that course, and are difficulties in substantial existence. To abandon these posts would be dangerous: on the one hand, as regards the natives, who, seeing in that retreat an evidence of our weakness and uncertainty, would redouble their boldness; on the other, as regards public opinion in France, which is often highly susceptible, but with little intelligence.

If we do not take care, every day will add to difficulties of this character.

The actual state of things in Algeria presents this singular anomaly. The government conceived the occupation under a special point of view. The person who represents the government at Algiers, and who is delegated to carry out its idea, has himself regarded the occupation in an entirely different aspect, so that the execution is a secret but perpetual struggle with the superior thought which is supposed to direct. But as the agent in Africa has the advantage of position, and it is through his reports that the government receives its information, he naturally presents it in a sense favourable to his personal connections, and the government finds itself reduced, without its own knowledge, to act contrary to its own intentions. If it resists, public opinion is brought into the question. Now, you, sir, are well aware how readily public opinion allows itself to be prejudiced, and becomes a panic

to which concessions are often yielded and afterwards regretted.

This is precisely the case with the expedition to Constantine. It has been loudly proclaimed, it has been sedulously repeated that it was necessary, and thus it has been allowed to take its course. But from this necessity others will spring up, and from concession to concession the government may find itself led on to such a point as to be unable to retrace its steps, and will be reduced to choose between these two alternatives,—to embark completely in a system which is not its own, is disastrous, and demanding incalculable sacrifices, and to consent to those sacrifices—or to abandon the colony altogether.

I have told the government my opinion on the expedition to Constantine, as much on the very equivocal necessity and utility of the enterprise, as on the danger of undertaking it at such a period. I have even expressed serious apprehensions as to its result, while deploring the departure of the Duke of Nemours. Unhappily, the reports spread within the last few days, and the echo of which must have reached Paris while I am writing, have already given a confirmation to my words far exceeding what I anticipated, but which I trust will not be verified.

These reports, the prolonged absence of news from the expeditionary force, the anxiety thereby produced, the demonstrations recently made by the Arabs under the walls of Algiers, and the consequent alarm,—all these circumstances have revived the interest attached to the African question. The session of the Chambers being about to open under the influence of so many painful prepossessions, it is probable that this feeling may re-exhibit itself in the debate on the address.

The African question principally affects you as a personal consideration. As you said to me, it is your individual affair. It will therefore be upon you that the weight will fall of

replying to the questions of which it cannot fail to be the subject, and of calming the uncertainties which recent events have cast upon the destiny of our possessions.

You will have once more to declare the formal and irrevocable intentions of the government, for such is the fatality attached to this question, despite the assurances given every year, that each annual debate renews the necessity of their repetition. The declarations of Marshal Soult did not exempt M. Thiers, and those of M. Thiers will not enfranchise you. It seems, in defiance of so many restricted announcements, and of time itself, that this matter is to remain ever in dispute.

It is not that the country doubts the sincerity of the words addressed to it, or the intentions of the government. But seeing that nothing yet corroborates these words and intentions; that the despatch of troops and expeditions increases; that expenses accumulate without positive progress; and that, on the contrary, things seem to recede rather than to advance; not perceiving anything indicative of establishment in future, it demands a guarantee for these solemn declarations which it fails to discover in facts, and which, without the support of facts, will ever prove insufficient.

On the present occasion, the declaration of the government passing through your lips will derive new strength from the authority of your character. But to balance the baneful effect of what has recently happened in Africa, to do away with prepossessions, which, to speak without reserve, have been perfidiously entertained and encouraged, it is indispensable that this declaration should be as explicit in its terms as absolute in its sense. You will, therefore, sir and minister, be called upon to repeat openly that Africa is a part of France, and that the government is resolved to make all the necessary sacrifices to secure to the country the benefits which ought to accrue from that possession.

This declaration being made, perhaps it would be prudent

not to enter into the details of the restrictive system which the government might think it suitable to apply to Africa. The public in general have a confused idea of restrictions; they more readily grasp absolute ideas because they are more simple. If you speak of restriction, it will give rise to a reserved apprehension of abandonment; people will misinterpret the meaning of your words, as they did once before, when you spoke with so much justice, truth, and enlightenment on the Algerian question.

The system of occupation is more an executive fact, on which the Chamber is less inclined to interfere. The approbation it bestowed two years since on the principles laid before it on this point, did not prevent its acquittal of Marshal Clauzel for having deviated from these principles. This, therefore, is a matter to be reserved for the reports between the minister and the officer appointed to carry out his instructions,—the Chambers care only for the expenditure and the definitive result.

But considering the delicate position in which the African question is placed at this moment, it is important to say nothing which might be laid hold of to augment the suspicions to which the public mind is now inclined, and to discredit beforehand the measures which the government may adopt to lead the affairs of the colony to a better direction.

You will, I hope, Sir, excuse the freedom with which I address you on subjects respecting which you can have no better inspiration than your own judgment. But having recently returned from Algiers, and still retaining the impression of all I saw there, residing in a city closely connected with Africa by the multiplied ties of its interests and hopes, and where everything that passes on the opposite side of the Mediterranean is so directly echoed, I have thought that the information collected in this double position might have some value in your eyes. If I have deceived

myself, you will pardon me for an excess of interest in a subject to which I am strongly attached by the mission with which I have lately been charged, and the manner in which that trust was confided to me.

I beg, above all things, that you will find in my proceeding a token of high deference, and of the respect with which I have the honour to remain,

Sir and Minister,

Your very humble and most obedient Servant,

The Lieutenant-General, Peer of France,

(Signed) COMTE DAMRÉMONT.

No. XI.

(Page 218.)

Plan and Notes prepared for the Debate on the Bill for the Disjunction of Prosecutions in cases of crimes imputed to civil and military offenders.—1837.

Gentlemen,

A day will come when the causes which now divide us will have disappeared, when the passions which agitate us will be extinct, and what we now see and do will have passed into history.

People will then read that on emerging from a great revolution, after I know not how many riots, conspiracies, and insurrections, the government of France, her King, and her institutions, were attacked, in open day, in a fortified city, by soldiers who imprisoned their general, marched comrade against comrade, regiment against regiment, and that this military revolt was brought to judgment, and absolutely acquitted.

It will be read that this was neither an isolated fact nor a solitary instance of the weakness or insufficiency of the laws in similar or in analogous circumstances.

It will be read, that in presence of such facts, in the midst of such a position, the government demanded of the Chambers—what? exceptional laws, more rigorous penalties, extraordinary powers?—no; but simply the surrender of military traitors and rebels to military tribunals.

At the same time will be read an account of all the

indignation, invectives, extravagant accusations, and sinister predictions of which, on this occasion, and through this Bill, the government became the object.

Gentlemen, I do not hesitate to affirm that all this will neither be comprehended, explained, nor believed.

What is there, in fact, in the bill, which can, I will not say justify, but even account for these recriminations and this passion?

Nothing, gentlemen, absolutely nothing; nothing at least in the eyes of resolute spirits unclouded by prejudice.

Nothing contrary to essential rights, to reason, and to immutable justice.

I believe in a right anterior and superior to written rights, which precedes, but does not proceed from them. I wish this right to be respected on all occasions.

It is perfectly respected by the bill which consigns military offenders, in all cases when the military element predominates in the act, to military tribunals.

This jurisdiction is founded on reason. There is a special peculiarity in the position of the soldier.

In his offence there are two constitutive elements of crime: first, the moral wrong; and secondly, the social danger; both are quite distinct from the crimes committed by civilians.

The necessity of judges capable of fully appreciating these distinctions: 1. The moral wrong; 2. The social danger. That is to say, capable of rendering justice to the accused party and to society.

Hence the essential and rational legitimacy of military jurisdiction in military cases: it is thus natural and right.

It contains nothing contrary to constitutional right. I have a profound respect for the Charter. It contains nothing in opposition to this bill.

1. It plainly supports military jurisdiction, not as an exceptional procedure, but as ordinary justice in certain crimes committed by certain individuals. Nothing is exceptional

but what is transitory, which does not rest on a permanent and ever reasonable motive.

The military tribunals belong to ordinary justice, as do the tribunals of commerce and police.

2. But the Charter, it is said, assigns political crimes to the trial by jury.

What! To all criminals whatever, even when they are implicated in other offences?

Evidently not.

The exceptions are numerous with regard to persons. 1. Ministers; 2. Peers; 3. The jurisdiction of the Chambers and tribunals in certain cases of offence; 4. Certain attempts against the safety of the state.

All this is written in the Charter. But there is also here another consideration. Political offences committed by soldiers are always, or nearly always, mixed up with military crimes. Not only does the offence receive, from the quality of the offender, a totally different character, but it becomes complex, mixed; there are, in fact, two different crimes.

But supposing that these two crimes fall under different jurisdictions, which is to absorb or annul the other? Must one remain unpunished? or must it be punished by a jurisdiction to which it does not belong?

Comparative table of political and military offences, according to the two codes.

Evidently the Charter prescribes nothing as regards these mixed crimes, and it is perfectly according to law to remit them to military judges.

A thousand notions of public interest suggest the course.

3. The disjunction, that is to say, the removal of persons distinctly accused to their respective natural judges, is, on the other hand, a true and constitutional solution of the difficulty.

Until now, one jurisdiction has been absolutely sacrificed to the other; alternately the military to the civil, and the civil to the military.

In fact, the alternate struggle and triumph of two absolute principles has been for a long time the condition of France.

This presents a special feature: the invariable result has been anarchy or despotism.

There is neither true nor durable order, true nor durable liberty, except under the condition of accepting natural distinctions and their consequences. We cannot long or with impunity outrage facts and social necessities. Uniformity, that idea which, by a false air of greatness, seduces so many little minds, as Montesquieu says, has done much mischief in legislation, as in other matters, and has led to much disorder and oppression.

We ought to emerge from it whenever natural distinctions command. This is the true constitutional principle.

I hold the religion of the jury, not its superstition: no idols.

Nothing, then, either in natural or constitutional law rejects the bill.

4. A single principle is opposed to it: the indivisibility of prosecution, the connection of crimes.

The principle exists neither in natural nor in constitutional law. It is affirmed to be in the very necessity of things. I deny this.

Historical argument. This, it is said, is the constant, eternal principle of our legislation. An error. Variety of competency in courts, and, consequently, disjunction of causes, according to the quality and position of persons, is, on the contrary, the old European law.

1. Legislation and competency were at first exclusively personal and not actual. A law anterior to feudal law.

2. Under the feudal law, competency was founded on the quality of persons,—nobles, citizens, ecclesiastics,—each were remitted to their appropriate judges.

The connection of crimes and the indivisibility of prosecutions have been the means of which royalty, and the judicial

power emanating from that source, have very skilfully and happily availed themselves to struggle against all those varied jurisdictions proceeding from as many different pretensions to sovereignty, to abolish these last, and to establish amongst us that unity of nation, monarchy, power, and law, which has so much contributed to the strength and beauty of our civilization.

I never deny to my adversaries their share of truth. I reserve my own, and call upon the Chamber to weigh them together.

Indivisibility of prosecution has been thus introduced into our law and practice. This is its origin and the cause of its empire. It is not with us an eternally historical principle.

2. *Philosophic argument.* Not to enter too far into the question; a few fundamental observations.

When a crime is committed by several persons, two facts are essential:

1. The unity of the crime.
2. The diversity of the actors.

When I say *the unity of the crime,* the expression is too vague. There are in the crime as many facts, that is to say, as many crimes as there are authors or accomplices.

And these facts and crimes are as distinct as the criminals.

But I admit *the unity of the crime.*

Legislation and criminal prosecution may take for their point of departure, for their dominant idea and guiding rule, one of these two facts; — either the unity of the crime or the diversity of its authors.

Hence arise two different systems:

1. General and simultaneous prosecution.
2. Individual and successive prosecution.

And not only have these two systems been adopted, but they are still adopted and followed in practice. General and simultaneous prosecutions in France, individual and successive

prosecutions in England, at the selection of the accused, and usually adopted by them.*

And the choice between the two systems depends, above all, upon the idea formed of the situation of the accused, and of the method it suggests of discovering the truth.

In France it is especially from interrogating and confronting the accused that the discovery of the truth is expected. The accused are held as liars who must be brought to confession, and compelled to see the truth exhibited before them and through themselves.

Hence the necessity of general and simultaneous prosecution.

In England they do not look for the discovery of the truth to what can be extracted from the accused, to their avowals or contradictions. They are held as liars from whom no truth can be expected. The witnesses alone are relied on.

Hence the faculty and natural adoption of individual and successive prosecution.

The first plan possesses the advantage of placing crime in a more complete and evident light. It is more systematic and dramatic.

The second plan has the advantage of confining the accused within a narrower circle; of examining his case more specially; and of obtaining a more exact estimate of his share in the crime and of the consequent penalty.

I do not compare the two systems. I bring them together to discover their essential features. I show that both may flow from the nature of things; that both are practicable and practised; — with different consequences in the administration of justice, but which neither threaten nor change in the slightest degree justice itself.

I do not propose to abandon generally the system which

* *Translator's Note.*—A remarkable exception occurred in the case of Lord Cochrane, who chose to be included in the general indictment, and in some measure owed his conviction to that mistake.

has hitherto prevailed with us; despite its serious objections it has great advantages. I conclude only from all this, and I conclude with strong conviction, that if powerful motives, and motives of public interest recommend the proceeding, we may, in certain cases, depart from this system and renounce indivisibility of prosecution without offending either reason, justice, the Charter, or practical possibility.

Do these motives at present exist with us? Does the actual state of society and of facts recommend and require the bill? —Reply to M. Teste and to the taunt of alleging the necessity.

I. *Necessity of strengthening military jurisdiction.*

Why is the bill introduced on the occurrence of a fact? I have already answered this taunt on the occasion of the bills of September. A fact manifests a pre-existing social necessity; the public is impressed by it; the government then acts. Thus we proceed in free countries. This is a homage to the necessity of convictions and to the liberty of intelligence.

Progressive enfeeblement of military jurisdiction:

1. State of siege in 1832. Not to discuss the merit of that ordinance. Proposed law. Not enacted. Blank remaining to the detriment of military jurisdiction.

2. Change of jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal on the subject of decoying and kidnapping.

3. Verdict of Strasburg.

General consternation of the military chiefs. Loss of discipline; and, in effect:

1. The political offences of soldiers are essentially mixed up with the most serious military delinquencies, which are thus transferred to the trial by jury. The connection of persons carries soldiers before the jury. The connection of facts equally delivers them to military jurisdiction.

2. Simple military offences not mixed with political crimes will be handed over to the jury by the sole fact of civil complicity.

An evident weakening, almost a complete abolition of military jurisdiction, which is not alone compromised. Remind the Chamber of its own impressions on the news of the verdict. Necessity of long reminiscences, of profound impressions. This is true wisdom. Danger of improvidence and oblivion.

Necessity of restoring the military spirit.

There has been a talk of suspicion against the army.

A strange proof of suspicion to call upon it to judge itself.

In the army, as in all other departments, the government mistrusts the bad and confides in the good. This is its duty.

There, as elsewhere, it recognizes the well-disposed in a great majority.

But we must go farther and obtain a more complete account of the position of the army in society as it now exists.

1. The army is *national*, taken impartially and blindly from the bosom of the nation. The ideas, therefore, and differences of opinion which exist in the nation will be found again in the army. There will be republicans, legitimists, and an immense majority of the moderate party.

The military spirit will diminish, melt, and absorb many of these different shades. But they will still exist. We may believe this, and endeavour to regulate them.

We ought neither to be astonished nor uneasy at this fact, neither should we deny nor treat it lightly.

2. The army is *idle*, — we are at peace; we shall remain long at peace. Inaction furnishes to external attempts more power over the army, and more room for the non-military activity of its internal dispositions.

3. The army lives in the same atmosphere with the citizens, — surrounded by the publicity and liberty of the press; — there is no more of the isolation, of the special and cloistered life of the armies of earlier days. — Everything now

reaches the army, — everything acts upon it. — It lives under the same influences with society in general.

From all these new facts springs the enfeeblement of the military spirit, of that special and powerful spirit which stamps on the army ideas, sentiments and habits peculiar to itself.

I do not absolutely lament this change. It has its good and evil; it suppresses old dangers, but it creates new ones.

The absolute necessity of the military spirit:

1. For the power of the army abroad and in case of need. It is not number nor even ardour which constitutes the sole strength of the army. Its first power lies in the peculiar spirit, the energetic tastes, and deeply-rooted habits of the military vocation.

2. For the power and discipline of the army at home:

The military spirit is the first element of obedience and discipline in the army; even as penal enactments would prove insufficient without public morality, to maintain order in society, so the police courts and prisons would be unable, without the military spirit, to preserve discipline in the army.

3. The military spirit has an extremely beautiful moral code, necessary for its particular application, and the more so that the virtues it develops are less regarded in general society. These virtues are especially:

Respect to the regulated system.

Fidelity to the oath. The importance of these virtues in the existing state of society. Shall we allow them to become effete in the army? — Shall we allow that military spirit, so noble and excellent in itself, so useful and essential on many accounts, to deteriorate? No, no.

Such, however, would be the inevitable effect of an enfeeblement of the military jurisdiction. The ties which unite inferiors to superiors in the army would become weakened thereby in full proportion, and we should thus add to all the

injurious influences which already tend to enervate the military spirit, and to take from it its moral and practical supremacy.

Thus the proposed bill is:

1. Conformable to reason and natural justice.
2. Conformable to the Charter, and to constitutional rights.
3. Practicable.
4. Necessary to re-establish and strengthen, 1. Military jurisdiction; 2. Military spirit. Will it accomplish these benefits?

Not alone, but it will co-operate in obtaining them. Good laws do not absolve governments from good conduct; but good conduct requires good laws.

We have already passed several. They have not done everything. They have done much. There is still evil, much evil, in our society. But an infinitely greater proportion of good, enough to conquer the evil. But the struggle will be long.

Nothing ends rapidly in free countries. The prolongation of strife is a demonstration of liberty. We would not, even if we could, stifle liberty. But we shall never cease to combat with its aberrations. I respect and love liberty. I do not fear it. We cannot promise repose to honest men and good citizens, — we can only promise them victory. — Moderate laws and measures applied by energetic legislators are what our state of society requires at present; these are what we endeavour to bestow on it.

No. XII.

(Page 286.)

*Draft of an Address to the King, presented to the Chamber by the Committee.**

Sire, *Session of January 4th*, 1839.

The Chamber of Deputies reciprocates your Majesty's satisfaction at the prosperity of the country. This prosperity will develop itself, more and more, in the bosom of the peace we have maintained, and the duration of which a prudent and firm policy can alone secure to us.

Under a government jealous of our dignity, and the faithful guardian of our alliances, France will always maintain in the world, and in the esteem of other nations, the rank which belongs to her, and from which she desires not to fall.

Your Majesty hopes that the resumed conferences in London will furnish new pledges for the repose of Europe and the independence of Belgium. We offer up sincere wishes for a people closely allied to us by conformity of principles and interests. The Chamber awaits the issue of the negotiations.

You announce to us, Sire, that in virtue of engagements

* This committee consisted of MM. Passy (Hyppolite), Debelleyme, Guizot, De Jussieu, Etienne, Thiers, Mathieu de la Redorte, De la Pinsonnière, and Duvergier de Hauranne.

entered into with the Holy See our troops have left Ancona. We have given signal testimonies of our respect for treaties, but we regret that this evacuation was not effected under more opportune circumstances, and with the guarantees which a wise and provident policy ought to require.

A misunderstanding has arisen between your government and that of Switzerland. We hope it may not alter the relations of old friendship which united the two countries, and which were even more closely drawn together by the political events of 1830.

With profound sorrow we see Spain exhaust herself in the horrors of civil war. We ardently desire that your Majesty's government, while continuing to lend the cause of Queen Isabella II. the support which consists with the interests of France, may, in concert with her allies, exert its utmost influence to terminate these deplorable excesses.

The Chamber, deeply affected by the misfortunes of Poland, renews its constant hopes in favour of a people, whose ancient nationality is placed under the protection of treaties.

The insults and spoliation to which our countrymen have been subjected in Mexico, called for signal satisfaction. Your government felt the necessity of demanding it, and the brilliant exploit of St. John d'Ulloa, while covering our army with fresh glory, has given France a just subject for exultation. She has seen, Sire, one of your sons sharing the dangers and successes of our intrepid mariners.

We accord heartily with your Majesty's satisfaction at the state of our possessions in Africa. We have full confidence that this condition will improve from day to day, through the discipline of the army, the regularity of the administration, and the beneficent action of an enlightened faith.

Your Majesty announced in a preceding session that propositions relative to the reimbursement of the public debt would be laid before us as soon as the state of the finances permitted. The condition of the national revenue becoming

continually more favourable, affords us the right of expecting that the co-operation of your government will not long be withheld from this important measure.

The wants of our colonies and our navigation will be objects of our undivided solicitude. We shall study to reconcile them with the interests of our agriculture, the development of which is of the highest importance to the prosperity of the country.

The Chamber will examine with equal care the bills destined to realize the promises of the Charter, and to introduce new improvements in general legislation, as well as in particular branches of public government. Our desires also call for the bill relative to the organization of the general staff of the army.

Sire, all France has hailed with acclamation the birth of the Count of Paris. We encircle with our homage the cradle of this young prince, granted to your love and to the most cherished wishes of the country. Educated, like his father, in respect for our institutions, he will learn the glorious origin of the dynasty of which you are the head, and will never forget that the throne he is destined one day to occupy is founded on the controlling power of the national will. We associate ourselves, Sire, in common with all Frenchmen, in the domestic and religious sentiments with which this auspicious event must inspire you as a father and a king.

Why, Sire, at the moment when we are returning thanks, are we called upon to deplore with you the loss of a beloved daughter, the model of every virtue! May the expression of the unanimous feeling of the Chamber afford some consolation to the sorrows of your august family!

We feel convinced, Sire, that the intimate union of authorities restrained within their constitutional limits can alone establish the security of the country and the strength of your government. A firm and skilful administration, based upon generous sentiments, causing the dignity of your throne to

be respected abroad, and covering it with its responsibility at home, is the surest pledge of the co-operation we are so desirous to offer. Trust us, Sire, in virtue of our institutions; they will secure, rely upon it, your rights and ours; for we hold it for certain that constitutional monarchy guarantees at once the liberty of the people, and the stability which forms the greatness of states.

No. XIII.

(Page 292.)

1. *M. Guizot to his Constituents.*

Gentlemen, *Paris, Feb. 6th,* 1839.

The Chamber of Deputies is dissolved. It is dissolved by a cabinet which, eight days before, after a formal debate, had dissolved itself in its presence, not being able to obtain there, by its own avowal, a sufficient majority for its support.

This is the second Chamber with which, within the space of sixteen months, this cabinet has been unable to exist, and feels compelled to dissolve.

Wherefore?

Have these Chambers, in the internal constitution of the state, adopted any of those great innovations, those important concessions to which the crown objects, and with reason, until the necessity of their adoption has been long felt and clearly proved?

Or have they driven the government, in its relations with other states, to any of those doubtful and dangerous enterprises which the wisdom of the crown ought to discourage?

In no sense whatever.

During no period of their existence have the two dissolved Chambers pressed on the crown any debilitating concession or compromising enterprise. Not for a single day have they shown themselves possessed with the spirit of innovation or of war.

Quite the contrary.

In the interior, they have both assented to nearly all the demands of the cabinet, without demanding anything themselves.

Their only expressed desire, the desire for the reimbursement of the funds, assuredly comprised nothing dangerous to our institutions, nothing hostile to power.

Externally, these Chambers sanctioned and sustained, in the most thorny questions, the policy adopted in 1830.

And in this session, scarcely opened, even in the draft of the address so vehemently attacked, the Chamber about to expire held precisely the same conduct.

Internally it has urged no new demand.

Externally: —

As regards Belgium, it has scrupulously abstained from indicating a design or uttering a word which might shackle the government and compromise it with Europe.

As to Spain, it has maintained the expression of the reserved and pacific sentiment maintained in its first session.

Facts proclaim this loudly; and it must be recalled to those who forget facts. The Chamber of 1837 was in 1839, as at its commencement, like the preceding Chamber, a stranger to all internal encroachment or foreign enterprise, favourable to the system of conservatism and peace.

Yet, nevertheless, these two Chambers have been dissolved, dissolved before their term. Neither with the one nor the other, not more with the Chamber convoked by itself than with that which it found, could the cabinet exist.

Once more, what has led to this strange and important fact?

Here is one, and the principal cause. The cabinet was unknown to the Chamber of Deputies: it had with the Chamber no reciprocal interest, no intimate and natural authority. Hence arose two consequences. The policy of the cabinet at home and abroad was weak and unnational. Even while still existing, the cabinet itself became more and more feeble,

and less national, incapable of maintaining with strength or credit its own policy.

Here is the fact in its truth; here is the evil in its full extent.

This fact, this evil, the cabinet itself has recognized, revealed, and palpably demonstrated by these two precipitate dissolutions of two Chambers, so moderate, and exacting so little.

The parliamentary impotence of the cabinet has, twice within two years, condemned the parliament to death.

Perhaps, if we had no Charter, no chamber, no tribune, no liberty of the press,—under such circumstances, possibly, the cabinet of the 15th of April might have sufficed to govern. It wants nothing of the dexterity and conformity, of the skill in saving appearances and treating with persons, of the art and qualifications which, under the old system, acquired and retained power.

But, fifty years ago, in 1789, our fathers conceived a noble desire, the desire of living in a free country; that is to say, of taking part themselves in the government of their country. This participation in power is the only strong and real guarantee of liberty.

This is the end which, through so many misfortunes and efforts, France has had in view for fifty years. Napoleon, with his immense genius, his immeasurable activity and boundless glory, could only detach her from it for a moment.

France is in the right. All her interests and rights are herein comprised, her entire safety and honour.

When the country powerfully influences the government, and the government frankly accepts the influence of the country, the powers become united and effective. Their strength passes into and appears in their acts, their attitude, their language; everywhere, within and without, instead of retiring, they advance; instead of postponing, they decide; affairs move on; questions are solved. The road may be

strewed with obstacles, the horizon may be charged with clouds, but we see and feel a leader who marches onwards, a sun which shines through the horizon.

In place of that, what is the spectacle we actually look on? Where, now, in the opinion of all men, are France and her government?

Within:

The crown is said to be weakened and menaced in its prerogative;

The Chamber of Deputies is pronounced to be weakened and menaced in its prerogative;

A struggle, without parallel since 1830, is in action between the crown and the chamber;

While the powers are in contest, the affairs of the country are at a stand-still. The administration is nullified. All questions are in suspense; the sugars, the railroads, the funds, the abolition of slavery, and public education. Material interests are not better treated or comprehended than moral interests.

Without:

I lay aside all generalization; I speak only of specific, evident facts, and I speak of them in the most moderate terms;

In Italy, in Switzerland, the influence of France has deteriorated;

In Belgium, in Spain, the position is aggravated.

Where we are not compromised, we have retired and isolated ourselves. Where we are still present and in action, we are more compromised than ever.

This is the situation which the cabinet of the 15th of April has created for us; this is the point to which, in two years, it has led authorities and affairs, the government and the country.

And this in the bosom of profound peace, in presence of the most amenable Chamber, despite the most favourable

incidents, without encountering any important obstacle or real danger.

I wish this favourable aspect of fortune to endure; I desire that the same facilities may continue to present themselves in the Chambers and throughout Europe, on the part of men and events. If the cabinet remains in office, what will happen?

What has happened for the last two years. The same simultaneous enfeeblement of the public powers, the same confusion amongst them, the same nullity of administration, the same adjournment of questions, the same decline of our influence, the same increase of our embarrassments.

Some day, I know not when, but the day is infallible, a reaction will come on, which will rudely rouse up the humbled powers, the adjourned questions, the bruised feelings, the forgotten interests; and which, without any possible presentiment of its bearing, will add its own evils and perils to the ills it proposes to cure.

The sentiment of this existing evil, and the anticipation of the evil in perspective have determined my opposition.

I love and respect the government of July. France founded it, and it has saved France. It is one of the profoundest and proudest enjoyments of my thoughts to foretel what the future will say of that glorious epoch, of that double national effort, the one so bold, the other so prudent; of those two serpents, absolutism and anarchy, both strangled in their cradle. It costs me much to displease when I love, and to oppose to serve. But I do not hesitate. The favour of my king or country is equally dear to me; but I hold more closely still to their true interest and my own duty.

I have seen more than one government compromised by weak or improvident friends. I have never seen that the warnings, even the resistance, of loyal and devoted partisans, could be, I will not say a serious, but even a possible danger.

If I am mistaken, the mischief will recoil on myself; if I am right, I have never rendered more effectual service.

But the coalition?

Here, I confess, if I were not well acquainted with the empire of words and prejudices, I should be unable to restrain my astonishment.

What! when for a great and cherished interest, a warning, an act appears to me to be necessary, if a hundred persons, otherwise extremely opposed, wish to speak and act with me, I am required to pause and be silent? I am not to do what I think right, because I cannot do it alone, or only in concert with my usual associates!

For, observe well, it is understood, it is certain, that to those persons, who, while acting with me on this occasion, conceive and desire in reality other objects than mine, I make no concession, I lend no support. The Republicans and Carlists approved of the address;—granted. Was the address either Carlist or Republican? And if it tendered profitable advice to the monarchy of 1830, if it drew it away from serious danger, was I bound to reject the address because the Carlists and Republicans seconded it? I see the flame originate; it smoulders, it will blaze forth; and am I not to cry *Fire!* for fear of some scattered mischief-mongers who will repeat the cry with a different intention?

But the approbation, the joy of enemies is suspicious. I admit it. It is therefore very necessary to be careful as to what you say or do before them. That in itself the question of the address was serious, that thus to point out the evil, to do an act of opposition, serious motives were necessary, no one is more convinced of than I am. I comprehend, I admit, I provoke the most scrupulous examination of the gravity of these motives. But the evil being recognised, to refuse the remedy because enemies will rejoice in seeing that evil admitted, or may endeavour to profit by the

fact,—this, permit me to say, is a line of conduct neither sensible nor manly.

Let us take care of this: we desired a system of publicity, discussion, and liberty. We live under it. It has its trials, its annoyances. If we do not know how to accept them; if we hesitate whenever an effort must be made, a vexation endured, if the conflict disturbs, or the noise dismays us, if the movement, the rapid and somewhat confused jostling of opinions, interests, pretensions, and passions chills and petrifies us, let us talk no more of liberty; let us abandon representative government, let us retrace our steps.

Has this been well considered? Has the position been properly calculated? I cannot too often repeat, that the draft of the address, just, according to my conviction, in its censure of the cabinet, was loyal, respectful, and even affectionate towards the monarchy of July. Is it then nothing to have brought all parties, I will say, if it be so desired, all factions to place themselves on such a ground, to adopt such language? Hereafter, the draft of that address will be read again, and some astonishment will be excited on finding that the Republicans and Carlists joined their approbation to ours. For myself, I am neither surprised nor grieved that it should be so. I do not believe in the conversion of all the enemies of the government of July. For a long time there will be some, who, despite the will of the country and their own experience, will persevere in their hostility. But I also know that, even in their obstinacy, the most inveterate parties will not entirely escape the action of the time, the progress of things; and I accept, I accept with eagerness, every attitude and conduct, entirely new for them, and which to a certain point may turn aside their enmity. Propose a good object, a good employment even to dangerous passions, they will suffer themselves to be drawn in that direction, and will lose

something of their dangerous character. For myself, when I see Republicans and Carlists engage in the service of a national cause, a national grievance, I watch them carefully, but I rejoice at the fact. The good also is contagious; whoever touches it imbibes a little; we do not place a foot on the right path without advancing a step; and when wise and moderate designs once begin to be entertained, some impression will remain of wisdom and moderation.

On much better grounds, and more keenly, I congratulated myself on seeing opinions and persons sincerely friendly to the government of July, and who restrain themselves within the circle of our institutions, meet together on this ground of the address, and act in concert. I may speak of true and honorable conciliation, for I have always rejected false and cowardly concession; that by which on both sides something is sacrificed of what we think and wish, in the hope of reciprocal deception. I hold such combinations as shameful in themselves and unworthy of representative government. But when the friendly understanding is sincere, when we bring to the common stock all that we have of corresponding sentiments, ideas, and intentions, I should like to know who can maintain a right, who could have the audacity to say any thing against this proceeding? It is not only legitimate, but excellent. It is one of the best results of our admirable institutions, which, incessantly holding ideas and men in contest, lead them to understand and purify each other, and sooner or later produce a compromise in the bosom of reason and the public interest. The representative system is a system of constant agreement and conciliation. Liberty divides at first, and brings together afterwards. Who would not be struck, to-day, by the progress of equitable sentiments and moderate ideas, which everywhere manifests itself and tends towards accomplishment. And is not this

to be permitted to pass into the practice of public business? If not, political camps would become prisons, in which men would remain eternally shut up and savage, inaccessible to each other, as on the day of the most determined combat! Such a pretension, at all times false and mischievous, could not be considered in our days, after all our revolutions, as anything better than an interested lie or a palpable absurdity. For myself, confident of never having deserted my standard, proud of having always carried it myself in the hour of danger, I am open, without embarrassment, to all honest approaches, to every loyal coalition; I look upon that accomplished on the ground of the address as a triumph for representative government; and I have no more fear of losing my liberty for the future than I had hesitation in using it on that occasion.

A passing word on the subject of the coalition, with reference to two expressions frequently applied,—ambition and intrigue.

I believe I may say without presumption, that if I had cared little for my ideas and my friends, I should have found it easy to gratify what is called ambition. I repeat here what I have said elsewhere: I have an ambition, but not such as that.

As to intrigue, of all accusations it is, in truth, the most extraordinary. Every thing took place in the broad light of day, under the eye of the country. What I have said, I have done; what I have done, I have said. I have gone farther: I have recorded what I did and said formerly. I have scrupulously sought publicity on the present, and fidelity for the past. On these two conditions, which constitute my law, I shall never hesitate to act and to follow up my object.

A last question remains; I have reserved it because I have it sincerely at heart. They have spoken of the crown, of its inviolability, and of the respect which is its due. They say

that the draft of the address and its defenders were wanting in that respect.

This is a spectacle without example. Here is an opposition which declares and maintains, that it addresses itself to the cabinet alone; it sees and exhibits nothing but the cabinet. And the cabinet retires, expunges itself, places the crown in front of it, affirms and repeats that it is with the crown that we are dealing! In vain the opposition persists; the cabinet persists in turn. It absolutely demands that the crown should descend into the arena and act as its shield.

But, ministers of the King, even though you indulged in the most injurious supposition, even though you believed that in addressing you exclusively, the opposition lied and concealed its true idea, your first and simplest duty was, to accept the lie of the opposition, and to hold royalty aloof from the combat. It was for you to prevent its being reached by the most trifling allusion, to keep its very name from being pronounced; you ought to have covered it with your own bodies. And at the very moment when you assert that you are capable of this, that you are fully equal to it, you prove the contrary by your anxiety to drag the King upon the scene to cover yourselves; yes, you yourselves, under the respect borne to him, and to demand in his name the votes you ought to be able to obtain on your own account, by your own influence, and which are refused to you alone.

Under a constitutional monarchy I recognise nothing more anti-monarchical and unconstitutional than the attitude and language of the cabinet in this debate.

No, it is not the royal authority that we have called in question. We bear towards it the greatest respect; we know how much its presence and strength are necessary to France, the services it has rendered, and will still render, to our country. Let it then display its prerogatives freely and fully; let it, in its councils, enlighten and persuade its ad-

visers; let it exercise over them its lawful influence. It is its right to do so. It is also your privilege, ministers, to enlighten the royal authority in your turn, to convince it and make it thoroughly understand the influence of the country. You will then answer to the country for all that it has done by your advice and with your concurrence.

This is what the country expects, what the Charter commands from the advisers of the crown. This is what we find you incapable of. You are too little acquainted with the country and its immediate representatives; you do not represent it yourselves, truly or firmly, with the crown. The interests, the sentiments, the whole political and moral life of the country, fail to reach the throne through your medium. And, then, when you appear in the presence of the Chambers as advisers of the crown, we find, on the one part, that the crown has been badly advised by you, and the country ill represented to the crown; and, on the other, that you ill represent and defend the crown before the Chambers. For, in our opinion, your weakness is double, and your insufficiency is double also. The crown suffers from both, with the country and in the Chambers, and the Chambers and the country suffer equally in the councils of the crown.

Hence comes, as we think, the impossibility in which you find yourselves of living with the best disposed and most judicious Chambers. Hence arise those repeated and sudden dissolutions, which reveal the troubles of power and aggravate without the capability of curing them.

Now, you have already tried this remedy twice, and the evil is not abated. It will re-appear on the opening, or soon after, of new Chambers as in those that you have dissolved; for it exists in you, in you alone, in your insufficiency for the Chambers with the crown, and for the crown with the Chambers.

This is our opinion, our full opinion, in this great emergency. It addresses itself to the cabinet, to the cabinet

alone, and nothing will induce us to exceed this limit of our rights as of our duty. But we shall fulfil our entire duty; we shall exercise our utmost rights. Representative government is our conquest; the Charter is our truth. We cannot lose a particle of either. The honour of France is implicated in maintaining both: the honour of her fame and existence, since 1789; more since 1814; and more than all since 1830.

Her repose too is not less engaged than her honour. As long as the actual cabinet subsists, you may hold this, gentlemen, for certain: all things will remain as they are, or be remitted to suspense and question. The dignity and security of the country will totter together. You will see prevail, in internal and external affairs, in the management of material and moral interests, the same improvidence, the same thoughtlessness, the same weakness; and, for the common term of all, the same trials to which you are called to-day.

I have exposed the evil; the remedy, gentlemen, lies with you.

GUIZOT.

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2. *M. Guizot to M. Leroy-Beaulieu, Mayor of Lisieux.*

My dear Sir, *Paris, Feb. 18th*, 1839.

The cabinet proclaims in all directions, that to vote with them is to vote for peace; to vote with the opposition is to vote for war.

On the 16th of January last, in the debate on the address, I said, in the tribune:

"For eight years France and her government have been engaged in the policy of peace. They were in the right. I have maintained that policy; I have maintained it in and out of office, on all the benches of this Chamber. I am con-

vinced, convinced to-day as then, that the morality and prosperity of our revolution counselled and commanded that policy. I am, and shall ever remain, faithful to it."

Repeat, I beg of you, repeat everywhere, what I said a month since, and what I reiterate to-day. Yes, we desired, we always desire peace; and peace can only be assured through our policy. The ministry which harangues so loudly on the subject compromises peace.

What sensible man would desire war at present?

We have made war for twenty years to liberate and establish ourselves. We required, we, new France required, first to be masters at home, and next, to prove our strength to Europe and to assume our proper rank.

The end is attained, thoroughly attained. We are masters at home. In 1830, we plainly exhibited this fact. Europe has acknowledged it. And as to glory, that baptism of peoples, what old State, what ancient race can relate more than what we have done?

In our fierce combats for our independence and rank amongst nations, two elements have mingled; the spirit of propagandism and the spirit of conquest. We have learnt the evil of both; we desire no more of either.

The propagandism of truth by force is the corruption of truth. Violence in the name of liberty is the ruin of liberty, first for the victors, secondly for the vanquished. We are not disciples of the Koran. We respect the ideas, sentiments, institutions, and rights of others, as we wish others to respect ours. We have faith in intelligence and in the times. We aspire to give the world the spectacle of free, true, and general civilisation,—of that civilisation towards which Europe advances through so many ages. We believe that this spectacle is a great example, and sufficient for our greatness.

Peace is dear to us for the interest of national morality. We ardently desire to see the spirit of order reign amongst us, the family spirit, respect for law, and confidence in the

future. Above all, we honour intelligence, industry, and good manners. We wish ambition to be regulated, souls to be tranquillised, minds to be enlightened; that in social life there may be much activity and little hazard.

We confine ourselves solely to the course of public prosperity. Thanks to God, it is already great, and increases daily. Our agriculture improves, our industry develops itself, our commerce expands; but how far are we still from what we can achieve, from what we ought to be! Capital is not equal to labour; knowledge is not adequate to the good employment of capital. In every case and class, whether the question is of material or intellectual means, of public administration or private affairs, how many gaps are to be filled up, how much progress is still to be made! Progress which ought to penetrate in every quarter, to infuse itself into all conditions; which will never be truly satisfactory until all society takes part in it, both in the labour and in the produce.

For all this we require peace, long settled peace. This, to-day, is the universal conviction and desire. Europe wants peace as well as France. In France, the country wants peace as well as the king's government. One of the noblest claims of our monarchy to public gratitude is its constancy in the policy of peace. And if I may be permitted to speak of myself in such weighty matters, I also have constantly associated myself with the same policy; I also have proclaimed and practised in this respect, and under the severest trials, the most unyielding conviction.

But it is not enough to desire; it is not enough even to will. Such is the weakness of man, that against his thought, against his wish, he may be led, by his own acts and errors, to the very result he most dreads, and anxiously endeavours to avoid.

This is the danger to which the cabinet of the 15th of April exposes us. This is the consequence of its policy. It compromises peace in place of securing it.

Peace may be compromised in two ways. By a weak policy, unworthy of and injurious to the national honour;

By an improvident, unskilful policy, which conducts affairs badly.

France is jealous, extremely jealous, of her national dignity and of her attitude in the world. Let us be thankful that she is so! Public, popular susceptibility, that sudden electrical feeling, somewhat blind, but powerful and devoted, constitutes the honour and greatness of democratic societies. It is through that sentiment, in spite of their inconsistencies and weaknesses, that they elevate themselves and resound brilliantly when once that noble fibre is touched. And let the government believe this thoroughly. The fibre may appear slackened and sluggish, but it may also become suddenly excited and shaken, and shake everything with its own agitation. You love peace; you desire peace. Be careful of the national dignity; give it full satisfaction and security. If it doubts and suspects, do you also doubt and tremble for peace. The blessings of peace are great and gratifying, but a free country will not long purchase them at the cost of moral suffering and offensive uncertainty.

It is moreover a position so desirable, an increase of power so important for the government, to sympathise with the national pride, and to use it as a buckler! What embarrassments will it not escape, what questions will it not solve through this medium! On all occasions, at every instant, the foreigners with whom you have to deal, watch you and feel your pulse. Let them know that you are proud and determined;—they measure, they restrain their words and acts. But if they find and look upon you as timid, irresolute, disposed to evade and yield, do you believe that they will offer you better conditions, or treat you with more consideration? Quite the contrary. They will insist, press, and annoy. They will care little to transact business with you; they will hold you in light esteem; and peace clogged with embarrass-

ments, questions, vexations, and disgusts, will gradually become more difficult and troublesome, and will find itself in peril, do what you may to maintain it.

What will be the result if, in other respects, affairs are conducted with thoughtlessness and improvidence, under the control of first impressions, with the sole end of escaping from the difficulty of the moment; of contriving an evasive answer, of temporarily saving appearances; without that power of attention and memory which keeps an account of all facts; without that prudent maturity of design which prevents incautious measures, and never sacrifices the security of the future to the convenience of the present?

Do you believe, my dear Sir, that on such conditions, with such conduct, in presence of the national dignity saddened and wounded, in the midst of affairs rashly commenced, and becoming hourly more complicated, peace can be either strong or sure? Do you believe that this can be the true policy of the country?

Examine facts—recent—proved facts. They speak more loudly than I can. They display everywhere, in our foreign relations, the weakness, improvidence, thoughtlessness of the cabinet, and their dangerous consequences. They exhibit peace incessantly compromised and on the point of escaping us.

In Switzerland, to remove from our frontier a young madman, a division of the army has been put in motion; and we have seen ourselves placed at the mercy of Louis Bonaparte and the radicals of Thurgovia, who, with fifteen days of obstinacy, were perfectly in a position to compel us to make war upon a friendly and valuable neighbour.

Wherefore?

Because the cabinet had neglected to maintain, in our relations with that neighbour, our sound and natural policy,—the policy adopted by its predecessors. Because it had commenced and conducted its remonstrances against the residence of Louis Bonaparte in Switzerland, hastily, confusedly,

without discretion or foresight, in a manner offensive to Switzerland, and which left neither to the Republic nor to us any honourable or pacific road through which to escape from the embarrassment.

In Belgium, matters proceeded to the last extremity. Revolutionary passions were placed in movement; the Belgian people and their king found themselves engaged, compromised, and placed between an impossible resistance and an unworthy retreat.

Wherefore?

Because, from the beginning of the affair, our cabinet dared not adopt a firm and clear resolution; because it had no influence in Europe, if that could have prevailed in the question of territory, to obtain favourable modifications for Belgium; and if not, to determine promptly the execution of the treaty, and to spare the Belgians the deplorable alternative to which they are now reduced, or ourselves the humiliating attitude we hold;—serious inconveniences, and perhaps important dangers to both.

In Mexico we have reaped success and glory; but the success and glory have settled nothing. Our countrymen are ill-treated, oppressed, persecuted, and banished by the Mexican government more violently than ever; the contest has become more bitter, and the issue more obscure; we are drawn into an enterprise infinitely greater than its motive and object, the means, sacrifices, and termination of which are equally difficult to calculate. We are engaged in a war more than two thousand leagues from home, in face of deserts and savages, and equally undecided whether to advance or retreat.

Wherefore?

Because the cabinet neglected to calculate the difficulties of the enterprise; because, from the beginning, it has allowed operations to languish from want of sufficient and well-combined means; because it has failed to engage, on our side, the great commercial nations, England and the United States,

for instance, whose interests there are analogous with ours; but on the contrary have placed us, with regard to those nations, in a very delicate position, which becomes more delicate from delay.

Thus, in every direction, our affairs are complicated and aggravated. Peace has been compromised; war has emanated from that cause, or has been, or still is, on the point of springing up.

And for a great people, for France, there are no means of avoiding these complications. We cannot retire from all quarters, as from Ancona, and isolate ourselves like the little republic of San Marino. France is present and interested everywhere; everywhere when a question arises, when an event occurs, we must be present and act. Everywhere and always, you desire peace: you are right; peace is most desirable: to break it now, vast reasons are required, reasons of national honour and security. But peace, the peace which becomes France, is a lofty and laborious work, requiring much activity, courage, foresight, ascendancy; which has its contests and demands its glory, like war. If you are weak and imprudent, truckling and unskilful; if you know not how to solve questions by negotiation or by arms; if you leave them to rise up lightly, or to establish themselves profoundly, by showing yourselves equally incapable of supporting or preventing, of removing or unravelling them, speak no longer of peace; cease to call yourselves ministers of peace: you are not more fitted for peace than for war; you profane the name of peace; you compromise its existence. Instead of owing you anything, it is by you and through you that peace debases itself and declines.

I pause, my dear Sir; for our country, in the natural disturbance under which it still suffers after so many rude shocks, dreads the energetic expression of even the most moderate sentiments, and pictures exaggeration in the language of every strong conviction. But rest assured that

light and pusillanimous policy is not the policy of peace, and that in the hands of the cabinet of the 15th of April peace is not more in safety than is our national honour.

GUIZOT.

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*Speech delivered by M. Guizot in the Electoral College of Lisieux, on the 3rd of March, 1839, immediately after his election.**

Gentlemen,

You have conferred on me a great honour: I thank you for it with profound gratitude. I see in this more than a personal success: I perceive in it a sanction of the conduct I have held in these latter times, a proof that I have judged soundly and acted well.

And do not believe, gentlemen, that I have acted inconsiderately. I have watched long and maturely deliberated. It is not by choice that I have placed myself at variance with the government I love and have served, which I still intend to serve, now and always. I foresaw the consequences of this division, the evil interpretations, the insults, the calumnies, and what touches me more nearly, perhaps, the sincere disapprobation of some of my oldest friends, estimable men, for having marched in concert with whom so long, I take honour to myself, and whose sympathy will ever be dear to me.

Nevertheless, I have not hesitated; I beheld two urgent and decisive points.

I saw, within, the weakness of our representative government, especially in the Chamber of Deputies; that is to say, of the influence of France in her own affairs.

Without, I saw the deterioration of our attitude, of our acts and alliances; that is to say, the deterioration of the influence of France in the affairs of Europe.

* M. Guizot had 477 votes in this college out of 525 voters.

And as a consequence to this prolonged change of national policy, I perceived a lamentable and perhaps dangerous reaction.

Experience, gentlemen, is not wanting to us. We know how governments engaging in an erroneous path, gradually become compromised, and end by losing themselves; ever surrounded by friends, but blind and weak friends, who are unable to guide or restrain them. This is no general idea or vague reminiscence. We have seen it. We shall not see it again. We have a double guarantee against it, — the wisdom of the King and the wisdom of the country. But this wisdom consists precisely in noting and pointing out, in good time, the deviation and the danger.

It is on the brink of the abyss that we ought, and are able to pause. It is the merit of free governments, it is the duty of good citizens in free governments, to combat the evil as soon as it appears, to repulse it before it augments. Our readiness to become alarmed and fortified for the present, constitutes our security for the future.

Do you also know, gentlemen, who would suffer most from the reaction necessarily produced by the enfeeblement of our institutions, and the change of our national policy? Government, and power. They would be held accountable, and by them the penalty would be paid. You would see the principles and resources of government become weakened in their turn. You would see revive in the country the desire for extensive guarantees, for precautions which enervate and disarm authority. We require authority to be strong, and I fear its deficiencies, at least as much for the mistrusts they inspire as for the immediate evil they produce.

This is what has determined my conduct, gentlemen; these are my reasons for opposing the cabinet. As I have had the honour to tell you, just now, I did not dissemble to myself the difficulties of such a position. I did not flatter myself that it would be at once understood and universally approved.

But I hoped that a long session, numerous and varied debates, would bring it to general light. It has not been so. An abrupt and unexpected dissolution has as suddenly brought before you, gentlemen, and before the country at large, questions scarcely enunciated and still obscure. I have dreaded, and freely acknowledge, mischievous consequences. I have apprehended one of two evils, both sufficiently serious, — the irritation or weakness of the country. I feared lest it should go beyond the mark or ignore the danger.

I have resumed confidence, gentlemen, for what has taken place in this district, what you have just done cannot be an isolated fact. It is undoubtedly, a symptom and type of what is now taking place throughout France. A majority will declare itself, a decided and powerful majority, stronger and more influential than it has ever been. Never, gentlemen, during nine years, and allow me to feel proud of the fact, have I ever received from you so many votes. And this strong majority is not an impulse of passion, the effect of enthusiastic party spirit; it is, on the contrary, as conciliatory as decisive; it rallies, I would say, if I dared, nearly all the sincere friends of our revolution of 1830, of our monarchy of 1830, of the Charter and dynasty of 1830. Divided for several years, to-day they approach and unite.

Gentlemen, there is yet another point which touches me nearly. What is the pressing, the evident necessity of our epoch? What is the method, the only method by which to fix a term to our embarrassments and to the dangers of our situation? Precisely that which you are now adopting: a majority at once decided and not exclusive, powerful and conciliatory.

A decided majority is indispensable to the strength and moral influence of our constitution, to the strength and moral power of government itself. We suffer, we decline together for five years, chambers and cabinets, authority and

liberty, through those narrow, floating majorities, which take from government all fixity, elevation, and ascendancy, to confer on miserable intrigues and paltry interests a lamentable and ridiculous importance.

For five years there has been much talk of conciliation. It is a powerful and a soothing word, which all parties have endeavoured to appropriate. I also, gentlemen, love and desire conciliation. I have ever contested for a moderate policy, a policy which considers and reconciles all rights and interests. And when I examine myself, I find nothing, absolutely nothing which should render conciliation difficult to me. I carry within me no violent or bitter feelings. I hate no one; I have injured no one. I defy any man in France to say that I have ever been guided by evil wishes or personal resentment. I have learnt from experience to comprehend and explain much; and I believe that the energy of conviction does not exclude some degree of impartiality in the judgment and of benevolence in the heart.

But, gentlemen, whenever I hear conciliation named, I consider two things; public security, and my individual dignity.

As long as the state appeared to me in danger; as long as I saw the King and the Charter menaced and attacked; and as often as conciliation has seemed to be proposed as the price of a disavowal of the policy of resistance, which saved both in evil days, I neither wished nor ought to lend myself to it.

Such was the state of things, gentlemen, in 1834, 1835, and 1836. These were the times of Fieschi, of Alibaud, of Meunier, of the conspiracy of Strasbourg; times assuredly of struggle and danger; times which demanded a vigilant and energetic policy, the policy of the 13th of March, and of the 11th of October. I have not abandoned it. You would not, gentlemen, have counselled me to do so. What do I say? You would not have forgiven it. You are vigilant for the

security of the government of July; you are jealous of the honour of your deputy. I have preserved both. I feel confident of your approbation.

Times are changed. The safety of the state is no longer threatened. Resistance has borne its fruits. The King and the Charter breathe freely under the shelter of the laws and of the public sentiment. Questions have arisen, foreign to our old debates, relative to the reality of our institutions, the dignity of our foreign policy, and the judicious conduct of our affairs;—questions on which I have nothing to disavow; a free and elevated ground on which a true and honourable conciliation may take place. I lend myself to it with eagerness. Therein lies the principle of a numerous and reconciling majority, which can concentrate the sincere friends of the government of July, without fixing on any of them the charge of weakness or falsification. Much is said of the coalition. Gentlemen, observe what passes amongst yourselves in this district, in this college. Has any one renounced his opinions, his antecedents, his friends? Do you feel guilty of defection or hypocrisy? No, certainly not; you are consistent with yourselves; faithful to all that you have thought, done, loved, and served. Yet, nevertheless, you have approached each other. You think, you vote in unison, under the empire of the same idea, the same conviction: attachment to representative government, to its dignity and vigour, to the desire of seeing it real and effective. Such is the coalition, gentlemen; there is no other. That which has taken place amongst you, naturally, usefully, and morally, is the same which has been accomplished in the Chamber. In all respects equally legitimate and honourable, it will, I hope, be everywhere equally salutary: it will every where restore to our institutions their truth and energy; it will every where become the source of true parliamentary majorities by leaving to all the honour of our past and the liberty of our future.

Gentlemen, in what I do and require to-day there is nothing new or strange to me. I am faithful, strictly faithful, to what I have always done and required. Nearly three years ago, in August 1836, in this place, many amongst you did me the honour of inviting me to a banquet. I then delivered a speech to which the press and the tribune have often referred. I gladly seized that opportunity of doing homage to the wisdom of the King; of recalling the eminent, the immense services, rendered by the King to France in the cause of order and peace. What I then said I should repeat, I do repeat still, with the same conviction, the same gratitude. And then I also said:

"To support the King is not to leave all on his hands. Our adhesion ought not to be passive, ineffective, a mere adhesion of spectators. The King can do nothing without the country; his firmness needs the support of our firmness; his wisdom draws its strength from our wisdom. Let not the national majority, which has so well sustained the King in the policy of a judicious medium, relax, disunite, or give way to discouragement: let it openly manifest its thought and boldly exercise its influence. Penetration, vigilance, perseverance, and energy, are its imperious duties. Let them be fulfilled. The perils of the King will continually remove to a greater distance with the perils of France. Liberty, real and universal liberty, will gradually develop itself, and we shall see the security of the people and the throne, the dignity of the country and the influence of power establish themselves together."

What did I intend by these words, gentlemen, if not to demand the realization, the actual energy of representative government, the influence of the Chamber of Deputies in the affairs of the country, the influence of a strong, active, becoming majority in the Chamber of Deputies? Never, gentlemen, for a single minute have I deserted that noble cause; never have I supposed our institutions to become enervated,

eluded, deteriorated; never have I admitted that an administration without principles or vigour could represent the true government of the country. Under such attributes I no longer recognise the proud and free government we won by conquest in 1830. I wish to see it complete and regular. I believe that its security and honour reside in the energetic development, in the constant equilibrium of all its elements. I wish to see them increase and strengthen, and all in concert. To-day, gentlemen, as in 1836, as at all times, I exclaim, *Long live the King! Long live the Charter!* This is the rallying cry of our country.

No. XIV.

(Page 304.)

King Louis-Philippe to M. Guizot.

Sunday, 2 *o'clock*, *March* 24*th*, 1839.

At the moment when I believed that all was on the point of being settled, all is broken off, and the Marshal has just announced to me that he retires. I wish most anxiously to see you, to hear and talk with you on this subject. Come then to me as soon as you possibly can.

No. XV.

(Page 319.)

Signatures to the Letter addressed to M. Guizot, by twenty-five American citizens, on the 1*st of February,* 1841.

E. S. Burd, Tho. van Zandt, Jared Sparks, Matthew Morgan, Eugene Avail, M. Brimmer, F. P. Corbin, Robert Walsh, Andrew Ritchie, Herman Thom, Robert Baird, Gas. M. Gibbs; Leonard Hoods, Professor of Brunswick College, Maine; Henry Seybert, R. N. Gibbes, H. L. Preston, M. Smiller, H. G. Dyar, Charles J. Biddle, E. C. Biddle, J. Randolph, J. Archer, W. van Reusselaer, Tho. Warner, Alex. van Reusselaer.

No. XVI.

(Page 329.)

1. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, May 25th, 1839.

Marshal,

As I announced to your Excellency yesterday, Lord Palmerston has communicated without delay to all the members of the council, the news of the renewal of hostilities between the Turkish and Egyptian armies. This evening, at the Queen's ball, Lord Melbourne, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Normanby, all three mentioned to me the serious aspect with which they regard this event. They sought, nevertheless, to persuade themselves still that the intelligence could not be perfectly correct, and they founded their opinion on the contrast it presents with that which preceded it from Constantinople and Alexandria. Although I concealed my communication as carefully as possible, it had already transpired. During the evening, Redschid Pacha, who was this day to take leave of the Queen, being informed by Lord Palmerston, announced openly that he had suspended his departure. Count Orloff was also aware of the news, and without commenting on the consequences, proclaimed its importance with affectation.

Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me again to day. We have had a fresh conference, which lasted two hours. Time will not permit me to forward a detailed

account of it to your Excellency, but I prefer confining myself to the leading points of the conversation to the postponement of a more complete analysis.

Lord Palmerston had just received a despatch from Lord Granville, which entirely confirms that which I communicated to him yesterday, and which adds also that the intelligence had reached Malta from two different points, Syria and Alexandria. We have therefore discarded the doubts of yesterday, and the evil being admitted, nothing now remains but to consider the remedy.

Lord Palmerston commenced by declaring that he was going to submit to me his personal views on the state of the question, that on Monday he should lay them before the council, but that nothing could be definitively decided before the arrival of answers from Paris. It is unnecessary to add, that throughout this long conversation I took care to represent myself as entirely without instructions, so that nothing I said could even in the most remote degree be construed into the authorized expression of my government.

Lord Palmerston at once laid down a hypothesis, from which flows the entire current of the ideas he has adopted. "I assume for point of departure," he said, "that the object of our common policy is the support of the Ottoman empire, as the least objectionable guarantee for the maintenance of the European equilibrium. There is here, as in France, a certain amount of opinion favourable to the development of Egyptian power. This opinion the English cabinet by no means partakes in, but it forms one of the many difficulties we have to encounter in the path of Eastern affairs.

"The preservation of the Ottoman empire being admitted as our end, we have to protect it against its *friends* and *enemies*.

"The actual event surprises and leaves us in ignorance as to what we have to fear from the friends of the Ottoman

empire. This is an eventuality we shall have to ward off at a later period. Let us begin with the enemies.

"The act of aggression (attributed to the Turks by the latest telegraph) has its moral importance, for there is a principle of justice, the power of which we cannot deny, in a first disposition to retort the consequences of war on the aggressor; but we must at the same time remember that we never became a guaranteeing party to the arrangements of Kutaieh; that we have never, by any act, obliterated the quality of vassal in the conqueror or of sovereign in the conquered: we have yielded to the pressure of things; these things being changed, we are now bound to inquire to what point the sovereign has a right to repossess himself by arms of what the arms of the vassal have wrested from him.

"Let us pass by the fact of aggression, and suppose it to be decided in favour of Egypt. We can neither desire that the victorious Pacha should again reduce the Ottoman empire to the brink of ruin, and force it to throw itself into the arms of Russia; nor that the Sultan, excited by past successes (very doubtful ones!) should leave the peace of Europe in danger as long as it may please him to dispute with the Pacha his recent conquests, and perhaps his old possessions.

"Our first duty then is to arrest, as soon as possible, the collision so unfortunately precipitated. With what means of action, and within what limits?

"The means of action may be of two kinds; ships of war, and troops for disembarkation. I know not whether it would fall within the views of the French government to despatch an expeditionary corps to the theatre of passing events. Occupied as we ourselves are in India and America, we could not appear there with a sufficient force in available time. This last condition would also apply to the military intervention of France; for an expeditionary force

ought at least to amount to fifteen thousand men, who could not be assembled and embarked in less than from two to three months. There remain, then, the squadrons. They are on the spot, and can be quickly reinforced. We have eight ships of the line in the Archipelago, and two in the Tagus. Our united fleets are sufficient for all maritime events.

"The instructions to our admirals ought to provide for two contingencies; whether, in presenting themselves on the coast of Syria they would find the Pacha victorious, or arrive to be present at his defeat.

"If the advantage remained with the arms of the Pacha, our admirals should be empowered to order him to pause in the position in which he might find himself on their arrival, under the threat of seeing his communications with Alexandria cut off, and all supplies by sea rendered thenceforward impossible. A sufficient number of ships should at the same time appear before Alexandria, declare the port in a state of blockade until Ibrâham received the orders of his father to suspend his victorious march, prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet should it be in the harbour, and interdict its return if at sea, until the acceptance of the proposed conditions.

"If the Ottoman army has commenced by a success, the same intimation should be conveyed to the Pacha in command; our admirals would have to use all their influence to restrain him from pushing his advantages beyond a boundary to be fixed in common, and to announce to him that they should instantly demand instructions from their government in the event of their representations being disregarded. During this time the efforts of our united embassies at Constantinople should be exerted without intermission to bring back and confine the Sultan within the limits of a wise moderation."

Such, Marshal, in a few words, is the naval action to be

adopted by the two powers, according to the recommendation of Lord Palmerston; this is what he intends to propose to the council on Monday, and this he submits to the consideration of the King's government. He added, as a necessary accompaniment, that to be effectual, their action should be immediate, and that not a moment is to be lost in combining the movements of our fleets, and preparing the instructions to our admirals.

I now pass on to the diplomatic action:—

Lord Palmerston is of opinion that we should, without delay, present ourselves at Vienna as entirely united in intentions and efforts for the maintenance of the Ottoman empire; that we should frankly avow the object we propose to accomplish, and that we should press for the co-operation of Austria by every means in her power. A similar step should at the same time be taken at Berlin.

"Here, again," Lord Palmerston resumed, "we have two contingencies to provide against. The Porte may already have *implored* and *received* the aid of Russia in men and ships; or, they may have been demanded and Russia may hesitate to comply.

"In the first case we should propose to the Austrian cabinet to join with us in declaring that Western Europe demands, in the name of the European equilibrium, that the Russian auxiliary troops should immediately return to their own territory after having accomplished their mission, and without any conquests being obtained by Russia, or any stipulations for political or commercial advantages. This declaration, in whatever terms it might be couched, should be peremptory to the point, and should leave Russia in no doubt whatever as to the consequences to which a line of conduct in opposition to that of the allies would inevitably expose her.

"In the second case, we should press the court of Vienna to propose with us to St. Petersburg a preliminary concert

between the five great powers, the object of which would be the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, and the action to be determined in common. We should then arrange the auxiliary interference of Russia, and confine it within the limits of a common understanding.

"Under these two hypotheses, we shall extenuate, as much as lies in our power, the disastrous effects on the destinies of the Ottoman empire, of being committed solely to Russia."

I have given you the most faithful summary which my memory can supply, of my two conferences with Lord Palmerston, and I believe that I have conveyed to you his exact ideas. I venture to request that your Excellency will enable me, as soon as possible, to make known to him the opinion of the King's government.

Deign to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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2. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Sir, *Paris, June 13th,* 1839.

We have not yet received the letters arrived by the last packet-boat from the east, but a telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, inserted in the *Moniteur*, proves that at the most recent date, notwithstanding a brawl between the Turkish and Egyptian soldiers, the fears of a collision between the two armies had not yet been realised. The time which passes will undoubtedly strengthen the hope we may be permitted to build, for the maintenance of peace, upon a concert between all the great European powers.

The reception given at Berlin, and more particularly at Vienna, to our first overtures for the accomplishment of a mutual accord to secure this object, is of the most satisfactory nature. The Prussian cabinet, placed as it is in a secondary position as to all that regards the East, could only show

itself disposed to support, according to its means, the efforts of its allies; but that of Vienna, whose situation is totally different, has not hesitated to declare itself frankly and categorically on the arrangements indispensably called for in this serious emergency. Count Appony has received orders to communicate to me a fully developed despatch, in which M. de Metternich explains, with his habitual diplomatic formalities, the view he has adopted on this important point. He commences by admitting that, in the present state of things, a *statu quo*, the source of so much anxiety, and almost equally objectionable to the two contending parties, is a matter of the utmost difficulty. If it could be solved by the restoration of Syria to the authority of the Porte, by the sole effort of the Turkish arms, he would approve of the solution; but he regards this as more than improbable, and believes that in the contest that might ensue, all chances would be in favour of Mehemet Ali. In this position of affairs, and without prejudice to the proposed negotiations for a definitive settlement, he agrees with us in opinion that the great courts ought to come to an understanding, with the object of preventing hostilities, if possible; of terminating them if they have commenced; and of reconciling, while admitting the power of existing facts, the reasonable claims of the two parties by an arrangement which may secure the future, while checking the exaggerated pretensions of both. Admitting, as indisputable axioms, that the powers neither desire the dethronement of the Sultan, nor admit the possibility of expelling Mehemet Ali from Egypt, and finally that not one of them seeks to aggrandise itself at the expense of the Ottoman empire, he concludes from these premises that it will be easy for them to agree, and repeats that they hold in their hands all that is necessary to give weight to their determination. French and English fleets are in the Mediterranean; land and sea forces are not wanting to Russia; a firm and uniform language at Alexandria and Constantinople,

seconded by the attitudes, equally imposing but expectant, assumed by the combined squadrons, would in all probability suffice, according to M. de Metternich, to secure success to the mediation of the powers. Such is the substance of the despatch communicated to me by Count Appony. It concludes with an observation which has struck me, as I see in it the timid apparition of an idea, ever fondly cherished by the Austrian cabinet and as constantly rejected by Russia,—that of establishing, in the capital of Austria, a conference on the affairs of the East. Vienna, says M. de Metternich, is, with regard to the great question in debate, a point so central that answers may reach it from all quarters at the same time.

Communications similar to that contained in the despatch written by Count Appony have been transmitted to St. Petersburg, to Vienna, and to Berlin . . . . .

As soon as I learn anything further, I shall hasten to let you know, for the information of Lord Palmerston.

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3. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, June 17th, 1839.

My preceding despatch has acquainted you with the answer of the cabinet of Vienna to our first communications . . .

The intelligence brought three days since by the packet-boat from the East, comprises no news of the slightest importance. The armies were still facing each other on the banks of the Euphrates, but nothing indicated a desire on the part of their leaders to come to action . . . The Turks can scarcely be in a condition to commence hostilities. Their army, it is reported, does not exceed 36,000 men, weakened by want of supplies and desertion.

The state of affairs, as it presents itself at this moment, is quite sufficient to justify serious anxiety. I am now going to

place you in a position to answer the questions addressed to you by Lord Palmerston, as to the opinion formed by the King's government on the measures to be adopted under the exigencies of the moment.

The King's government comprehends the utility and convenience of an understanding between the great powers to settle the means of securing, by a common attitude and language, the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, and it thinks the seat of the deliberations to be opened with this object should be established at Vienna, as the most desirable locality.

It considers that to prevent hostilities, if they are still suspended, or to bring them to an end if they have unhappily commenced, the French and English fleets should operate as a sort of armed mediation, commanding the sea, to contest the movements of the Egyptian and Turkish armaments; to oblige them to return to their ports, in case they have issued from them.

The English squadron appears to amount to six sail of the line, without counting smaller vessels. Ours will also be increased to that number, and will include four or five frigates, with four steamers, at the least, and other smaller vessels. Six men-of-war are already collected at Smyrna, or on the way there. Three others will sail for that place immediately. It is important that instructions, not exactly common, but dictated by the same idea, and previously arranged between the two courts, should be forwarded without delay to the officers commanding the two squadrons, to direct their operations.

As soon as it becomes known in the East that these forces act in the same spirit and with a similar object, it is not possible to believe that either the fleet of the Sultan or that of the Pacha will be disposed to risk a conflict with them. I go still further; this demonstration, by rendering war almost impossible, will take from Russia all pretext for

placing in movement her fleet at Sebastopol, or even her land forces.

To attain more completely the end we have in view, perhaps it would be desirable that the Austrian flag should display itself in conjunction with the combined squadrons of France and England. One or two frigates, with some lighter ships, would suffice for that purpose. It is to be observed, moreover, that M. de Metternich has already expressed his opinion to that effect.

Such are the measures which I think should be at once adopted, if we do not wish to be surprised by events. I now pass on to those which, as soon as formal deliberations are opened between the cabinets, might be put in force to terminate the existing crisis and definitely to prevent its renewal.

In the event of our resolutions and the attitude of our squadrons not being able to prevent the two contending parties from having recourse to arms, the necessity of a common action would become evident; and there is no reason to expect that we should then be able to induce Russia to abstain from material interference in a question in which her interests would be so directly engaged. What we ought to insist on is, that her action should be determined and limited in concert with the other courts; that she should confine herself to the course adopted by France and England; and, in fact, that a European convention should replace the stipulations of Unkjar-Skelessi. I cannot estimate the full amount of obstacles that such a project might encounter from the cabinet of St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, it would find few available arguments, however speciously they might be set forward, by which to repulse combinations evidently proceeding from a desire for peace, and supported by all the allies.

It remains for me to speak of the final object of this negotiation, of the arrangement by which it would be possible to

place the Sultan and his powerful vassal in more satisfactory relations with each other, and in a position offering better security for the future repose of the East.

The importance of conceding to Mehemet Ali the investiture of at least a part of his actual possessions seems now to be almost unanimously admitted. It is felt, that at the point of greatness he has reached, the necessity of assuring the future fortunes of his family, and of placing it, after his death, in security from the vengeance of the Porte, has too strongly impressed itself upon his mind to suffer him to entertain pacific notions until he has obtained satisfaction on that leading point.

On the other hand, we cannot flatter ourselves with a hope that the Porte will consent to yield to him this increase of moral force, unless, by way of compensation, some advantage is granted to itself which may furnish a material guarantee against the eventual enterprises of an enemy whose power it has thus augmented. The nature and extent of this advantage is not easily determined. Lord Palmerston thinks that it should not fall short of the entire restitution of Syria.

At Berlin, they seem to admit that the Sultan should content himself with merely a portion of that province. For ourselves, we acknowledge that the Porte has a claim to a substantial compensation; but we think that the moment for fixing the exact proportion has not yet arrived; that such a question cannot be decided until after many important and complicated data have been considered, the full appreciation of which cannot be the work of a moment; and that this point ought to be referred to the concerted understanding, which, if our views prevail, will be established between the powers. You will have the goodness to let Lord Palmerston read the present despatch. In thus laying open to the cabinet of London, without reserve, the aspect under which we regard the important circumstances of the moment, we offer it an unequivocal pledge of the confidence with which it has

inspired us, and of our desire to act in the most perfect accordance.

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4. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

Marshal, *London, June 17th*, 1839.

Yesterday Lord Palmerston wrote to request I would call upon him, stating also that he wished to confer with me on the affairs of the East. I repaired to him without delay. I had abstained for several days from pressing too urgently for an answer to the overtures which I was instructed by your Excellency to make to the English cabinet; but the answer being announced, I considered it right to evince the most eager anxiety to receive it from the lips of Lord Palmerston.

Lord Palmerston stated that the council had occupied Saturday in deliberating on the affairs of the East, and that he was authorized to communicate to me the result of that consultation. He also added that Prince Esterhazy would only be informed of it after me.

"Hitherto," Lord Palmerston began, "you have only heard my personal impressions on the Eastern question. I am now going to tell you the mature opinion of the Council; that opinion I beg you will convey to the knowledge of your government, adding, with the transmission, that before acting we shall wait its judgment on the question."

I shall now lay before you, in a faithful summary, all that my memory has retained and my reason has classified on the result of these deliberations of the Council.

The Council has thus decided:

That England is called on to proceed in strict uniformity with France; that everything is impossible without this perfect understanding; that, with it, all is easy, or at least

possible. The Council has divided the question into two parts:

1. Immediate action in the event of a conflict having already commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian armies. 2. The negotiation of such an arrangement as shall render the renewal of this conflict impossible.

The immediate despatch of our combined squadrons to the coast of Syria is considered indispensable.

Our admirals should be instructed, if they find hostilities already commenced, to order the two generals in command to arrest without delay the march of their armies, and to extend the radius of distance which six weeks since separated their respective advanced guards. This order should be accompanied by a declaration in the name of their governments, that at Constantinople and Alexandria the great powers had entered on a treaty of settlement calculated to satisfy the just pretensions of both parties.

If the Turks refused to stop, the admirals should, without a moment's delay, despatch two officers to Constantinople to announce to our ambassadors the refusal of the commandant of the Ottoman army to acquiesce in our suggestions, and they would hold him responsible for such a serious infringement of the relations of the Porte with all the powers of Europe. Our squadrons would maintain a strict look-out on the coast of Syria.

If the Egyptians slighted our summons, the admirals should be instructed to intercept all supplies by sea, and to detach a considerable portion of the fleet to Alexandria, where we should appear in imposing force, and with the threat of blockading the harbour in case Mehemet Ali refused to suspend the advance of his son.

The Council is of opinion that this demonstration would suffice to prevent hostilities from breaking out, or to arrest their progress if they have already commenced.

Meanwhile, we should open negotiations at Constantinople and Alexandria on the double basis of the establishment of the hereditary right of the family of Mehemet Ali over Egypt, and of the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops. The Council thinks that we should encounter no serious difficulty at Constantinople, and that if any presented itself at Alexandria, we should surmount it by convincing the Pacha of our union. The Council has neither determined the place nor details of negotiation; it merely proposes the basis and recognizes its indispensable necessity for securing the peace of the world on a solid foundation.

To render this negotiation successful, the council relies much on the efficacy of the co-operation of Austria; but it also considers that such co-operation should be governed and led by the union of our two cabinets. Let a single doubt arise at Vienna on that union, and all will evaporate in words.

Finally, the Council has weighed the conjuncture under which, unauthorized by events and even beyond the limits of reasonable prevision, we might find the Russians already established at Constantinople, or in march towards the capital of the Ottoman empire. This most important question has been discussed here under the profound impression caused by the phrase in your Excellency's despatch, No. 16: "I fear that in London they may treat too lightly the idea of a new Russian expedition." The Council thinks that, in this case, our combined squadrons should appear before Constantinople as friends, if the Sultan accepted our aid, and by force, if he refused it. The question of the passage of the Dardanelles, in a military sense, has also been debated. It is looked upon as practicable, but dangerous, during the six winter months when the wind blows from the Mediterranean; during the six others it is considered easy, but with troops for disembarkation. I need not

add, that this last step is, if I may so express myself, an extreme conjecture, but for the accomplishment of which it rests with us alone to prevent the retractation of England.

Your Excellency has now before you an exact analysis of the resolutions adopted by the Cabinet Council held the day before yesterday. My despatch will convey them to you before you receive a more direct and detailed communication which Lord Palmerston is at this moment preparing. I strongly represented the necessity of drawing up a plan of instruction for the admirals; such points cannot be too minutely defined. This plan will be communicated by Lord Granville to your Excellency.

Prince Esterhazy followed me at Lord Palmerston's. He will have received the same overtures which were made to me (perhaps with certain reservations). The Prince is full of hope as to the success of the Turco-Egyptian negotiation.

The Russian embassy listens, watches, but hesitates in its action as in its language. There have been many Russians in London during the last month, and some amongst them high in the confidence of the Emperor: I venture with timidity an opinion hastily formed, but it appears to me that in that quarter also they are not prepared for extreme measures.

I venture to entreat that your Excellency will acquaint me as soon as possible with the opinion formed by the King's government on the plan proposed by the British ministry. That opinion will be decisive as to the march of events.

It is long since I have so thoroughly comprehended as I now do the weight of France in the balance of Europe.

Deign to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

5. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.

Marshal, *London, June 20th*, 1839.

I received yesterday the despatch (No. 23) which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me under the date of June the 17th, with extracts from the latest correspondence with St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople, and Alexandria. I informed Lord Palmerston that I had a communication to make to him on the part of the King's government. He appointed an interview for the same day, but the sitting of the House of Commons having commenced by an important vote in which he was compelled to take part, my visit was of necessity postponed until the day following.

My despatch (No. 53), which has crossed your Excellency's, already contained an answer to the greater portion of the questions on which you now direct me to call for the decision of the English cabinet. My conference of this day enables me to complete my information.

I placed your Excellency's despatch in Lord Palmerston's hands, requesting him to read it himself, and to weigh well its bearing and object.

Lord Palmerston, after having read the despatch, addressed me in these words:—"We understand each other upon all points; our accordance will be complete. Principle, end, means of execution, all is full of reason, simplicity, and clearness. This is not the communication of one government to another; call it rather an understanding between colleagues, between members of the same cabinet."

I then requested Lord Palmerston to allow me to recapitulate the points on which I perceived some diversities of opinion, slight, in truth, but real, between the exposition of the views of the King's government and that of the English cabinet, as he had explained it to me in our last conversation.

I began with the instructions to the admirals. Lord

Palmerston had told me that Lord Granville was charged to communicate to your Excellency a plan of instructions which approached so clearly to the spirit and letter of the despatch he had just perused, that he regarded the question of identity as settled. I observed to him that our naval action was proposed under the form of mediation, and consequently with the character of impartiality suitable to that position,—that is to say, that we should use the same language to the respective commandants of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets. Lord Palmerston no longer appeared, as on the first day, opposed to that plan. He added that in the plan of instructions transmitted to Lord Granville for communication to your Excellency, it was even proposed to separate the two fleets, and to direct one on Constantinople, the other on Alexandria. Lord Palmerston entirely coincides with the opinion of your Excellency on the advantage of thus uniting the moral effect which cannot fail to be produced in the East and elsewhere by this imposing development of our maritime power.

Passing from the instructions to the admirals, to the relative strength of the squadrons, Lord Palmerston evinced sincere satisfaction at the increase we were hastening to make to ours, and assured me that the English fleet, already comprising eight sail of the line, would immediately be augmented to ten, to which would be added four or five frigates, three steamers, and a considerable number of light vessels.

Returning then to the very improbable contingency of our squadrons, on their arrival on the coasts of Syria, finding the Russians already in march towards the scene of events, Lord Palmerston repeated to me that the English cabinet proposed that our admirals, after summoning the belligerent parties to cease hostilities, should, through our ambassadors at Constantinople, demand from the Porte the entrance of our fleets into the Bosphorus. He added that he was unable to imagine any pretext under which the Sultan could refuse our aid, without unmasking such a submission to Russian

influence as would compel us to adopt other methods, either to shake or oppose it.

But on this point I found Lord Palmerston much disposed to admit, with your Excellency (and building also on the correspondence from Petersburg and Vienna), that Russia would hesitate in any attempt to execute the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and that she is in no manner prepared for a rupture with Western Europe.

We then reverted to the negotiation, the seat of which your Excellency proposes to fix at Vienna, and the principles and object of which are explained in the despatch.

Lord Palmerston, on the first point, that of fixing the seat of negotiation, requested permission to expose frankly the doubts he entertained. He stated that he had fears lest the influence of Russia should exercise itself more effectually at Vienna on Prince Metternich, than on Count Appony in Paris, or on Prince Esterhazy in London. In reply, I urged some of the objections which naturally presented themselves to my mind. I said that Prince Metternich would probably feel flattered by the choice of Vienna as the place of negotiation; that this feeling would more readily dispose him to the co-operation we sought; that in a question not implicating the policy of principle, and in which Austrian interests presented themselves in full evidence as opposed to the interests of Russia, Prince Metternich would himself be more controlled at Vienna, than elsewhere, by an Austrian opinion very strongly declared. Finally, I represented the central position of Vienna, as a decisive argument in favour of the proposed selection. Lord Palmerston ended by saying: "I have thought quite openly before you. I see the *for* and *against;* and all things considered, I believe the *for* will carry it, but I must consult the cabinet, and will acquaint you with its decision." I expect that it will be favourable.

As to the general datum of the negotiation, that is to say, the hereditary succession in the family of Mehemet Ali, and

the territorial compensation to the Sultan, Lord Palmerston repeated to me that the English cabinet entered completely into the views of the King's government. The arrangement of the limits of that territorial compensation will undoubtedly become a question of debate; but Lord Palmerston wishes me to assure your Excellency, that from the point of departure to the end of the treaty, from the principle to the execution, the most intimate understanding and concert cannot cease to reign between the two cabinets.

You have here, Marshal, an exact analysis of the conversation I held this morning with Lord Palmerston.

Lord Palmerston requested permission to communicate to Lord Melbourne your Excellency's despatch. I felt it my duty not to refuse this mark of confidence.

I pray you to accept, &c. BOURQUENEY.

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6. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, June 27th, 1839.

The approbation given by the British cabinet to the plan you were instructed to communicate to Lord Palmerston for the settlement of the affairs of the East, a plan, which, in all its parts, approaches so closely to the ideas which that minister himself transmitted to us, has afforded warm satisfaction to the King's government. We find an additional pledge of concert in the instructions destined for Admiral Stopford, the substance of which Lord Granville has made me acquainted with. The spirit in which they are conceived is in general relation with our own views, as to the means of solving the crisis which threatens the peace of the world. You will judge of this by the conformity of the English instructions with those which our minister of Marine has this day forwarded to Admiral Lalande. I enclose you a copy, that you may place them under Lord Palmerston's eyes. We have not thought it necessary to touch on a highly important

point, which might embarrass the arrangements of the British Admiralty, — the hypothesis of the arrival of Russian forces at Constantinople. That hypothesis involves considerations I am about to explain to you, and which I request you will submit to the examination of Lord Palmerston.

It appears to us that in directing its attention solely to the prolongation of the stay of the Russians after the retreat of the Egyptian army, by referring to that epoch, and in reserving for that single contingency the measures to be adopted to obtain the passage of the Dardanelles for the allied squadrons, the cabinet of London has not sufficiently provided for the exigencies of the situation. We think that at the moment of the arrival of the Russians at Constantinople, the great interests of European equilibrium, and still more, perhaps, the susceptibilities of public opinion, justly exacting, would require that the English and French flags should show themselves there also. We believe that, instead of waiting the course of events, and of leaving to the ambassadors and admirals themselves the initiative and the responsibility of the important events that may become necessary, France and England ought, without losing a moment, and obtaining, if possible, the assent of Austria, to demand from the Porte the free passage of the Dardanelles for their ships, at the same time when the Russian forces reach the Bosphorus, so as to enable them to co-operate together for the protection of the Sultan's throne. It is certain that the Porte, if left to itself, could not fail to accept joyfully the additional guarantees which would thus be offered against the conflicting dangers to which its independence and security are exposed. Should any external influence, on the contrary, impel it to a refusal, such a rejection would be significant, and France and England would then have to understand each other on the resolutions to be mutually adopted in consequence. But I think that according to the positive data we possess on this point, it would be pre-

mature to confide to the admirals eventual, and in some degree hypothetical powers, which, under circumstances easily conceived, might lead to serious and irremediable complications.

Let me know, I pray you, as soon as possible, what Lord Palmerston thinks of this proposition. If the British cabinet feels disposed to adopt it, I am of opinion that not a moment should be lost; the least delay might deprive it of all its value.

You have already learned the commencement of hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians. I send you an extract from the despatch of M. Cochelet, which announces this deplorable fact. It contains, in addition, the most complete and peremptory refutation of the pretended grievances by which the Porte endeavoured to fix on the viceroy the blame of provocation.

At Constantinople they were still ignorant, up to the seventh of this month, as to what was passing in Syria, but intelligence was expected. The Ottoman fleet was preparing to put to sea. I ought not to conceal from you that all reports confirm the assertion of our ambassador as to the influence exercised by Lord Ponsonby.

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7. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, July 9th, 1839.

The King's government has learned with much satisfaction the consent of the cabinet of London to the proposition of a step being taken with the Porte to obtain the passage of the Dardanelles for the squadrons of France and England, in case the forces of another power should be invited to the succour of Constantinople. The anxiety manifested by the cabinet in preparing the necessary instructions for Lord Ponsonby, furnishes an unequivocal pledge of the sincerity and earnestness of its adhesion. Nevertheless, I know not

whether in London they have sufficiently considered the importance of a complete understanding, in form as well as in object, in a negotiation of so much moment and delicacy, and which is about to be confided to two ambassadors whose reciprocal antecedents unfortunately ill dispose them to a perfect concert. To guard as much as possible against this last inconvenience, I had prepared the draft of the subjoined note, with the intention of communicating it previously to the British cabinet, and of arranging its adoption in mutual accordance. As you will see, the leading idea is to impress on the step of which it treats, a European character. I request you to lay it before Lord Palmerston. It may so happen that it arrives after the despatches to Lord Ponsonby have been forwarded; but if approved of by the British government, supplementary instructions might be sent to its representative. . . . M. de Sainte-Aulaire will acquaint Prince Metternich with the mission entrusted to the two ambassadors, and he will endeavour to associate the Austrian internuncio with it in some degree or other.

What you have made known to me on the substance of the instructions transmitted to Lord Ponsonby, has suggested a reflection to which perhaps it would not be inappropriate to call Lord Palmerston's attention. To ask the Porte, in a specific case, to call for the aid of our squadrons, is not this in some degree affording it a facility of keeping them at a distance from the Dardanelles, by eluding or delaying this invitation through the means of some pretext more or less specious? Would it not be better to ask the Porte simply to issue the necessary orders for their reception in the straits, on their presenting themselves after the accomplishment of the condition which permitted them to appear there? I think we should obtain a substantial advantage by thus reserving to ourselves the initiative, and in this sense the draft of the note I forward is drawn up.

The news from Alexandria comes down to the 19th of

June. The viceroy, informed of the progress of the Ottoman army in the invasion of Syria, had forwarded orders to Ibrahim Pacha to repulse and pursue it beyond the frontiers, when my orderly officer, M. Callier, whose mission I apprised you of, reached Alexandria. The viceroy, after listening to the representations which M. Callier, in concert with M. Cochelet, communicated to him on my part, consented, not without repugnance easily conceived, to recall the authority he had transmitted to Ibrahim, and to command him to limit himself to the repulse of the invasion, and this result being accomplished, to pause wherever he might then find himself. M. Callier was instructed to carry this order to Ibrahim Pacha. . . . It would be difficult not to admit that in the whole progress of this affair, the Turks seem to take pleasure in leaving to their adversaries the advantages of sincerity and moderation.

This remark assumes a character of much more incontestible evidence, when we compare the reception given by the viceroy to our counsels, with that which the warnings of Admiral Roussin obtained at Constantinople. In vain did that ambassador, without suffering himself to be discouraged by the ill success of his friendly remonstrances, demand explanations as to the sailing of the fleet; in vain, after receiving fresh instructions forwarded to him by me, did he return to the charge, and seek to open the eyes of the Sultan on the dangers into which he thus wantonly precipitated himself. . . . The Porte has completely thrown off the mask with which it covered itself only a few days before; it now avows its hostile projects, and that the fleet is destined to effect a disembarkation.

The refusal of Lord Ponsonby to support the representations of his colleague is a lamentable circumstance. The mere silence of the English ambassador, in such a conjuncture, has acted as an encouragement to the rash designs of the Porte. Unfortunately, that encouragement results even more di-

rectly in a strange circumstance to which allusion is made in the correspondence of Admiral Roussin, namely, the promise of the despatch of English forces to Bassora, with a view of preventing the pretended aggressive projects of the Egyptians. One of the smallest dangers resulting from such a measure would be the pretext or rather the justification it would prepare for the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian army. I have spoken to Lord Granville on this subject without reserve, while avoiding at the same time any expression that might give my language the appearance of an official complaint. On your part you will confine yourself to placing under the eyes of Lord Palmerston the documents I forward to you, and you will acquaint me with any explanations he may feel disposed to give.

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8. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, July 9th, 1839.

On reaching Lord Palmerston's residence yesterday, I began by inquiring whether the courier bearing the instructions to Lord Ponsonby had commenced his journey. Lord Palmerston informed me that the despatches were not yet completely ready, and could not be so for four and twenty hours. "I rejoice to hear it," I replied, "for I come by order of my government to suggest to your Lordship, in the form of your proposal to the Sultan, a modification, the propriety of which I have no doubt you will fully appreciate." I then began to read your Excellency's despatch. I paused at the third paragraph, intending to return subsequently to that with which it concluded, but in the mean time confining myself to the separate discussion and arrangement of the questions respecting the instructions to our ambassadors. I then placed in Lord Palmerston's hands the draft of the note prepared for Admiral Roussin.

Lord Palmerston, who listened with the most profound

attention to your Excellency's despatch, and who read deliberately, weighing each expression, the draft of the note for the King's ambassador at Constantinople, renders full justice to the political view under which that note has been drawn up. He acknowledges, with your Excellency, that both cabinets will obtain a real advantage by reserving to themselves the initiative in the step of immediately requiring the Porte to issue the necessary orders for the admission of our squadrons, after the accomplishment of the conditions to which we ourselves subordinate that admission. In its form, Lord Palmerston thinks that the first part of the note, notwithstanding all the precautions of language with which it is invested, presents to the Sultan a picture too faithful, but at the same time too sombre, of his actual position. He fears that such a frank expression of the truth may incline him to reject our proposal. He feels satisfied that these documents will be communicated by the Porte to Russia on the same day when they reach Constantinople; and he apprehends, over the haughty and blind spirit of the Sultan, the abuse by Russia of a language which she might represent to him as humiliating to his crown. The second part of the note, and all the considerations on which it founds European concert, he considers excellent. But Lord Palmerston does not even insist upon the first objection; he is satisfied to leave it to the enlightened consideration of the King's government. He merely apprises us that the note of Lord Ponsonby will, in this part of its detail, present a slight difference to that of Admiral Roussin.

I could not refrain from observing to Lord Palmerston that there was no method of escaping from the necessity of foreseeing or of making foreseen a catastrophe, in the form of drawing up a note, the object of which was to offer the means of preventing it, and which only founded the occasion for the measure adopted on the very *preliminaries* of that expected catastrophe. I added that our action on the Porte since the events in Syria had always consisted in alarming the Sultan,

so as to restrain him within the bounds of moderation; in telling him the truth, in fact, to render him wise. "You are right," replied Lord Palmerston; "I admit the necessity which controls us; thus I do not reject the idea; I adopt it even to the letter. I only think we ought to be cautious in its development."

I promised Lord Palmerston to communicate this observation to your Excellency.

I offered Lord Palmerston, for bearer of his despatch to Lord Ponsonby, the courier your Excellency has appointed to proceed overland to Admiral Roussin. Lord Palmerston thanked me, but he will naturally avail himself of the messenger who should have left London yesterday, but whose departure is now delayed for forty-eight hours to insert in the instructions to Lord Ponsonby the modifications proposed by the King's government.

The English courier, as will also yours, must go through Vienna, and Lord Beauvale, with M. de Sainte-Aulaire, will receive orders to exert their utmost efforts to induce the Austrian cabinet to associate itself with our measure.

This first question being disposed of, I resumed and finished the reading of your Excellency's despatch. I then handed to Lord Palmerston the extracts from the last despatches of the King's ambassador at Constantinople, and added: "I am not charged with any official complaint. Some strange facts have taken place. I am ordered to place before your Lordship the documents which verify them, and to wait the explanations which you may consider due to the mutual confidence of our two cabinets.

Lord Palmerston rang the bell, and ordered the four last months of Lord Ponsonby's correspondence to be brought to him, with the two last years of that of Colonel Campbell.

"Let us confine ourselves at first," he said to me, "to what concerns Lord Ponsonby; we will then turn to the affair of Bassora. I feel bound to prove to you that my

instructions have never varied on this fundamental point; that the English ambassador at Constantinople was to consider it his constant duty to restrain the warlike propensities of the Sultan. On the basis of the question there is no divergence between us; that we may be a little more prepossessed with the quality of the sovereign than with that of the vassal, that our bias may incline on the side of that principle, is quite true. But the reason is, that in our estimation the fact is on the side of the principle. The independence and stability of the Sultan's throne seem to us to require that partiality, and we have always dreaded lest in wounding the pride of the sovereign of Constantinople we should furnish Russia with a weapon against us. But I affirm to you that we have incessantly repeated to Lord Ponsonby, 'Prevent war from breaking out.'"

Lord Palmerston then made me read seven or eight despatches written by him to Lord Ponsonby, from the end of January to the middle of June, and all founded on this general datum.

"Now," Lord Palmerston resumed, "I cannot conceal from you that the personal opinion of Lord Ponsonby, an opinion in which I by no means participate, has always been opposed to the maintenance of the *statu quo* of Kutaieh; he preferred even extreme measures as at least susceptible of a favourable termination. But I am justified in believing, that in his official relations at Constantinople the ambassador has subordinated his personal opinions to his instructions." (Lord Palmerston then read to me, at hazard, all the last despatches of Lord Ponsonby, which verified his pacific endeavours with the Porte.)

I observed to Lord Palmerston that it seemed to me very difficult to suppose that the personal opinions of the ambassador — easily penetrated on the spot, and *transparent*, even in the despatches I had just read — must not have detracted in some measure from the efficacy of his pacific action at

Constantinople. Lord Palmerston, without directly assenting to my opinion, answered in such a manner as to convince me that he entertained similar apprehensions.

In any other country, the result of this conversation would have been the probable recall of Lord Ponsonby. Here matters are differently arranged. External affairs are entirely regulated by internal influences.

With reference to the refusal of Lord Ponsonby to associate himself with the step reported by Admiral Roussin in his despatch of the 14th of June, I demanded of Lord Palmerston whether such a circumstance would be repeated after the close union now manifesting itself between the two cabinets on the affairs of the East. Lord Palmerston assured me that Lord Ponsonby had already received, and would speedily receive in addition, *official* and *confidential* instructions which would give an entirely new character to his language and conduct.

"I now come," said Lord Palmerston, "to the affair of Bassora. More than two years have elapsed since we engaged Mehemet Ali not to extend his occupation towards the Persian Gulf. To our remonstrances at Alexandria he has always replied by a denial of the facts. The reports of our agents convinced us that the occupation had actually taken place, and that Egyptian officers had entered Bassora, Lalesa, and Katif, and were menacing the small island of Baleraie, under the pretext of preventing it from becoming a focus of insurrection against themselves. At Alexandria we had threatened to employ force to prevent any Egyptian establishment in the Persian Gulf; but before adopting that extreme measure we had thought it right to apply to the sovereign *de jure* to ascertain whether he had given consent to this extension of Egyptian power. Undoubtedly we knew that the reply would be in the negative; but we thought by this course to render our action regular. This is the step alluded to in the despatches you have just read to me. After

that, I may add that we never contemplated anything beyond sending out a ship of war without troops for disembarkation. This demonstration alone appeared to us likely to be more than sufficient. I must also inform you that this question, exclusively special for us, with relation to the Persian Gulf, has nothing in common with the events of Syria, and will have no influence whatever on our course in the general negociation."

I asked Lord Palmerston whether he did not apprehend that at Constantinople the recent proceeding of Lord Ponsonby might be translated into an encouragement of the warlike propensities of the Sultan. He answered, that if so, it was because they were determined to deceive themselves as to its bearing, for it was well known, for a year at least, that the matter was in dispute between the English government and the Pacha of Egypt.

Lord Palmerston placed before me the entire correspondence of Colonel Campbell since November 1837, and I am bound to admit that it settles the question on the data he had previously laid down.

It is not for me to decide whether the King's government will be contented with those explanations; but I can assure your Excellency that there is here every desire to render them satisfactory.

I pray you to receive, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

9. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, July 11th, 1839.

Marshal,

. . . Lord Palmerston gives his most unreserved consent to the plan of declaration by which the powers engage themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, without excepting any portion of its territory. Lord Palmer-

ston is ready to make this announcement in the name of the British ministry; and he proposes, moreover, to the King's government, when all the declarations reach Vienna, to combine them under the most solemn form of a general engagement.

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10. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Lord Palmerston had just received his courier from Vienna when I brought to him your Excellency's despatch (No. 27), and the extracts from the correspondence of the Count de Sainte-Aulaire. After reading them, he replied by communicating to me the despatches and confidential letters of Lord Beauvale, without the omission of a single syllable.

Our ambassadors agree entirely on the dispositions of Prince Metternich: they entertain the same hope of inducing the Austrian cabinet to join in our political action at Constantinople; the same anticipation of the death of the Sultan; and the same approval of the plan of declaration by which the European powers would solemnly pledge themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire,—the initiative of which plan has been assumed by M. de Metternich in his successive conferences with M. de Sainte-Aulaire and Lord Beauvale.

As I had the honour of announcing yesterday in my despatch (No. 62), Lord Palmerston has ratified without reserve the favourable opinion which your Excellency expressed on the proposition of Prince Metternich respecting all the measures to be adopted. Starting always from this general datum, that Russia is at the present moment *incapable*, Lord Palmerston expects that we shall obtain her concurrence. A refusal would completely change the order of facts.

Lord Palmerston asked me if the King's government,

favourable as it had expressed itself to the idea of M. de Metternich, had found time to determine on the form of the declaration by which it would reply to the Austrian cabinet. I told him that I had as yet received no information on that point. He then requested me to consult our ministry on the project of uniting at Vienna, in a general European act, all the individual declarations of the powers as soon as they should reach the seat of negotiation. Ever since his lordship has admitted the advantage of fixing on Vienna for that purpose, I owe him the justice to acknowledge that I cannot perceive the slightest disposition on his part to reserve any points for exclusive consideration in London, beyond the share of control which every cabinet has naturally a right to exercise in communication with its own ambassador.

Lord Palmerston is equally anxious to ascertain whether our government coincides with the opinion he expressed to me yesterday, and which I have already had the honour of transmitting to your Excellency, on the necessity of making the presumed death of the Sultan a plea for the admission of our squadrons into the Sea of Marmara. This project will lead to a certain increase of latitude and responsibility in the instructions to be conveyed to our ambassadors at Constantinople; for in such an eventuality they must necessarily be left to judge of circumstances which we cannot possibly forestall at this distance from the scene of action.

In his despatch of the 1st of July, Lord Beauvale strongly recommends to Lord Palmerston the plan of adding to our squadrons on the coast of Syria some Russian men-of-war from the Black Sea. The arguments are ably set forward:— "We flatter Russia, and lead her into the European concert; we take from her all pretext for using her influence at Constantinople to close the Dardanelles against our ships; finally, we extort from her a pledge, for such her detachment would be in the midst of our two fleets." These arguments have not, up to this date, shaken the opinion which Lord Palmer-

ston had previously expressed to me on the closing of the Sea of Marmara by the Bosphorus and the straits. The general manner of contemplating the question remains the same, with the single exception to which we have recourse at this moment, as our couriers are on the road to Constantinople bearing a demand for the admission of our squadrons in a given case; and the expected death of the Sultan adds to the probable contingencies which may render that admission necessary. "But," Lord Palmerston observed, "the advantage of the presence of Russian ships on the coast of Syria does not appear to me to be sufficiently demonstrated to call for a deviation from principle." He then added this curious fact: "When we returned to power in 1835, I waited on the Duke of Wellington: my intimacy with him justified a confidential step. I mentioned to the Duke that the East being called upon to act an important part in the affairs of Europe, I was extremely anxious to ascertain his opinion on the two plans which offered themselves to our policy,—either to open the Sea of Marmara to our fleets, and consequently to those of the other powers, or to close it to all, including our own. The Duke replied, without hesitation,—'Close it; on those shores we are too far from our resources, while Russia has hers at hand.' His words struck me," continued Lord Palmerston, "as being full of sense and sound argument."

Lord Palmerston read to me the despatch he was about to send to Lord Clanricarde, in answer to the last communication from Count de Nesselrode. "The English cabinet thanks the cabinet of St. Petersbourg for the readiness with which it offers to co-operate in restricting the theatre of the struggle between the two belligerent parties; but it insists on the necessity of rendering impossible a repetition of events which might compromise the peace of the world; and it considers a permanent arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali as the surest means of obtaining the end proposed by the European powers. The despatch adverts several times to

the close union existing between the cabinets of London and Paris,—a union which has dictated the instructions forwarded to the admirals commanding our respective squadrons in the Mediterranean.

Lord Beauvale had added to his despatch of the 2nd of July to Lord Palmerston, a private letter from Lord Ponsonby, which reached him by the last post from Constantinople. Lord Palmerston expressed a wish that I should read it. My impression is that Lord Ponsonby does not always confine himself *to the views of his own cabinet.* The letter is an appeal to his colleagues and to the cabinets they represent. In it he speaks of the death of the Sultan as of a realized fact; he exclaims against the policy of the *statu quo*, which, according to him, has ruined the East since 1832. He says there is not a moment to be lost in repairing its errors. Our flags must wave before Constantinople; Austria must declare her determination to push an army in advance, &c. Constantinople once in the power of the Russians, and there no longer remains one single first-rate power in Europe,—England alone excepted, if she stoops to enter into a disgraceful bargain with the cabinet of St. Petersbourg. All this is a compound of good and bad ideas, nearly always ingenious, but often inapplicable. I was before inclined to think that Lord Ponsonby is not a very scrupulous organ of the policy of his cabinet; now I am convinced of it. I venture to request that your Excellency will maintain secrecy on the communication which I owe entirely to the confidence of Lord Palmerston.

I pray you to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

11. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, July 17th, 1839.

Monsieur le Baron,

Under the very serious crisis into which the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, happening in the midst of the events which have marked the last months of his reign, has plunged the Ottoman empire, the union of the great powers of Europe could alone offer a satisfactory guarantee to the friends of peace. The communications exchanged for several weeks have fortunately proved that this union is as complete as can possibly be wished. All the cabinets desire the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Porte under the dynasty actually on the throne; all are disposed to employ their means of action and influence to secure the continuance of this essential element in the political equilibrium, and they would not hesitate to declare themselves against any combination whatever that might seek to assail it. Such a perfect unanimity of sentiment and resolution being sufficient, since no one can refuse to doubt it, not only to prevent any attempt against this great interest, but, in addition, to dissipate the anxieties, the urgency of which constitute in themselves a substantial danger in consequence of the general agitation they excite,—the King's government is of opinion that the cabinets would take an important step to the secure establishment of peace, by announcing in written documents, reciprocally communicated, and which would of necessity soon obtain publicity more or less complete, a statement of the intentions I have named above. As far as we are concerned, I declare formally that such are and will continue to be ours, and I authorize you to leave a copy of the present despatch with Lord Palmerston, having previously given it to him to read. I feel satisfied that the British government in the answer it will undoubtedly consider due to the letter with which you will accompany

this despatch, will adhere, in the most formal manner, to this profession of faith, so entirely conformable to the repeatedly expressed avowal of its policy. If, as I have reason to hope, the cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersbourg, reply in the same tone to similar communications I am about to forward to them, the end which the King's government purposes to itself will be accomplished.

His Majesty, desirous of affording an unequivocal testimony of the friendly dispositions with which he is animated towards the Porte, has instructed me to forward to Admiral Roussin, without waiting the official intelligence or even a direct confirmation of the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, his credentials as ambassador to the new Emperor.

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12. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, July 17th, 1839.

Monsieur le Baron,

I have made known to you by telegraph the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, the news of which we received through the same channel, and which the last despatches from Constantinople announced as being then imminent. It is to be apprehended that the order transmitted to Hafiz Pacha for the suspension of hostilities may have reached him too late to prevent the expected battle. Although it is at present extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the influence which this change of reign may exercise upon the destinies of the East, it is evident that they have reached a crisis which calls for the most serious and loyal concurrence of all the cabinets to secure the continuance of peace. It seems to me that the moment has arrived to act upon the idea already suggested by M. de Metternich, of guaranteeing, by means of an interchange of diplomatic declarations, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman

empire; and to prevent any delay, I have resolved to assume the initiative myself in the necessary steps to be taken for that object. The accompanying despatch formally expresses on our part the engagement of which I now speak. Lord Palmerston will, I have no doubt, reply to the communication you will make to him, in terms sufficiently precise to attain the end we have in view.

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13. *Baron de Bourqueney to Lord Palmerston.*

London, July 19th, 1839.

My Lord,

I obey the orders of my government in transmitting to your Excellency, without delay, a copy of the despatch I have this moment received from the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, bearing date July the 17th.

The King's government, my Lord, feels assured beforehand that it will find in the cabinet of her Britannic Majesty principles and sentiments conformable to those which direct and will invariably continue to direct its policy in the affairs of the East; but it attaches an important value to the acknowledgment of a new testimony of that happy unanimity.

I pray your Excellency to acknowledge the receipt of this letter, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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14. *Lord Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney.*

Foreign Office, July 22nd, 1839.

Monsieur le Baron,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 19th inst., enclosing, by order of your government, a copy of a despatch, dated the 17th inst., which you have

received from the Duke of Dalmatia, relative to the present posture of affairs in Turkey.

I have to express to you, in reply, the great satisfaction with which her Majesty's government has received this communication, and lose no time in authorising you to assure your own government that the British cabinet, like that of France, desires to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire under its existing dynasty; and is ready to use its influence and its means of action for the purpose of maintaining this essential element of the balance of power in Europe; and like that of France, would not hesitate to declare itself openly against any combination which might be conceived in a spirit of hostility to the principles above mentioned.

I have the honour to be, with high consideration,

Monsieur le Baron,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

PALMERSTON.

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15. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

Monsieur le Maréchal, *London, July 23rd*, 1839.

I have communicated to Lord Palmerston the two telegraphic despatches of yesterday's date, which your Excellency has done me the honour to forward. They have naturally produced a most painful impression upon his mind, and he was unable to restrain an ebullition of displeasure at the blindness which has exposed Mahmoud and his empire to such a disastrous event.

Upon considering, however, more calmly, the general position, and assuming that Ibrahim Pacha may not have followed up his successes to an extremity dangerous to the actual safety of the Ottoman empire, Lord Palmerston has gradually come to a conclusion analogous to that of his first

reasoning, when I informed him of the death of the Sultan. The second event, like the first, finds, as he thinks, the great powers nearly determined as to the means of preventing all European complication; the interchange between our two cabinets of declarations relative to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, is even an additional step in this sound direction; by persevering in the same course, Lord Palmerston hopes that every impending catastrophe may be prevented.

At the same time his mind is strongly impressed by the deplorable prostration of the Ottoman power, at the moment when it passes into the hands of a sovereign of sixteen years of age; and this prostration must of necessity form a serious cause of regret and alarm to the powers who are the disinterested protectors of the Porte. Lord Palmerston associates this reflection with a natural tendency to suspect that Russia, without absolutely desiring a European complication, but looking upon the weakness of the Ottoman power as favourable to her views for the future, may have secretly urged on Egypt and the Porte to this last collision. This suspicion he holds as confirmed by the recent efforts of the Russian cabinet to restrict the theatre of contest within certain limits, and to prescribe to the presumed victor, Ibrahim Pacha, the route of Diarbekir,—a direction which would not compel the Porte to demand the fulfilment of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and for which Russia feels herself at this moment unprepared.

Passing from these general considerations to the practical side of the question, I asked Lord Palmerston whether he considered that the news of the defeat of the Turkish army required any modification in the measures already adopted by our two cabinets under an anticipation of the event now realized. Lord Palmerston replied that as yet he saw no such necessity.

"The instructions to our admirals," he said, "enable them

to deal with the event of the 24th of June. Ibrahim Pacha will probably have paused of his own accord in his first successes. Should he prosecute them, the commanders of our squadrons have their course traced out; if, on the other hand, terror should again have thrown the Porte into the arms of Russia, our first instructions to the ambassadors peremptorily indicate to them the demand they will then address to the Porte for the admission of our fleets into the Sea of Marmara. We must redouble our efforts and activity at Vienna to push on the conclusion of a permanent settlement, the general bases of which have already been prearranged by the other powers as the limits within which the negociation is to proceed. Egypt will, of course, become more exacting; but European concert will be able to triumph over all these obstacles.

Your Excellency has now a summary of the principal points of Lord Palmerston's conversation. . . . I may add, in confidence, that in case the King's government should feel the necessity of modification in the course pursued up to this moment, any overtures on that subject will be received here with sincere deference.

Lord Palmerston requests me to thank your Excellency in his name for the promptness and accuracy of your communications.

Pray accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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16. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, July 26th, 1839.

The answer given by Lord Palmerston to the declaration, a copy of which I instructed you to remit to him, is satisfactory on all points.

The important news which have reached us within the last few days from the East, have given an entirely new aspect to the state of affairs. Whatever may have been our anxiety as to the future, arising from the magnitude of the danger to which the late policy of the Sultan Mahmoud exposed the Ottoman empire, the event has exceeded all conjectures. The death of the Sultan, the utter defeat of the Turkish army in Syria, the defection of the fleet, have placed that empire in such a position, that henceforward the protection of Europe and the prudence of Mehemet Ali are the only securities remaining to the throne of the young Abdul Medjid.

. . . The Porte, a few days after the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, while still unacquainted with the defection of the fleet, but doubtlessly aware of the defeat of Hafiz Pacha, announced officially to the representatives of the great powers, its intention to seek a reconciliation with the viceroy, and to make concessions to him with this object. Mehemet, inflated by the feeling of superiority derived from recent circumstances, evinced a disposition to exorbitant demands.

The rapidity with which events hasten onwards, excite apprehensions that the crisis may wind up by some arrangement in which the European powers will not have time to interfere, and that, consequently, the interests essential to the general policy may not be sufficiently considered. This danger is an inevitable consequence of our distance from Constantinople, and there are no means of providing an absolute remedy. I think, however, that it will be desirable to continue the course adopted up to this time, and which consists in subordinating as much as possible to an intimate and sustained concert between the cabinets, the action which some amongst them are prepared to exercise in the Eastern question. As regards England and France, including also Austria, although she does not as openly proclaim her views, the principle and

veritable object of this concert is to restrain Russia, and to accustom her to treat in common on oriental affairs. It is enough to say, that under existing conjunctures, there is more reason than ever for our strict unanimity, and the same sentiment prevails at Vienna. M. de Mettermich even evinces a strong prepossession on this point.

This being agreed, I consider that the powers, while giving full approbation to the conciliatory sentiments of the Porte, should insist upon nothing being precipitated, and should interdict all treaty with the viceroy, except through the intervention and concurrence of its allies, whose co-operation would undoubtedly supply the best means of securing better and more securely guaranteed conditions.

I think that the same powers should at Alexandria assume a tone and language with the viceroy calculated to make him feel that, whatever advantages he may have obtained, he would encounter the risk of compromising by seeking to push them too far, and that if he attempted, under any form or pretext whatever, to extort from the Sultan conditions incompatible with the dignity and security of his throne, combined Europe would interfere in opposition. To render such language effectual, the consuls should be empowered to adopt it simultaneously, and in such terms as to prove their entire accordance. It is also essential that the firmness, I had almost said the severity of the advice conveyed, should be tempered by a tone of moderation and good feeling which, while checking the audacity of Mehemet Ali, would abstain from wounding too deeply his pride and ambition. There would assuredly be affectation in seeming to believe, that after the successes he has obtained through the senseless aggression of the Porte, he would not feel himself in a condition to expect more than he had a right previously to demand. This would be to deny the empire of facts, and the necessities of the situation. If the viceroy were to convince himself that he had nothing to expect from the equity

of the powers, he would revolt against their imperious representations, and his irritation might, from one moment to another, bring on consequences, the very possibility of which is sufficient to alarm all provident minds.

Such are the first impressions the King's government has received from the latest oriental news. You will make them known to Lord Palmerston, and ascertain whether they coincide with the views of the British cabinet.

You will remark in Admiral Roussin's despatch, in which he details the propositions submitted by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, that which concedes to the Pacha the *investiture for life* of the sovereignty of Egypt. Our ambassador has mistaken the intention of Nourri Effendi. The question is of *hereditary* investiture, as evidently results from two documents appended to the report of the Austrian chargé d'affaires on the conference in which these reports were communicated to the representatives of the powers, and also from the letter with which the Grand Vizier transmitted them to the viceroy.

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17. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

Monsieur le Maréchal, *London, July 27th*, 1839.

I received this morning the telegraphic despatch, in which your Excellency announces to me the defection of the Capitan Pacha. I wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston to acquaint him with this important intelligence. He replied by requesting me to call on him at two o'clock at the Foreign Office; a cabinet council was being held there, and I believe he was anxious to consult his colleagues during that sitting.

Lord Palmerston left the Council to read the telegraphic

despatch, and returned to communicate it to the other members of the cabinet. The result of their deliberation was, that until they ascertained the particulars of this new event, nothing should be modified in the preceding instructions.'

A courier from Vienna, who left that city on the 17th instant, arrived this morning in London. He brings news from Constantinople to the 8th. The treason of the Capitan-Pacha was already known at that date. Prince Esterhazy handed to me the despatch of M. de Metternich to read, and the extracts from the correspondence of Baron Sturmer. The description given by the chargé d'affaires is extremely sombre. Prince Metternich writes to Prince Esterhazy that *time must not be wasted in lamentation*, and that the moment has arrived for cementing more closely than ever the union of the governments in the projected negotiation at Vienna.

Lord Palmerston spoke with me this morning in the same sense; he thinks we should press as urgently as possible the conclusion of the arrangement, under the protection of the five courts. He says that Lord Beauvale is amply provided with instructions and powers to that effect. These instructions, as your Excellency is aware, include the hereditary sovereignty in the family of Mehemet Ali, and a territorial compensation for the Ottoman Porte. I hear that, in the opinion of the English cabinet, this compensation amounts to the *complete restoration of Syria!* but I do not think it will be insisted on as a *sine quâ non*.

Lord Palmerston is strongly apprehensive that the Russian cabinet will urge at Constantinople a direct arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which would break down, by rendering them useless, the negotiations of Vienna, with the accruing guarantees; but he thinks that even admitting the case of direct settlement, we should continue our efforts to

produce from the moral concurrence of the four courts an act to which the fifth would be compelled to subscribe.

Deign to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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18. *Baron de Bourquency to Marshal Soult.*

Monsieur le Maréchal, *London, July 31st*, 1839.

Yesterday, when I was preparing to send off the portfolio of the embassy, Lord Palmerston wrote to request I would call upon him. He had just received his courier from Paris, and he was anxious to show me the correspondence of Lord Granville, being struck by some discrepancies of detail between his despatch and that which I communicated to him the day before.

Lord Granville writes, on the evening of the 26th, that your Excellency had declared to him that, in the opinion of the King's government,—

"Neither the disastrous defeat of the Turkish army, nor the treason of the Capitan-Pacha, nor the dejected attitude of the Divan, ought to modify the course which the great powers of Europe propose to follow. That any arrangement entered into between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at the moment when the ministers of the empire were either paralyzed by fear or traitorously occupied in satisfying their own personal ambition, in contempt of the rights of their sovereign, *ought to be considered as null and void*, and that *a declaration to this effect should be conveyed to Mehemet Ali*. Finally, your Excellency is stated to have added that *you would write on the same day to Vienna to the French ambassador*, to transmit to him this opinion of the King's government,

instructing him also *to obtain the adhesion of the Austrian cabinet.*"

I quote Lord Granville's despatch according to the text.

Lord Palmerston replies to Lord Granville that the English ministry adheres to *every syllable* of your Excellency's declaration; that, without previous concert, the two cabinets adopt an identical conclusion, and that nothing can more decidedly prove the community of the object they propose, and the mutual responsibility by which they are animated.

But Lord Palmerston also remarked, with some anxiety, certain divergencies between the declaration of your Excellency, as reported by Lord Granville, and the following phrases in the despatch you did me the honour to address to me:—

"We must make the enemy feel that, whatever may be the advantages he has obtained, he would encounter the risk of compromising, by seeking to push them too far." . . .

"There would be affectation in seeming to believe that after the advantages Mehemet Ali has obtained, through the senseless aggressions of the Porte, he would not feel himself in a condition to expect more than he had a right previously to demand. This would be to deny the empire of facts, and the necessities of the situation." . . . .

I endeavoured to weaken, as much as I possibly could, the contrast which Lord Palmerston pointed out to me. I even reduced it to a mere obscurity in the formula; I called his attention to the idea which predominated, as well in the declaration of your Excellency to Lord Granville as in the despatch you did me the honour to forward,—an idea comprised in preventing a direct settlement between the Sultan and the Pacha, in which the interests of the Ottoman empire would be sacrificed to a combination of disastrous circumstances, and the interests of Europe deprived of the guarantee they looked for in a treaty concluded under the influence of the great powers. But not being furnished

with positive information as to the basis which the King's government desires to give to this arrangement, I avoided entering on that ground of discussion. Lord Palmerston, however, did not allow the opportunity to escape of notifying to me more clearly the views of the English cabinet. He said:—

"The more I reflect on this Eastern question (and I assure you that I do not suffer any exclusively *English* prepossession to enter my mind on the subject), the more I arrive at this conclusion, that France and England must, of necessity, desire identically the same thing,—the security and strength of the Ottoman empire; or, if these expressions are too ambitious, its return to a state which presents the fewest possible chances of foreign intervention. Well, we shall only attain this object by placing *the desert* between the Sultan and his vassal. Let Mehemet Ali remain master of his Egypt,—let him obtain the hereditary sovereignty which has been the constant aim of his desires; but let there be no longer any possible collision, and, consequently, no *neighbourhood* between these two rival powers. Russia covets (prospectively) the European provinces, and, at the bottom of her heart, sees with joy the Asiatic limbs separate themselves from the Ottoman body. Can we promote this interest? Evidently not. They speak of the material difficulties we shall encounter in obtaining our object. I believe that Mehemet Ali will not resist a sincere desire expressed in common by the great powers. Should he do so, his claims will not be increased by this contempt for the advice of Europe, while endeavouring to save appearances; and, if force should become necessary, the result would neither be long nor doubtful.

"Such," continued Lord Palmerston, "is the well-considered opinion of the English cabinet. If we thought that Mehemet Ali could seat himself, strong and respected upon the Ottoman throne, and possess the empire in its independence and integrity, we should say—let it be so. But,

convinced as we are, that if any strong feeling yet survives in Turkey, it is a religious attachment to the Imperial family, and that the whole empire will never consent to look upon Mehemet Ali as a descendant of the prophet, God forbid that we should embark in such a line of policy! We should find a second *South America* in the East, surrounded by neighbours who would not always leave her to be consumed by internal dissensions."

I have repeated Lord Palmerston's opinion in the exact style of the conversation in which he developed it. I need not add that it in no way replied to even a presumed idea of the King's government; but the last publications of the press in both countries have recently given circulation to certain notions which Lord Palmerston took the opportunity of refuting.

I promised Lord Palmerston, on leaving him, that I would call your attention to the slight shade of difference he pointed out to me between Lord Granville's correspondence and your Excellency's last despatch.

In compliance with Lord Palmerston's remonstrances, the Prussian envoy had requested his cabinet to explain itself on the basis of the projected arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. M. de Werther has just read to me the confidential answer he has received from his father. The Baron de Werther states in this letter that the Prussian cabinet, not wishing to take any initiative in the Eastern question, it is not the opinion of his government, but merely his own, that he transmits to London; and this opinion is, that the bases of the arrangement ought to be the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt in the family of Mehemet Ali, and the complete restoration of Syria to the Sultan. M. de Werther has communicated his father's letter to Lord Palmerston.

I beg you to receive, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

19. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Sir, *Paris, August 1st*, 1839.

I send you a copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have just received from the Consul-General of France at Alexandria. We learn from this that the Turkish fleet, on the 14th of July, placed itself at the disposition of Mehemet-Ali, who has formally announced his intention of not restoring it to the Porte until the removal of the Grand Vizier, and his own hereditary investiture of the country he governs. In communicating this information to Lord Palmerston you will have the goodness to ascertain the opinion of the cabinet of London on the new attitude which France and England may find themselves called upon to assume in consequence of this serious complication.

M. de Metternich has forwarded an answer in conformity with our declaration in favour of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. According to what M. de Sainte-Aulaire writes, the Chancellor of Austria, who recently appeared to be quite satisfied with the intentions manifested by Russia, is now extremely uneasy on that point. It appears that the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, far from continuing the assurances, otherwise sufficiently vague, which it had at first proffered of its desire to act in concert with the other powers, now recedes under frivolous pretexts from all that might substantiate or reduce them to formal acts. I am surprised at the astonishment that M. de Metternich evinces at this proceeding. I never imagined that, in the actual question, Russia would be brought to associate herself frankly with the other cabinets whose policy is so opposed to hers. I thought that, while appearing to labour with that view, while using the most conciliatory forms, we only proposed to restrain and intimidate her to a certain point, by

a demonstration of the perfect concert of the other great powers, united in one common interest. With that object it would be necessary for the powers, particularly France and England, to hold a language towards the cabinet of St. Petersbourg absolutely uniform, and to address it only by combined measures. I have, therefore, felt some regret at the step lately taken by Lord Clanricarde with M. de Nesselrode.

. . . . . .

The Russian government has naturally concluded from thence that on one point at least, the limits to be imposed on Mehemet Ali, England expected to find more sympathy from that quarter than from the other cabinets; and will therefore conclude, very erroneously without doubt, that an alliance in which such discrepancies are manifested can neither be very homogeneous nor imposing.

It is not, as I believe, only at St. Petersbourg essential to neglect nothing to impress a conviction of the intimate understanding between the courts of London and Paris. At Vienna, also, notwithstanding the powerful interest which would seem, at least for the moment, to impose silence on the narrow prejudices of a superannuated policy,— at Vienna they are too much given to receive with a sort of satisfaction all that tends to encourage a belief that this union exists not, or has only existed imperfectly. M. de Metternich incessantly affects, I am not quite sure with what object, to impress on our ambassador, that in Paris and London we are not agreed, and that on that point he knows more than he chooses to disclose. He collects with minute anxiety the most trifling circumstances that can lend support to this assertion. Thus, on the most recent occasion, he remarked that Lord Beauvale was not instructed, as M. de Sainte-Aulaire had been, to engage the court of Vienna to demand with us the free admission of the allied squadrons into the Sea of Marmara. And thus also he pointed out with exaggeration the difference in the instructions forwarded to the two admirals.

You are requested to direct the attention of Lord Palmerston to the considerations I have here indicated. In the frankness of our language he will unquestionably discover a striking testimony of the desire we entertain to preserve in our relations with the English cabinet the character of intimacy so imperatively required by all the leading interests of Europe.

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20. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, August 1839,
9 *o'clock in the Evening.*

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston, to inform him that your Excellency had instructed me to announce the arrival of the Ottoman fleet at Alexandria, and to consult the English cabinet on the new attitude which France and England might find themselves called on to assume, in consequence of this serious complication.

Lord Palmerston appointed me to meet him at four o'clock, at the Foreign Office. A cabinet council was to assemble at two,—the important intelligence I had transmitted to be the subject of debate.

Lord Palmerston left the Council, accompanied by Lord Minto; he informed me, on entering his closet, that the First Lord of the Admiralty would be present at our conference.

"The Council," Lord Palmerston said, "has deliberated on the news which the French government charged you to communicate to me. Its first care was to re-peruse the instructions addressed to Admiral Stopford. Nothing could be found there to serve as guide to the commander of our

squadron, under the existing circumstances; and it has been decided to furnish him with more special directions.

"The Council thinks that the consummated defection of the Capitan-Pacha cannot modify the political view which has governed our mutual proceedings for six weeks. It furnishes, on the contrary, an additional motive for perseverance and progress in the same course.

"The principle being admitted, the Council is of opinion that we ought to adopt coercive measures to obtain the restitution of the Ottoman fleet. These measures must form the subject of the fresh instructions to Admiral Stopford, which Lord Minto and I will now draw up in your presence."

I replied to Lord Palmerston that the King's government would duly appreciate this mark of confidence; but I added that I was myself without instructions; that I was merely authorized to *consult*, and not to *deliberate;* that, consequently, anything I might say would in no manner commit the King's government. Lord Palmerston said that this was perfectly understood, and took up his pen.

Your Excellency will find, appended to my despatch, a draft of the instructions drawn up by Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto, while the Council was sitting.

The object is the restitution of the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan; the means of coercion to be regulated by the degree of resistance which the summons of the admirals will encounter, on the part of Mehemet Ali,—from the appearance of the allied squadrons before Alexandria, to the taking possession of the Egyptian fleet and the blockade of the port,—the rights of neutrals being duly respected. Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto argue on the ground that the Egyptian fleet would be at sea, because, as it cannot re-enter Alexandria without being lightened, that operation would amount to a dismantling; and Mehemet cannot dispense with his fleet at this moment, even for the necessities of his army in Syria. Much latitude is left to the two admirals, as

to the selection of points on which to direct themselves, under specific circumstances.

Finally, a supplementary instruction provides for the emergency under which the course of events might call upon our ambassadors to require, in conformity with the orders of their respective courts, the presence of our fleets in the Bosphorus, at the moment when the admirals receive their fresh orders. In this hypothesis, the admirals would have to answer the appeal at once, and they would reserve, for a future epoch, the execution of the present instructions.

Such is the summary of the document I append to my despatch.

Feeling strongly the advantage of not losing a moment, under these pressing circumstances, and still more convinced of the necessity of acting in perfect concert with us, Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto have urgently requested me to transmit the copy of instructions to your Excellency this evening. A courier from the English Admiralty will leave London to-morrow, for Paris, and will place himself on Monday at the disposition of Lord Granville. If the King's government approves the plan, and feels disposed to address analogous instructions to Admiral Lalande, your Excellency will, perhaps, be so kind as to announce this to Lord Granville, and the English courier will then continue his route to Marseilles. Should the conclusion be contrary, your Excellency will equally have the goodness to acquaint Lord Granville, and the courier then will wait in Paris for fresh instructions from London. The objections of the King's government, should any arise, will be weighed here with a sincere desire of arriving at a perfect understanding between the two cabinets.

. . . . .

I thought it essential not to allow this conference to terminate without calling the most serious attention of Lord Palmerston to the considerations developed in your Excel-

lency's last despatch. The presence of Lord Minto appeared to me an additional reason for pointing out to the English government the mistaken interpretations adopted in Europe on the differences manifested between our foreign agents; and the conclusions drawn from thence against the solidity of the alliance between the two courts. I insisted with some pertinacity on the necessity of arranging their proceedings beforehand, particularly at St. Petersbourg; I quoted the instance of Lord Clanricarde as being of a nature to create false impressions by giving credit to the idea that the English government was looking for a *point d'appui* with the Russian cabinet on the question of the limits of the *Egyptian restitution*,—a question entirely secondary to the leading object we all propose,—the establishment of the principle that the affairs of the East can only be arranged by mutual concert between all the great powers of Europe.

Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto received these observations in good part. Lord Palmerston assured me that Lord Clanricarde had exceeded his instructions if he had given his step any character contrary to an expression of the most perfect unity between the two cabinets.

I was not anxious to extend further the circle of recrimination; but the sincerity of our desire to maintain a perfect understanding with the English cabinet, gives us on all occasions a right to be frank with its organs; this frankness is in itself an additional pledge of our loyalty, and I can assure you that this is the impression conveyed to the minds of Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto by the reading of your Excellency's last despatch.

I pray you to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

21. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Sir, *Paris, August 6th,* 1839.

I received yesterday the letter you have done me the honour to address to me, with a copy of the instructions to the admirals handed to you by Lord Palmerston to be submitted to the approbation of the King's government. The Council which has now debated on it, does not consider it possible to adhere in all points to the proposed plan. I apprehend that the English cabinet, under a first impression of the untoward news from Alexandria, may not have sufficiently considered the position in all its points. Hostilities are evidently terminated in the East. Neither by land nor by sea have we any announcement of an intention to continue, or rather to resume them. On the one side, they have not the means, even under the supposition, which is doubtful, that they have the desire. On the other, they have no interest to gain, and they are well aware that they could not continue the war without exposing themselves to very serious consequences, and without gratuitously compromising a most advantageous position. In this state of things, the defection of the Ottoman fleet is an unfortunate and much to be regretted event, for which we must endeavour to provide a remedy, but it scarcely constitutes one of those cases of imminent danger which justifies such extreme measures as are now proposed to us. This fleet, in the hands of Mehemet Ali, is now nothing more than a deposit, a pledge by aid of which he proposes to obtain the hereditary investiture of all that he at present possesses. France and England, while strongly insisting on the demand already made to Mehemet Ali, through our consuls, to restore the Turkish ships, ought undoubtedly to take such measures, in the improbable event of his renewing the war, as may prevent him from using them

against the Porte; and perhaps the best method of depriving him of any such desire, would be to announce to him formally that henceforward the French and English squadrons will act in perfect unanimity to protect the Sultan against all aggressions or invasions of whatever description they may be. Any step or demonstration made in the sense I now indicate, would meet with our fullest approbation, because we see in it a real utility and great chances of an effectual result. But, I repeat it, an act of hostility against Mehemet Ali would not facilitate the plan proposed by England and France in concert. The destruction of the Egyptian fleet would neither add to the strength of the Porte nor induce the enemy to abate his pretensions in the slightest degree. The material and moral power which at this moment he exercises *by land*, would render his action much less dependent than is supposed on his maritime resources. To attack him when he is not disposed to attack, would be to run the risk of driving him to extremes. Feeling convinced, when his ships were taken from him, of having nothing more to fear from Europe, who would thus have exhausted her means of coercion in a comparatively secondary object, he would naturally conclude that it was no longer necessary to temporize; and even supposing that he abstained from ordering the immediate advance of Ibrahim on Constantinople, it would suffice, for a threatening diversion, to excite such a rising in Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Albania, as would revive the question of Russian interference. We know unfortunately that he would find ready instruments for this work, and that probably to set it in action, he would not require to move a single soldier. Such eventualities are surely worth the trouble of grave deliberation before they are risked. I must add, that in London they seem to attach too much importance to Mehemet Ali, or rather to his aggrandisement, because they persist in considering that side of the question as if treating of a European state. There can be no doubt that in the

hands of such a man as the Pacha of Egypt, the possession of extensive territories may entail dangers which explain and justify the efforts of the powers to put a stop to his encroachments. France is the first to acknowledge this, and she has never ceased her efforts to restrain the projects and moderate the pretensions of this Pacha. But we must not exaggerate the evil. The Ottoman empire, even divided administratively by stipulations to which the clause of hereditary sovereignty, however expressly conveyed, could not in other respects convey a character of conclusive permanence,—the Ottoman empire, united, notwithstanding this partition more or less durable, by the controlling ties of manners and religion, will still continue to form, in face of the European powers, that great body whose existence has ever been considered indispensable to the maintenance of the political balance. The resources it still possesses in both its existing divisions concur equally to this end, and I do not hesitate to say that in ruining the Pacha of Egypt we shall operate the destruction of the Ottoman empire. Our policy to-day, as from the commencement of the crisis, ought to be to take care, above all other considerations, that Constantinople receives no foreign protection without our common consent.

Such are the objections suggested to the King's government by the proposition of the cabinet of London, and which prevent an unqualified adhesion. Be so good as to make them known to Lord Palmerston, while indicating to him the course which we consider preferable. It consists, you will observe, in repeating our demand for the restitution of the Ottoman fleet, and in case of a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali, in declaring to him that henceforward he must look upon the allied squadrons as mutually and specially instructed to repulse all attempts directed against the territory or authority of the Porte. The English cabinet will, I doubt not, on reflection, acknowledge that such an attitude suffices for the necessities of the moment; that without any compromise, it will attain,

according to all probability, the end which France and England have in view; and that placed, to our great regret, under the impossibility of acceding without reserve to the plan of the British government, we could not more effectually evince our absolute confidence and the perfect accordance of our policy with theirs.

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22. *Baron de Bourquency to Marshal Soult.*

Monsieur le Maréchal, *London, August 9th*, 1839.

Lord Palmerston informed me yesterday that according to news from Berlin (Lord Clanricarde's informations are slow and rare), Russia withdrew from the projected negotiations at Vienna. M. de Kisseleff, who followed me at Lord Palmerston's, was charged with a communication to this effect. It is under a plea of respect for the independence of sovereign states that the Russian cabinet declines all intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. Before the events in Syria, before the death of the Sultan, when there was no other possible issue than war to the disputes between the Porte and Egypt, the Russian cabinet felt disposed to participate in the opinion of the other powers of Europe as to a negotiation carried on independently of the interested parties. But now, when the Porte itself anticipates an arrangement, and addresses acceptable overtures to Egypt, Russia is of opinion that the treaty in progress at Constantinople should be allowed to advance, and should be seconded *only by her good offices*; otherwise there is no longer an independent Ottoman power. Such is the spirit of the step taken by M. de Nesselrode.

The King's government will feel no surprise at this overture from the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, which the correspondence of your Excellency has repeatedly foretold.

Here, where they readily believe what they wish, more confidence had been evinced, not in the sincerity of Russia's intentions, but in the necessities of her European position. They therefore indicate more surprise than will be exhibited in Paris, but they now comprehend the motives which dictated M. de Nesselrode's last despatch, and they read in it an evident proof that if the Imperial cabinet does not consider the appropriate moment arrived for committing itself openly with Europe on the affairs of the East, it is, at least, determined to struggle against the written guarantees which might threaten to control it for the future.

Lord Palmerston received the communication of M. de Kisseleff with due courtesy, but he left him under no delusion as to the opinion he had formed of it.

While entirely deferring yesterday to the wish manifested by the King's government relative to the draft of instructions to the admirals, Lord Palmerston entered more than he usually does into the discussion of the general question. In reply to that part of your Excellency's despatch (No. 36), which combats the predisposition of the English cabinet to reduce the limits of the Egyptian sovereignty, Lord Palmerston informed me that with himself and many of his colleagues, it was a strongly determined point, that nothing useful or permanent could be established in the East unless the provinces wrested from the Porte by Mehemet Ali were restored. "I cannot too often repeat to you," Lord Palmerston resumed, "how entirely this conviction is, as far as I am concerned, independent of all political considerations exclusively English! But I suppose Egypt and Syria hereditarily invested in the family of Mehemet Ali, and I then ask myself how can Europe flatter herself that an incident of the most trifling nature may not arise to break the last and feeble tie which unites those provinces to the Ottoman empire. Independence will come as heirship came; and do you consider what Europe will then say when Russia resumes her sus-

pended cravings after the European provinces? That the Ottoman empire, dismembered by the separation of a part of its Asiatic provinces, is no longer worth the risk of a war for its maintenance."

"Such," continued Lord Palmerston, "is the order of ideas that occur to me when deliberating on this great question. But I by no means rely on the infallibility of my own judgment. I perfectly understand that others may differ from me, and I look for no *French prepossession* in the opinion you have conveyed to me from Marshal Soult. I am so well convinced of the good faith of that policy, that here is an argument which could confirm me, had I still any inclination to doubt. France wishes to make Egypt stronger than we do, and yet your influence over the sovereign of Alexandria, be he who he may, would increase by reason of his weakness! You see now whether I seek for any reserved thoughts in the discrepancies between our two points of view."

I replied to Lord Palmerston that his reasoning supposed a question to be settled which was at least open to controversy, namely, that of ascertaining whether in a future, more or less remote, the Ottoman empire could gather from Egypt and Syria the elements of strength and vitality,—elements which it would be a great error to disperse if they could, one day or other, be turned to the advantage of the body we were anxious to preserve.

"That is true," replied Lord Palmerston; "and I agree with you that the question lies there. My own conviction is fixed in the negative; but there are members of the English cabinet who decide affirmatively."

Your Excellency will undoubtedly perceive that there is a difference between the two cabinets on an important point; but such is the identity of the object proposed by both, so great is the absence of all mistrust, of all reserved meaning, that I feel strongly convinced some slight mutual concessions

as to the *means* to be employed, would suffice to maintain between the two governments the perfect understanding which, until now, has directed their proceedings, and can alone render them effectual.

I pray you to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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23. *Baron de Bourquency to Marshal Soult.*

London, August 17th, 1829.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Yesterday evening Lord Palmerston received news from Constantinople to the 29th of July, and from Vienna to the 10th of August. The first announced the remission of the collective note signed by the ambassadors of the five courts, and the immediate suspension of the direct treaty between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.

The news from Vienna represents Prince Metternich as advancing steadily in the path on which he has entered, and confident in the hope of inducing Russia to follow, or rather of preventing her from escaping from it with credit.

Under the impression of this intelligence the council debated this morning on the plan of instructions to be forwarded to Admiral Stopford for the special case of the restitution of the Ottoman fleet.

The council approves of that portion of the instructions to Admiral Lalande, in the event of the Turkish fleet being under sail.

Should the fleet have entered the port of Alexandria, the council is of opinion that our consuls ought to summon the enemy to restore it under a threat of *their departure;* but in compliance with the concert which appears to manifest itself at Constantinople, by the despatch of the 29th of July,

and with the satisfactory dispositions of the Austrians, evidently increasing, it also expresses a wish, "that the French and English cabinets should forward their instructions to the admirals to Vienna, and, at the same time, propose to the Austrian cabinet to unite its squadron to ours in case the Ottoman fleet should be at sea within the limits of action designated in the orders to Admiral Lalande, and to associate their consul-general with ours in the measure proposed, should the Turkish fleet have entered the port of Alexandria."

In conclusion, the council, after examining the project previously set forward by Lord Palmerston for carrying out an act to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire, between France, England, and Austria (giving up the hope of associating the two other powers), accords the most unqualified approbation to this proposal, and recognizes, at the same time, that the negotiation ought to be conducted with great reserve, so as to refrain from alarming Russia, and from affording her the means of impeding it. The council thinks that this would be in reality a commencement of the work of peace and of the balance of power, which France and England are equally anxious to accomplish.

Since the commencement of the Eastern crisis I have never seen Lord Palmerston so well satisfied with the aspect of affairs.

I pray you to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

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24. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, August 18th, 1839.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

. . . . . .

I was only able to forward an extremely concise account to your Excellency of the last intelligence from

Vienna; but I was anxious to inform you without delay of the profound impression it had produced on the English cabinet.

The two predominating facts are: 1st. The signature of M. de Boutenief attached to a collective note, declaring that, *in the accordance of the five great powers* on the affairs of the East, the Ottoman Porte had found a sufficient guarantee against the dangers of its position to enable it to break off all direct negotiation with the viceroy. 2nd. The immediate interruption of that same negotiation.

Neither the despatches of M. de Barante to your Excellency, nor those of Lord Clanricarde to Lord Palmerston, nor even the last communications of Prince Metternich, had prepared our courts for this sudden adhesion of the Russian ministry to a measure of so much importance. In London, as undoubtedly in Paris, they reasoned on the general datum that the Russian cabinet not only declined participating in the negotiation of Vienna, but sought to render it futile by favouring the conclusion of a direct arrangement between the sovereign and his vassal without any foreign intervention whatever, at least any *that could be apparent.*

Here, they have not given themselves much trouble to explain a fact in open contradiction with the dispositions which were not even held in doubt on the day before it was made known. They repeat readily; "Russia will not, because she cannot. M. de Boutenief has heard the name of the Dardanelles pronounced by France and England, and so has passed on to the step she has taken." (This last hypothesis, before forming a definitive judgment, requires that the act of the minister should be acknowledged by his court.) But all these explicatory considerations are sacrificed to the simple fact, and people say; "Here has Russia joined the co-operation by an official act; she could not keep aloof from it but by provoking complications *for which she is not prepared.*"

From this first datum, the English cabinet, in its consulta-

tions of yesterday, has decided that the moment has arrived for relaxing in some degree the threatening and suspicious attitude assumed towards the Russian cabinet, without prejudice to its resumption hereafter under a more decided form should circumstances so require.

It feels, moreover, that an act of respect is due to Prince de Metternich for his perseverance in the course he has adopted in common with France and England, a perseverance which manifested itself at Vienna on the 8th of August, when there was reason to believe that the Russian cabinet declined all concert with the other powers, but the expression of which became more clear and decisive on the 10th, after receipt of the news from Constantinople of the 29th of July.

Under the influence of this double expression, Monsieur le Maréchal, the English cabinet proposes to forward to Vienna a copy of our instructions to the admirals, relative to the defection of the Ottoman fleet, so that there may not be a single act of the drama now beginning to unfold itself, from which France and England may appear disposed at this moment to isolate the allied powers, and most especially the cabinet of Austria.

Your Excellency is aware that the English cabinet has not considered the attitude of observation prescribed to our admirals as sufficient, in case the Ottoman fleet should have entered the port of Alexandria, or the viceroy may have refused its restitution. To the demand of our consular agents it has thought of adding means of moral coercion; such as the retirement of our consuls-general; but this part of the question it equally proposes to the King's government to transfer to Vienna, and to treat it there in common with the Austrian cabinet.

Your Excellency will perceive by what precedes, the extent of the change which has taken place, within thirty-eight hours, in the spirit of the members of the English cabinet.

The possibility of the concurrence of Russia was positively denied; now it is hoped for.

The concurrence of Austria was hoped for to the end; now it is assured.

I have now, as I think, explained the motives upon which the satisfaction, exaggerated perhaps, is founded, which has displayed itself here since the reception of the news from Vienna and Constantinople, with regard to the position in all its bearings.

They start from the principle that, when once the bases of the intervening arrangement between the Sultan and the viceroy are determined by the five powers, the employment of force will be superfluous to obtain their acceptance by Mehemet Ali; a menace will suffice in case of his refusal. With respect to these bases, Austria is supposed to incline more closely than France to the views of the English cabinet, and as it is well known that the official differences manifested between the two great maritime powers might sap all the foundations of the pacific work in hand, it is presumed that these differences will dissolve more readily in a concurrence of the five powers than in a direct negotiation between two or even three.

When once the arrangement between the sovereign and the vassal is accepted and guaranteed by the powers of Europe, that is to say, the practical question regulated, they feel confident of finding in Paris, and it is hoped in Vienna also, the eagerness that will be manifested here to crown this act of peace for the present by a diplomatic transaction which may equally secure the future.

I pray you to accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

25. *Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.*

Paris, August 22nd, 1839.

The King's government regards as a fortunate circumstance the adhesion of the Porte to the measure by which the five powers have engaged it to conclude no treaty, except under their concurrence, with the Pacha of Egypt; an adhesion of which, however, the official intelligence has not yet reached me. Meanwhile we do not attach much weight to the lively joy which this event seems to have caused in Vienna, and more particularly in London. There is, as I think, even an excess of exaggeration in concluding that because M. de Boutenief has associated himself with this step, Russia has determined henceforward to link her actions in the Eastern question to that of the allied courts. A result of this importance, such a deviation from the prosecution of a policy hitherto immutable, can scarcely be presumed; to believe it, the most formally declared evidences could not be too much, and these evidences I look for in vain. So far from this, the correspondence of M. de Barante exhibits to me the cabinet of St. Petersbourg proceeding more than ever in its isolated views, even where believing itself compelled to admit some concessions of form. Moreover, to appreciate the true bearing of the act to which such important consequences are attached, it is enough to remember that amongst the arguments set forward by the Russian government in rejection of the proposed conference at Vienna, one was particularly conspicuous, which maintained that the seat of negotiation would more naturally be fixed at Constantinople; implying in fact, that Russia, by the natural ascendancy which her envoy exercises upon the Porte, would be more advantageously placed there, either to impede or influence the progress of the treaty.

If I dwell on the exaggerated hopes which the cabinet of London appears to have conceived, it is because I fear lest this misconception should impress a false tendency on its policy, and may induce it to lose sight of the essential end towards which France and England are equally directed,—the means of preventing the Porte from falling back under the exclusive and dominant protection of one of the great powers. In London, I incline to think they are too confident on this point, and disposed to concentrate their anxiety on the danger, relatively a secondary one, of the exclusive aggrandisement of Mehemet Ali. If the expression of the disagreement which exists on this point between France and England were confined to the circle of the communications exchanged between the two governments, little inconvenience would then result; but, unfortunately, I acquire every day a positive conviction that it is not so. The cabinet of London, governed by its prepossessions, does not sufficiently conceal them from the other cabinets; it sometimes appears to see in them auxiliaries whose co-operation may assist it to bring us into its way of thinking, and the courts to which it addresses these confidences, mistaking the intentions by which they are dictated, discover in them a serious relaxation of the Anglo-French alliance. Already several indications give me reason to think that one of these courts is endeavouring by advances, adroitly calculated, by apparent concessions, to draw the British government into a new course. I have little fear of the definitive result of these attempts. England will resist them as we have ourselves resisted them at other times, when similar artifices were employed in respect to us. But it would be lamentable if simple appearances should for a single moment inspire the authors of these machinations with the slightest hopes of success. Little more would be wanting to infuse a most injurious perturbation into the progress of the general policy.

Lord Granville has, as yet, said nothing to me on the new

views of his court with respect to the means of obtaining the restitution of the Ottoman fleet. I imagine that in London they will have recognised the unseasonableness of the mutual recall of the consuls at the moment when the decision adopted at Constantinople renders the presence of European agents near Mehemet Ali more indispensable than ever.

General Baudrand will not be sent to Constantinople, as I apprised you. The King, on learning the names of the persons entrusted by the Emperors of Austria and Russia with an analogous mission has thought it more suitable to send an officer of his household less elevated in rank.

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26. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, September 5th, 1839.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

. . . I have to render an account to your Excellency of my first interview with Lord Palmerston.

Before entering on the questions which have been separately discussed, I must declare to your Excellency that my impression resulting from this conference is, that the English cabinet desires with us, to the same extent, and as completely without mental reservation, the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire; and that it wishes to accomplish this end pacifically, without compromising the great powers amongst themselves.

. . . . . .

I took the first opportunity which presented itself of discussing and combating the measures proposed by the

English cabinet, and communicated by Mr. Bulwer to your Excellency.

I commenced by establishing that the question of the Ottoman fleet ought not to be treated specially, and preliminarily to the final arrangements now about to commence between the Sultan and the Pacha. I said we ought not to employ our strength against an incident, but to reserve it entire for the principal fact. I even enjoined Lord Palmerston to reflect seriously on the consequences of success, that is to say, on the return of the Ottoman fleet to Constantinople with a body of officers imbued with admiration for Mehemet Ali, and little confident themselves, in spite of the guarantee of the powers, against the reactionary vengeance of the Porte.

These last arguments produced an impression on Lord Palmerston's mind. He replied, nevertheless, that if the powers, all equally penetrated as they were with the necessity of repressing, or rather of repairing, an act so culpable on the part of a vassal against his sovereign, should pause before a peremptory refusal of Mehemet Ali, he, on his side, would feel more encouraged in his resistance to the acceptation of a final arrangement.

I represented the full weight of the motives which ought to restrain us from an armed demonstration against the island of Candia; I spoke of the Greek party who might take advantage of it to declare their independence, and I added that it would disseminate throughout the remainder of the empire the example and necessity of internal risings. I hope I have convinced Lord Palmerston that no substantial advantage could accrue from the occupation of Candia by the forces of England and France.

I discussed with him the recall of the consuls-general from Alexandria, and I demonstrated the serious inconveniences that must result from leaving us without agents near the viceroy at the very moment when we have the most pressing need of influencing his mind by active communication.

Lord Beauvale has already received instructions and powers relative to the Ottoman fleet; I cannot, therefore, lead your Excellency to hope that these instructions will be recalled or even modified; but the question being carried to the very centre of negotiation, the influence of the King's government may exercise itself there in a powerful manner, and I believe that even from London, those points will be indicated to Lord Beauvale on which he is not to insist, if he perceives the course adopted by France to be entirely opposed to that of England.

I cannot, however, conceal from your Excellency that the disposition of the English cabinet to the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, whether to obtain the restitution of the Turkish fleet, or to make him accept exclusively the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt on the basis of the impending arrangements with the Porte, *may from time to time yield upon certain points to the representations of France, but it incessantly re-appears, and if it encounters on our part an invincible and absolute repugnance* to the adoption of violence in some shape against the viceroy, *I fear they will persuade themselves here that it is useless* to continue a negotiation in which even the eventual sanction of force is denied beforehand.

I endeavoured to excite the apprehensions of Lord Palmerston on the consequences to which the peace of the world would be exposed from the extreme measures to which the viceroy might be driven if the powers persisted in refusing the conditions he exacted for his reconciliation with the Porte. Lord Palmerston replied that unquestionably a march on Constantinople was possible, but that nothing would be easier to the European powers than the preservation of the Ottoman capital; that we should all concur in that object with our fleets, and Russia with her armies; but that we should limit the amount of the Russian troops and fix the date of their departure. "We should arrive together," he continued, "and we should depart together. Russia is fettered at this

moment, be assured of it. I know to a certainty that this arises from her not being prepared; but it is a fact, and we ought to take advantage of it. She will not act without us, and if she acts at all it will be with us, and in the same manner."

Lord Palmerston spoke to me of the dispositions of the Prussian cabinet and of the cabinet of Vienna, as agreeing entirely with those of the cabinet of London in all that relates to the bases of the final arrangement between the Porte and the viceroy.

Lord Palmerston has replied to the last Russian communication by a despatch to Lord Clanricarde which he allowed me to read, and in which he formally establishes the union and mutual responsibility of France and England in all that relates to the conjoined entry of our squadrons into the sea of Marmara.

I redoubled my efforts to bring back the point of view of the English cabinet to that of the King's government. Lord Palmerston, with respect to the withdrawal of our consuls-general from Alexandria, informed me that he never thought of extending that measure to the actual consular agents; that it was only on account of the diplomatic character of our consuls-general that he wished to make this recall a demonstration of discontent on the part of the powers against Mehemet Ali; but that we should maintain, after their departure, should it take place, acting consuls who would still serve as organs with the viceroy. Lord Palmerston also informed me that, under any circumstances, Colonel Campbell would be replaced by another agent. His conduct during late events was not approved of, and his successor was appointed. Lord Palmerston has just received despatches from Constantinople, informing him that an Egyptian brig had carried agents of the viceroy to Salonica. Lord Ponsonby had ordered Admiral Stopford to chase the

Egyptian brig, to take possession of her, and to secure the failure of her mission. Admiral Roussin had signified his approbation of this measure.

I pray you to accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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27. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, September 23rd, 1839.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Lord Palmerston passed several hours this morning in London. I have to detail to your Excellency the important conversation I have just held with him.

Baron Brunnow proposes in the name of his government to regulate and define the degree of coercive action to be exercised by each of the five powers against Mehemet Ali to obtain a final settlement between the Sultan and the Pacha. With this object, a convention to be signed between the five courts, stipulating that France and England shall employ their fleets against Mehemet Ali if he refuses to accept the proposed conditions; that Russia, in the event of Ibrahim Pacha advancing upon Constantinople, shall employ her army and fleet in the Bosphorus and in Asia Minor, on their side of the Taurus, to protect the existence of the Ottoman empire, but that for the future the closing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles shall remain a principle of public European law, and that Russia shall pledge herself not to renew the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. Finally, it is to be understood, although not specified in writing, that under existing circumstances, the derogation of Russia from the principle of closing the two straits is to be admitted without authorising the maritime powers to consider it a legiti-

mate reason for the presence of their respective fleets in the Bosphorus.

This convention Russia proposes to the acceptance of the four powers, but she is ready to sign it here with three, if France is not inclined to admit the stipulations.

Such is the substance of the propositions of which Baron Brunnow is the organ; I need not dwell on the immense importance of their bearing.

Lord Palmerston informed me that he should speedily summon the members of the cabinet at present in the neighbourhood of Windsor or London, to lay before them the state of the question; but he did not conceal from me that he was personally favourable to the Russian overtures. It is probable that the determination of the cabinet may conform to the opinions of Lord Palmerston.

I asked what bases Russia proposed to give to the arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha? Lord Palmerston replied that M. de Brunnow was not charged with any specific proposition to that effect, but that the Russian cabinet, like that of England, was in favour of the complete restoration of Syria and its appendages.

Lord Palmerston is inclined to add to the Russian project the despatch of an Austrian corps to Syria in the event of the viceroy's resistance. This corps, united to the relics of the Ottoman army, to obtain by force the evacuation of the provinces held by the Egyptian army.

I began by declaring that I was without instructions from the King's government on the greater part of the questions submitted to me; but, that I felt nevertheless authorised to reject and contest, at least in my own name, nearly all the data on which the new plan, proposed by Russia and almost adopted by England, is founded.

Object, means, and facility of execution, I equally objected to. I argued on the consideration that Mehemet Ali, hereditary possessor of Egypt and Syria, would naturally

fall within the sphere of the influence and action of the two maritime powers; and that these same powers could in their turn employ the Egyptian forces to restrain Russia in her projects on Constantinople. I shall not tire your Excellency by a repetition of the arguments I used; they are all drawn from the order of ideas and facts set forward by the King's government in its correspondence with the embassy.

It is evident to me, that the English cabinet regards the abolition of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi as an ample success for its actual policy in the East. Now, this success it does not consider as too dearly purchased by the appearance of Russian forces in the Bosphorus; and, moreover, as this measure is dependent on the advance of Ibrahim Pacha against Constantinople, it hopes to lay down a hypothesis that will not be realised.

I told Lord Palmerston that the convention, the bases of which he had explained to me, would be treated in Europe as an act of weakness and pusillanimity towards Russia. He considers it, on the contrary, as an able measure. The very action of Russia at Constantinople, defined beforehand by the concurrence of the other powers, seems to him the action of the five courts and an abdication of the exclusively Russian protectorate.

Your Excellency's last despatch enabled me to demonstrate to Lord Palmerston how far, up to this point, the different cabinets are from agreeing as to the activity and energy of actual measures against Mehemet Ali. Lord Palmerston replied that he could not doubt for an instant that the propositions of which M. de Brunnow was the bearer would receive the most sincere and cordial support from the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

Prince Esterhazy, who saw Lord Palmerston to-day, opened the interview by pleading the absence of instructions from his court, to avoid giving any opinion on all the new projects submitted to him, and particularly as to the despatch

of an Austrian corps to Syria; but evidently he feels convinced that the plan of the Russian cabinet will be approved of by the Austrian government.

The restoration of the Turkish fleet is now confounded with the general question from which Lord Palmerston declines to separate it.

Lord Palmerston, on my asking him where the negotiation of the convention he had detailed to me would take place, replied, "I have not thought of that, but in London if they please."

I pray you to accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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28. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, October 3rd, 1839.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

The English cabinet rejects the proposals from the imperial cabinet presented by the Baron de Brunnow. Lord Palmerston announced this morning to the Russian envoy, that France, on her part, could not consent to the exclusion of the allied fleets from the sea of Marmara in the event of the entry of Russian forces into the Bosphorus, and that England would not separate herself from France, with whom she had moved in perfect union from the commencement of the negotiation.

This point being determined,—in place of the convention originally presented by the imperial cabinet, Lord Palmerston proposes an act between the five powers, by which they would regulate their share of action in the existing crisis of Eastern affairs, but without any privilege accorded to the Russian

flag to the exclusion of the flags of France, England and Austria. Russia, in case of the resistance of Mehemet Ali to the conditions proposed to him, to employ her troops in Asia Minor, but on their own side of the Taurus. The independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire under the reigning dynasty to be stipulated for, for the longest possible time; finally, the closing of the Straits to become a principle of public European law.

Such is the important modification attached by the British cabinet to the Russian overtures.

Passing from the European act I have here analyzed, to the conditions of the arrangement pending between the Sultan and the Pacha, Lord Palmerston, pressed at once by my arguments and by a sincere desire, as I believe, to perform an act of deference to France, after a long discussion, adds to the hereditary investiture of Egypt in favour of Mehemet Ali, the possession equally hereditary of the Pachalic of Acre: the town of Acre alone to remain to the Porte, and the portion to be measured from the glacis of the fortress in the direction of Lake Tiberias. The Porte to recover all the rest of Syria, including the Holy Cities, considerations of preponderating weight in the estimation of the English cabinet: this second concession rests on the datum that the King's government, having agreed with its allies on the territorial limits of the arrangement, will accept its share of action in constraining Mehemet Ali, should he refuse the conditions.

This new position results from our persevering efforts to bring back the English cabinet to the same point of view with France on the Eastern question. Undoubtedly this return is not as complete as we could desire, but the actual step is of the highest importance. I fear, however, it will be the last.

I asked how Baron de Brunnow had received the announcement of such a serious modification in the final dispositions of the British cabinet. Lord Palmerston replied that he took

these new proposals *ad referendum*. His disappointment must have been excessive.

Lord Palmerston appears to flatter himself that we shall induce Russia to accede to the European act he proposes. I do not see the data on which he bases this confidence; but whatever they may decide on at St. Petersbourg, it is not the less highly important to have arrested here all arrangement independent of France, and to have restored the English cabinet to its first sentiment of the necessity of our alliance.

I pray you to accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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29. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, October 10th, 1839.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

. . . . . .

I have read your Excellency's last despatch to Lord Palmerston. He had already been prepared by Mr. Bulwer, for the intelligence that the cession of the Pachalic of Acre was not considered sufficient by the King's government. This news has thrown him back upon his former course of argument. I left none of his objections without answer; but I convinced myself yesterday that it would be almost a hopeless task to attempt to obtain anything beyond the last concession. Lord Palmerston enlarged upon the importance of this sacrifice, made in the hope of renewing his first ties with France, and gave me clearly to understand that if the English cabinet found itself disappointed in this attempt, it would necessarily be forced to seek elsewhere the support it could no longer find in us.

. . . . . .

Nothing will be done here until the final determination of the King's government is positively and formally an-

nounced. . . . My impression is that the English cabinet will return to the first proposals of Russia if the last concessions are rejected.

. . . . . .

Baron de Brunnow embarks on the 13th for Rotterdam.

Accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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30. *Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.*

Paris, December 9th, 1839.

. . . . . .

The news you have given me of the approaching return of M. de Brunnow to London, furnished with full powers to sign a convention regulating on the foot of equality the degrees of protection to be afforded by the powers to the Porte, has excited, as you will readily believe, the most serious attention of the King's government. We impatiently expect the details. If they are such, in fact, as the language of Lord Palmerston leads us to suppose, if they embrace on the part of Russia an effective abandonment of the exceptional position she had assumed at Constantinople, if the addition of no secret or indirect clause does not interfere to paralyze, on the other hand, the apparent concessions of the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, I need not tell you that the determination of that cabinet, be the motive what it may, will convey to us the most lively satisfaction. It will, in fact, gain our cause, on the point which has constantly appeared to us the most important in the Eastern question; it will yield us the result we have always had in view, and which for some time we despaired of obtaining. You know that from the origin of the negotiation our object was to deduce from it the abolition of the exclusive protectorate exercised by Russia

over the Sultan, and that we have demonstrated this object to our allies as one that ought to be accomplished by every possible means. We have said and repeated incessantly, that it was at Constantinople, in particular, that the independence of the Porte should be guaranteed, and that the knot of the difficulty lay in that quarter. It is not our fault, if in persisting too long to see it, where it was not be found, in the relatively secondary questions as they regard Europe, of the relations between the Sultan and the viceroy, complications and embarrassments have been multiplied to the extent of rendering them almost insoluble. We may now, at last, hope for a return to the true path; assuredly it is not we who have placed obstacles in the way; and I repeat, if the overtures of Russia are such as they have been described to you, if they contain nothing more, nothing at least that can change their bearing, I am ready to authorize you to accede to them formally. I even go farther; the King's government, recognizing with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention settled on such bases would signally alter the state of things, would find in it a sufficient motive for submitting itself to a new examination of the Eastern question in its entirety, even with regard to those portions on which each of the powers seems to have so decidedly adopted its opinion that prolonged discussion was considered impossible.

Such, Count, is the impression conveyed to us by the important intelligence you have just transmitted. I ought not to conceal from you, however, that I have more desire than hope of speedily learning their entire confirmation. I confess that I am apprehensive lest the proposals intrusted to M. de Brunnow should contain some insidious clause which would render our adhesion impossible, and would, undoubtedly, lead also to a fresh refusal on the part of the cabinet of London. I am strengthened in this fear by the impossibility I feel myself under of accounting for the motives which could induce the Russian government to a concession, just and reasonable

without doubt, but to which until now it has manifested such an invincible repugnance. If, indeed, we were inclined to suppose that its idea was to place itself in a position of according, in concert with England, a more effectual protection to the Porte, and of imposing more rigorous conditions on the Viceroy, this conjecture would find itself falsified by what is now passing at Constantinople. Redschid Pacha said, in fact, to M. de Pontois that the cabinet of St. Petersbourg had engaged the Porte to treat directly with Mehemet Ali, and that M. de Tattitscheff had given this advice at Vienna to the Ottoman ambassador. Such advice, reasonable in itself, as we think, if there is no change about to take place in the situation, is, nevertheless, very extraordinary on the part of a government which affects to place itself in relations of intimacy with England. . . . When Lord Palmerston, to strengthen himself in his own convictions, rests on the adhesion they receive from the Chancellor of Austria, I can understand the tactic he employs in conversation with you, to present matters under this aspect; but I find it difficult to believe that he considers really as *an adhesion* the equivocal declarations of the cabinet of Vienna. Austria, after accepting our propositions, ends by acceding in principle to those of England, but at the same time rejects the measures of constraint which could alone render them effectual. If this is a sufficient adhesion in Lord Palmerston's eyes, he is, without doubt, easily satisfied, and we should at least be as much justified in assuming that Austria had adopted our ideas.

A few words will suffice to tranquillize the anxiety Lord Palmerston has allowed me to discover on the subject of the formation of a squadron of reserve at Toulon. The appointment of Admiral Rosamel has no other object than to give eventually a superior chief to our squadron, commanded by two officers of equal rank, from which inconveniences might arise. There is no question at this moment of augmenting

our naval forces, and if such should arise, we should not fail to notify it to our allies.

The last news from Constantinople contains little of interest. Mehemet Ali persists in all his demands. He protests that he will not surrender Adana, at least, unless the governorship is confided to one of his sons. — "It is the key of the house," he says, "and I shall only give it up to a member of my own family."

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31. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, January 5th, 1840.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Lord Palmerston, in conformity with his promise, read to me the project of the Russian proposals left in his hands by M. de Brunnow. After having discussed and commented on its details, he promised to send me a copy to-day that I might forward it this evening to Paris, and take it for the basis of the account of our conversation.

For the textual communication of the Russian pamphlet, Lord Palmerston substitutes a sort of summary, extremely incomplete, the blanks in which I shall endeavour to fill up. I followed the reading yesterday with sufficient attention to feel convinced that I shall omit nothing of importance.

To give substance to the ideas of the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, while taking care not to impress on them an official character, the finesse of the Russian envoy has had recourse to a strange expedient: he has consigned them to an official despatch addressed to another agent of his court.

On the subject of his interview at Calais with M. de Neumann, M. de Brunnow expresses to M. de Tattitscheff the satisfaction he felt at the despatch of the Austrian diplomatist, the accordance between the two courts of Vienna and St.

Petersbourg, of which he considers this mission a pledge, and the hope that M. de Neumann will receive the necessary powers to co-operate in the great results which the Emperor his master has instructed him to prosecute in London.

Then follows the detailed development of the Russian policy, and plans on the Eastern question.

The court of St. Petersbourg proposes:

"That the quarrel between the Porte and the Pacha be definitively settled under the guarantee of the powers by a territorial partition:

"That the portions offered to the Pacha, with hereditary investment, shall be *Egypt and Syria to the fortress of Acre* as boundary; that the restoration of all the other possessions held by Mehemet Ali shall be immediately carried out:

"That in the event of resistance on the part of the Pacha, a choice shall be made of the various coercive measures successively debated in the preceding communications of the cabinets;

"That all those of a nature to hasten the settlement of the question shall be instantly and vigorously executed; but that all shall be abstained from which would seem to encroach upon the *right* we desire to see triumphant:

"That thus, maritime forces shall be despatched to the neighbourhood of Alexandretta, because their armed object would be to threaten the flank of Ibrahim's army; but that the coasts of Syria should not be declared in a state of blockade, as this would imply that we are in hostility with the legitimate sovereign of territories momentarily occupied by a revolted subject:

"That a Turkish expedition be directed and supported against Candia, but that the consuls shall not be withdrawn from Alexandria, because the measure would be to treat a victorious Pacha too much in the light of a sovereign; it would, moreover, deprive ourselves of means, influence and

information important to maintain, and would at the same time compromise the commercial interests of the power.

"The *Turco-Egyptian* part of the question being settled, we shall occupy ourselves conjointly, in London, with the European part.

"The mode of Russian intervention, in case she should be appealed to by the Porte, will be agreed upon and regulated between the powers.

"Russia, in the event of the march of Ibrahim Pacha upon Constantinople and of the appeal of the Divan, *will pass the Bosphorus with troops for disembarkation, and will undertake the defence of Constantinople in the name of Europe.*

"The other powers may then pass *the Dardanelles with some ships of war, to cruise in the waters of the Sea of Marmara, from Broussa to Gallipoli.*

"The number of these ships to be from *two* to *three* under each flag.

"As soon as the object proposed by the powers is attained by the submission of Mehemet Ali, the Porte will resume full and immutable possession *of the right of closing the two straits against all the flags of Europe.*

"This right will be equally and formally consecrated in principle by the convention to be held in London, previous to any action in the East.

"We are certain of the concurrence of Austria, of England, and also of Prussia, on all the above-named points; we hope that France will not *isolate* herself from the other powers, but will unite her action to theirs.

"The Emperor addresses his views to *all the cabinets;* his earnest advice is to promote and establish the general interests of Europe, &c." . . . . . .

I have now recapitulated the substance (and I believe my memory to be faithful) of this confidential despatch, the only written document which up to this time has been received on the negotiation opened by M. de Brunnow.

I have no time to enter into details, but I imagine I have here transmitted information which will not be without interest for your Excellency. Yesterday, when we reached the paragraph relative to the portion of territory to be assigned to Mehemet Ali, namely, the cession of Syria to St. Jean d'Acre, Lord Palmerston paused in his reading and observed, "I have strongly opposed this idea in my conversation with M. de Brunnow; it would compromise *the principle*. Egypt alone and the desert for frontier,—this is the true position. I have convinced M. de Brunnow, and I feel certain of the adhesion of the two others."

Accept, I pray you, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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32. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, January 10th, 1840.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I did not consider it necessary, after the terms in which the last communication of Lord Palmerston had placed me, to evince any eagerness to make known to him the substance of your first despatch; the arrival of the second, which appeared to me to contain at once the complement and corrective which existing circumstances require, has furnished me with a natural opportunity of seeking an interview of which they successively formed the object, and the principal features of which I have now the honour of relating to you.

To the warning so replete with sense and moderation which your Excellency has again addressed to our ally on the real object which Russia has in view, Lord Palmerston replies: "I never thought of abandoning the alliance, and least of all of sacrificing it to Russia. The only understanding between Russia and us relates to a special question, that of the East;

on all other points the alliance continues; and even when I say *understanding between Russia and us*, I express myself badly; I ought to say, *between us and all the powers*."

I then communicated to him the information which had reached the King's government as to the presumed intentions of the Viceroy relative to the possession of Arabia and the Holy Places. Lord Palmerston received it with satisfaction.

Accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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33. *Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.*

Paris, January 20th, 1840.

I am anxious to learn the tone adopted by the diplomatic body, and particularly by the embassies of Austria and Russia on the last phase in the mission confided to M. de Brunnow. The information you may give me on this point will enable us to understand the bearing of that incident.

I must also tell you that in the difficult position in which the ministry of her Britannic Majesty appears to be placed at this moment, I regret that I cannot always discover in your correspondence those details and conclusions on the internal state of the country you are in to which your accurate judgment would impart so much value.

You will see by the accompanying extract that the Russians do not uniformly hold the same language with regard to the conditions to be proposed to Mehemet Ali.

34. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, January 20th, 1840.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Lord Palmerston explained to me that before deciding on the plan, the drawing up of which had been intrusted to him, and of which we have spoken at several intervals since the last meeting of the cabinet, he intended to make me acquainted with it. He has done so this morning.

The plan being as yet only sketched out, and Lord Palmerston appearing desirous of having my personal opinion before producing the definitive formula of the English propositions, I venture to request that your Excellency will receive this communication in its exclusively confidential character.

The plan is that of a convention of *eight articles* preceded by a *preamble.*

The convention is not concluded as in the original project, *between the great powers,* but *between the great powers on the one part and the Porte on the other.*

The object of the preamble is to state the question in this sense: The powers being convinced that the integrity and repose of the Ottoman empire are important to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, and taking, of common accord, into consideration the circumstances in which the Sultan finds himself, place at his disposal the succours of which he may stand in need to secure the tranquillity of his empire and the submission of his vassal to the conditions it becomes him to offer.

The Sultan declares that he grants to Mehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of Egypt, on condition of the immediate surrender of the other territories occupied by the Pacha.

In the event of this surrender being refused, or of any movement of the Egyptian army tending to menace Constantinople, the Sultan will appeal to the aid of the powers.

This aid, the amount and composition of which is determined by consent between the contracting parties, will operate simultaneously.

The Sultan will at the same time demand from Russia the despatch of six sail of the line and two frigates, having on board troops for disembarkation (Lord Palmerston has not yet fixed the number, but he thinks of proposing 15,000 men), which will pass the Bosphorus.

From France and England, six sail of the line and two frigates (three sail of the line and a frigate under each flag), which will pass the Dardanelles, and cruise on the coast of Asia.

From Austria a detachment of her squadron, which will accompany the French and English flags to the Sea of Marmara.

The Sultan being provisionally deprived of his fleet by the treason of the Capitan-Pacha, at his request the combined squadrons will cut off communication between Egypt and the coasts of Syria from the ships of the Viceroy, and will seize all transports conveying warlike stores or provisions.

The powers, moreover, will place at the disposition of the Sultan a sufficient convoy to protect the passage and arrival of the governor he may think proper to send to Candia; these forces will also contribute by maritime interference to secure the re-establishment of the authority of the Porte in that island.

The object which the Sultan proposes by calling the aid of the powers to the waters of the Sea of Marmara being attained, that auxiliary succour will retire as it was admitted, at the same time.

The closing of both straits to all flags of war is formally recognized as a permanent and inalienable privilege belonging to the Porte, and constitutes henceforward, as heretofore, a portion of public European law.

Meanwhile, the Porte guarantees, in time of peace, to all merchant flags, free access to the waters of Constantinople, and also to any frigate having on board a diplomatic envoy, under the condition, that only one frigate at a time under such flag will be admitted into the Sea of Marmara.

Such is in substance the plan which Lord Palmerston has read to me.

Your Excellency will observe that the measures against the Pacha are limited to the obstacle opposed to the revictualling of Ibrahim Pacha's army on the one hand, and on the other to the mutual protection of a Turkish government in Candia. There is no reference to blockade nor to any other co-action whatever. Your Excellency will remark also that there is no question of any communication to be made at Alexandria; the powers do not acknowledge the independent existence of the Pacha; they address themselves solely to the Porte.

The project has been already communicated to Messrs. de Brunnow and Neumann.

M. de Brunnow has raised objections to the form, and insists on the return to the original plan of a convention between the powers themselves, who would subsequently act with the Porte in conformity with stipulated clauses.

It is needless to tell your Excellency, that having been consulted on this point by Lord Palmerston, I neglected nothing which I thought calculated to confirm him in his resolution, and that while maintaining all necessary reserve on the great object of the question, I recommended for adoption the form best suited to preserve its European character.

If I am correctly informed in other particulars, the dissatisfaction of M. de Brunnow is not confined to the mere form of the proposed convention; but up to this time, the manifestation of his discontent is restrained. M. de Neumann, if a credible report can be trusted, is less reserved, and freely exhibits his disappointment at the plan of the English

cabinet. Altogether, the two special envoys are evidently disconcerted by the turn which the negotiation confided to them has taken.

Lord Palmerston also invited my opinion as to the utility and convenience of inserting a complemental article, by which the ambassadors of the powers at Constantinople would be charged to superintend the execution of the convention. I thought it right to encourage this idea, which would permit and even require the continuance of men-of-war in the Sea of Marmara, under the orders of our resident representatives at the Turkish court.

I need not add that the point of departure of every opinion delivered by me during this conversation has been that of perfect ignorance of the intentions of the King's government, and that I have not uttered a word which Lord Palmerston could interpret as going beyond my own personal ideas. I must merely mention a remark made by his lordship when he finished reading his plan: "That he had drawn it up in such a manner as to render it easy for France to adopt it, and to unite herself to the common action of the other powers."

Before its official transmission to the King's government this plan may receive important modifications from Lord Palmerston himself, and from the British cabinet in council.

As to the council, I believe that the majority, if not the whole body, coincides with Lord Palmerston's ideas. The conversations I have held within the last few days with several of its members lead me to think that their opinion is formed. I neglected nothing in these interviews which might convey to each the true motives by which the policy of the King's government has been directed, and convince them of the sincerity of the desire by which it is animated, of maintaining, to the utmost possible extent, the most perfect understanding with its allies.

Accept, I pray you, &c. H. SEBASTIANI.

35. *Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.*

Paris, January 26th, 1840.

Monsieur le Comte,

I have received the despatch you have done me the honour to forward. The importance of its details has engaged the most serious attention of the King's government. You will understand that I do not yet explain myself fully on Lord Palmerston's communication. The confidential character of that communication, the basis of which, and even the mode of drawing up, were not definitively settled by the British cabinet, demand the less urgently on our part an immediate and official answer, inasmuch as in such a case the object can scarcely be separated from the form. Be that as it may, and without pausing on points of detail, which might require explanation, I do not hesitate to say, that in all that regards the mode of protection to be afforded to the Porte against an eventual advance of Ibrahim Pacha against Constantinople, the modifications proposed by Lord Palmerston to the plan of the cabinet of St. Petersbourg appear to me to embrace an important amelioration. The idea of introducing the Porte as a party to the treaty regulating this mode of protection, is especially a most happy concession, and highly advantageous in its bearing. I regret that I cannot equally approve, in Lord Palmerston's project, the part relating to the territorial arrangements to be settled between the Sultan and the Viceroy. We continue to believe that the minister undervalues the resources of Mehemet Ali, the energy of his character, and the moral impossibility of a man of that stamp accepting without resistance conditions which would take from him a considerable part of his material power, with the whole weight of opinion from which he draws his principal reliance. Rather than submit to them, I feel convinced he would expose himself to the greatest extremities, and that even if he suspended the march on Constantinople, he would

not hesitate to invade Mesopotamia, and to wrest from the Porte provinces the resources of which would enable him to meet the resolutions of the powers with the most determined resistance. Against such enterprises what would the coaction indicated by the new English plan avail? What could even the intervention of Russia effect, within the limits to which it is proposed that it should be restrained? Is it not evident, that having adopted that course, the powers would have no alternative but to recede before Mehemet Ali, or to revert to the only real mode of protecting the Porte, by authorizing the influence of Russia in its most extended sense? Unless determined to abandon the Sultan to his weakness, would they not be compelled to allow an Imperial army to traverse Asia Minor and Syria to drive back to Egypt the forces of the Viceroy? I do not think this extremity would be more agreeable to England than to France. In pointing out to you the insufficiency of the coercive measures proposed by the cabinet of London, I wish above all other points to impress upon you the amount of contradiction in the magnitude of the concessions demanded from Mehemet Ali and the weakness of the means proposed to extort them. Undoubtedly the cabinet of London persuades itself that the Pacha will yield to the first demonstration of the powers, and that being unable to sustain for any length of time the burdens of a *statu quo*, rendered more onerous by the sort of blockade we should establish on the coast of Syria, would hasten to relieve himself from it by accepting the proposed arrangement. I firmly believe this to be a mistake; and even admitting, which is scarcely probable, that Mehemet Ali would not laugh at the idea of plunging Europe into the most fearful complications, the prolongation of the actual *statu quo*, with its uncertainties and dangers, would be, at the least, the consequence of his passive resistance. It would be a strange miscalculation of the respective positions of the two parties to believe that this prolongation could be more disadvantageous to the Viceroy

than to the Sultan. In the state to which the Porte is at present reduced, she particularly requires to recover herself, so as to resume the degree of consistency and consolidation demanded by the general interest; as also to regain repose, security, and a sentiment of confidence in the future. Such advantages are infinitely more important to her than the immediate restitution of certain provinces, which she would find it extremely embarrassing to govern, and the sovereignty over which, under any circumstances, would be secured to her. But the Porte can only reap these advantages by a prompt reconciliation with Mehemet Ali, and to afford this reconciliation a reasonable chance of success, it should be founded on bases justly proportioned to the relative force and power of the contracting parties.

These are the reasons which induce us to look upon it as dangerous and impracticable to impose on Mehemet Ali the conditions enunciated in Lord Palmerston's communication. On our part there is neither obstinacy, blind predilection nor engagement of any description. Our motives are all drawn from the general interest, from the force of things as they exist, and from profound conviction. Let Lord Palmerston consider them as inspired by the most ardent desire for a perfect understanding, and for the establishment between our two governments of that identity of views and tendencies which would furnish the best guarantee for peace as well as for the interests of both countries.

It is unncessary to add that the King's government leaves entirely to your own judgment the selection of the time and mode that may appear to you the most suitable for urging with advantage the arguments I now suggest.

I have received your despatch of the 24th. The details it contains with allusion to the attitude of MM. de Brunnow and Neumann are important. I can readily understand the difficulties Lord Palmerston finds in drawing up his counter-project. I am too anxious to see means of reconcilia-

tion, between the causes really mixed up with the pacification of the East, spring from these very difficulties, not to entertain a certain degree of hope.

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86. *General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.*

London, January 28th, 1840.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I have just left Lord Palmerston. He has informed me that the Council, consulted by him on the question as to whether the projected convention should be concluded between the five powers only, or between the powers and the Porte, has decided unanimously in favour of the latter view, and that the Sultan ought to be admitted as a contracting party.

This resolution, the only one as yet definitively settled in the matter, being disposed of, the British cabinet seems necessarily to adjourn not only any conclusion but even debate on the negotiation commenced, and to postpone its resumption until sufficient time elapses for the arrival of a Turkish plenipotentiary. Notwithstanding your Excellency's justly founded impatience to see the solution of a question so full of difficulties and dangers, you will find that this delay, with the chance of reconciliation and action that it opens to us, with the new and increasing embarrassment it adds to the attitude and proceedings of the Austrian and Russian envoys, is not without advantage for the King's government, and that we may permit ourselves to read a success in every impediment opposed by the English ministry to the eagerness and activity of MM. de Brunnow and Neumann. Such is at least my own conviction, and until I receive fresh orders from your Excellency, by this I shall regulate my conduct and language.

You will also perceive with satisfaction the decision of the English cabinet to include the rights of the Porte, and the

stipulations concluded by her, within the circle of public European law.

Your Excellency, in addition, will recognize that, in spite of the daily fluctuations to which a negociation must of necessity submit, in which so many opposite and powerful interests are in presence and in competition (fluctuations, the returns and even the inconsistencies of which are reflected in my correspondence), no interest essential to us has yet been compromised, and no irrevocable position assumed.

On the territorial question, Lord Palmerston has just informed me that he would endeavour, according to his convictions, to obtain the utmost possible extent for Mehemet Ali, with a view of facilitating the acceptance, by France, of the bases of the projected arrangement.

Accept, &c.

H. SEBASTIANI.

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37. *Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.*

London, February 14th, 1840.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

. . . . . .

I was about to retire when Lord Palmerston forced me, if I may so say, to ask him whether anything new had occurred since his last conversation with General Sebastiani on the affairs of the East. "Nothing," he replied. "I have even for the moment suspended the drawing up of the protocol, of which I had requested General Sebastiani to apprize his government. I restrain the *eagerness* of the Russian negotiator, and since M. Guizot is soon expected in London, bearing undoubtedly the last and complete idea of the French cabinet, I think it much more desirable to wait his arrival before resuming the discussion." "Thus then," I resumed, "not only has nothing taken place, but nothing is preparing during the interval?" "No," replied Lord Palmerston,

"absolutely nothing." I smiled at the word *eagerness* applied by Lord Palmerston to the Russian negotiator, at first to show him that I did not confound what belongs to the personal part of the envoy with a pretended anxiety for the instructions of his court; and, secondly, because the protocol committed to the charge of the Baron de Brunnow, as an initiative, is repudiated by him in his confidential conversations, and I did not wish Lord Palmerston to suppose me ignorant of that circumstance. I added nothing to this short digression. It belonged neither to my instructions nor to my position to approach the question in its entirety; and I know from experience how essential it is to be cautious in fastening on those axioms, delivered on a first impression, which influence here more than anywhere else, and too often clog the future with difficulties. The ground is now clear; the negotiation is really suspended, and the King's new ambassador will enter on it with the secret of the weakness of his adversaries. This position is good, although still delicate. I should not like to have to reproach myself with a single word tending to modify it on the arrival of M. Guizot.

Baron de Brunnow replies to the questions addressed to him, on the subject of his departure, that he has received no counter-orders from his court, and that his instructions directed him to leave London for Darmstadt on the 20th of February; but he adds that the journey of the Imperial Grand Duke is delayed, and that this circumstance appears to him naturally to entail the postponement of his own. In fact, he assumes the air of preparing people's minds for the prolongation of his residence.

Accept, &c.

BOURQUENEY.

THE END.

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